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East-West Value Differences in the European Union and the Legacy of Communism

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By 2007, two successive waves of enlargement will have added ten or possibly – with the inclusion of Croatia – eleven former communist countries of Eastern Europe to the European Union. Although the combined population of all these countries barely exceeds that of the united Germany, they will have a rather more significant voting power in EU decision-making bodies (cf. Hix forthcoming).

There are many reasons to believe that significant differences in political orientations and underlying social values divide the previous 15 member states of the Union and the new Eastern and Central European members. Almost all the latter have a much lower level of economic development than the poorest of the fifteen pre-2004 members states, Portugal. Nearly all went through a very deep and painful recession in recent memory, i.e. in the early 1990s, while the rest of Europe – with the initial exception of Finland, which was also hard hit by the collapse of the Soviet economy – reached previously unprecedented levels of affluence. Moreover, the new Eastern members share the legacy of a unique - and rather long-lasting - social, economic and political experiment with communism. This too must have had at least some impact on popular attitudes.

Hence, the citizens of the new Eastern members are likely to display lasting and significant differences in value orientations from the citizens of the former EU-15. If so, then this will almost certainly have an impact on the policy-making process in the EU. Obviously, some shift in policy demands is to be expected in the EU citizenry from the addition of the new members, and the true degree and underlying cause of these shifts needs to be better understood. In addition, conflicts over some policy issues may generate a new East-West cleavage inside the Union, and it would be interesting to know in advance on what dimensions of human values such a cleavage is mostly likely to be anchored. Which East-West differences are relatively transient, which ones are merely a reflection of the differences in socio-economic development that may well shrink within the Union over the coming decades? Which value differences may be more long lasting? Surely, it would be interesting to learn the answers to these questions. Whatever the answers are, the East-West value differences, if they really exist, will significantly add to the complexity of coalition- and policy-making in Europe.

So far these are just speculations, of course, since little compelling evidence of such value differences exist (although see Inglehart's 1997 world map of human values, for instance). Nonetheless, the basic thrust of these speculations seems to be confirmed by the results of the 2004 elections to the European Parliament. The distribution of votes between parties belonging to the EP's different party groups was remarkably different in the new Eastern member states than in the EU-15 (see table 1). According to Hermann Schmitt's calculus, the Party of European Socialists and the Greens each received roughly seven percent less, while the Left Socialists three, and the Europe of Democracy and Diversity group 2.5 percent less (i.e. zero percent) of the vote in the East than in the EU-15 and Cyprus and Malta. In contrast, the European People's Party and the Europe of Nations group each received about four percent more of the vote in the eight new Eastern member states than the rest of the Union (see Schmitt 2004).

Some of these differences may be easily explained with reference to the Eastern member states recent entry in the Union and their relatively new party systems. For instance, parties that do not belong to any party group in the EP did much better in the East than in the rest of the Union. Similarly, the fact that that the biggest of the new member states - Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary - were governed, at the time of

the 2004 election, by centre of left governments that were badly hit by mid-term blues might go a long way to explain the differential electoral performance of the Party of European Socialists and the European People's Party in the East and the West. But, at the end of the day, the colour of these three governments on the polling day in 2004 is just a coincidence – all the three countries had a fair share of right-wing governments in the years before.

Yet, it is tempting to think that there may still be somewhat more lasting and fundamental differences between election results in the East and the West, which may derive from a shared legacy of communism in the East. This paper aims to make a few steps towards a better understanding of whether, in what respect, and to what extent this may be the case. The first, longer part of the paper deals with East-West value differences, which is then followed by a brief simulation exercise assessing their possible impact on European parliamentary election results.

1.1 Contrasts with previous studies

Given the amount of speculation surrounding the issue of East-West value differences, which became especially salient after 1989 (cf. Gerlich, Plasser and Ulram 1992; Jowitt 1992; Schöpflin 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1993, 1994; Sztompka 1996), the previous literature on East-West value differences and the role of communism in their making is surprisingly patchy. Most comparative survey studies carried out in Eastern Europe in the 1990s did not even involve comparisons with non-East European samples (cf. Barnes and Simon 1998; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Hayo 1997, 1999; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Miller, Reisinger, Hesli 199x, 1993; Miller, White and Heywood 1998; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; and Tóka 2000 for a comprehensive survey of these studies), notwithstanding the East-West comparative inferences only too frequently drawn from them (see e.g. Bardi and Schwartz 1996; Miguel and Berlund 1992; McIntosh et al. 1994; Mondak and Gearing 1998; Plasser and Pribersky 1996). Explicit East-West comparative studies often involved very small sets of countries (e.g. Dalton 1994; Kohn and Slomczynski 1990; Weil 1993), or global comparisons (Abramson and Inglehart 1995). Either way, the explanation of the specifically East-West differences within Europe could not advance very far.

The analyses of the studies that probably supplied the best fuel for such explorations often remained merely descriptive overviews of question-by-question differences across countries and the two halves of Europe (see Ester, Halman, and de Moor 1993; Times Mirror 1991). The more analytical studies typically focused either on overtly general values (e.g. materialist vs. post-materialist value orientations as in Inglehart 1997); or on attitudes towards the democratic system that may well be more strongly influenced by performance evaluations than by lasting value differences (Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999; Klingemann 1999; Tóka 1995); or on highly domain-specific indicators with little obvious implication for policy preferences (e.g. Hofstede 2001). Either way, they left many open questions about whether and what kind of lasting and relatively specific differences in political orientations may obtain between the East and the West of the European Union when it comes to practical political issues.

In this study, the focus will be on attitudes that, in a rather straightforward way, can lead to differences in policy preferences between Eastern and Western member states of the EU. Both the degree and the causes of these differences will receive attention. The analytically richest previous studies along these lines focused on a single value or

cleavage domain each (cf. Evans and Kelley 2002; Klingemann 1999; Klugel, Mason and Wegener 1995; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Meulemann 2004; Tomka and Zuhlener 1999). Instead, this paper will rather follow the footstep of Renwick and Tóka (1998), who studied East-West attitude differences along many relatively specific dimension in order to obtain a better understanding of what differences may be caused by differences in level of development (and other exogenous variables preceding communism), and what, if anything may be the specific result of communist legacies in Eastern Europe.

This paper also aims at contributing to our knowledge about how the composition of the European Parliament may be impacted by the Eastern enlargement, and hence Eastern Europe's communist (and other) legacies. Thus, the final part of the paper tries to assess the impact of East-West value differences on vote choices in the new member states. This part of the paper is not yet fully integrated into the present draft of the paper, but it should still give a clear idea about the findings emerging from the data.

1.2 Hypotheses about the impact of communism on values

The more plausible causal mechanism can be postulated between communist legacies and observed East-West differences, the more likely that the latter was caused by the first, rather than by some other factor that also differentiates the East from the West – such as level of economic development, or pre-communist history, or some consequences of communist legacies as they materialized in the course of the 1990s. Plausibility is highly subjective, though, and can itself be affected by the knowledge that certain propositions are apparently more in line with the given data than others. Besides, an imaginative social scientist could, with some effort, explain nearly any observations with nearly any independent variable.

This paper employs the simplest and safest method of assuring the readers that the hypotheses presented below were unaffected by the findings obtained. Namely, the theoretical expectations that are tested here are based on ideas spelt out by Renwick and Tóka (1998) well before the present analysis was conceived and the EVS 1999/2000 and ESS 2002 data used for their testing were collected. These hypotheses are all suggested by obvious defining features of communist regimes such as the dictatorial nature and their adherence to collective property, to bureaucratic – rather than market-driven – allocation of goods, income equality, and atheism.

"As regards the legacy of communist rule, we can identify four mechanisms through which it may have had an impact upon current attitudes: those of indoctrination, repression, change in social structure and the post-communist backlash.

Indoctrination was widespread in the communist countries, particularly in the fields of economic policy, egalitarianism and the role of women, leading us to expect more left-wing economic policy attitudes, more favourable attitudes to egalitarianism, and more acceptance of the role of women in the workplace than might otherwise have been the case. It would also be expected to lead to weaker religious beliefs and, because of the emphasis placed on industrial progress, to less concern for the environment.

Repression took place on several fronts. Public debate on many social issues was often suppressed, and the activities of the churches were severely curtailed. The lack of public debate could be expected to lead to slower attitude change over time, to a fossilisation of those traditional values not affected by indoctrination, and thus to a tendency towards conservatism. This needs, however, to be set against the effect of

suppressing the churches, which might be expected to weaken the role of traditional moral teachings over such matters as sexual norms and the place of women.

Radical *social change* was deliberately promoted in numerous spheres. For example, the employment of women was both boosted and celebrated, and education levels greatly increased in many communist countries. The greater employment of women could be expected to lead to increased acceptance of a role for women in the workplace, and raised education levels might be expected to have a broad range of liberalising effects.

Finally, it is important to remember that there has also been a substantial *backlash* against communist rule in all of the post-communist countries considered here. The backlash has tended to be strongest in those areas where the message or impact of communism was clearest - so we might expect it to promote inegalitarian views and right-wing attitudes towards economic policy. It may also lead to increasingly anti-authoritarian views on other issues.

Of course, the effects of these different mechanisms upon social attitudes may at times be contradictory. For example, when it comes to religious values, the effect of repressing religious teachings under communism must be weighed against the likely consequences of a backlash against such repression. And while a growth in religiosity after the collapse of communism might promote conservative attitudes towards marriage, these sit uneasily alongside some of the likely effects of social change and an anti-authoritarian backlash."

In a nutshell, the communist legacies argument leads us to expect that East Europeans show rather more left-wing, if you like, attitudes than would be expected on the basis of the level of development of their societies in some domains. These include gender equality and religion in particular, but, more generally, any domain where attitude change in this direction was explicitly promoted by the communist regimes with a wide range of policies as well as by propaganda.

In other value domains, like environmentalism or social liberalism, we may, however, expect rather less progressive views from them than a developmental theory of values would suggest from societies at a level of development comparable to the conditions in Eastern Europe.

On economic policy issues and redistribution, one might also expect that, with the possible exception of a period of anti-communist backlash in the early 1990s, public opinion in former communist countries is more left-wing – or, if you like statist and anti-individualistic - than their level of development may imply. Several aspects of these hypotheses, most clearly those regarding religiosity and support for high levels of government spending, were broadly supported by the previous analysis of ISSP data in Renwick and Tóka (1998) as well as other analyses published since (Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Meulemann 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Renwick and Tóka 1998; Tomka and Zulehner 1999).

1.3 Data on value differences and research design

The data used in the first part of the paper come mostly from the 1990 wave of the World Values Study and the 1999/2000 European Values Study. For the time being, only such questionnaire items are included in the analysis that were present in both studies. Then, the same analysis is replicated, to the extent that this is possible, with the 2002 European

Social Survey data that will provide the raw material for the simulation exercise regarding European Parliament elections.

The analysis covers six substantially different attitude dimensions in total: support for socialist economics, environmentalism, religiosity, moral permissiveness, attitudes towards traditional ideas about marriage and the role of women. The minimum and maximum values on the six corresponding attitude scales are set as 0 and 100, respectively. The measure for the Support for Environmentalist Ideas is based on a single item, which has the disadvantage that the observed cross-national variation on this scale may be unduly influenced by unknown differences in the connotation of this single questionnaire item in the different languages. In the case of the other attitude dimensions, this potential problem was reduced by creating an additive scale based on multiple items that, given their wording, seemed to tap relatively similar attitudes.

A serious shortcoming of the WVS/EVS and ESS data bears mentioning here: they feature no item that would allows an analysis of how nationalist feelings and their ethnic kin may differ between East and West. This introduces a serious shortcoming in the present analysis, since to many observers this dimension seems to cause striking differences between the two parts of Europe, which may also be responsible for the better showing of the Europe of Nations group in the new than the old member states. However, it would certainly not help our better understanding of the world if this omission would prevent us analyzing the data that is available regarding East-West differences.

Only those European countries are included in the analysis of the 1990 World Values Study and the 1999/2000 European Values Study data that both study covered. However, the analysis is not confined to EU-members and confirmed members-to-be like Bulgaria and Romania. Iceland, Russia and Belarus are also included in the analysis since they are relevant West and East European cases, respectively, for the assessment of the impact of communism. For reasons that are probably obvious already, the Eastern and Western provinces of Germany are treated as separate countries – after all, East Germany used to be a separate state with one of the most doctrinaire and oppressive communist regimes in Eastern Europe from the late 1940s up to late 1989. Northern Ireland, in its turn, was left out of the analysis because of small sample size. The weighted size of each national sample remaining in the analysis was set at 1000.

A number of different tests can be used to provide fresh answers regarding the impact of communist legacies using these data. First, if any special trait of the East European region has a truly significant and lasting impact on citizens' orientations, then we would expect much the same kind of East-West differences to have occurred in 1990 as ten years later.

Secondly, if level of development is the explanation for these differences, then we should be able to see that GDP per capita – as the most convenient indicator of developmental level – is related to cross-national attitude differences the same way across Eastern and Western European countries.

Third, if communist legacies have no effect of their own once level of development is controlled for, then a dummy variable standing for communist legacies must have no significant impact on values once GDP per capita is controlled for. Of course, attitudes need not be a perfect linear function of development for the latter to qualify as the true explanation. A slightly lesser dependence on attitudes on level of development in one region than the other would still be consistent with no separate effect of communist legacies. Yet, in such an eventuality a linear regression may mistakenly

suggest a significant effect of communism if the assumption of a strictly linear effect of development is built in the model. Therefore, a simple eyeballing of the relationship between these variables, albeit necessarily inconclusive and subjective, can be an essential addition to the regression analysis.

Fourth, one would expect that most differences between Eastern and Western Europe caused by level of development increased between the early and late 1990s, for the simple reason that the post-communist recession increased the developmental gap between the two regions. At the same time, the presence of communist legacies probably diminished over time – this is at least what we would expect on the basis of socialization theory and given the changes of ideological climate and socio-economic structures in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Belarus, where the recession was deepest and socio-economic and ideological change the smallest, can offer a particularly interesting test case for this over-time comparison.

Note, however, that in some instances East-West differences caused by the legacy of communism may have even increased over time. Suppose, for instance, that communist systems, partly through their explicit propaganda, and partly through the subtle and complex impact of sweeping socio-economic changes that they introduced, increased support for income equality and state intervention in the economy, while reduced trust in private business and market forces. However, in the early 1990s many East Europeans probably blamed the communist system for poor economic performance, while ten years later, following the controversial privatization of productive assets, the painful post-communist economic recession and so forth, they probably shifted back to the anti-capitalist attitudes for which the communist systems did create a cultural hotbed. Thus, the attitudinal differences created (or heightened) by the communist systems between East and West may have been either less, or more, or about equally visible in 1990 as a decade later.

Yet, for most of the time and in most attitude domains, socialization theory and the pattern of historical changes in the 1990s should suggest that the impact of communist legacies is vanishing. For the same reason, if economic development in the formative years of one's development had a bigger impact on East-West differences than communist legacies, then we would expect that in the 1990/2000 studies the East-West regional differences are even bigger in the youngest cohort. If, however, communist legacies are the most important explanation, then the youngest cohort should show the smallest regional difference in 2000. A cohort analysis of regional differences will thus provide a fifth tool of determining the roots of any East-West value differences that may emerge from the data.

Unfortunately, things are a bit too murky for a study like the present one to obtain unambiguous answers to the kind of complicated questions asked in this paper. For instance, there are many other factors besides level of development that may also show high colinearity with the presence of communist legacies across European countries and may, at the same time, offer plausible explanations for whatever East-West attitude difference we may observe. These other factors can include anything that preceded the emergence of communism – such as the different religious heritage of the different countries, or the relative size of their agricultural sector – as well as things like the post-communist recession, which can be considered path-dependent consequences, rather than part of communist legacies.

In other words, the biggest obstacle to controlling for the effect of such influences in our analysis is theoretical. Given our current knowledge about the determinants of value systems, we may not be able to develop very clear expectations about what attitudes are most likely to be affected by one or another factor from a potentially very long list of potential determinants that may matter.

In the presence of clear theoretical guidelines to model selection, a theory-blind comparison of East and West Germany can provide for a natural experiment that may be a more reliable test than multivariate statistical analyses of multiple countries. While this exercise does not offer a perfect control for all other possible influences but the presence of communist legacies, the two parts of Germany share many elements of pre- and post-communist history, which makes it easier to argue that the differences observed between them are indeed somehow related to communist legacies. Thus, the closer the size of regional differences within Germany are to the East-West differences between the former communist and non-communist parts of Europe, the more support the communist legacies hypothesis receives. Conversely, small differences between Germany compared to the East-West differences within Europe should suggest that the latter were probably caused by something else than communism per se.

The present version of this paper presents a preliminary empirical analysis, with virtually no individual level variables (like age and its interactions with the year of interview, see above) included in the analysis. Yet, the estimations are carried out at the individual, rather than at the country-level, and without weighting for the different population size of the countries included. For simplicity, all national data sets are pooled from the two waves of the study in the analysis. The estimated standard errors are not corrected for clustered sampling. All these technical weaknesses will, of course, need to be addressed in a later version of the paper.

The empirical analysis involves regressing individual respondents' scores on these six attitude scales on (A) the GDP per capita of their country in the year of the survey; (B) a dummy variable called REGION which distinguishes between post-communist Eastern Europe and Western Europe; (3) a second dummy variable distinguishing between the 1990 and 1999/2000 observations; (4) the interaction between the last two variables, which allows us to model whether East-West differences increased or decreased over time; and (5) religiosity. This last variable is the only individual-level variable included in the analysis, and the purpose of including it among the control variables is to see whether the effects of communist legacies on values can be exclusively attributed to cross-national differences in individual-level religiosity (which, in turn, may have been caused either by communism itself or may predate that regime).

1.4 Findings about value differences

An obvious difficulty encountered in this analysis is the strong correlation between GDP per capita and communist legacies. Graphs 1 to 6 give visual illustrations of the problem. Each of these graphs shows the relationship between GDP per capita and the mean values of the 54 national samples (i.e. each of 27 European countries observed twice) on one attitude scale used in the analysis. The horizontal axis of the graphs shows level of development, and the coloring of the individual bars indicates whether the bar shows the mean attitude score of Eastern or Western countries. Because of their level of economic development the former communist countries all crowd on the left-hand side of the graphs, while the West European countries on the right.

Yet, Graphs 1, 3, 4 and 6 – which are indeed the only charts that hint at some East-West differences - suggest that there is a way to tell apart the impact of communist legacies and level of development. In Graph 1, support for socialism seems to decrease with the level of economic development, and does so both across Eastern and Western countries. If we draw an imaginary straight regression line first across the Eastern and then across the Western cases, then the two lines would seem to run parallel with each other. However, at comparable levels of affluence we find higher support in Western than in Eastern countries. In other words, it seems that post-communist countries have less support for socialist economics than we would expect just on the basis of their level of economic development.

Similarly, Graph 3 suggests that religiosity declines with level of development in the East and to some extent, and somewhat non-linearly, maybe in contemporary Western Europe too (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2004), but citizens of former communist countries are generally less religious than we would expect on the basis of their countries' level of development. The same eyeballing of Graphs 4 and 6 seem to suggest that – paradoxically - both support for family values and moral permissiveness is higher in the East than we would expect on the basis of GDP.

Most of these ad hoc and subjective inferences from the visual inspection of graphs are confirmed by the statistical tests reported in Tables 2 to 7. All these tables report three parallel analyses in their three columns: one each for the 1990 and 1999/2000 data – pooled across countries - separately, and one for all data sets pooled together. The upper panel of these tables shows the fit of various models to the data, while the lower panel shows parameter estimates for Model 7, which also controls, where appropriate, for the possible effect of Religiosity.

An important feature of these regression analyses is that they, unlike the graphs, allow us to assess whether the East-West gap changed over time. This is done through the inclusion of a YEAR times EAST interaction among the independent variables in the model for which parameter estimates are presented.

The first startling finding is that support for left-wing economic policies generally drops with level of economic development, but former communist countries have a rather more right-wing opinion climate on these issues than Western Europe. In the course of the 1990s, Eastern values apparently shifted to the left significantly (see the positive impact of the YEAR*EAST interaction in Table 2), but this effect is not as large as the general negative effect of communist legacies. Hence, we see nothing of the expected indoctrination effect of communism. The backlash anticipated by our theory is visible, but appears to have a more lasting impact than anticipated.

Contrary to what we may have expected, GDP per capita appears to have a negative – albeit tiny – effect on support for environmentalist. In spite of this result, and entirely against our expectations too, former communist countries actually show stronger support for environmentalism – or at least they did so in the early 1990s - than would have been expected on the basis of their level of economic development. This again suggests that the backlash against communist policies – indiscriminate support for industrialization, in this case – was stronger than whatever opposite effect communism could have had. In the course of the 1990s, however, public opinion shifted away from Support for Environmentalist Ideas. The significant negative effect of YEAR suggests that this change also occurred in Western Europe, but the additional negative impact of

the YEAR*EAST interaction underlines that this shift was even more pronounced in recession-ridden Eastern Europe.

Similar findings are echoed by Table 6. Despite both propaganda and some effective policies – stemming mostly from the unlimited demand for labor in planned economies - to promote gender equality, the Eastern European countries fail to show the expected impact of communism in 1990. Yet, possibly following an initial backlash against communism, Eastern public opinion became more favorable towards women's emancipation. Indeed, in the 1999/2000 data we can already observe a positive effect of the EAST variable on support for women's liberation.

As we would have expected, both level of development and communism have a large negative effect on religiosity. Quite unexpectedly, however, in the course of the 1990s there seemed to be a net shift towards higher religiosity – relative to the increase of GDP per capita – in Europe: but, quite counter-intuitively, this shift occurred not in the East but the West (see the opposite effects of YEAR and YEAR*EAST in Table 4).

Regarding support for family values, women's liberation, and moral permissiveness, cross-national differences seem to be driven, to some extent at least, by the underlying differences in religiosity. This makes good sense and establishes the expectation that East European public opinion should be relatively liberal on these issue dimensions. Just as our argument about the conservative effect of communism on social values anticipated, the findings show that Eastern opinions were, at least in 1990, actually more conservative – at least with respect to family values and women's liberation - than we could expect on the basis of their relatively low religiosity. By 2000, however, Eastern publics became relatively more liberal along all three attitude dimensions. This, although not explicitly anticipated by Renwick and Tóka (1998), is perfectly in line with their theoretical argument about why – through the lack of free discourse - communism had a conservative impact on social attitudes. Logically, the free discourse conditions of the 1990s had to exercise a liberal push on Eastern values in the dimensions where communism fossiled traditional attitudes.

Before moving to the second part of the present analysis, a brief look is due at tables 8 to 12, which present a partial replication of the above analyses with the 2002 European Social Survey data. This survey used different attitude items, and did not feature any item that would seem to be a good measure of support for environmentalist ideas or women's liberation. However, more or less adequate equivalents of the other four attitude indices seen above could be constructed from the ESS data too. Since this replication is already paving our way towards simulating the impact of value differences on election outcomes, only EU-member states are included in this part of the analysis. However, Eastern and Western Germany are once again treated as if they were separate countries.

This analysis is simpler than the previous one to the extent that the ESS data is only available for one time point. Thus the YEAR variable and its interaction with EAST do not appear among the independent variables. The results are largely consistent with the picture that we saw above. Once again, it seems that the citizens of former communist countries are less religious, but on moral issues nevertheless more conservative than the citizens of the EU-15. The observed effects of economic development level and religiosity are also much the same in this analysis as before.

The only noteworthy difference from the previous findings is that here the Eastern countries seem to be less different from the EU-15 in terms of their Support for Socialist

Economics – though the difference is still statistically significant and the same direction as before, i.e. the publics of the new Eastern members tend to be less socialist than citizens of the EU-15. However, even this is consistent with the findings reported above. Those suggested that in the course of the 1990s the citizens of the former communist countries increasingly turned away from supporting capitalist market economies. A simple extrapolation of this trend might suggest that by 2002, the year when the ESS data was collected, the most economically advanced (and the most thoroughly reformed) of the former communist countries should show nearly as much support for socialist economics than the citizens of the EU-15. This is indeed what the ESS data show.

The present results about the East-West value differences are largely consistent not only across the EVS, WVS and ESS data sets, but also with Renwick and Tóka's (1998) own findings based on ISSP data from the first half of the 1990s. In light of the differences in question wording, time period, and the range of countries covered across these data sets and analyses, this is quite reassuring regarding the robustness of the above reported findings. But can the observed East-West value differences influence the composition of the European Parliament? The second part of the paper considers this issue.

2. An exploratory analysis of the impact of value differences on vote choices

There are at least two ways that value differences between member states can affect the composition of the European Parliament. On the one hand, they can influence the development of the party alternatives in the given countries, and hence the choice set from which MEPs are selected by the citizens. I understand this influence in an inclusive way, allowing for the possibility that actors' intuition about the values of the electorate shapes not only the supply side of electoral competition, but also the expectations about which of the existing party can count on more support, and the results of intra-party candidate selection processes.

On the other hand, as long as vote choices in a given country are affected by citizens' attitudes towards, let's say, moral permissiveness, the distribution of their votes among the party alternatives will be impacted by the distribution of moral permissiveness in the society: how many people are in various positions on this value dimension, and how moral permissiveness tends to coincide or be detached from other relevant values.

The first of these routes of influence seems extremely hard to model, and therefore I will not consider it here in any detail. However, I think that by modeling the impact of the second route we can actually improve our future ability to model the first route too. Once we know whether observed value differences themselves may make some party alternatives more or less attractive in Eastern Europe, we will be on safer grounds in guessing why party alternatives themselves develop they way they do.

The simulation procedure regarding the second route can be rather simple. Since I ignore the first route mentioned above, I will take the choice set faced by citizens as given. Thus, the input of the model is given by (A) data about the distribution of certain value orientations in different national electorates in Europe; and (B) estimated probabilities of support for the given parties among voters with particular constellations of values in the national electorate that actually chooses between those parties. The simulation consists in calculating the likely probabilities of support for the given – Hungarian, Polish, etc. - parties in every single European national electorate, assuming that Italian etc. voters with a given constellation values will be just as likely to support

one or the other Hungarian party as those Hungarian voters who hold exactly the same values as them.

Obviously, this is a highly contrafactual exercise, but it addresses a question that is of some interest: would Hungarian etc. election results be different if only certain values were distributed differently in the Hungarian electorate, let's say in the way they are in the electorates of the 15 older member states of the EU?

As we can see in Tables 2 to 7 in the fit statistics about Model 3, support for socialist economics, conventional family values, and moral permissiveness – and to a smaller extent support for gender equality – are the value dimensions where we can observe an overall difference in the central tendency of value orientations between East and West. On all these dimensions, the average citizen of the new Eastern member states tends to be more conservative than the average citizen of West European countries. In this part of the analysis it is irrelevant whether these value differences stem from level of development, or from communist legacies, or from some other reasons. What is interesting about them here is that they may make East Europeans support various parties at a different rate than they would if they had the same values as their West European counterparts. The analysis below aims to explore the possible size and likely direction of this influence on election outcomes in Eastern Europe.

In the lack of comparative survey data from 2004 with a good coverage of value orientations, the analysis relies on European Social Survey data from 2002. Unfortunately, this survey did not cover either the Baltic states and Slovakia, nor the countries likely to enter the Union in the second wave of Eastern enlargement. On the other hand, the ESS survey covered all 15 older member states. Thus, this analysis focuses on a comparison of Czech, Hungarian, Polish, East German and Slovenian data to the EU-15. Where several national samples are pooled in the analysis, each country is assigned a weight reflecting its actual population size, alongside with the ESS design weight of individual respondents.

Vote choice is measured here as vote in the last national election. Discriminant analysis is used to establish the relationship between vote choice and value orientations emerging within each national data set. The observed relationship between values and vote choices are then used to estimate the probability of support for each Hungarian etc. parties among other Europeans and Hungarian etc. non-voters, should they ever face the same choice set and relate their values to that choice set the same way as the Hungarians etc. voters do. In other, and somewhat simplified words, first we observe what proportion of Hungarian citizens with any given value profile supports each of the Hungarian parties. Then we calculate what percentage of all Spaniards, Italians, etc. would vote for these parties if they had to choose between them and a voter of any given value profile, independently of his or her nationality, would be equally likely to support any one of the Hungarian parties as a Hungarian citizen. Then, the only differences between the estimated support for a party among Hungarians, among other East Europeans, and among citizens of the old EU-15 will simply be the result of the underlying value differences, if any, between these three groups of EU citizens.

Table 13 to 16 present the results. The first column shows the observed distribution of voting support (i.e. percentage of recalled votes supposedly cast for the party in the given national electorate) for each Eastern party in the ESS data. The second column shows the simulated support for the same parties in the whole sample from the given country. Note that data only differ from those displayed in column one because

they includes simulated vote distributions among non-voters and respondents who failed to recall how they voted in the last election. These data in column 2 are the truly important baseline for our cross-national comparisons, since this is the level where we can make sensible cross-country comparisons on the question of interest without letting differential rates of turnout obscure the impact of the value differences. The third column shows the estimated distribution of voting support for the same parties in the EU-15 sample as a whole (again including non-voters and so forth), while giving each country a weight proportional to its actual population size.

The results are clearly mixed, which is probably the most important lesson to be emphasized. If Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Slovenes voted in an East German election, then they would give significantly more support for the CDU and less for the ex-communists than do the East Germans themselves. Albeit to a lesser extent and with an exception regarding the greens, the citizens of the EU-15 would deviate from the East Germans much the same way as the Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Slovenes combined (see table 12). It would thus appear that, quite confusingly, the difference is not so much between East and West, but rather the East Germans as such are different from both East and West.

A similar pattern appears in Tables 13 and 14. Facing the Czech and Hungarian party alternatives, both the rest of East Europeans and citizens of the EU-15 would give less support for the ex-communists and more to the local representative of the European People's Party, i.e. the Christian-conservative parties. To make the results even more puzzling, there is virtually no difference between columns 2, 3 and 4 in table 15 about Slovenia, while in Table 16 about Poland we see the exact opposite of the story observed in the tables about East Germany, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Namely, in Polish elections, both the rest of East Central Europeans and the citizens of the EU-15 would give dramatically more support for the ex-communists, and much less for the Christian conservative parties than the Poles themselves do.

It would thus seem that there are more differences between the new members than between the East and the West as such. To cut a long story short, much of the puzzling findings cited above have a simple and straightforward explanations. In Tables 12 to 15, the "other East Europeans" mean mostly the roughly 30 million, and by the standards of contemporary Europe extremely religious Polish adults who vastly outnumber the citizens of all other new East European member states. In fact, the total population of Poland is more than twice larger than that of East Germany, and a bit larger than that of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic states combined. In their turn, East Germany, the Czech Republic, and, to a lesser extent, Hungary too, are among the least religious countries in the European Union, while tiny Slovenia is closer to the average in this respect. Furthermore, party alignments in all these countries are relatively closely linked to a secular-religious divide.

Thus, the "other East Europeans" in Table 16 about Poland are mostly East Germans, Czechs and Hungarians, and we predict that given their much weaker religiosity in a Polish election they, like the West Europeans, would give much less support to the main secular party – the ex-communist SLD – and less to any of the Christian-conservative parties than the Poles do. Similarly, the "other East Europeans" in Tables 12 to 15 are mostly the Poles, and hence they – like the West Europeans - are expected to give less support to such distinctively secular parties as the ex-communist PDS, KSCM and MSZP and the Czech secular-conservative ODS.

What the second part of the analysis highlights most clearly is therefore the importance of the religious dimension for explaining both the heterogeneity of the East (and of the West too, which I did not deal with here), and for the understanding of the only really major difference between the simulated voting behavior of the EU-15 citizens and of the locals in the East, which occurs in the table on Poland. Put in the geographically broader context of the first part of the paper, this finding brings home an interesting paradox. On the one hand, postcommunist Europe is, by and large, significantly less religious than the West, and even more so if we also take into account its lower level of socio-economic development. On the other hand, one of the largest East European countries, Poland, is – like tiny Ireland in Western Europe – an outlier in terms of its high level of religiosity within Europe. Moreover, the eastward enlargement of the EU happens to include all the relatively religious countries in the former communist world – apart from Poland, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia would fall in this group -, but will not include Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine, where communist rule undermined the positions of organized religion much more comprehensively than in the countries that only came under communist rule after World War 2.

The net result of this is that despite the negative impact of communism on religiosity – which, as we saw, was probably the only effect of it on values that was in line, rather than against the intentions' of the regime -, the Eastern enlargement probably strengthens, rather than weakens the position of the Christian-conservative policies in the European Parliament. This is so partly because of the numeric dominance of the unusually religious Poles in the population of the new member states, and partly because of the – at least partly unintended - fossilation effect of communism on social values in Eastern Europe. It should be stressed again that where we should expect their political expression is probably less the distribution of seats among European party groups, but rather the socially somewhat more conservative profile that most MEPs from the new member states will probably display from their EU-15 counterparts – in whichever party group they should be a member of. At any rate, not the least because both the East and the West of the Union are so heterogeneous internally, the overall East-West differences that obtain as a result are likely to be rather minimal.

Conclusions

Overall, the findings show rather small differences between Eastern and Western European values. Except for its large negative effect on religiosity, the effects of communism appear to have been largely unintended, or even of the backlash-against-communism type. Paradoxically, since the biggest new member state (Poland) happens to be an outlier in terms of average religiosity, this biggest impact of communism made the population-weighted average of the new member states more alike the West European average than it would be otherwise. While the findings are consistent with the proposition that the lack of free public discourse under communism made East Europeans somewhat unexpectedly conservative on some social issues, it seems that this gap between Eastern and Western values rapidly started to erode following the arrival of civic liberties in Eastern Europe. The remaining value differences per se, except for Poland's outlier status in terms of religiosity, probably cause very little difference in elections results between old and new member states.

Again, it needs to be pointed out that several possibly relevant value dimensions could not be considered in the present analysis for lack of data: attitudes towards national

identity and the like stand out as an obvious example. However, as far as the values considered here are concerned, they do not seem to offer much of an explanation for the differences in EP-election outcomes between East and West. Therefore, the preliminary results of the analysis seem to support situational accounts of these differences, for instance in terms of party system age, or in the incumbency of left-wing parties. Less interesting as these results may sound than the usual hypotheses about how communism may have transformed the value systems of East Europeans, they nevertheless imply a probably more upbeat conclusion about the prospects of integrating the new members in the EU without generating new divisions and increasing the complexity of decision-making inside the Union.

Obviously, the results have implications for the current arguments about the possibility of Turkey joining the EU too. If communist regimes largely failed to transform human values the way they intended to, why would Islam be more successful in that? This question surely belongs to a different analysis than the present one, and there is nothing in the above presented analysis that would foreclose the validity of possible economic or political arguments against Turkish membership. Yet, the present findings, indirectly, raise a cautionary note regarding the often-heard cultural arguments against Turkish EU-accession.

Appendix 1: Data sets, cases, variables and scales used in the analysis of WVS/EVS data (see Tables 2 to 7 and Graphs 1 to 6)

The analysis relies on the integrated cross-national data sets from the second wave of the World Values Study included in the February 2000 public release by the ICPSR archive and the 2003 public release of the 1999/2000 European Values Study by the Zentralarchiv and Tilburg University. Non-European countries and countries that were not included in both of these waves of the WVS/EVS surveys were excluded from the analysis. Cases with missing values were excluded from the reported analysis listwise.

In the description below all variable names like v128 etc. follow the variable names appearing in the original World Values Study 1990 dataset. The variable names in the 1999/2000 European Values Study are different, but the wording of the questions and the response categories were the same, except for a minor difference in the case of the church attendance and changes in the coding of party preference, which for most of the time merely followed changes in the respective national party systems between 1990 and 1999/2000.

Independent variables:

Country dummies: one dummy variable each for every country but one included in the analysis, coded 1 for all respondents from the given country and zero otherwise.

East: A dummy variable coded 1 for Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

GDP: Gross domestic product (at purchasing power parity) per capita in one thousand 1995 USD in the year of the study, i.e. 1990 for the 1990 WVS data and 2000 for the 1999/2000 EVS data. Source: World Development Indicators (internet edition as of August 2004). Note that no 1990 data were available from the source for the Czech Republic and Slovenia, and these missing values were substituted with a subjective estimate that set the 1990 figure for these countries at 120 percent of the respective World Bank estimate for 1993. Similarly, since the source does not report East and West German GDP separately, the figures for the two parts of Germany were estimated from the figure reported for Germany as a whole in the given year, using the assumption that the difference in PPP GDP per capita between the two regions remained the same throughout the entire period and equal to the ratio between the 1989 PPP GPD per capita estimates provided by the 1990 CIA World Fact Book.

Year: A dummy variable coded 1 for all respondents to the 1999/2000 EVS study and zero otherwise.

Religiosity: see below.

Dependent variables:

Support for Socialist Economics: an additive scale calculated as v128 - v125 + v126 - v127, where the V_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the respective V_i variables. The scores on the final scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range. The question wording was as follows. "Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. V125. Incomes should be made more equal OR We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort. V126. Private ownership of business and industry should be increased OR Government ownership of business and industry should be increased. V127. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for OR People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. V128. Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas OR Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people." In the 1999/2000 the scale is altogether missing for Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, and Sweden. The sum of the original scores on the input variables was rescaled so that all observed values on the scale fall between 0 and 1.

Support for Environmentalist Ideas: this scale was calculated as v38* -1, with the scores on the resulting variable linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range. The question wording for v38 was as follows. "I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one I read out, can you tell me whether you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) disagree or (4) disagree strongly? (READ OUT EACH STATEMENT AND CODE AN ANSWER FOR EACH) V38. I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental damage."

Religiosity: an additive scale calculated as ((v135-1)/3 + (v181-1)/6 + (v182-1)/2 -3)*(-100)/3, where the V_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the respective V_i variables, and the linear transformations assure that all valid values on all three variables fall into the same (0 to 1) range, and the final scale has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum of 100. The question wording was as follows. "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it (1) a great deal of confidence, (2) quite a lot of confidence, (3) not very much confidence or (4) none at all? […] V135. Church(es)." "V181. Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? [CODING: (1) More than once a week, (2) once a week, (3) once a month, (4) only on special holidays, (5) once a year, (6) less often, (7) never practically never.] V182. Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are...(READ OUT) (1) … a religious person; (2) not a religious person; or (3) a convinced atheist?" Note that in the 1999/2000 European Values Study the church attendance scale was coded on an 8-point scale, and hence the above formula was altered so that the equivalent of v181-1 was divided by 7.

Support for Conventional Family Values: an additive scale calculated as v94 - v92 - v93, where the V_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the

respective V_i variables. The scores on the final scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range. The question wording was as follows. “V92. If someone says a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily, would you tend (1) to agree or (2) disagree? V93. Do you think that a woman (1) has to have children in order to be fulfilled or (2) is this not necessary? V94. Do you (1) agree or (2) disagree with the following statement? (READ OUT): "Marriage is an out-dated institution"?”

Support for Women’s Liberation: an additive scale calculated as v99 - v98 – v96, where the V_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the respective V_i variables. The scores on the final scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range. The question wording was as follows. “V96 If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent, but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?” “For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. V98. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. V99. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.” For V98 and V99 the responses were coded as (1) strongly agree, … (4) strongly disagree, and for V96 they were recoded as (1) approve (2.5) it depends (4) disapproves.

Moral Permissiveness: an additive scale calculated as v197 + v198 + v199 + v200 + v201, where the V_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the respective V_i variables. The scores on the final scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range. The question wording was as follows. “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. [READ OUT STATEMENTS. CODE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT ON A 1=NEVER JUSTIFIABLE … 10=ALWAYS JUSTIFIABLE SCALE.] […]V197. Homosexuality. V198. Prostitution. V199. Abortion. V200. Divorce. V201. Euthanasia - ending the life of the incurably sick.“

Appendix 2: Data sets and variables used in the analysis of the 2002 ESS data (see Tables 8 to 16)

The analysis relies on the integrated cross-national data sets from the first, 2002 wave of the European Social Survey. All data from non-EU states - Israel, Norway, Switzerland – covered by the ESS data are excluded from the analysis. The data are weighted by the product of the population proportional and design weights provided with the data set. Missing values on the value variables were replaced with the weighted mean value of the given variable in the given country. The data were subjected to a discriminant analysis as described in the main text, with the following variables included in the analysis. The variable names B14, B43, etc. below refer to the numbering of the questions in the ESS1 main questionnaire.

Support for Socialist Economics: an additive scale calculated as ((B43-1)/4 + (5 – B44)/4 + (5 – B45)/4) * 100/3, where the B_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the respective B_i variables. The scores on the final scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range. The question wording was as follows. B43: ”[Do you agree or disagree that] The less that government intervenes in the economy, the better it is for [country]?” B44: ”[Do you agree or disagree that] The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels?” B45: ”[Do you agree or disagree that] Employees need strong trade unions to protect their working conditions and wages?” Responses to all three items were originally recorded on a 5-point agree-disagree scale. Missing values were substituted here with the sample mean.

Religiosity: an additive scale calculated as ((C13/10) + (7 – C14)/6) * 100/2, where the C_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the respective C_i variables, and the linear transformations assure that all valid values on all three variables fall into the same (0 to 1) range, and the final scale has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum of 100. The question wording was as follows. C13: ”Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?” (10-point scale from ”not at all religious” to “very religious”.) Missing values were substituted with weighted sample mean. C14: “Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?” (7-point scale from ”not at all religious” to “very religious”.) Missing values were substituted with weighted sample mean.

Support for Conventional Family Values: an 0-100 scale calculated as 100 * (B46-1)/4. The question wording was as follows: B46: ”[Do you agree or disagree that] Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish?” The responses were originally recorded on a 5-point agree-disagree scale. Missing values were substituted here with the weighted sample mean.

Moral Permissiveness: an 0-100 scale calculated as 100 * (B47-1)/4. The question wording was as follows. B47: ”[Do you agree or disagree that] Whatever the circumstances, the law should always be obeyed?” The responses were originally recorded on a 5-point agree-disagree scale. Missing values were substituted here with the weighted sample mean.

Table 1: Percentage distribution of the popular vote among members of the different party groups represented in the European Parliament

% of popular vote won by members of different party groups by region	EPP	PES	Lib	Green	Left	EDD	EoN	non-aligned
EU 15 + Cyprus and Malta	36,3	27,5	8,7	7,4	6,8	2,5	3,7	7,1
8 post-communist member countries	40,4	20,1	8,2	0,7	3,7	0,0	7,4	19,5
EU 25	36,8	26,8	8,7	6,8	6,5	2,2	4,0	8,2

Row percentages, calculated by Hermann Schmitt (University of Mannheim, Germany), on the basis of the official results by excluding the votes for unrepressented parties from the calculation of the total.

Graph 1: Support for socialist economics by communist legacies and level of economic development in Europe, 1990-2000



Note: The graph displays mean values of the Support for Socialist Economics scale by GDP per capita and region. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the scale). For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Graph 2: Support for Environmentalist Ideas by communist legacies and level of economic development in Europe, 1990-2000



Note: The graph displays mean values of the given attitude scale by GDP per capita and region. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the scale). For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Graph 3: Religiosity among citizens by communist legacies and level of economic development in Europe, 1990-2000



Note: The graph displays mean values of the given attitude scale by GDP per capita and region. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the scale). For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Graph 4: Support for conventional family values by communist legacies and level of economic development in Europe, 1990-2000



Note: The graph displays mean values of the given attitude scale by GDP per capita and region. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the scale). For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Graph 5: Support for women's liberation by communist legacies and level of economic development in Europe, 1990-2000



Note: The graph displays mean values of the given attitude scale by GDP per capita and region. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the scale). For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Graph 6: Support for moral permissiveness by communist legacies and level of economic development in Europe, 1990-2000



Note: The graph displays mean values of the given attitude scale by GDP per capita and region. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the scale). For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 2: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Socialist Economics

Year:	1990	1999/2000	Both years		
Model fit statistics (R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables					
Model 1: country dummies only	.102	.043	.044		
Model 2: GDP only	.031	.016	.001		
Model 3: EAST only	.063	.009	.012		
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.069	.024	.030		
Model 5: GDP, EAST, YEAR	.069	.024	.040		
Model 6: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.069	.024	.049	
Model 6x: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.060	.025	.041	
Model 7: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR, RELIGIOSITY			.060	.025	.041
*Standardized parameter estimates for model 7 (**: p<.01, *: p<.05)*					
GDP	-.15**	-.42**	-.23**		
EAST	-.36**	-.30**	-.36**		
YEAR	-	-	-.01		
EAST*YEAR	-	-	.16**		
RELIGIOSITY	-.01	.03**	.00		

Note: The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the given scale). The YEAR and EAST*YEAR variables are, of course, irrelevant when data are not pooled across years. Note that Model 6x and Model 6 are, however, always identical but the first is estimated with fewer cases because of missing values on RELIGIOSITY. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 3: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Environmentalist Ideas

Year:	1990	1999/2000	Both years	
Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables				
Model 1: country dummies only	.050	.080	.051	
Model 2: GDP only	.003	.001	.000	
Model 3: EAST only	.003	.002	.000	
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.003	.003	.003	
Model 5: GDP, EAST, YEAR	.003	.003	.024	
Model 6: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.003	.003	.027
Model 6x: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.003	.003	.025
Model 7: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR, RELIGIOSITY			.003	.003 .025
*Standardized parameter estimates for model 7 (**: p<.01, *: p<.05)*				
GDP	-.03*	-.06**	-.05**	
EAST	.02	-.10**	.02*	
YEAR	-	-	-.10**	
EAST*YEAR	-	-	-.10**	
RELIGIOSITY	-.02**	.01*	-.00	

Note: The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the given scale). The YEAR and EAST*YEAR variables are, of course, irrelevant when data are not pooled across years. Note that Model 6x and Model 6 are, however, always identical but the first is estimated with fewer cases because of missing values on RELIGIOSITY. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 4: Regression analyses of the determinants of Religiosity

Year:	1990	1999/2000	Both years	
Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables				
Model 1: country dummies only	.171	.175	.158	
Model 2: GDP only	.004	.005	.004	
Model 3: EAST only	.000	.000	.000	
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.023	.017	.016	
Model 5: GDP, EAST, YEAR	.023	.017	.019	
Model 6: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.023	.017	.020
*Standardized parameter estimates for model 6 (**: p<.01, *: p<.05)*				
GDP	-.28**	-.31**	-.30**	
EAST	-.25**	-.26**	-.23**	
YEAR	-	-	.09**	
EAST*YEAR	-	-	-.06**	

Note: The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the given scale). For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 5: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Conventional Family Values

Year:	1990	1999/2000	Both years	
Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables				
Model 1: country dummies only	.235	.196	.200	
Model 2: GDP only	.126	.112	.125	
Model 3: EAST only	.157	.101	.122	
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.158	.113	.133	
Model 5: GDP, EAST, YEAR	.158	.113	.146	
Model 6: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.158	.113	.148
Model 6x: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.139	.115	.134
Model 7: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR, RELIGIOSITY			.184	.163 .148
*Standardized parameter estimates for model 7 (**: p<.01, *: p<.05)*				
GDP	.02	-.19**	-.10**	
EAST	.39**	.14**	.29**	
YEAR	-	-	-.09**	
EAST*YEAR	-	-	-.05**	
RELIGIOSITY	.22**	.22**	.22**	

Note: The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the given scale). The YEAR and EAST*YEAR variables are, of course, irrelevant when data are not pooled across years. Note that Model 6x and Model 6 are, however, always identical but the first is estimated with fewer cases because of missing values on RELIGIOSITY. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 6: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Women's Liberation

Year:	1990	1999/2000	Both years		
Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables					
Model 1: country dummies only	.088	.063	.039		
Model 2: GDP only	.014	.001	.004		
Model 3: EAST only	.017	.001	.007		
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.017	.002	.007		
Model 5: GDP, EAST, YEAR	.017	.002	.012		
Model 6: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.017	.002	.016	
Model 6x: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.016	.002	.017	
Model 7: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR, RELIGIOSITY			.049	.003	.023
*Standardized parameter estimates for model 7 (**: p<.01, *: p<.05)*					
GDP	-.00	.10**	.04**		
EAST	-.14**	.07**	-.11**		
YEAR	-	-	-.15**		
EAST*YEAR	-	-	.12**		
RELIGIOSITY	-.18**	.03**	-.08**		

Note: The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the given scale). The YEAR and EAST*YEAR variables are, of course, irrelevant when data are not pooled across years. Note that Model 6x and Model 6 are, however, always identical but the first is estimated with fewer cases because of missing values on RELIGIOSITY. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 7: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Moral Permissiveness

Year:	1990	1999/2000	Both years		
Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables					
Model 1: country dummies only	.153	.088	.121		
Model 2: GDP only	.069	.012	.046		
Model 3: EAST only	.038	.005	.021		
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.073	.017	.049		
Model 5: GDP, EAST, YEAR	.073	.017	.052		
Model 6: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.073	.017	.063	
Model 6x: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.077	.016	.060	
Model 7: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR, RELIGIOSITY			.229	.185	.218
Model 8: country dummies, YEAR, EAST*YEAR, RELIGIOSITY			.288	.219	.263
*Standardized parameter estimates for model 7 (**: p<.01, *: p<.05)*					
GDP	.28**	.13**	.22**		
EAST	.04**	.00	-.03**		
YEAR	-	-	.00		
EAST*YEAR	-	-	.11**		
RELIGIOSITY	-.39**	-.42**	-.40**		

Note: The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the given scale). The YEAR and EAST*YEAR variables are, of course, irrelevant when data are not pooled across years. Note that Model 6x and Model 6 are, however, always identical but the first is estimated with fewer cases because of missing values on RELIGIOSITY. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 8: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Socialist Economics (ESS version)

Year:	2002
Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables	
Model 1: country dummies only	.094
Model 2: GDP only	.004
Model 3: EAST only	.000
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.005
Model 7x: GDP, EAST, and RELIGIOSITY	.008
*Standardized parameter estimates for model 7x (**: p<.01, *: p<.05)*	
GDP	-.080**
EAST	-.030**
RELIGIOSITY	.056**

Note: The source of the data are wave 1 of the European Social Survey. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000. Since the ESS data are only available for a single point in time, the YEAR variable does not enter this analysis and hence Models 5 and 6, as depicted in Tables 1 to 6, cannot be distinguished from Model 4. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 9: Regression analyses of the determinants of Religiosity (ESS version)

Year:	2002
Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables	
Model 1: country dummies only	.196
Model 2: GDP only	.004
Model 3: EAST only	.004
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.018
*Standardized parameter estimates for model 7x (**: p<.01, *: p<.05)*	
GDP	-.147**
EAST	-.146**

Note: The source of the data are wave 1 of the European Social Survey. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000. Since the ESS data are only available for a single point in time, the YEAR variable does not enter this analysis and hence Models 5 and 6, as depicted in Tables 1 to 6, cannot be distinguished from Model 4. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 10: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Conventional Family Values (ESS version)

Year:	2002
Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables	
Model 1: country dummies only	.091
Model 2: GDP only	.038
Model 3: EAST only	.042
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.051
Model 7x: GDP, EAST, and RELIGIOSITY	.102
*Standardized parameter estimates for model 7x (**: p<.01, *: p<.05)*	
GDP	-.083**
EAST	.172**
RELIGIOSITY	.227**

Note: The source of the data are wave 1 of the European Social Survey. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000. Since the ESS data are only available for a single point in time, the YEAR variable does not enter this analysis and hence Models 5 and 6, as depicted in Tables 1 to 6, cannot be distinguished from Model 4. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 11: Regression analyses of the determinants of Moral Permissiveness (ESS version)

Year:	2002
Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables	
Model 1: country dummies only	.077
Model 2: GDP only	.008
Model 3: EAST only	.019
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.019
Model 7x: GDP, EAST, and RELIGIOSITY	.029
*Standardized parameter estimates for model 7x (**: p<.01, *: p<.05)*	
GDP	-.002
EAST	-.145**
RELIGIOSITY	-.103**

Note: The source of the data are wave 1 of the European Social Survey. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000. Since the ESS data are only available for a single point in time, the YEAR variable does not enter this analysis and hence Models 5 and 6, as depicted in Tables 1 to 6, cannot be distinguished from Model 4. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 12: Observed and simulated election results under the East German party system

	Recalled votes	Simulated votes in:		
	in East Germany	East Germany	New members	EU-15 (minus East Germany)
SPD (social democratic)	39	39	39	38
CDU (conservative)	28	28	38	31
Bündnis '90/Die Grünen (green)	10	10	8	13
FDP (liberal)	6	6	4	5
PDS (ex-communist)	15	15	9	12
Other parties	2	2	2	1

Notes: for explanations see the main text. Data source: 2002 European Social Survey.

Table 13: Observed and simulated election results under the Czech party system

	Recalled votes in Czech Republic	Simulated votes in: Czech Republic	other new members	EU-15
CSSD (social democratic)	38	39	40	39
Nezavisli (unaffiliated)	3	3	4	4
ODS (conservative)	28	27	23	23
KSCM (ex-communist)	10	11	10	8
Coalition (conservative & liberal)	16	15	18	19
other parties	6	6	6	6

Notes: for explanations see the main text. Data source: 2002 European Social Survey.

Table 14: Observed and simulated election results under the Hungarian party system

	Recalled votes	Simulated votes in:		
	in Hungary	Hungary	other new members	EU-15
Fidesz-MPP-MDF (conservative)	41	40	44	43
MSZP (social democratic, ex-communist)	51	51	45	45
SZDSZ (liberal)	4	4	6	6
other parties	5	5	5	5

Notes: for explanations see the main text. Data source: 2002 European Social Survey.

Table 15: Observed and simulated election results under the Slovenian party system

	Recalled votes	Simulated votes in:		
	in Slovenia	Slovenia	other new members	EU-15
DESUS (pensioners party)	3	3	3	3
LDS (liberal)	49	49	50	51
SLS (conservative)	13	13	11	10
SNS (conservative)	3	3	3	3
SDS (conservative)	14	14	12	13
NS (Christian Democratic)	7	7	7	6
ZLSD (social democratic)	8	8	10	9
SMS (?)	3	4	3	6

Notes: for explanations see the main text. Data source: 2002 European Social Survey.

Table 16: Observed and simulated election results under the Polish party system

	Recalled votes	Simulated votes in:		
	in Poland	Poland	other new members	EU-15
SLD-UD (social democratic, ex-communist)	48	47	68	62
AWS (conservative)	9	8	3	4
UW (liberal)	6	6	5	7
Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (radical agrarian populist)	9	10	4	5
PS (conservative)	5	5	3	3
PSL (agrarian, conservative)	12	12	6	7
PO (conservative, right-liberal)	8	7	10	10
LPP (Christian)	5	5	1	2

Notes: for explanations see the main text. Data source: 2002 European Social Survey.

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