Geographical Metanarratives in East-Central Europe: Neo-Turanism in Hungary

Emel Akçalı and Umut Korkut[1]

Abstract: Two EU-based social scientists investigate the geographical metanarrative of Neo-Turanism as articulated by the recently ascendant far-right party Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary), which differs from most European far-right movements but shares some elements of the anti-Western orientation with Eurasianism and Pan-Slavism. The authors trace Neo-Turanism's origin to a historical ideology (Turanism) that aspires to terminate Hungary's alliance with the Euro-Atlantic community and instead form a cultural, political, and economic alliance with the Uralo-Altaic peoples (i.e., Turks of Turkey, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, Tatars, the aboriginal tribes of Siberia, and even Mongols, Manchus, Koreans, and Japanese). After examining the development of Turanism during the 18th to 20th centuries, they draw on concentrated fieldwork and interviews in 2012 to focus on its revival (Neo-Turanism) in post-communist Hungary. Due attention is paid to the revival within the political platform articulated by Jobbik as well as in the everyday political activities of many of the country's inhabitants and social groupings in the context of Europeanization and globalization. *Journal of Economic Literature*, Classification Numbers: F020, F590, Z000. 1 figure, 1 table, 79 references. Key words: Hungary, Jobbik, Turanism, Neo-Turanism, Magyars, Jews, Roma, Fidesz, geopolitical metanarratives, far right party, everyday geopolitics, anti-Semitism, Finno-Ugrian, Ural-Altaic, Treaty of Trianon.

INTRODUCTION

Far right populism in Europe is occurring within the context of European integration and globalization, the most significant manifestations of which are the expansion and deepening of market relations. Individuals during such times of profound transformation and economic restructuring of their societies consciously assess their options and also engage in effective construction and re-construction of their identities (e.g., see Overbeek, 2002; Ruane and Todd, 2003; Todd, 2005, pp. 452–453). The more pronounced the pressures experienced by people confronting change, particularly young people reacting to a more competitive employment market, the stronger the feelings of disorientation and dissatisfaction. Disoriented, disaffected people, in turn, are less critical in their perception of history and are more prone to mythologize the past (e.g., see Ptaszyńska et al., 2010, p. 18). This pattern is particularly relevant to the present psychological and socio-economic mindset of Hungarians, who

prior to the demise of Communism in 1989 were a part of a different economic and political system.[2]

More specifically, Hungarian scholars attribute the re-emergence and popularity of the far right in their country to the fact that the creation of democratic institutions and a market economy after 1989 was not accompanied by a redistribution of economic and cultural power (Tamás, 2012).[3] Instead, "members of the former elite converted their pre-1989 political influence into economic and cultural capital in order to retain their privileged positions in many crucial fields" (Egedy, 2009, p. 43). As Hungary's neighbors have surged forward, it has been suggested that Hungarian self-confidence has been greatly diminished, with one observer (Jordan, 2010, p. 102) noting that "… Slovaks …, to whom Hungarians have long been condescending, have adopted the Euro and are prospering, buying homes in cheap Austrian and Hungarian villages and turning them into Slovak suburbs." Jordan calls attention to the "… increasing number of Hungarians, stirred by hate speech, [who] are fed up with what they see as a flood of broken promises, corruption and incompetence by their mainstream left and right, [seeing] themselves betrayed by Brussels, the World Bank and the IMF [and] even … by capitalism and democracy" (ibid.) "For these Hungarians," he continues "[the political party] Jobbik alone stands untainted. The party rails against the establishment and has identified a host of scapegoats—anyone it deems harmful to Hungarian interests, ranging from multinational corporations and foreign investors (with an obsessive focus on Israeli businesses) to neighbouring states that abuse their large ethnic-Hungarian [Magyar] minorities (ibid.)

Not unlike in Russia with its revival of pan-Slavic and Eurasianist worldviews (see Laruelle, 2012 and Suslov, 2012 in this issue), we seek to show in this paper that the contemporary context of rapid change, hardship, introspection, and disillusionment in contemporary Hungary has led to the resurgence of an old geopolitical metanarrative—in this case Turanism—which embraces Hungary's affinities with Turkic peoples to the east.[4] However, in Hungary, unlike in Russia, the mechanism by which this old metanarrative has been re-introduced (as Neo-Turanism) after one-half century of dormancy during the communist period came to the fore through the platform of a right-wing political party, Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary).

Our paper draws on fieldwork conducted by the authors in Budapest from January through May 2012, which included in-person interviews with Hungarian scholars and politicians. It also is based on observations of both virtual and actual sites of what we consider to be the "performance of Turanism," as well as on archival sources about its historical development. Starting with relevant coverage of the right-wing Movement for a Better Hungary, we attempt in the following sections to probe the resonance of Turanism in the contemporary Hungarian society at the everyday level by examining its historical development and investigating how everyday social relations, beliefs, insecurities, rituals, and elite geopolitics reinforce one another to help forge a rather powerful metanarrative. We then contextualize the historical legacy of Turanism in Hungary for a better portrayal of its anti-establishment appeal and the alternatives that the Turanist ideology offers the Hungarian far right and its

---

[2]Hungarian difficulties with democratization and Europeanization are discussed in greater detail by one of the authors of this paper (Korkut, 2012).

[3]It should be noted, however, that such economic indicators as unemployment do not differ much from the Euro zone average, with Hungary's 10.9 percent only marginally above the Euro zone's 10.2 percent in 2011 (Eurostat, 2012).

[4]Affinities with Turkic peoples are historically linked to the first Magyars, who, originating east of the Urals, established a western outpost in the region corresponding with present-day Hungary (which separated the Northern Slavs from the Southern) after crossing the Carpathians in 895–896 A.D. (e.g., see Helmreich, 1956).

followers. Lastly, we investigate Turanism in the arena of party politics and society more broadly to depict the ways in which the vision attempts to enter the mainstream and become more broadly accepted.

THE MOVEMENT FOR A BETTER HUNGARY

The views of extreme right political parties have become increasingly prominent in Europe for a number of reasons. First, they appeal to the aversion of many ordinary citizens to cultural, religious, racial, or ethnic diversity. They essentialize notions of culture and ethnic origins in order to mobilize people against such alleged threats as minorities, immigrants, and cosmopolitan liberal elites. These parties offer "national reinvigoration and cultural reinforcement as remedies against the nation's newly identified enemies" (Gingrich and Banks, 2006, p. 17) and promote scapegoating in reference to various "national" vis-à-vis "nonnational" communities. They are overtly anti-globalist and anti-European inasmuch as they interpret globalization and Europeanization as processes of disempowerment for nations and nation-states. In addition, the far right offers masculine and patriarchal reassurance against socio-economic challenges by calling for a return to order, in circumstances wherein economic liberalization threatens a largely male, low-skilled workforce (ibid., p. 16). Finally, in support of its narratives, the far right often instrumentalizes history in a defensive manner against those alleged enemies of the "nation," plays the victimization card when necessary, and regenerates or mythologizes a "glorious past" (Ptaszyńska et al., 2010, p. 18).

Jobbik as a Far Right Party

The above characterization of the extreme right in Europe finds stark empirical evidence in the case of the *Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom* (Movement for a Better Hungary) of Hungary. Jobbik won three seats in the 2009 European Parliament elections, and the 2010 national election elevated Jobbik to third place with 47 seats in the Hungarian Parliament (garnering 16.7 percent of the votes cast; see Table 1). Currently, it holds 45 seats in the Hungarian Parliament, and according to a poll in late July 2012, Jobbik was supported by 22 percent of likely voters (if general elections were held at that time), even though receiving only 10 percent support in the entire sample (MTI, 2012). Yet, the number of seats held by the party and votes that it commands does not give an accurate account of the strength of the political views that Jobbik represents. In order to understand these views, one needs to explore the origins of the party in some detail.

The origins of Jobbik date back to MIÉP (The Hungarian Justice and Life Party), which set the tone of extreme-right discourse in Hungary as a party of the populist radical intelligentsia after its founding in 1993. It was established after its founder, István Csurka, was ousted from MDF—the main populist right wing party during Hungary's transition from socialism (Bernard, 2007), which is now defunct. While Csurka and MIÉP have been notable elements of Hungarian politics since that time, the party had no representation in Parliament from 2002 to 2010 (Table 1). Outside of parliamentary politics, however, extreme nationalist and far right opinions were articulated vociferously, especially among some young radical intelligentsia. These radicals founded Jobbik in 1999 at Budapest's Eötvös Loránd University.[5] Despite its roots in the intelligentsia, rather than following the elitist traditions of other ideological

---

[5]Although MIÉP's extreme right discourse influenced the early mindset of Jobbik's elite, the two parties never shared a common leadership or merged, and MIÉP continued to run in elections independently until 2010, becoming defunct after that year (MIÉP's founder, Csurka, died in 2012).

Table 1. Number of Votes and Seats Secured by MIÉP and Jobbik in National Parliamentary Elections, 1994–2010

Year of election	Party	Number of party list votes	Percentage of party list votes	Number of total seats	Role in parliament
1994	MIÉP	85,734	1.6	—	Failed to enter[c]
1998	MIÉP	248,901[a]	5.55[a]	14	In opposition
2002	MIÉP	245,326	4.4	—	Failed to enter[c]
2006	MIÉP + Jobbik	119,007	2.2	—	Failed to enter [c]
2010	Jobbik + MIÉP	856,722[b]	16.67[b]	47	In opposition

[a]Received 28,806 votes in second round of voting (0.6 percent of total).
[b]Of which 1,286 votes (0.03 percent) were cast for MIÉP; Jobbik received 141,323 votes (12.26 percent of total) in the second round.
[c]Below the 5 percent threshold.
Source: Compiled by authors from Elections Resources, n.d.

streams in Hungary (especially that of liberals), Jobbik concentrated on life in the countryside as its major focus.[6] Its decentralized political style has proven increasingly popular among young voters over the years (Ungár, 2012, p. 12).

Jobbik appears to have gathered strength as a contending party particularly in counties of Hungary where there is a significant Roma population (Index, 2009). In this regard, Jobbik's 2010 electoral manifesto is quite telling: under a section entitled "Gypsy Issues," Jobbik alerted the general public that "the coexistence and cohesion of Magyar and Gypsy was one of the severest problems facing Hungarian society" (Jobbik Foreign Affairs Committee, 2010, p.11). In effect, Jobbik called for strengthening security mechanisms beyond the established police force by forming a dedicated rural police service to combat so-called "gypsy crime." This stance emanates from Jobbik's belief that "certain specific criminological phenomena are predominantly and overwhelmingly associated with this [Roma] minority, and that as a result such phenomena require the application of fitting and appropriate remedies" (ibid.). As Kulinska (2010, p. 54) persuasively argued, such a radical narrative is open to extremely dangerous interpretations, paving the way to "appropriate remedies" that could include the policing of the Roma minority through terror. Indeed, Jobbik propaganda implicitly triggered such measures through the actions of paramilitary groups loosely affiliated with the party, which have carried out self-ascribed roles in providing for law and order (Korkut, 2012, pp. 188–190).

Furthermore, Jobbik inherited an acute anti-Semitism from MIÉP, even if its officials have been careful to dismiss any direct links to neo-Nazism.[7] Both in the background (and

---

[6]It also established a presence through social media and a few conspicuous Internet sites (kuruc.info and barikad.hu) to enhance its reach (Havas, 2009).

[7]Although a relatively insignificant percentage (<0.5) of Hungary's total population (48,600 of the country's total population of 9,976,000 in 2010 [U.S. Central Intelligence, 2010]), Hungarian Jews are singled out as villains by Jobbik's expanding propaganda and are exposed to rising Jobbik-inspired excesses such as Holocaust-memorial desecrations, mounting pressures to rehabilitate the country's World War II leadership (instrumental in the deportation of 430,000 Jews to Nazi death camps), or revival of accusations known as blood libel. According to a 2011 survey by the American Anti-Defamation League, more than 60 percent of Hungarians expressed agreement with [insulting] anti-Semitic stereotypes (Hungary, 2012; Judaism, 2012).

sometimes at the forefront) of right-wing criticism of globalism in Hungary, there is an element of reflection on the world economic system as merely serving the needs of Jewish capital. As absurd as it may sound, Jobbik's propagandists even refer to "a master plan" to reduce the number of Hungarians from about 10 million to 6 million in order to make room for (some 4 million) Jews to settle in Hungary (Kenez, 2009, p. 9).[8] Nonetheless, scapegoating against the Jews and Roma is not what makes Jobbik exceptional in Europe today. Indeed it is noteworthy that the solutions that Jobbik proposes to solve Hungary's problems not only signal an anti-liberal, anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, anti-capitalist, anti-European, and anti-globalist stance (positions that may be shared by other European right-wing parties), but also appear to be historically and culturally (as well as geographically) hostile to the West. The study of this underlying cultural-historico-geographic metanarrative and what makes Jobbik unique among other extreme right parties in Europe is the particular focus of this paper.

Jobbik's Embrace of Turanism

To better understand the uniqueness of Jobbik, one must examine its recent adoption of Neo-Turanism,[9] the revival of a historical ideology that aspires for the unification of "Uralo-Altaic" race, including the Turks of Turkey, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, Tatars, Hungarians, the aboriginal tribes of Siberia, and even the distant Mongols, Manchus, Koreans, and Japanese. In politically articulating such a narrative, the party seeks to terminate Hungary's alliance with the Euro-Atlantic community and replace it with an Eastward turn in order to empower the country that has been, allegedly, weakened by its aspirational Westernism.

Party officials emphasize that an Eastward turn is not mere soul-searching idealism, but has realistic foundations, as Jobbik's young leader Gábor Vona has stated: "Hungary stands desperately lonesome in the arena of world politics," is incapable of fostering independent, key economic and political relationships in the Western world, and is "in dire need of close and supportive alliances."[10] At this juncture, the East appears as a solution for the centuries-long solitude of Hungarians in Europe. Jobbik propagates that "Hungarians are the most westerly of the Eastern people," and if "lies" about their Finno-Ugrian origins (see below) were to be put aside and Hungarians were to profess that they were the descendents of Atilla, they "would suddenly find hundreds of millions ready to form a common basis for alliance."[11] Moreover, Csanád Szegedi, former deputy chairman and MP of Jobbik, openly advocates

---

[8]Not unthinkably, this bizarre idea may have some resonance with Jobbik's pro-Palestinian sentiments in support of expelling >4 million Jews from a no-longer existing Israel.

[9]Although not precisely defined, Turán is the Persian name given for Central Asia, the land of the Tûr. It is also an imaginary region, and thus a political term, developed by nationalist Turkish and Hungarian circles at the beginning of the 20th century (Karatay, 2003). According to Tamás Hegedüs, Jobbik's MP and Chairman of the Inter-Parliamentary Hungarian-Turkish Friendship Group, interviewed on May 17, 2012 in Budapest, the party formally embraced Turanism during its December 2010 general assembly.

[10]These phrases were taken from Vona's article entitled, "Turanism Instead of Euro-Atlantic Alliance" (Vona, n.d.) which was available on Jobbik's official webpage in April 2011. However, since March 2012, this webpage is no longer accessible. The recent Turanist orientation of Jobbik and the notion of the "loneliness" of Hungarians in Europe, especially in the midst of Germans and Slavs, was noted by Márton Gyöngyösi, the Vice-President of the Committee on Foreign Relations of Jobbik (interviewed by the authors on May 10, 2012 in Budapest) and Tamás Hegedüs, interviewed on May 17, 2012 in Budapest. Gyöngyösi observed that Jobbik is the only right radical party in Europe that has a close relationship with Islam, and in fact the editor of *Barikat*, a Hungarian weekly closely affiliated with Jobbik, is a recent convert to Islam.

[11]This language also is taken from Vona (n.d.)

leaving the European Union and establishing a new "Turanian" alliance with Central Asian states (Ungváry, 2012).[12]

It is precisely the re-emergence of this peculiar geopolitical narrative and its resonance in contemporary Hungarian society that our paper seeks to scrutinize. It would appear that with Fidesz (the dominant right-wing party that has shifted the entire political discourse in Hungary to the right) in power,[13] it would be rather difficult for Jobbik to retain its anti-establishment zeal within the Hungarian political spectrum if it relies solely on right-wing narratives. Although Jobbik certainly has room to move beyond Fidesz's national conservative solutions to Hungary's woes, given its extreme anti-Semitic and anti-Roma rhetoric as well as actions (Hockenos, 2010, p. 20), we hypothesize that no other action can stake out Jobbik's anti-establishment position as much as its pursuit of Turanism—the unification of a wider "Uralo-Altaic" race. Such a geopolitical vision, although perhaps ludicrous to outsiders, is strikingly attractive to young, educated, urban voters due to its endorsement of national pride and inclination toward mysticism and the exotic. In order to better understand the context within which the Turanic discourse has re-emerged, we will now briefly delve into its historical legacy.

THE EMERGENCE OF TURANISM AS A GEOGRAPHICAL AND ETHNO-CULTURAL CONSTRUCT

Historical Origins

According to *Gesta Hungarorum* (*The Deeds of the Hungarians*), a record of early Hungarian history probably written between 1196 and 1203 by an unknown author who describes himself as Anonymi Bele Regis Notarii (the Anonymous Notary of King Béla [Anonymous, 2010]), and the *Gesta Hunnorum et Hungarorum* (*The Deeds of the Huns and Hungarians*), written mainly by around 1282–1285, the grand prince of the Hungarians named Árpád, who settled his tribes in the Carpathian basin, is a direct descendant of the Hunnish King Attila. Thus, according to these oldest extant chronicles of the history of the Hungarians, of which the former has been famously described by the medievalist C. A. Macartney as "the most obscure, the most exasperating and most misleading of all the early Hungarian texts" (1953, p. 59), grand prince Árpád took back the land that once belonged to his ancestors by settling his tribe in the Carpathian basin (and later the basin drained by the Danube and Tisza rivers farther west). As such, these documents, despite questions surrounding their veracity (Magocsi and Pop, 2002, p. 170), offer Hungarians a powerful historical narrative of territorial belonging to the Carpathian basin without forgetting their glorious Scythian-Hunnic past.[14]

---

[12]It is noteworthy that in July 2012 Szegedi was forced to resign from from all his posts in Jobbik after revelations that his grandparents were Jewish Holocaust survivors, that Szegedi had knowingly lied about his ancestry, and had even offered money to stop news from being published regarding his Jewish background. The announcement to this effect (Szegedi Resigns, n.d.) is no longer posted on Jobbik's website (see also WJC, 2012).

[13]The party won a landslide victory in 2010 and still appears (in late October 2012) to retain a lead in the polls, with 31 percent support versus the Socialist Party's 20 percent and Jobbik's 13 percent (Magyar Politics, 2012).

[14]In classical antiquity, Scythia encompassed the Pontic-Caspian steppe and was inhabited by a Scythian people thought to have originated in the Central Asian region. Turán, a term that came into use during the 19th century, replaced Scythia and changed into a concept summarizing Huns, Avars, and other nations related to Hungarians (Szendrei, 2010, p.10). The Hungarian people, the "most valiant and most powerful in the tasks of war" (Anonymous, 2010, p. 17), are believed in the *Gesta Hungarorum* to have originated from the Scythian people, whose land "was so full … of people born there that it was insufficient to sustain … them" (ibid.). This led to a "war to occupy lands that they might live in" and in particular over the land of Pannonia, rumored to have been "the land of King Attila, from whose line Prince Álmos, father of Árpád descended" (ibid.).

The aforementioned chronicles are not the only historical records that emphasize the Asiatic origins of Hungarians. Additionally, one can mention Turkish sources referring to Turks as related to Huns and the prevalent reference in Byzantine, Arab, and Iranian sources to Hungarians as Turks. The Holy Crown of Hungary, on display in the central Domed Hall of the Hungarian Parliament Building since 2000, tends to reinforce this interpretation by bearing a Greek inscription on its lower diadem that translates as "Geovitzas the Faithful, King of the Land of the Turks."[15] Also noteworthy in this regard is the fact that the Hungarian branch of the Greek Orthodox Church, under Constantinople's jurisdiction was named the "Metropolitanate of Tourkia" during the 11th and 12th centuries (Baan, 1999, p. 46). As a matter of fact, the theory of a prestigious steppe kinship of the Hungarians with the mighty Huns was not even a contested issue ever since its authoritative formulation by Simon Kezai in the 13th century (Kontler, 2011, p. 133).

By the time of the Enlightenment, however, both Hungarian and German scholars had systematically challenged the existing hegemonic articulations of the origins of the Hungarian language and people. In 1768, Johann Eberhard Fischer, a German scholar from the University of Göttingen, completed and published his two volume *Sibirische Geschichte von der Entdeckung Sibiriens bis auf die Eroberung dieses Landes durch die Russische Waffen*[16] in Saint Petersburg, in which he reiterated and contextualized the claim that the Hungarians were a Finno-Ugrian people (Kontler, 2011, p. 137). Another Göttingen scholar, August Ludwig Schlözer, further recognized and encouraged research on the Finno-Ugrian links of the Hungarian language (ibid.). Although this new linguistic interpretation was accepted by some Hungarians (as representing the most modern, scientific, and rational line of thinking of the time), for many others it was approached with caution, because to many, it seemed "a less than full[y] prestigious pedigree" (Kontler, 1999, p. 34). This was mainly due to its elaboration of language as the focus of belonging and, in a way, undermining the glorious Scythian-Hunnic past of the Hungarians. Moreover, this new thesis was introduced at a time when Hungarian nobles, upper classes, and intellectuals were quite wary of the ascendant Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism and as such, and thus considered dubious (Winternitz, 1985, p. 146) and "smelly like fish like the Finns."[17]

It was precisely during this period that the idea of Turán, as a geographical and an ethno-cultural concept, began to penetrate into the Hungarian political and intellectual consciousness at the initiative of the Hungarian upper classes, as a counter-ideology against Western-oriented depictions of Hungarian historiography. In 1869, the orientalist Ármin Vámbéry, who was described by Hamid Dabashi (2009, p. 72) as a "self-confessed spy working on behalf of British colonialism in general and European Zionism in particular," published an article that suggested that Hungarian was a language close to Turkish through the Ural-Altaic link. Vámbéry's enthusiastic advocacy of a close Turkish-Hungarian linguistic relationship (e.g., Vámbéry, 1895) provoked a fierce scientific and political debate in Hungary that came to be known as the [academic] Ugrian-Turkish War (Hubbes, 2011, p. 5). In this context, the official academic doctrines categorically rejected the theory of Scythian-Hun-Turkic-Hungarian continuity—"a standpoint that left many adepts of this latter view deeply frustrated" (ibid). Still, Vámbéry was not only convinced of the existence of a close link between the Turks and

---

[15]The diadem also depicts the Hungarian King Géza I (1074–1077).

[16]Crudely translated, "Siberian Story of the Discovery of Siberia up to Its Conquest by Russian Power."

[17]This attribution, also mentioned in Pusztay (1977, p. 93 cited in Demirkan, 2000, p. 10) and in Kenez (2009, p. 9), was made known to us by a researcher interviewed on February 27, 2012 during our field work at the History Department of the prestigious Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, focused on historical debates about the "true" origins of Hungarians.

Hungarians, but in his mind, Turks, Chinese, and northeastern European nations all had the same ethnic origin. A year after the publication of his work, Vámbéry also founded Europe's first Turcology department at the University of Budapest.

The debate surrounding the roots of the Hungarian language and the ethnic origins of the Hungarian people was heated during much of the 19th century. The distinguished linguist and politician Pál Hunfálvy (1810–1891) argued that the Hungarian language contained both Finno-Ugrian and Ural-Altaic elements. In 1880, his assistant József Budenz (1836–1892) seriously challenged the Turanian hypothesis via an investigation of Eurasian languages and argued that the Finno-Ugrian connection of the Hungarian language was overwhelmingly more persuasive than the Turkic link. After long and passionate debate between the two camps, the defenders of Finno-Ugrian linguistic school were victorious in the linguistic battle. However, because those who supported the Ural-Altaic thesis were politically influential, their arguments were still widely accepted in Hungarian academic circles and by the Hungarian public. Géza Nagy, a pupil of Vámbery, wrote a series of articles about the political and academic situation of the Ural-Altaic people in 1890 and included the Koreans and Japanese in the mythic geographical sphere of Turán. He also warned Hungarians to be wary of the political developments in Western Europe, be more critical, and consider unification with Ural-Altaic, namely the Turanic people, in order to escape from the turmoil in Europe (see Kessler, 1967, pp. 68–71).

It can thus be concluded that despite its "scientific defeat," the Ural-Altaic thesis and the aspirations of Turanic theory survived to remain in the mainstream discourse at the turn of the 20th century and onward. This was mainly due to the Hungarian nobles' continuous monopoly over cultural and political matters, despite rapid urbanization and development of the bourgeois class in 19th century Hungary. The nobles sought to preserve their traditional influence in the political and cultural spheres (vis-à-vis an emerging bourgeois-liberal wave) by remaining the spokesmen for Hungarian national identity, and found it useful to project a Hungarian nationalism based on a mythical past and political independence. As such, Turanism early on acquired not only an anti-Western, but an anti-liberal dimension.[18]

Turanism in the 20th Century

Turanism reached its apex in Hungary in 1910, first with the publication of a poetry book *A Turáni Dalok* (Turanian Songs) by Árpád Zempléni (1910). This was an expression of disappointment with Europe and a glance toward the East as the real location of brotherhood (Önen, 2003, pp. 28–29). Such sentimental stimulation encouraged the Hungarian Turanists— most notably well-known academics, politicians, and nobles such as Count Pál Teleki, Jenő Cholnoky, Gyula Pekár, Sándor Márki, and Árpád Zempléni—to form the *Turáni Tarsaság* (Turan Society) in the same year (Demirkan, 2000, p. 26). In this context, Cholnoky introduced the idea that the concept of Turan is neither linguistic, historical, ethno-geographic, nor political, but merely geographic. The main objective of the Turan Society was identified as one to study, propagate, and develop the national cultures and economies of the (Ural-Altaic) peoples of Europe and Asia, which are related to the Magyar people. In brief, the activities of the Turan Society consisted of convening informative conferences about other Turanic societies and organizing anthropological and socio-economic research trips to Anatolia, the Caspian Sea region, the Caucasus, and Inner Asian lands to study the economic conditions of these territories (Ablonczy, 2005). According to Önen (2003, pp. 31–32), although in the initial

---

[18]We owe much of the information in this paragraph to research by Alaattin Ogüz, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.

years, public interest in these activities was limited, with the support of official institutions, such activities gained increasing attention over time. In 1913 the Turan Society started to publish the accounts of the field trips in its journal *Turán* in the French, Hungarian, German, and Turkish languages and, despite brief interruptions, *Turán* contributed to the Hungarian intellectual sphere until World War II (Oba, 1995, p. 13).[19]

Nonetheless, Ablonczy (2005, p. 90) also emphasized the economic advantages that the Turanist movement sought in enhancing Hungary's relations with the Balkans, Middle East, and other territories of the Ottoman Empire. For Hungary, Turanism pragmatically promised new markets in its competition with Germany and Austria, and offered a political counterweight to Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism. At a meeting of the Turan Society on January 31, 1914, its then vice-president Alajos Paikert stated that Hungary does not have colonies and does not endeavor to possess any.[20] However, there was a need for economic expansion, to support the other brotherly nations of Turan, and to build feelings of reciprocity and togetherness (Szendrei, 2010, p. 17).[21] As such, the Hungarian elite pursued Turanism as a quest to seek political and economic benefits beyond their borders. The Turanic symbols—pagan warriors on horseback, roaming the Asian steppes—became constant elements of the rhetoric that Turanists inspired (Hanebrink, 2009, p. 118).

Despite the fact that Turanism was introduced to the Hungarian public by Ármin Vámbery, a Jewish orientalist, the Turanian idea became increasingly associated with anti-Semitic nationalism during and after World War I (Szabó, 2003 cited in Hanebrink, 2009, p. 118). This may relate in part to the anti-nationalist activities of Jews in the upper ranks of the government during Hungary's first Communist regime (led by Bela Kun), which briefly held power after World War I, and the subsequent post–World War II regime led by Matyas Rakosi.[22] Another explanation is that the emerging bourgeois class included a considerable number of Hungarian Jews and this class outgrew the existing political framework, threatening the monopoly of Hungarian nobles and upper classes. The Jews were thus seen as infiltrating the core of the Hungarian "nation" and compromising its "cultural" characteristics with their "liberal" mindset and "money market" practices. Consequently, the threat that they ostensibly posed to the Hungarian nation fit well with the entire post-Trianon[23] conceptual framework that the Magyars were an "errant people of Turan" unwanted in the European continent (Janos, 1982, p. 274) In this vein, the Turanists called for an "end to the age of servility to the West," pledged not to "shed more blood in the defense of the Occident," and called for the "unification of all Turanians" against the dual evils of "Semitic corruption and Aryan decadence" (A Magyar, 1921). As demonstrated below, this rhetoric has also been a ubiquitous element of Jobbik's propaganda machine in Hungary more recently.

The turning point for Hungarian Turanists in the 20th century was the emergence of Italian fascism. The Turanists came to admire Benito Mussolini, considering him as the leader of a bloodless revolution and admiring his resistance to socialist irrationality,

---

[19]Issues of *Turán* can be found in the National Széchényi Library in Budapest on microfiche.

[20]Paikert also argued in a French publication that the word Touran (*Turán* in French) represents "the old common homeland, the souvenirs of our old common past and the hopes of an even greater future"(translation from the French by Emel Akcali).

[21]One can detect an undertone of the "white men's burden" in Paikert's conceptualization of the role that the Hungarians were to play vis-à-vis their Turanian brethren.

[22]The Jewish-born journalist Bela Kun was one of the founders of the Hungarian Communist Party. His comrade and co-founder Matyas Rakosi (similarly of Jewish descent) later became the country's uncompromising Stalinist leader (from 1949 to 1956 with an interruption after Stalin's death) (Held, 1954, pp. 247 and 290; see also Kovrig, 1979).

[23]This refers to the Trianon Peace Agreement signed on June 4, 1920 between Hungary and the Allied Powers, on the basis of which Hungary lost 71 percent of its territory and 64 percent of its former population (see Helmreich, 1956).

anarchy, as well as his struggle to establish the rule of law (Szendrei, 2010, p. 29). There were conspicuous efforts to implement fascism in Hungary during this period and looking beyond Italy, the Hungarian Turanists also sought ways to co-operate with their Turkish counterparts (Demirkan, 2000, p. 58).[24] In the aftermath of the catastrophic World War II and the installation of a communist regime in Hungary, however, the Turanist discourse ebbed away and the alleged Scythian-Hunnish roots of Hungarians became at best marginalized. Thereby, regardless of the political and economic goals of the Turanist thinkers and their aspirations to acquire international distinctiveness for Hungary, Turanism remained largely a self-serving prophecy unable to retain its prominence when confronting the forces of internationalism.

THE REVIVAL OF TURANISM AND ITS PERFORMANCE

The revival and performance of Turanism by far-right movements in post-communist Hungary offer an excellent example of the expression of everyday geopolitics via the accumulation of "little things." As Nigel Thrift, author of "It's the Little Things" (Thrift, 2000), has suggested, some of the most efficient geopolitical conceptualizations are concealed within utterances and practices in everyday geography. Accordingly, a critical perspective on geopolitics should demonstrate how popular and elite forms of geopolitical reasoning interact and then resonate with and through popular culture (Dodds, 2001, p. 474). With his seminal work on "banal" nationalism, Michael Billig (1995) was one of the first to methodologically and theoretically weave "little things" with high geopolitics.[25]

Another relevant contribution is that of Muller (2008), who focused attention on Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) conceptualization of discourse, which far from being merely cognitive or linguistic, is rather a practice that constitutes and organizes social relations. Their conceptualization radically broadens the number of participating actors and implies that human action[26] is implicated and structured in discourse (Müller, 2008, p. 330).

We argue, however, that within Laclau and Mouffe's discursive framework one cannot accurately clarify why a radical discourse such as (neo-)Turanism has re-emerged at this particular time in an EU member state, amidst much more dominant articulations such as globalization and Europeanization. More specifically, a deeper investigation of the everyday social world may point to the existence of social relations[27] outside the realm of discourse, much of which operate "behind the backs" of social actors (Iosifides, 2011, p. 53) and are effectively hidden.

These hidden relations (little things)—manifest in such diverse forms as Internet sites, Facebook pages, ethnic clothing, pop culture, books, children's games, varied memorabilia, theme parks, concept holidays, and even esoteric pursuits—are important in fostering everyday consciousness about Neo-Turanism. They are especially effective in reaching adherents who are not necessarily always at the front window of high politics, but mostly in the background.

To support our interpretation of the significance of everyday geopolitics, we have carried out a systematic analysis of such "little things" in circulation in Hungary, grouping them

---

[24]One can note Laszlo Sekres's lecture in Turkey in 1930, which was then published in the journal *Türk Yurdu* under the title "Fascist Public Discipline" (Demirkan, 2000, p. 58).

[25]In addition to Billig, the notion of everyday geopolitics and connecting the geopolitical with the everyday has appeared in the works of some feminist writers (e.g., see Secor, 2001).

[26]Here "human action" means reproducing particular discourses through constant recitation and reiteration.

[27]In this context, also the existence of material practices, beliefs, rituals, and desires.

into two main categories—corporate and electronic resources. Corporate resources included a variety of cultural commodities (books, clothes, games, and memorabilia) on sale in various shops scattered around Budapest as well as clubs, hotels, and theme parks reflecting cultural themes central to a Turanian interpretation of geopolitics. Electronic resources included a variety of Internet sites (e.g., kuruc.info and barikad.hu) as well as the Facebook pages of various associations inspired by Turanism. An underlying theme in all these resources is a ubiquitous Asiatic reinterpretation of the Hungarian past and a conscious effort to identify Hungarians with their Asian brethren.

Corporate Resources

The Hungarian Turan Association webpage (http://kurultaj.com/magunkrol/) skillfully offers both ideas and items for consumption directed toward those attracted by the Turanist ideology. The Association recommends that analysis of ancient Hungarian history is one of the fundamental duties of Hungarian scholarship. Accordingly, such research informs and affects not only academic studies, but also public thinking. The Association accords an important role to tradition-keeper groups (*hagyományörző csoportok*), which not only meet on a regular basis to perform traditional routines of Hungarian folklore, but also exhibit a distinct affiliation with Asiatic motifs. The website of the Hungarian Turan Association also lists numerous advertisements for establishments that sell ancient Asiatic clothes, provide family advice, and organize action sports holidays at theme parks and hotels named after "Attila" or that conceptualize the subject of *Honfoglalás* (settlement of Hungarians in the Carpathian basin). Spiritual healing and traditional medicine also are featured on these sites. Essentially, the Association promotes a truth-producing activity, inspired by Turanian themes, for those looking to adopt a non-Western lifestyle. The website also provides news about the annual *Kurultaj* (gathering).[28] What is interesting about this term is that it is not Hungarian (at least it not included the official Hungarian Explanatory Dictionary), but a recent adaptation from the Turkish word *Kurultay*.

In parallel, one can also witness expressions of similar identities by Hungarian rock groups such as Hungarica and Kárpáthia. The lyrics of their most popular songs not only carry extremely nationalist undertones, but also aspire to communicate a type of belonging that is alternative to the Western model. Abundant in these songs are themes that feature allegiance with and continuity in a free Hungarian homeland, the banishment of the EU flag from Hungary, as well as the equation of the so-called "invasion of bankers" (in the form of global capital) with the earlier invasion of Hungary by the Turks, Austrians, and Russians. Upon close inspection, one can even detect a certain propagation of *lebensraum*. We found it interesting, in the least, that the albums of Hungarica as well as Kárpáthia were on sale at Jobbik as well as at Fidesz celebrations of the Hungarian National Day on March 15. Typical excerpts from a song entitled "I Am a Hungarian" by Hungarica rather clearly illustrate the expression of mythic Turanian identity as an alternative to a Western one:

I am a Hungarian, proud scion of the Hunnish, *Avarian* bow-stretching Scythians … Don't tell me that my past stinks of fish[29] … The Middle Ages were dark elsewhere, and it wasn't here that Galilei was sent to the stake.

---

[28]The annual gathering days (of those with shared characteristics to constitute a collective or group) are celebrated at a fairgrounds, where people wear ancient Asiatic costumes and clothes (Fig. 1), congregate around the Flag of Árpád, which is conspicuously associated with Hungarian fascists of the interwar period, and buy and sell commodities.
[29]The aforementioned popular disparagement of Finno-Ugrian descent.

Fig. 1. Scene from *Kurultaj* in Bugac, Hungary in July 2010 (posted on the Facebook page of *Kurultaj–The Hungarian Tribal Gathering* and used with permission of Arpád Szakács, the press chief of *Kuraltaj*).

This excerpt exemplifies various elements of far-right delusions of grandeur: hostility to Europe, arrogance, and self-pity. Revill (2000, p. 605) and Megoran (2008, p. 32) have posited that popular music is far more than simply a conveyor of the texts of patriotic ideology, as it speaks to people directly, communicating through bodily involvement, rhythm, and melodic qualities. As such, songwriters of the Hungarian far right play their part in popularizing themes of everyday geopolitics. Overall, corporate resources express the modern face of Turanism through cultural means.

Electronic Resources

Electronic resources also deserve to be mentioned as a means of popularizing reactionary thoughts by the use of modern technologies. Here, the content of the Facebook site "The Ancient Turanian-Hun-Nations Brotherhood" supports our thinking about how the circulation of little things can endorse everyday geopolitics. The website presents a relentless attack on the EU, an offensive portrayal of the EU flag, but at the same time, heaps praise on the mythic lands of Turán and all that it promises based on the imagined brotherhood of eastern nations. This Facebook site also hosts links to sites associated with Jobbik, such as barikad.hu, replete with anti-Semitic, anti-Western, and anti-EU opinions. What is interesting is that the same site hosts links to Dalai Lama, Atatürk, the Turkish Armed Forces, Azerbaijan,

as well as comments from different countries in the "Turán" area, such as Kazakhstan and Turkey, and also posts photos of Hungarian horse herders.[30] A similar Facebook site, entitled "Kurultaj—Magyar Törzsi Gyűlés (Kurultaj—The Hungarian Tribal Gathering)" illustrates a conglomeration of various, but largely unrelated, themes from which right-wing circles have traditionally benefited. One can hence find a picture depicting the re-conquest of Vojvodina by Hungarian armies during WWII; a commemoration of a Hungarian Turanist on the 170th anniversary of his death; links to a Kazakh pop song and a Turkish national rock music group's website; travel advertisements to ancient Hungarian lands; commemorations of (purported) pogroms against Hungarians in the aftermath of WWI; an advertisement for a Hungarian folk school (*népiskola*) that teaches students how to live as a Hungarian both at home and abroad (named Prince Csaba after the mythical son of Attila); and lastly some pictures of a Central Asian family. This potpourri of random items may astound outside observers of Hungary's socio-politics, but all resonate with neo-Turanism and a search for an Eastern identity as an alternative to the country's Western orientation.

A pertinent question is how a Neo-Turanist orientation relates to the simutanous intense appeal of the beacon of Catholicism, that is, Saint Stephen's Crown—the Holy Crown of Hungary[31]—to the Hungarian right as the foundation of Hungarian nation. We believe that despite its widespread identification with Hungary's Christianity and alliance with the West, in fact the extreme right views the Crown as the last bulwark against the social collapse and disintegration that has haunted the Magyar nation since Trianon. A yearning for the days of Greater Hungary pervades the public mood and the continuity signified by the Crown is one of the few remaining links (along with the mythical construction of Turán as a geopolitical vision) with the glorious past. On the Kurultaj—The Hungarian Tribal Gathering facebook site, it is not an accident that the entry of the Hungarian army into Vojvodina appears alongside all the other links. The followers' comments illustrate the pride that this entry garnered, along with pride in the myth of Turán. It is quite striking, but perhaps not all that surprising, that very recently a *shaman* was invited from Russia's Tuva Republic to perform a ritual immediately beside the Holy Crown at the Hungarian Parliament, witnessed by Hungarian MPs and duly recorded and broadcast by the Szent Korona (Saint Crown) Radio Station. Essentially, although the everyday rituals of geopolitics in Hungary are complex, they tend to support the alternative geopolitical identifications to which Jobbik aspires. After all, Turanism, confined to elite beliefs during the interwar period, has broken out of elite circles and is gaining increasing visibility thanks to the circulation of the aforementioned "little things" that constitute everyday geopolitics in Hungary.

DISCUSSING THE REVIVAL OF OLD DEBATES

In the preceding section of this paper, we attempted to demonstrate that a radical conceptualization of the mythic past of the Hungarians has now entered into the general frame of Hungarian cultural life (via both corporate and electronic resources), and has thus become "grounded in" the material world (see Jessop and Sum, 2006, p. 167). As such, Neo-Turanism, a radical form of imagining the Hungarian past, has become consumable both ideologically as well as materially. The question may arise as to why such a turn in the national consciousness of Hungarians (as evidenced by the consumption of these cultural items) must necessarily be

---

[30]See http://www.facebook.com/pages/The-ancient-turanian-hun-nations brotherhood/173381806030314
[31]Hungary was Christianized during the reign of King Stephen (St. Stephen) from 1000 to 1038 A.D.

viewed as anti-Western and anti-Semitic. Yet when analyzed within the historical context of Turanism, one can easily see almost the exact revival of old debates.

As already discussed in this paper, historically Turanism signified a widely shared resentment, a search for an alternative version of modernization to replace the prevailing one, and a repudiation of a modernization that may have been more organically related to the legacy of Finno-Ugrian roots—a sign of Westernization for many. The revival of Turanism thus enables its adherents to present the Enlightenment and modernism—in other words the ''Western'' heritage of Hungary—as ''degenerate and diabolical'' (Tamás, 2009), and offers a fresh terrain for a rebellion, especially for young people. As such, ''all the reactionary clichés of the past come out'' (ibid.). Moreover, the (Neo-)Turanian rationality foresees a congruence between a responsible, orderly, and proper individual and a new generation of Hungarians proud of their mythical past (Lemke, 2001) as the ''responsible and moral'' citizen within a new more patriotic, nationalist ''citizenship-regime'' (Dobrowolsky and Jenson, 2004; Jenson and Phillips, 1996 in Sparke 2006, p. 155).

At this juncture, one should remember that the context of socio-economic crisis in Hungary and in Europe in late 2012 offers ample grounds for the cultivation of Neo-Turanism as a truth-producing practice. In a period of global economic crises that has hit most EU states hard, by proposing quick and radical answers, proponents of such radical geopolitical narratives as Neo-Turanism find it easier to present themselves as healers of social ills such as immorality, unemployment, poverty, cultural decadence, and the threat of immigration.[32] Far right movements and their propaganda are also attractive to the working class, ''since it is exactly this very section of the society that has been left without any political representation'' (Tamás, 2009). As Žižek (2000, pp. 37–38) has pointedly argued, the far right today is the only ''serious'' political force that still employs anti-capitalist rhetoric and as such can ''mobilize whatever remains of the mainstream working class in our Western societies.'' Furthermore, Neo-Turanist discursive practices are linked with a rebellion against social collapse and disintegration, promising order, social cohesion, and survival.

A pertinent question here is whether Turanism would have re-emerged in the absence of the current socio-economic crises and inequalities in Hungary and in Europe. As we have attempted to establish in the preceding section, Turanism is not merely an instrumental ideology revived and reiterated by certain socio-political formations at strategic moments of the economic crisis. As Peter G. Feher (the editor of the conservative weekly *HetiVálasz*, which is closely and openly affiliated with the less radical right-wing Fidesz) has noted, more than a generation grew up without knowing about Turanism in Hungary, because it was forbidden in the communist era. However, he now believes that people and groups will try to renew this cult in Hungary.[33] Martón Gyöngyesi reinforced Feher's observations about the re-emergence of Turanism in Hungary, by commenting that:

> We have always been outsiders to the Europe … For us, Turanism is a way to realize that we are not alone. We are in a huge cultural Turan family. We thus need to find the deep interconnectedness between our nations and this gives us something like a ''spiritual resurrection.'' … After 50 years [of suppression], there is now a huge demand in Hungary for [tracing] the roots. [34]

---

[32]Unlike in other right-wing movements in the EU, the threat of immigration in Hungary is not associated with Islamophobia.

[33]Authors' personal meeting with Peter Feher in *HetiVálasz* building in Budapest on March 30, 2012.

[34]Personal meeting with Márton Gyöngyösi, in the Office Building of the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest on May 10, 2012.

Thus, rather than being an elitist conceptualization only—a top-down construct, diffused into the everyday by the help of "little things"—Turanism may very well uphold the far right movement in Hungary from the bottom-up. While the hegemonic discourse of the post-communist transition implied a "return to Europe" initially, and later a "becoming a part of the West," the recent crises in Europe and the West seem to have inculated in Hungarians an ideological and material disillusionment with their European experience, and thus a weakening of Western-oriented geopolitical conceptualizations. The radical anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-European, but pro-Russian, pro-Palestinian, sympathetic-to-Islam,[35] and pro-Iranian rhetoric of Jobbik further weakens the public's subscription to Western geopolitical constellations (Kenez, 2009; Kovács, forthcoming). Further, one can also note the serious efforts by Jobbik ideologues to foster a "sacral alternative" to the universalistic Judeo-Christian heritage in order to distance Hungary from the "West" (Kovács, 2012). Thus, Neo-Turanism provides a breeding ground for seemingly ludicrous efforts to reconstruct a neo-pagan, pre-Christian national mythology, at times reminiscent of the exclusivist ethno-nationalism of the interwar period (Hubbes, 2011; Szilágyi, 2011 cited in Kovács, forthcoming).

The 20th century is notoriously rich with symbols of collective Hungarian suffering. The present Hungarian socio-economic ills, the enormity of the national debt, and concerns about the future of foreign investment in the country all replenish the feeling of suffering. In response to all this, the discursive practices supported by a Neo-Turanian belief system make it possible to envisage the creation of new generations, which will be the panacea to the myriad crises confronting the country. According to this line of reasoning, just as the crisis that Hungary faces should be an obvious, universal reality, so too are the solutions to it.

Hence, in order to understand the emergence of radical geopolitical narratives in Hungary, especially during the post-communist period, one can surmise a great deal from the opinions and feelings that Hungarians articulate today about their history and the ways in which capitalism and democracy were introduced and adapted to the country in the years after the end of Communism.[36] Our empirical study has significant implications for the literature on everyday geopolitics, in the sense that it has depicted how Neo-Turanist rhetoric appeases Hungarian national pride and cures certain societal insecurities and disillusionments through resonating discursively with social, economic, and cultural structures already existing in Hungarian society.

CONCLUSION

It seems inherently logical that the asymmetrical relationship between Europe and EU-neighbor states such as Turkey and Russia would lead to the emergence (or re-emergence) of alternative non-Western, anti-European geopolitical discourses in these countries, such as Eurasianism (Akçalı and Perinçek, 2009 as well as Laruelle, 2012, this issue) and pan-Slavism (Suslov, 2012, this issue). It is rather unusual, however, to observe such a phenomenon unfolding in a much more radical way in Hungary, reflecting the identity crises that globalization and Europeanization can exacerbate even in an EU member state. Intrigued by the revival of such a radical geopolitical narrative within the European Union, we investigated it at the everyday level in an effort to learn more about its resonance in contemporary Hungarian society.

As our study has attempted to demonstrate, Neo-Turanism is reinforced within the material world through a variety of structural mechanisms. Resonant with already existing ideational structures, it offers ordinary Hungarians a sense of agency, an alternative against

---

[35]E.g., Hungary favors Turkey's efforts to secure membership in the European Union.

[36]We maintain, however, that our understanding would be incomplete if we do not scrutinize the extra-discursive material practices, beliefs, desires, values, and rituals of the everyday.

the powerful but "cunning" West and its alleged allies within Hungary (e.g., Jews and liberals). Moreover, in this context the deeply entrenched legacy of the Treaty of Trianon, marking the undeserved treatment of Hungarians at the end of the WWI and the resulting truncation of their country, also prevails and influences the political landscape in present-day Hungary. This context enables the mobilization of ordinary Hungarians by those usurping the nationalist folklore (Vardy, 1983, p. 22), and offers the promise of survival based on the glorification of a mythical past. We have attempted *inter alia* to show in this paper that it involves, as Mark Bassin (2012, p. 553) puts it in his introduction to this symposium, "the construction of idealized pictures of national glory lost at some point in the remote past," and then projected "as an aspirational vision for the future."

REFERENCES

"A Magyar Turáni Szövetség céljai és tevékenysége (Aims and Activities of the Hungarian Turanian Association)," *Turán*, **VIII,**74, 1921 (cited in Janos, 1982, p. 274).

Ablonczy, Balázs, *Teleki Pál (Teleki Pál)*. Budapest, Hungary: Osiris Kiadó, 2005.

Ablonczy, Balázs, *Trianon Legendák* (*The Legends of Trianon*). Budapest, Hungary: Jaffa Press, 2010.

Akçalı, Emel and Mehmet Perinçek, "Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey," *Geopolitics*, **14**, 3:550–569, 2009.

Anonymous Notary of King Béla, *Gesta Hungarorum—The Deeds of the Hungarians*. Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press, 2010.

Baan, István, "The Metropolitanate of Tourkia. The Organization of the Byzantine Church in Hungary in the Middle Ages," in von Günter Prinzing and Maciej Salamon, eds., *Byzanz und Ostmitteleuropa*, *950-1453* (*Byzantium and East-Central Europe, 950–1453*). Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 1999, 45–55.

Bassin, Mark, "National Metanarratives after Communism: An Introduction," *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, **53**, 5:553–556, 2012.

Bernard, Ivan Tamas, *From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary, 1989–1994*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2007.

Billig, Michael, *Banal Nationalism*. London, UK: Sage, 1995.

Dabashi, Hamid, *Post-Orientalism—Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror*. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009.

Demirkan, Tarik, *Macar Turancilari* (*Hungarian Turanists*). Istanbul, Turkey: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfi, 2000.

Dobrowolsky, Alexandra and Jane Jenson, "Shifting Representations of Citizenship: Canadian Politics of 'Women' and 'Children'," *Social Politics*, **11**, 2:154–180, 2004.

Dodds, Klaus, "Political Geography III: Critical Geopolitics after Ten Years," *Progress in Human Geography*, **25**, 3:469–484, 2001.

Egedy, Gergely, "Political Conservatism in Post-Communist Hungary," *Problems of Post-Communism*, **56**, 3:42–53, 2009.

Elections Resources on the Internet, "Elections to the Hungarian National Assembly," n.d. [http://www.electionresources.org/hu/assembly.php?election=1994&region], last accessed August 20, 2012.

Eurostat, "Unemployment Rate, 2000–2011 (%)," 2012 [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Unemployment_], accessed October 23, 2012.

Gingrich, Andre and Marcus Banks, "Introduction," in A. Gingrich and M. Banks, eds., *Neo-nationalism in Europe and Beyond*. New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2006, 1–26.

Hanebrink, Paul, "Islam, Anti-Communism, and Christian Civilization: The Ottoman Menace in Interwar Hungary," *Austrian History Yearbook*, **40**, 114–124, 2009.

Havas, Gábor, "Ne próbáljuk a bűnt etnicizálni (Let Us Not Ethnicise Crime)," *Élet és Irodalom*, April 3, 2009.

Held, Joseph, *Dictionary of East European History since 1945.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1954.

Helmreich, E. C., "Hungary in History," in E. C. Helmreich, ed., *Hungary.* New York, NY: Praeger, Mid-European Studies Center Series, 1956.

Hockenos, Paul, "Central Europe's Right-Wing Populism," *The Nation*, May 24, 2010.

Hubbes, Laszlo-Attila, "A Comparative Investigation of Romanian and Hungarian Ethno-pagan Blogs," *Reconect Working Papers*, 2:1–12, December 2011.

"Hungary: Old and Nasty," *The Economist*, July 28, 2012, 46.

Index, "Hol volt eddig a 400 ezer Jobbik-szavazó? (Where Have 400 Thousand Jobbik Voters Been until Now?)," June 09, 2009 [http://index.hu/belfold/2009/06/09/uj_teruleti_elemzes/].

Iosifides, Theodoros, *Qualitative Methods in Migration Studies—a Critical Realist Perspective.* Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2011.

Janos, Andrew C., *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825–1945.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982.

Jenson, Jane and Susan Phillips, "Regime Shift and Citizenship Practices in Canada," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, **14**, 111–135, Fall 1996.

Jessop, Bob and Ngai-Ling Sum, "Towards a Cultural International Political Economy: Poststructuralism and the Italian School," in Marieke de Gode, ed., *International Political Economy and Poststructural Politics.* New York, NY: Palgrave, 2006, 157–176.

Jobbik Foreign Affairs Committee, "A Guide to Jobbik's Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto for National Self-Determination and Social Justice," 2010 [http://jobbik.com/temp/Jobbik-RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf], last accessed March 25, 2012.

Jordan, Michael J., "The Roots of Hate," *World Policy Journal*, 99–111, Fall 2010.

"Judaism and the Jews: Special Report," *The Economist*, July 28, 2012, S8–S10.

Karatay, Osman, *Iran ile Turan—Hayali Milletler Çağinda Avrasya ve Ortadoğu* (*Iran and Turan—Eurasia and the Middle East in the Age of Imagined Nations*). Ankara, Turkey: Karam, 2003.

Kessler, Joseph, Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890–1945. Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1967.

Kenez, Peter, "Hungary Moves to the Right," *The New Leader*, 8–9, November/December 2009.

Kontler, László, *Millennium in Central Europe—A History of Hungary*. Budapest, Hungary: Atlantisz Publishing House, 1999.

Kontler, László, "The Lappon, the Scythian, and the Hungarian, or Our (former) Selves as 'Others'. Philosophical History in Eighteenth-Century Hungary," in G. Abbattista, ed., *Encountering Otherness. Diversities and Transcultural Experiences in Early Modern European Culture*. Trieste, Italy: Edizioni Università di Trieste, 131–147, 2011.

Korkut, Umut, *Liberalization Challenges in Hungary: Elitism, Progressivism, Populism*. New York, NY: Palgrave, 2012.

Kovács, András, "Rightwing Populist Movements in the European Union" in Ruth Wodak and Brigitte Mral, eds., *The Post-communist Extreme Right*. London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012 (forthcoming).

Kovrig, Bennett, *Communism in Hungary from Kun to Kadar*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

Kulinska, Elena, "The European Extreme Right in 2010: A New Phenomenon or the Same Pattern?," *Western Balkans Security Observer*, 17:50–62, April–June 2010.

Kushner, David, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism: 1876–1908*. London, UK: Frank Cass Company, 1977.

Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London, UK: Verso, 1985.

Laruelle, Marlene, "Geographical Metanarratives in the Post-Soviet Realm: Eurasianism, Cosmism, Arctism," *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, **53**, 5:557–574, 2012.

Lemke, Thomas, "'The Birth of Biopolitics': Michel Foucault's Lecture at the Collèd de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality," *Economy and Society*, **30**, 2:190–207, 2001.

"Magyar Politics: Marching Season," *The Economist*, October 27, 2012, 55.

Macartney, Carlile A., *The Medieval Hungarian Historians: A Critical and Analytical Guide*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1953.

Magocsi, P. R. and I. Pop, *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2002.

Megoran, Nick, "From Presidential Podiums to Pop Music: Everyday Discourses of Geopolitical Danger in Uzbekistan," in Rachel Pain and Susan J. Smith, eds., *Fear: Critical Geopolitics and Everyday Life*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008, 25–37.

MTI, "Socialists Almost Even with Fidesz in New Ipsos Poll as 'None of the Above' Nears Two-Thirds Majority" [http://www.politics.hu/20120723/socialists-almost-even-with-fidesz-in-new-ipsos-poll-as-none-of-the-above-nears-two-thirds-majority/], last accessed August 12, 2012.

Müller, Martin, "Reconsidering the Concept of Discourse for the Field of Critical Geopolitics: Towards Discourse as Language and Practice," *Political Geography,* **27**, 3:322–338, 2008.

Oba, Ali Engin, *Türk Milliyetçiliginin Dogusu* (*The Emergence of Turkish Nationalism*). Ankara, Turkey: Imge Kitabevi, 1995.

Önen, Nizam, *Turanci Hareketler: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910–1944)* (*Turanianist Movements: Hungary and Turkey [1910–1944]*). Ankara, Turkey: Ankara University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Public Administration and Political Sciences, 2003.

Overbeek, Henk, "Neoliberalism and the Regulation of Global Labor Mobility, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, **581**, 1:74–90, 2002.

Ptaszyńska, Aleksandra, Rossalina Latcheva and Christian Gerbel, "Theoretical Framework and Historical Development," in O. Rathkolb and Günther Ogris, eds., *Authoritarianism, History, and Democratic Dispositions in Austria, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic*. Innsbruck, Austria: StudienVerlag, 11–20, 2010.

Pusztay, Janos, *Az Ugor tőrők haboru utan* (*After the Ugor-Turkish Battle*). Budapest, Hungary, 1977.

Revill, George, "Music and the Politics of Sound: Nationalism, Citizenship and Auditory Space," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, **18**, 5:597–613, 2000.

Ruane, Joseph and Jennifer Todd, "Old and New Irish Nationalisms: Reading the Belfast Agreement," in J. Ruane, J. Todd, and A. Mandeville, eds., *Europe's Old States in the New World Order: The Politics of Transition in Britain, France, and Spain*. Dublin, Ireland: University College Dublin Press, 2003, 121–145.

Secor, Anna, "Towards a Feminist Counter-Geopolitics: Gender, Space, and Islamist Politics in Istanbul," *Space and Polity,* **5**, 3:191–211, 2001.

Sparke, Matthew B., "A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security, and the Biopolitics of Citizenship on the Border," *Political Geography,* **25**, 2:151–180, 2006.

Suslov, Mikhail, "Geographical Metanarratives in the Post-Soviet Realm: Pan-Slavism," *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, **53**, 5:575–595, 2012.

Szabó, Mikló, *Az újkonzervativizmus és a jobboldali radikalizmus története (1867–1918)* (*The History of New Conservatism and Right-wing Radicalism [1867–1918]*). Budapest, Hungary, 292–297, 2003.

Szendrei, László, *A Turanizmus* (*Turanism*). Máriabesnyő-Gödöllő, Hungary: Attraktor, 2010.

"Szegedi Resigns from All His Posts," n.d., [http://www.jobbik.com/jobbik_news/jobbik-announcements/3253.html].

Szilágyi, Tamás, "Sacred Characteristics of the Nation: Hungarianism as Political Religion?," 2011 [http://www.revacern.eu/exchange-programme/EP-paper szilagyi.pdf].

Tamás, Gáspár M., "Where We Went Wrong," *International Socialism*, 123, June 2009 [http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=555], last accessed October 18, 2012.

Tamás, Gáspár M., "Hongrie, laboratoire d'une nouvelle droite (Hungary, Laboratory of the New Right)," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February 2012 [http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2012/02/TAMAS/47418], last accessed October 18, 2012.

Thrift, Nigel, "It's the Little Things," in K. Dodds and D. Atkinson, eds., *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought*. London, UK: Routledge, 380–387, 2000.

Todd, Jennifer, "Social Transformation, Collective Categories, and Identity Change," *Theory and Society*, **34**, 4:429–463, 2005.

Ungár, Tamás, "Sarjad a vetés (Stems from the Crop)," *Népszabadság Hétvége*, September 22, 2012, 12.

Ungváry, Krisztián, "Turanism: The 'New' Ideology of the Far Right," *Budapest Times*, February 5, 2012.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook 2010*. Washington, DC: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2010.

Vámbéry, Ármin, *A Magyarság Keletkezése és Gyarapodása* (*The Formation and Growth of the Hungarians*). Budapest, Hungary: Franklin-Társulat, 1895.

Vardy, Steven B., "The Impact of Trianon upon Hungary and the Hungarian Mind: The Nature of Interwar Hungarian Irredentism," *Hungarian Studies Review*, **10**, 1:21–41, 1983.

Vona, Gábor, "Turanism Instead of Euro-Atlantic Alliance," n.d. [http://www.jobbik.com/jobbik_news/europe/3198.html], accessed April 2011.

Winternitz, Judith, "The 'Turanian' Hypothesis and Magyar Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century," in R. Sussex and J. C. Eade, eds., *Culture and Nationalism in the Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe.* Columbus, OH: Slavica Publishers, 1985, 143–158.

WJC (World Jewish Congress), *World Jewry Digest*, November 2012.

Zempléni, Árpád, *Turáni dalok. Mondai és történelmi hős-énekek* (*Turanian Songs, Historical and Heroic Songs*). Budapest, Hungary: Franklin-Társulat, 1910.

Žižek, Slavoj, "Why We All Love to Hate Haider," *New Left Review,* 2:37–45, 2000.