Trzy pierwsze prace w sekcji „Studiów doktrynalnych" dotyczą teologii wszechmocy Bożej. Pierwsza, pióra M. Palucha, ograniczając się do omówienia roli zasady niesprzeczności w definicji wszechmocy, ukazuje zasadnicze przesłanki stanowiska Tomasza, formułowane w oparciu o tradycję i w dyskusji ze współczesną mu teologią. Dwie następne, których autorami są P. Napiwodzki i M. Przanowski, zajmują krytyczne stanowisko wobec dzisiejszych negacji wszechmocy wiążąc jedne z funkcją i rolą języka, inne z psychologizującym postrzeganiem postępu, z nową formą antropomorfizmu lub z pytaniem o możliwość uprawiania teologii po doświadczeniach Auschwitz, z niezrozumieniem transcendencji Boga. Prace te przedstawione były 30 września 2008 na sesji o Wszechmocy Bożej zorganizowanej z okazji pięćdziesięciolecia Instytutu Tomistycznego i trzydziestolecia śmierci jego założyciela, Ojca Bernarda Przybylskiego. Ta okoliczność pozwala uczcić pamięć O. Przybylskiego opartym na materiałach archiwalnych opracowaniem jego „teologii oddania się Matce Bożej", dokonanym przez Bogusława Kochaniewicza. W trzech ostatnich artykułach tego działu znajdzie Czytelnik obszerne i krytyczne omówienie poglądów kilku uczonych „anglosaskich". Poglądy A. Peacock'a, wybitnego uczonego i teologa, omawia M. Tabaczek. Dominikańską szkołę filozoficzną w River Forest, jej osiągnięcia·oraz programowy wysiłek, aby odczytać na nowo i zrekonstruować filozofię św. Tomasza na podstawie jego komentarzy do Arystotelesa i skonfrontować ją ze współczesnymi naukami, przedstawia M. Pieńkowski. P. Lichacz zajmuje się „organem moralnym", wedle M. Hausera wrodzonym i usytuowanym w mózgu, skąd kieruje ocenami i działaniami moralnymi. Dostrzeżone podobieństwa owego „organu" do znanego scholastyce zmysłu wewnętrznego, dopuszczają porównanie obu stanowisk i dokonanie ich oceny. Czytelnik otrzymuje tu jasny wykład Tomaszowej teorii poznania zmysłowego.

Nasze „Archiwum dominikańskie" przynosi czysto historyczną rozprawę o sporach polskiej prowincji dominikanów lub niektórych jej klasztorów z duchowieństwem diecezjalnym w w. od XIII do XV. Wspomniana już okoliczność pozwala opublikować na zasadzie wyjątku pracę Józefa Puciłowskiego o inwigilacji O. Przybylskiego i Instytutu Tomistycznego przez służby bezpieczeństwa.

Dobrej lektury!

Zenon Kałuża

György Geréby
Medieval Studies Department,
Central European University, Budapest (Hungary)

WHAT ANSELM AND GAUNILO TOLD EACH OTHER[1]

In the following analysis I would like to propose a novel approach to the famous and curiously challenging argument of Anselm of Canterbury for the real existence of God. Ever since its publication, the argument has inspired a wide range of commentators, from enthusiastic supporters to scathing critics, with all kinds of modest "colourings" or more ambitious reworkings in between. It has been commented on and reflected upon in the most varied ways by practically every major philosopher over the centuries.

The fact that it has retained its mysterious quality of attractiveness testifies to the fact that the argument contains a truly puzzling and perplexing problem. The deeper scope of the problem is usually taken to be, as the generic term for these kinds of argument suggests, the problem of existence. It is the problem of concluding existence from concepts which has kept readers intrigued, and this is why the "ontological argument" has remained such a respectable subject for commentaries, despite the many serious charges that claim the argument is based on simple logical fallacies. One could probably

summarize the issue by saying that it is this deep problem which explains the attraction of the work, while Anselm's surface argument can be more easily disposed of. With due respect, I beg to disagree. I suggest that it is the formal side of the argument which is of real interest, as it deals with a set of very subtle issues, while the "problem of existence" does not play an important role at all in Anselm's argument. In addition, the argument itself is not based on a simple fallacy. I would be ready to go as far as to claim that it is not even an "ontological argument." The real issue in Anselm's case (which, as I will try to show, is not the case with later truly "ontological arguments") is the issue of the levels of logical language and the nature of proof. It will be along these lines that my reconstruction will try to do justice to the attractiveness of Anselm's argument, while at the same time it will attempt to point out the real problems with his assertions, an exercise which will be more involved than merely pointing out a number of simple mistakes.

Since my strategy will be to look at the original form of Anselm's proof as contained in the 2nd chapter of his *Proslogion* (dated 1078), I would like to state in advance that in my reconstruction I will set aside many traditional issues that concern the argument. I will therefore take Anselm's argument — which is clearly an original piece of logical argumentation — at face value. Even though there are earlier records of certain elements included in the argument, the work as it stands still provides some uniquely original insights.[2] Therefore, from a methodological point of view, the historical element will be kept to a bare minimum. In exchange for neglecting religious content, my reconstruction will concentrate on the presuppositions of the argument. The analysis will be charitable, but not uncritical: the ultimate result is to show precisely *where* and *why* the argument was wrong, despite its *prima facie* validity — but simultaneously to demonstrate why the claim of validity can be justified to some extent. My claim is that the argument is much more sophisticated than generally assumed, and that this can be shown in a precise way.

To spell out the intricacies of the argument, I will provide an unusual type of formal reconstruction. In it I will try to avoid both wrong-headed simplifications and overly complex approaches, such as the recent attempts to reconstruct the argument in the various systems of modal logic.[3] I claim that there

is no reason to buy into the unavoidable intricacies of modal systems, as this would be an attempt doomed to failure from the very beginning, since any one of the various axiomatizations of modal calculi would allow criticism in terms of another system, and intuitions. Instead a more appropriate formalism will be offered, as this is surest way to spell out the presuppositions and dissect the author's reasoning.

The appropriate formalism is needed since the argument put into the terms of simple logical systems, such as propositional logic or first-order predicate logic, would inevitably lead to the omission of some of Anselm's key premisses. Alternatively, the reconstruction will have to be made in higher order logic, although this reconstruction will not require anything beyond second order standard logic with identity. (As opposed to modal versions.) However, once we have shown this to be a necessary requirement, it will also become apparent that this operation will spell doom for the argument, since certain characteristics of the argument will lead to an unavoidable — and insurmountable — metalogical difficulty.

It is well known that Anselm's argument was first criticized by an otherwise unknown contemporary named Gaunilo, a fellow monk from Marmutier, in his *Libellus pro insipiente* [*Short treatise on behalf of the fool*]. Anselm tried to defend himself against the objections, and supplemented his argument with further points in a rejoinder. Based on my proposed framework I will also plead that Gaunilo, the other — albeit much-neglected — genius involved in the debate, was aware (at least to a certain degree) of the intuitive difficulties that Anselm's logical tools led him into, and this formed the basis of his criticism.

For this reason, the interpretation takes the approach that Anselm's proof is a proper example of logical proof, and that its refutation is therefore a properly logical one. (As opposed to the interpretation of e.g. Karl Barth.) Both Anselm's original proof and Gaunilo's counterarguments will be put into the language of one unified system. The approach will hopefully point out the unusually tricky issues involved in analyzing Anselm's proof, and reveal some of Gaunilo's great insights into the nature of logical proof. (As opposed to those, like Kant, who considered Anselm's proof as a simple fallacy.) Again, by looking at some highly interesting criticisms of various philosophers, the interpretation presented here will be indirectly substantiated.

---

[2] See Eadmer's account of the illuminating experience of Anselm, Eadmer, VA i.19, quoted by R.W. SOUTHERN, *Saint Anselm. A portrait in a landscape*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 128: "Behold, one night during Matins the grace of God shone in his heart and the matter became clear to his understanding, filling his whole being with immense joy and jubilation."

[3] A magnificent analysis of the best modal argument by Kurt Gödel was provided by my colleague, Ferenc CSABA, "Az ontológiai bizonyítás és Kurt Gödel," [The Ontological

---

Proof and Kurt Gödel] *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle* 43 (1998): 57–69. A general introduction to the "ontological arguments" can be found in G. OPPY, *Ontological Arguments and Belief in God*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; A. PLANTINGA, ed. *The Ontological Argument*, London: Macmillan, 1968, and J. HICK, A.C. McGILL, *The Many-Faced Argument*, London: Macmillan, 1967.

The novelty of the approach I suggest is that it offers a unified framework for the discussion of both Anselm and Gaunilo in such a way that — to some extent — it justifies both parties in a systematic way. What I find interesting in their debate is that there is neither a simple mistake committed by Anselm, nor is there a simple refutation by Gaunilo. As I see it, there are a number of inherent structural ambivalences in the argument, and their precise location is rather tricky to point out, as they allow a perpetual iteration of their positions.[4] They can re-establish their positions over and over again, provided that their opponent posits a conclusion. Neither of them is perfectly right or perfectly wrong: they are both falling victim to the decoys their logical language provides them with. In order to develop this interpretation, it is necessary that we specify the common assumptions of a unique logical framework that accounts for both the manoeuvres that justify their approaches, and the tricks that their logic plays on both of them.

Such a reconstruction will hopefully help us understand why Anselm's argument has remained captivating for so long, and why no less brilliant minds have found the conclusion to be deeply counter-intuitive.[5] My proposal is that these details point to the existence of a deep-rooted ambivalence, rather than mistakes of a simple nature. There must be a reason why both of these intuitions are so strong.

First of all, we have to clear up a methodological problem. It seems trivial to state that a proof is either "good" or it is not. It either contains a fallacy, or it is valid. Am I going to propose that one could warrant the validity of both positions at the same time? Not at all. Anselm's argument ultimately fails, but it fails in such a way as to be infinitely repeatable. This possibility of the iteration or reopening of the argument (even though it ultimately fails) is the key to its long-lasting attraction. Thus, the reiterative character of the argument is the real problem to be solved. The analysis proposed here highlights the rather complex issues assumed by the argument, which relate to the higher

problems in model theory and natural language semantics, and, if treated in a naïve way, allows for an infinite chain of restatements. Of course, the 11th century arguments could not take into account much later developments in logical argumentation — but thoroughly insightful opponents seem to have had rather deep intuitions on the subject.

As I said I will not deal with the history of the debate. I will look at some historical issues, but only when the reconstruction of the logical structure requires so. I will restrict myself to Anselm's proof, and by this I mean I will not deal with the Cartesian version, which I consider to be a hugely inferior version. As I said, I will not enter into the thorny issues of distinguishing meditation from argument, or whether the argument is rather a prayer, and whether it presupposes belief in God. I simply take it for granted that Anselm meant what he said, and that he said that his text was an argument for proving the real existence of God, since it was Anselm himself, after all, who used the phrase 'unum argumentum' for his proof. Not only Gaunilo, but also later scholastics clearly understood him this way. Again, I think that Anselm did not consider belief in God as a pre-requisite for the argument, for if that was the case, then why would he have to persuade the Fool? He would have considered a belief in a solely conceptual God that had no real existence to be more foolish than anything else. However, he does assume an understanding of a definition of God, but more about this later. Suffice it to say that if Anselm assumed, that is, presupposed the real existence of God in the argument, and then assumed the Fool to doubt it, he would have rendered the Fool so stupid that probably no argument could have ever possibly convinced him. The argument, therefore, will be treated as a proper subject for logical investigation, irrespective of its solemn subject, the real existence of God.

Again, as I said above, I saw no need to introduce a modal context for the analysis of the argument. While this approach was very popular in the last century, the many attempts failed to convince me of the advantages. A reconstruction has to be as simple as possible, and the extensional interpretation I propose is already complex enough for the purpose. Anselm himself never recurs to modal *principles* in his version of the argument. His use of modal terms is part of the rhetorical language he employs to indicate inferences, but these are only logically redundant and dispensable stylistic elements.

Finally, I assume that the basic elements of my reconstruction do indeed occur in the texts of Anselm and Gaunilo bequeathed to us. I do admit that the texts — especially that of Gaunilo — are sometimes very difficult to interpret. A detailed justification could not be provided, since it would have required a separate treatment, and here I wanted to concentrate on the essen-

---

[4] This is why I am alluding to the famous article of Lewis CARROLL, "What the Tortoise Said to Achilles," *Mind* 4, No. 14 (April 1895): 278–280.

[5] As an illustration let me quote Bertrand Russell who remembered: "the precise moment one day in 1894, as I was walking along Trinity Lane, when I saw in a flash (or thought I saw) that the ontological argument is valid. I had gone out to buy a tin of tobacco; on my way back, I suddenly threw it up in the air, and exclaimed as I caught it: 'Great Scott, the ontological argument is sound'." The description of this intellectual insight is not that far removed from Eadmer's account of Anselm's. The two cases are quoted and compared by R.W. SOUTHERN, *St. Anselm...*, p. 58. Southern quotes B. Russell, (1944) 'My Mental Development,' in P.A. SCHILPP, *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, New York: Tudorm 1951, p. 10.

tials. Therefore I will forgo the long and detailed justification, even though I will, of course, provide a textual basis. At least in some cases I will certainly be left to invoke the principle of charitable interpretation.

For the sake of clarity, I will first structure the argument and isolate the premisses. Then I will put forward the language of analysis. As a third step, I will propose the reconstructed version of the proof, with a detailed justification of the proposed premisses. Fourth, I will look at the simple criticisms, and then proceed to some of the best counter-arguments I believe can be found in Gaunilo's text. Finally, as part of the summary, I will look at the Cartesian version in order to demonstrate the superiority of Anselm's original argument.

1. The structure of Anselm's argument

Let me now provide a side-by-side juxtaposition of the Latin text and my reading of it. In some cases I also add versions of the sentences repeated later in the text. In the fourth column I suggest what I take to be the logical function of the text. The Latin text is in a semi-natural language, a kind of technical and regimented Latin, which I have rephrased only slightly in translation (modifying personal pronouns, changing to 3rd person, and so on). Required additions — in elliptic structures — are in square brackets. Emphases are mine.

1.1.	*'Et quidem credimus te [Deum – GyG] esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit,'* or *'aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest.'[6]*	[God] is something, than which nothing greater can be thought.[7]	Definition
1.2.	An ergo non est aliqua talis natura.	Can it be that a thing of such nature does not exist?	Formulation of the problem
1.3.	*Dixit insipiens in corde suo 'non est deus.'*	The fool has said in his heart: "there is no god". (Ps 13, 1; 52(3), 1).	Existential premiss.
1.4.	*hoc [1.3] cum audit intelligit, ...* or *cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico [1.1] intelligit quod audit.*	The fool [1.3] understands what is spoken about [1.1.] and understands what he hears.	1.4. instantiated for the Fool
1.5.	*quod (insipiens) intelligit, in intellectu eius est ...* or *... quidquid intelligitur, in intellectu est.*	What is understood [by the fool] is in his mind. In a generalised form: 'Whatever is understood is in the mind.'	hypothesis

[6] For the Latin text I used the *Opera Omnia*, ed. F.S. Schmitt, Vol. I, 1946, p. 93–122. For the logical structure the textual variants are not significant.
[7] I use the translation of M.J. Charlesworth in the volume: Anselm of Canterbury, *The Major Works*, B. Davies and G. Evans eds., Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 87–89. I slightly modified the translation if necessary.

1.6.	*Aliud ... est rem esse in intellectu et aliud intelligere rem esse.*	For it is one thing for an object to exist in the mind, and another thing to understand that an object actually exists.	hypothesis
1.7.	*...hoc, cum audit, intelligit...* [for "hoc" substituted] *hoc ipsum quod dico: 'aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest', intelligit quod audit.*	The Fool hearing the definition 1.1. understands the definition (as a sentence).	Inference from 1.1, and 1.3
1.8.	*Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest ...*	The thing defined in 1.1. is at least in the mind.	Inference from 1.4, and 1.5
1.9.	*Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, ... (quod) potest cogitari esse et in re, ...maius est ...* (emphasis – GyG).	For if it exists solely in the mind, it can be thought to exist in reality *also*, which is greater.	Definition of 'being greater'
1.10.	*Si ... id, quo maius cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu, id ipsum, quo maius cogitari non potest, est, quo maius cogitari potest.*	If then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in the mind alone, this *same* that-than-which-a-greater-*cannot*-be-thought is that-than-which-a-greater-*can*-be-thought .	Conclusion from 1.1, 1.8, 1.9
1.11.	*Sed certe hoc esse non potest.*	This case is obviously impossible.	Impossible conclusion of lemma.
1.12.	*Existit ergo... aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet et in intellectu et in re.*	Therefore there is .. that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought *both* in the mind *and* in reality.	Conclusion of the argument from 1.11.

As a first conclusion I would like to suggest that Anselm presents his argument in a clearly articulated way. He takes care of the formulation of definitions to indicate inference, and proceeds towards a conclusion. Once introduced, he employs the definitions and connectives precisely, even at the expense of getting complex.

Now in the second step I would like to show in what sense Anselm can claim that his argument is formally correct. The argument assumes a language and a special universe of discourse, the elements of which will be deployed first.

2.0. The presuppositions of the Anselm — Gaunilo universe and its vocabulary.

Let it be:

2.1.   R   is the non-empty set of mind-independent phenomena. Such things can be individuals or individual facts. *Commentary: I will consider "real" and "actual" (or "truly", "in reality", or even "objective") to be synonyms, which all*

mean that something exists independently of the mind, or in other words, separately of the thinking subject. This realm is not empty. There is no indication to suppose that there are no things in the world that are independent of being thought about. One could even weaken the assumption to the point that there are at least certain real things that are independent of the mind of the fool. The assumption is warranted by the declaration of the fool that there is no god in reality. It is important to note that by "phenomena" I mean not only material substances, but any individual entity, be it physical, non-physical (e.g. mental, or spiritual), or individual facts.

2.2.   S   is the non-empty set of (individual) persons. *Commentary: the Fool must exist if he is to utter his judgement about the non-existence of God.*

2.3.   P   is the set of sentences, formed by correct syntax from the usual logical and set-theoretical signs, such as the sentences (formulas) formed e.g. from the logical operators "∈", "~", "=", "∃", "∀", ">", "&", "⊃", "!"; the function names "C", "T"; set names "S", "P", "I", "R", "U", "V", individual variables, individual names, predicates (e.g. F(a)). Naturally, the sentences formed by negation, conjunction or disjunction are also sentences. The sentences stand between single quotation marks ' ', as opposed to their isomorphic counterparts among the sentences understood (or "in the mind"), which stand without quotation marks. *Commentary: the elements of P are uninterpreted sentences, uttered by the persons of S. This set can be empty, e.g. if there would be no persons, or all persons would just remain silent. In our case this set can not be empty, since the Fool utters at least one sentence. This is why premiss 3.1.1. below is an existential premiss (that is, it has an existential import). Modern parlance: every sentence-token is in this set.*

2.4.   I   is the set of intelligible phenomena, which represent the phenomena in the mind that are intuitively the meanings of the sentences in P (one could take them as sentence-*intensions*). P ∩ I ≠ ∅. Every *i* element of I is an isomorphic pair of a $p \in P$ sentence, which is written as: if 'F(a)' ∈ P , then $i_{F(a)}$ is its picture in I. Convention: the pair of 'p' in I can be signalled by p. The corresponding pair of sentence 'p' in I, that is p or i_p is isomorphic to 'p' as regards its logical content: the predicates forming 'p' correspond to predicates, the in-names to in-names, and the constants to constants. *Commentary: I will consider "conceivable things", and "things in the mind" as identical to the term "intelligibles". The modal facet in "conceiv*able*" can be disregarded, like in the case of the obtainable goods in a shop, which are those that are in fact in the shop. For the present case there is no need to suppose that there are other things to be understood (or thought of) beyond the realm of sentences, or their component parts.*

2.5.   T = S X P → I   is the function of "thinking of", which assigns to sentences uttered by persons an intelligible element *i* of I. *Commentary: on the basis of 2.4. the value of the function is the "meaning" of the sentence p in P, corresponding structurally to the sentence p.*

2.6.   C = I → R   is a correspondence-function, which assigns to certain elements of I certain different elements of R, in such a way that individual names are assigned to individuals, predicates to listed ranges of extensions, and sentences to facts.

2.7.   V = { i |i ∈ I, ∃ r. r ∈ R, r = C (i)}   is the set of those intelligible things (thoughts or concepts), which have a counterpart, or a corresponding element in reality R. *Commentary: Compare 2.1.*

2.8.   U = I \ V   is the set of those thoughts, or phenomena of thought and concepts which do not have a corresponding real pair, that is, of those thoughts which do not have a counterpart, a corresponding element in reality R. *Commentary: Anselm introduces this case by the example of the painter. Before actually painting the picture, the painter has a concept (only) of the picture. When it will have been executed, there will be a real counterpart of the thought.*

2.9.   ∩ {R, S, P, I,} = ∅   R, S, P, I are disjunct sets. *Commentary: see 1.5. above*

2.10.   R, S, P, I, U, V ≠ ∅   *Commentary: consequence of the above assumptions.*

2.11.   U, V ⊂ I; U ∪ V = I; ∩ {U,V} = ∅   U, V are real and disjunct subsets of I, which divide I completely

2.12.   b ∈ S   *b* is the individual name of the Fool, who is a person

2.13.   g   the individual name for God

3.1. The proof of the thesis: ∃ r. r = C (g)

3.1.	T (b, ' ~ ∃ r. r = C (g) ')	*The Fool says in his heart that there is no God.*	Existential premiss
3.2.	g = $_{def}$!x. ~ ∃ y. y > x	*God is the one thing greater than which can not be conceived.*	Definition, stipulating uniqueness
3.3.	∀x. x ∈ P & ∃y. T(y, 'x') ⊃ x ∈ I	*What is said and understood is in the mind.*	Assumption, on T def., (= 2.5)
3.4.	g ∈ I	*What is understood by the Fool of the definition is in his intellect.*	3.3; 3.1.

3.5.	$\forall i. \forall j. i \in U, j \in V, j > i$	*Whatever is in the intellect and also in reality is greater than that which is solely in the intellect.*	def. (= 1.8)
3.6.	$g \in V$		lemma
3.7.	$g \notin V$	*g is only in the intellect. ('God is only a concept' — but a concept he is)*	Assumption for the *reductio ad absurdum*
3.8.	$g \notin V \Rightarrow g \in U$	$\forall w. \ w \in V \veebar w \in U$	Assumption 2.11.
3.9.	$V \neq \varnothing$	*V is not empty.*	Assumption 2.10.
3.10.	$\exists j. j > g$	*There is a greater thing than God in the mind (a concept which is an element of V).*	2.1.4; 2.1.5.3.
3.11.	$\sim \exists x. x > g \ \& \ \exists x. x > g$	*God is the greater-than-which-can-not-be-conceived and God is not the greater-than-which-can-not-be-conceived.*	2.1.1.; 2.1.5.4. Contradiction. Conclusion of the *reduction*.
3.12.	$g \in V$	*Lemma Q.E.D.*	Conclusion of lemma
3.13.2	$\forall v. \exists r. r = C (v)$	*Applying the character of V*	Definition
3.14.2	$\therefore \exists r. r = C (g)$	*Q.E.D.: God is in the intellect in such a way that he has a counterpart in reality.*	1.1; 2.1.5.6.
3.15.	$'C(g)' \in R$	*Lemma: God exists in reality.*	Rule of detachment

It is clear that given the assumptions the conclusion seems to follow from the premisses. But are the premisses justified?

3.2. Justification of the premisses

3.2.1. It is important to observe that 3.1. is an existential premiss. It has often been neglected in the reconstructions that an existential conclusion necessarily requires that there be an existential premiss. Therefore it is absolutely necessary for the Fool to pass a judgment if the argument is to continue. Otherwise the premiss 'g ∈ I' would never work, and the whole argument would collapse. Anselm seems to have been very well aware of this, since he adopts a rather subtle strategy to secure the premiss, that is, the voicing of the opinion of the Fool. He quotes a psalm (either Ps 14, 1 or 53, 1), which guarantees the occurrence of the utterance for all times, so to say. The Fool of Anselm is not just an empirical fool — but an instance of an eternally existing position.

3.2.2. In premiss 3.3. g is considered as an individual name and it is introduced by a definition. God is a singular term (expressed by the "!" uniqueness operator), a name, of which we only know that nothing (conceived or otherwise, it is not specified yet) is greater. It is important to secure the quality of uniqueness, since the *"thing greater than which can not be conceived"* would allow for more than one such maximal element. It is for this definition of God that Anselm has received not only serious criticism, but also unsavoury endorsement. The criticisms ranged from the impossibility of defining God to the form of the definition. The endorsements on the other hand, detected in the definition the ultimate formulation of Anselm's personal belief, and then the personal religious nature of such a belief-premiss would have rendered it unassailable. As for the first problem, I take it as a sign of Anselm's logical acumen that the term g is introduced through a definition. First of all, the premiss is required, and Anselm clearly sees that the meaning of the term can not be assumed to be something self-evident. Secondly, it is a matter of convention whether we stipulate that the set I has an element like g, or not. Some commentators identify here the religious presupposition of Anselm, since this definition is for God, who is to be believed in. I do not see here a special case of belief, and therefore the apology based on religious conviction is ill-meant. In a general sense, Anselm is theologizing or speaking about God, but in the definition he does not make use of any special theological pleading. He only offers a "minimalist" formula which should be acceptable — he thinks — even for Fools. Now why would there be only one g? Is not the definition already implying that God really exists (that is, does the definition not imply a kind of *petitio principii*)? I take it that Anselm would first reply that for a Christian there is only one God, at least on the basis of the Creed. Second, setting the Creed aside, reason also supports the uniqueness of God, since if there was more than one god, they would either be equal to each other, or different, in which case one would be greater or have "more" than the other(s). If they were unequal, then some of them would not be unlimited, or all-powerful. Limitation would also be implied by multiplicity even if they were equal, since they would be limited with respect to the other's equal omnipotence. A multiplicity of gods can not be absolute and all-powerful, and this goes against the assumption of the properties found in the Biblical concept of God.[8] As for the logical allegation that the definition of God as that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought would imply a "defining into existence," one could answer that even a cursory look at the definition shows that there is no existential import implied by the formula. A definition specifies that the logical use of a name has a meaning which at most implies a concept of the mind — and in

---

[8] Anselm puts forward this argument in the *Monologion*, ch. 1. For an English translation see ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, *The Major Works*, p. 11.

fact even this will not be assumed without much ado by Anselm. Therefore, there is no *petitio principii*.

3.2.3. This formula is an often neglected but very important step in Anselm's train of thought that shows his great care in formulating the argument. In the previous premiss he gave a *nominal* definition of God. Anselm's move is a far cry from defining God "into existence", since he does not take it for granted that there is a concept corresponding to the nominal definition. Rather, if a sentence is said and if it is understood, that sentence will have a corresponding element in the mind. Thus it is sure that the concept of God is not just repeated by the Fool as by a parrot, but is assigned as an element in the mental realm as well.

3.2.4. In this step Anselm offers the conclusion that the Fool has a concept of God in the mind. This step is crucial, since it is not a name–phenomena connection that Anselm wants to build his argument on, but a concept–phenomena relation. Without the introduction of concepts, the function T would be superfluous, and definition of God would be meaningless.

3.2.5. Premiss 3.5. is the definition of "greater". If we are correct in our understanding, this idea (which has caused a great number of headaches for commentators) is a deceptively straightforward and simple concept, which is based on the intuition that something is greater than something else, if it has everything that the other has, plus something more. That is, the smaller is a "real part" of the other. The straightforward interpretation can be seen both in the formulations of Anselm ("not only ... but also ..."), and in his example of the painter. The plan (or idea) of the picture compared to the picture realized (in addition to the concept) is a clear instance of such a "greater" relation.

There are numerous advantages to this definition. First, unlike "perfection" it does not imply modalities, and the intensional context can be avoided. Second, in this way Anselm avoids the vexed question of comparing concepts to things, since he is comparing only two concepts: one, which does not have a corresponding element in reality, and another, which has. Anselm has been often understood to compare something real with something in the mind (in fact at least at once by Gaunilo).[9] If Anselm had indeed meant this, a rather serious problem would crop up, since then the smallest of the bacteria would then be "greater than" the idea of the Glass Mountain. Again, if God would be the "greatest" thing *imaginable* in reality then our *imagination* would be the criterion for ordering real things. If somebody would *imagine* that the greatest

_____
[9] GAUNILO, *Libellus pro insipiente*, c. 5; ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, *The Major Works*, p. 108.

thing *imaginable* (among real things) would be a vintage Rolls-Royce, then this would qualify as God according to the simple understanding of "greater". But Anselm's idea is better than these. He compares, as we said, not disparate, but similar things: concepts of the mind to each other. This is why g will have to be one of the two concept types, either being an element of V or of U (indicated by an added asterisk). In this case we compare concepts, in the way that if i is an element of U, then any element j of V is greater than i, since j has all i has, plus a significant addition, namely a corresponding element in R. The important issue here is that j is equally a concept as i except that j has the corresponding element in R, and this is their only difference. (One could also say, that g ranges over I, and the stipulate that for every g there is either an element i of U, or, alternatively, an element j of V, to which g would be identified.)

3.6. The lemma proves a perfectly sensible point. If there is a concept $i \in$ I, it is a meaningful question to ask which of the mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets it belongs to: that is, whether $i \in$ V or $i \in$ U. (3.8) This is an especially pertinent question regarding the maximal element g.

4. Criticisms of the argument

4.1. Traditional criticisms

On the basis of the above reconstruction the argument looks valid. Does it then prove the existence of God? As I said above, there were very strong intuitions voiced in the earliest critiques that state it does not. But then where is the mistake?

One of the most famous objections levelled against the argument is attributed to Immanuel Kant. The essence of his criticism is that ontological arguments, which are concluded by attributing the property of existence to a subject, cannot be conclusive, since they assume the existence of the subject to which they want to attribute being. A predication of existence is therefore either tautological if the subject exists, or impossible if it doesn't. Existence can not be an ordinary property, only a second-order predicate, as Frege observes. Many versions of Kant's argument have been proposed against Anselm, but all of them point to the same basic flaw about predicating existence. Now this argumentation is certainly correct. What this reconstruction shows, however, is that Anselm's argument does not use existence as a predicate, and therefore the Kantian objection is irrelevant. The argument simple does not assume an existence-predicate anywhere. I will indicate later that Kant's objection is valid only against the Cartesian type argument, which is indeed ontological, making use of existence as "perfection."

Another set of objections are raised against the modal versions of the argument, but since this reconstruction does not need modal operators, I will set them aside for now.

As a first step in the criticism, let us look at the premisses to see whether they can be accepted.

As for the first premiss, let us observe that this existential premiss is absolutely necessary for Anselm's argument. Legend has it that it was Schopenhauer who noted — quite wittily — that the easiest way for the Fool to refute Anselm's argument would be *to remain silent*. If the Fool would not say in his heart that "there is no God", or at least not voice it publicly, he would not be forced to understand what he said, and so on. If the Fool keeps silent, *g* will never become an element of *I* and the argument will never get off the ground.[10]

Another way of rejecting the argument would be to attack the definition of God, which was a well-known criticism made by Thomas Aquinas. He judiciously said that the Fool is not bound by anything to accept this particular definition, since it does not necessarily correspond to an intuitive concept of God. Indeed, there are many possible theologies that do not think about God as the "greater-than-which-can-not-be-conceived," (or, we may add, as a *single* such entity). Such theologies are, for example, those of Greek polytheism and Stoicism. Even an atheist such as Lucretius would not be forced to accept the definition. If the real existence of God is impossible, why would anyone be inclined to identify God with the greatest thing conceivable?

The interesting impact of this objection on the argument would be that while it would not prove God (since God could be conceived in a different way to the definition), it would still prove the existence of *something*. The argument would still prove that, given an appropriate model, the conclusion about the real existence of something would follow (to this we will return below.)

Also, it highlights that Anselm's universe of interpretation (his model) is weak in the sense that *must be* one that allows for a maximal element. This means that the rejection of the definition of God by Aquinas can be given a stronger formulation: why should one accept that the world is arranged in such a way that it must have a single maximal element? What if *g* is not interpreted in *I*? One can easily think of an *I* which does not allow for such a total ordering of its elements that results in a maximal element. As it is well known, there are such universes, including the universes of numbers, prime numbers, and of naïve set theory.

[10] I could not identify this reference in Schopenhauer. He certainly considered it as a charming joke.

Again, the fifth premiss could be criticized on Platonic grounds. The definition of "being greater" would not be acceptable for someone who thinks that the existence of an intelligible reality (like Platonic or divine ideas) "exists more," in a more elevated and real sense than ordinary reality. An idea is for the Platonist certainly more real than those things which exist changeably in physical reality. Against this one could say that it would be absurd to think — and Anselm would no doubt agree — that the mental idea of God is more real than his real existence. If this were the case it would permit the concoction of the most absurd entities. Again (and an appropriate distinction was developed by the later Platonists of the Roman period as well) one should differentiate between mental ideas, and the "real", independently subsisting ideas that exist in a different realm. The idea of God Anselm speaks about is certainly of the first kind, while the Platonist's ontological preference pertains to the second.[11] It is precisely because of this that Anselm's definition works, as it does not allow for a confusion of subjective intelligibility with the subsistent, ontologically independent realm of intelligible ideas.

4.2. The Gaunilo-type counterarguments

Let me now turn to the counter-arguments of Gaunilo who, I think, proposed specifically different and even more interesting objections to those raised above. As his text is rather convoluted it is extremely difficult to precisely establish his strategy. Nevertheless, I will attempt a reconstruction. My first methodological observation is that Gaunilo is more generous than others in analysing Anselm's argument. He does not look for simple mistakes, but it is as if he looks beyond finding a successful criticism towards an actual examination the very nature of proof. This is the motivation, I think, behind his counterexample of the "greatest island", which to my mind points to a strategy that does not want to show that the argument fails in a simple sense; instead, Guanilo's strategy attempts to demonstrate that Anselm's argument is in fact much too fertile. And Gaunilo doesn't seem to be bothered with attacking the premises individually either. Instead, he takes Anselm's argument seriously, and turns it against him by referring to his own so-to-say "success." He deploys two arguments along these lines.

4.2.1. Gaunilo's first argument

As it is well known, Gaunilo first raises the counter-argument of the greatest island, greater-than-which-can-not-be-conceived. Now what does this ar-

[11] This is the famous Neoplatonic distinction between *noeros* (mind-dependent), and *noetos* (mind-independent) ideas.

gument mean? Does it mean that the argument is bad because it proves the existence of some absurd object? The *reductio ad absurdum* may be understood in this way, but there might be another interpretation, too. The argument must equally well be problematic if it is *too good*. What Gaunilo shows, is that once set in motion, the argument cannot stop. Gaunilo's point is that here Anselm found an argument so fertile that it does not terminate at proving God's real existence. Gaunilo apparently intuited a basic problem with a valid argument. If an argument is valid, then it can be schematized. If it can be schematized, and it is satisfiable according to interpretation *A*, then it will remain satisfiable for every isomorphic interpretation (*A**) as well. That is, if Anselm's interpretation has one model, then it will have more. Plainly speaking, the argument will yield an appropriate conclusion when applied to any suitable interpretation, where there are persons, statements, or concepts (or meanings of statements which can be understood); where there is a possible difference between concepts that have real counterparts and those that do not have them, and finally, where a maximal element can be stipulated that is at all conceivable. In all such cases it can be proven that the *g* of the actual interpretation can only be of the kind which has a corresponding real element, that is, it also exists in reality. That is, if the argument is good, then it will also be good for any isomorphic interpretation of its intended interpretation. For example, such interpretations could also be used in qualifying arguments for the greatest island, the best car (better-than-which-can-not-be-conceived), the best wild boar stew, the best football-player and the most evil creature. All these interpretations, of which each one is more peculiar than the other, are all equally qualified to yield real existence, since they all satisfy the requirements for an isomorphic interpretation of Anselm's intended interpretation.

4.2. Gaunilo's second objection

I take Gaunilo's equally brilliant second counter-argument as follows. Once again, he seems to allow the conclusion to be valid. However, what does the acknowledgement of the conclusion ∃ r. r = C(g),' commit the Fool to? Here comes the trick. Even if the Fool admits the validity of the argument, the acceptance of the conclusion only implies that he *understands* what the *sentence* ∃ r. r = C(g)' means. Why can he say this? Since — in order to get the argument moving — Anselm had to make it possible to speak *about* a sentence uttered by the Fool (namely that there is no god, see 1.3, and formally 3.1.). According to the reconstruction above — which is now confirmed by Gaunilo's counter-argument as well — the necessary existential premise requires the Fool to say his foolish judgement aloud. If I may refer back to this

move, it is required to secure a concept of God in the mind of the Fool. In order to secure this concept, Anselm has to introduce the T function above (2.5), and by this he has to allow *reference to sentences* in his semantic theory. Anselm needs to allow reference to sentence-tokens. The discerning modern reader has already detected the implication of this, namely semantic closure, the systematic origin of the liar-paradoxes. Gaunilo, however, need not be credited with Tarski's theory. He has no need of generalising what he observed in the single case of Anselm's proof. It is enough for him if any sentence thought of by a person (2.5) can be interpreted in the sense of the T function.

If it is generally accepted that T (s, 'p') ⇒ p ∈ I, then Anselm can, correctly from the point of view of his proof, only assume that p ∈ I, and not that p ∈ V, since *the understanding of any sentence whatsoever will only imply that there is a meaning-pair of the sentence in the mind, that is, there will be a 'p' sentence thought of or conceived.* And this remains true irrespective of the interpretation of the conclusion of the argument, that is, whether the conclusion is about the real counterparts, or not. Any understandable sentence, as a formula, must have an apparent form — and the ambiguity between form and content was introduced by Anselm himself.

Therefore the conclusion of the proof can be regarded only as a sentence (a well-formed formula of Anselm's logical language), of which, since it is a proven conclusion, we can safely assume that we have understood it, and not just mentioned it. But then let us apply the T function to the formula ∃ r. r = C (g)'!

$$T (b, \exists\, r.\, r = C\, (g)') \models i_{\exists\, r.\, r = C\, (g)} \in I, \text{ while it does not follow that: } i_{\exists\, r.\, r = C\, (g)} \in V.$$

If Anselm's argument is valid, then we arrived to a conclusion, but this conclusion will have to be *understood*, that is, we have to apply the function T in order to understand the conclusion, and by the same move we will arrive to I. In *I*, however, we will have to decide again whether ∃ r. r = C (g)' is an element of U or V.

Therefore, if the conclusion of the proof is a sentence, and if it is understood by anybody, either by Anselm or by the Fool, then it has not achieved more than bringing about an element of I, about which no one yet knows whether it is a thought with a real counterpart or not.

Therefore, from Anselm's valid conclusion all that follows is that the Fool encounters a sentence, which, like any other sentence, if understood, only commits him to have an understanding of it in his mind. But from understanding the conclusion, the real existence of God does not follow. Any con-

clusion will be systematically ambiguous: it may be taken in a significative sense, in its object-language meaning, but it can equally well be taken as a *name* of the object-language sentence on the second-order language. Because of the systematic ambiguity of the conclusion nothing more follows than an *understanding* of something as a real object.

5. The rejoinder of Anselm

5.1. To answer Gaunilo's first objection Anselm clearly saw that he had to solve the uniqueness of the model. This meant that he would have to ensure that it is *theoretically* necessary for his argument to have only one interpretation. Such a single interpretation is required to interpret g adequately as the One God, and not only as one specific such element greater-than-which-can-not-be-thought-of which is part of a *restricted* interpretation. For if the interpretation is not a *maximal* interpretation, the successive enlargements will always allow for the re-emergence of another possible "greatest" element. Therefore the problem emerges, whether one can find a way to ensure that there can only be one and only one interpretation of the union of the premisses and the conclusion (or, more precisely, whether it is impossible to satisfy the union of the premisses and the negation of the conclusion). Now to counter any such attempt, Gaunilo claims that there *will always remain a* possibility for other maximal elements.

Anselm follows the natural strategy of suggesting the union of all models. On this suggestion one could consider all "maximal elements," like the greatest island, the best car ("better-than-which-can-not-be-conceived"), the best wild boar stew, football-player and the most evil creature (just to list the examples above, but the list could continued at will), and view at them as one group, in order to find the "truly maximal element." Anselm seems to suggest that all these other "maximal elements" belong to their respective smaller universes, and once put together they will dwindle and fade in the light of the truly greater-than-which-can-not-be-conceived element, that is, God. In this case, intuitively nothing precludes the maximal element of the union of the interpretations from being the unique "greater-than-which-can-not-be-conceived," and that this unique element by definition would be greater than any partially maximal element g of any restricted interpretation. From the point of view of this maximal interpretation, that is, *sub specie aeternitatis*, the synoptically conjoined "world of all worlds," Gaunilo's examples would all become partial examples of g or only local g-s. Therefore, according to Anselm, Gaunilo's inflationary argument for the multiplication of "greatest things" will fail, since nothing will secure the fact that all these g-s will remain g-s in a maximal interpretation. What is more, since the uniqueness of g was stipulated, all other g-s will necessarily be demoted to ordinary elements. Therefore the argument can indeed be reduced to concern the real existence of the single, truly unique g, which would intuitively be identified with God. Thus, according to Anselm, the argument can be restricted to this single case, and parsimony will be secured against proliferation.

At this point the educated modern reader will instinctively turn to Russell's well-known paradox of the impossibility of the set of all sets. The maximal element of the union of all worlds smacks of inconsistency, or even impossibility. But Gaunilo does not need such overkill (and, historically speaking, he was no Russell *avant la lettre*, either.) For him a weaker argument suffices. All right, he could have said, let's go back to repeating the argument (this is an argument *pro Gaunilone*, in fact). If the original argument is conclusive regarding the maximal interpretation, then it has at least one interpretation. But then, necessarily, it can be interpreted according to any interpretation I* isomorphic with interpretation I, which would yield yet another interpretation. For any repetition of Anselm trying to secure the maximal, or "all-embracing" inclusion, Gaunilo's move will be repeatable as well. Example: let one such I* *interpretation* be the following: let I be the set of all imaginable interpretations. Let i* be that maximal element, greater-than-which-can-not-be-conceived in I. Then i* will really exist in this interpretation. But this element i* of I is clearly not god, since it is an interpretation only (the elements of I are *interpretations*). Now the greatest interpretation, whether it exists or not, clearly cannot be identical to God in any meaningful theological sense, and thereby the uniqueness is once again corrupted.

In sum: if it is always possible to find at least one more model, in which there can be assumed a maximal element, then besides the g of Anselm there will always be a similar g* for Gaunilo, which means that Anselm's strategy for securing the uniqueness of his argument fails.

5.2. To counter Gaunilo's second argument Anselm reapplies his argument. Let us indeed allow that we have only conceived the conclusion. Then let us posit again the question: is "g' ∈ R' an element of the mind only, or does it exist in reality as well? But then this very statement that God exists in reality ("g' ∈ R') has to be considered as a statement uttered by somebody: T(b, ' 'g' ∈ R'), but then it will become an element of I. Now again, will this g belong to U or to V? Is g ∈ U or g ∈ V? (We have to ask this, since the g shows up in the formula of P.) Thereby we are back to step 3.8. Then again we will conclude that g ∈ V. But if g ∈ V, then for C(g) there is such an r ∈ R that r = C(g). Therefore g exists in reality.

Oh yes, answers Gaunilo smilingly, but then we are back to square one. The new conclusion is a sentence again, and so on, and so forth. He should only refer to Anselm's strategy again when introducing the T function, which remains in force, and will be applicable to any sentence that is in need of understanding.

On the above interpretation these are the counter-arguments of Gaunilo that win the day. I take their real weight to be in the understanding that the argument's problematic aspect is not the neglect of ordinary logic, but that these are the metalogical consequences of the Anselmian "calculus." It is a much trickier point which shows that any such argument will be doomed to failure on the second level, precisely because of the ingenious move that allowed it to succeed on the first level. To put it succinctly, it is not enough for an argument to be conclusive formally: its semantics have to be appropriate, too. Without separating the metalogical level, however, the ambiguous character of Anselm's calculus (since it is semantically closed) is strong enough to accommodate Gaunilo's conclusion, and enable Anselm to re-start his argument over and over again. This, in turn, would invite Gaunilo's counter-arguments. If the first, the second, but if the second, then we get back to the first, and so on.

6. Summary

Let me now recapitulate my main findings. Anselm's argument was reconstructed with the help of a second order extensional language (with identity), and it was found to be *prima facie* conclusive. The success of the reconstruction shows that there is no need to introduce modal terms. It was also shown, however, that the required language is not of first order, but of second order, since it has to allow reference to sentences. Moreover, it is not an *a priori* argument, since for the existential conclusion an existential premiss is needed, which was identified in the often-neglected statement of the Fool. Again, the argument seems to depend on the underlying three-tier semantic theory (spoken words or sentences — meaning — extraneous things), which formed the backbone of logical theory in the Latin Middle Ages. Finally, the intuitive appeal of the argument may lie with its peculiar nature, namely that in a semantically closed context it leads to an infinite metalogical cycle.

As a final point, let me now fulfil my promise to show that the Anselmian argument is not an "ontological" argument of the Cartesian type. In a nutshell the argument of Descartes in the *Fifth Meditation* runs as follows: since God, as a supremely perfect being necessarily has every perfection, and since existence is a perfection, necessary existence is contained in the clear and distinct idea of God. Or, to put it another way, God also possesses the perfection of existence. Setting aside niceties, one could identify the following basic differences to Anselm's argument: 1. Anselm's definition of God, as the "greater-than-which-can-not-be-conceived" is different from the concept of a "supremely perfect being". Conceiving is not just a rhetorical element here: it implies the "T" function above. 2. The concept of the one-place predicate "perfection" is missing in Anselm, since for him the key concept is "greater", which is a two-place relation. 3. For Anselm, existence is not a vague notion of "perfection", but a well-defined concept of membership ("belonging") in a realm, specified by correspondences between realms. 4. Anselm's argument is not without an existential premiss, unlike that of Descartes. 5. The argument of Descartes seems to require a modal context, while that of Anselm does not. The Cartesian concept of "necessary existence" can not be represented in a purely extensional environment. 6. Anselm's proof does not require the use of existence as a first order predicate (it is for him a second-order predicate), while for Descartes it is first-order. There is also a similarity, though, namely that "perfection" is a predicate of properties, and therefore the Cartesian proof, I suggest, should also be reconstructed in terms of a second-order language.

Finally, I'd like to make the autobiographical remark that I largely owe the above thoughts to the enlightening influence of Gaunilo's modest little treatise on behalf of the Fool. We know precious little about Gaunilo, close to nothing compared to what we know about Anselm. But besides his personal story, if I understand correctly that he thought along the lines suggested above, then he deserves to be listed among the great saints of the history of philosophy alongside Anselm — even if he was a little mean to him on at least one point, as indicated above.[12]

Irrespective of his pending canonisation, Gaunilo, I suppose, remains patient in waiting, since he has other things to do in the meantime. I imagine that both of them are sitting somewhere opposite each other, two saintly Benedictine genii, and for every move of Anselm, Gaunilo reapplies Anselm's T function, to which move Anselm repeats his ingenious argument, and they will continue to do so — until Judgement finally comes.

gerebygy@ceu.hu

[12] Formal reconstructions are not goals in themselves. Formal methods may help to see certain implications more clearly. To illustrate the advantages of this methodological approach, I would like to add a few interesting corollaries resulting from the above reconstruction: 1. If God exists (is in reality R), there can be nothing greater conceived. 2. if there is only one world, then it is the greatest (most perfect) conceivable. 3. As Anselm's argument employs existence as a second-order predicate, which is implied in the conclusion "g' ∈ R', there emerges an interesting dilemma: it is either the case that existence is a predicate, or else we have to suppose the existence of a mental language. This latter strategy was taken by the medieval logicians, in fact, by Anselm himself.

CO POWIEDZIELI SOBIE
ANZELM I GAUNILO

STRESZCZENIE

Autor, za pomocą czysto ekstensjonalnej formalnej rekonstrukcji w logice predykatów drugiego rzędu, przedstawia nowe spojrzenie na debatę Anzelma z Canterbury z Gaunilo z Marmutier nad zamieszczonym w *Proslogionie* argumentem za istnieniem Boga. Spojrzenie to pozwala rozpoznać rzadko brane pod uwagę aspekty dowodu Anzelma. W analizie ustala się najpierw, że argument jest konkludywny na pierwotnym poziomie, a potem jednocześnie – dokładnie z tego powodu, że jest prawomocny, ale w semantycznie zamkniętym języku – wykazuje się, że argument prowadzi do nieskończonego metalogicznego ciągu. Wydaje się, że Gaunilo wyczuwał te metalogiczne pułapki. Jego pierwsza obiekcja (argument z doskonałej wyspy) opiera się na metalogicznej naturze prawomocnego dowodu, mianowicie, że jeśli prawomocny dowód jest satysfakcjonujący w jakiejś dziedzinie, jest równie satysfakcjonujący w każdej izomorficznej dziedzinie. W niniejszej interpretacji druga obiekcja Gaunila (oparta na myśleniu o istnieniu doskonałego bytu) wskazuje na metalogiczny charakter dowodu Anzelma, który wprowadził odniesienie do zdań w niezbędnej przesłance egzystencjalnej: „Głupi mówi, że *p*”, gdzie *p* znaczy: „Nie ma Boga”. Kontrargumenty Anzelma są skuteczne w tej mierze, że dla każdego zarzutu Gaunila można powtarzać początkowy argument z tą samą prawomocną konkluzją, lecz ta konkluzja będzie znowu otwarta na zarzuty Gaunila. Tworzy to nieskończony cykl argumentów i kontrargumentów, ponieważ omawiany dowód ma charakter metalogiczny. Rekonstrukcja dostarcza kilku interesujących wniosków. Po pierwsze, dowód Anzelma nie jest trywialnie błędnym argumentem. Po drugie, nie jest on dowodem „ontologicznym” i fundamentalnie różni się od argumentu Kartezjusza. Po trzecie, nie wymaga on istnienia w użyciu predykatywnym. A nawet, ostatecznie, wydaje się, że występuje konieczna alternatywa pomiędzy przyjęciem istnienia jako predykatu lub wprowadzeniem języka mentalnego do dyskursu.

Henryk Anzulewicz
Albertus-Magnus-Institut, Bonn (Niemcy)

ŚW. ALBERT WIELKI
O NATURALNYM PRAGNIENIU WIEDZY

„Może ktoś zapyta, co jest ową rzeczywistością w człowieku, która sprawia, że wszyscy ludzie z natury pragną wiedzy. Człowiek dąży mianowicie do osiągnięcia tego, czego pragnie, a jeśli pragnie tego z natury, pragnienie to będzie silniejsze, co z kolei wzmocni w nim zapał do studiowania”[1]. Tymi słowy rozpoczyna nauczyciel św. Tomasza z Akwinu, św. Albert Wielki, w komentarzu do *Metafizyki* Arystotelesa, swój wywód o naturalnym pragnieniu wiedzy, o tym, czego ona dotyczy oraz skąd się bierze rozmaitość studiów. U wielu ludzi jednak, dodaje Albert, objawów takiego pragnienia nie spostrzegamy[2]. Przyczyną tego jest, jego zdaniem, zepsucie obyczajów i skłonności, które oddalają człowieka od jego własnej natury i sprawiają, że nie jest ona w stanie bezustannie pobudzać go do studiowania, lecz pozostaje w stanie możnościowym, będąc skrępowaną przez sprzeczne z nią nawyki[3].

Ponieważ Albert jest przekonany, że wiedza sukcesywnie przyswajana przez studium prowadzi do mądrości, doskonalącej nasz umysł, który jest w nas niejako czymś boskim, jak twierdzi nie tylko we wspomnianym komentarzu do *Metafizyki*, lecz i w innych swoich dziełach[4], staje się w tym kontekście zrozumiałe jego radykalnie intelektualistyczne pojęcie człowieka. Intelektualistyczny radykalizm Alberta nie ogranicza się do sfery teoretycznego poznania, lecz dominuje także w jego koncepcji etyki, nauki filozoficznej

---

[1] Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, I, 1, 5, ed. B. Geyer, Münster 1960 (*Opera Omnia*, Ed. Colon. XVI/1), s. 7.44–48: „Quaeret autem fortasse aliquis, quae illa natura in homine sit, qua omnes homines natura scire desiderant. Homo enim studet adipisci, quod desiderat; et si desiderat illud natura, vehementius erit in ipsum desiderium, et hoc vehementius accendet ad studium”.

[2] *Tamże*, s. 7.49: „Et hoc in multis hominibus non videmus”.

[3] *Tamże*, s. 7.65–70: „Et quia corruptelae consuetudinum et affectionum a natura deducunt hominem, ut in X Ethicorum probatum est, ideo natura haec non semper potest movere ad studium, sed manet in potentia et virtute, contrariis habitibus naturale bonum corrumpentibus impedientibus, ne in actum procedat”.

[4] Por. Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, I, 1, 1, s. 1.11–12; *De anima*, I, 2, 9, ed. C. Stroick, Münster 1968 (*Opera Omnia*, Ed. Colon. VII/1), s. 43.49–50; *De natura et origine animae*, tr. 2, c. 6, ed. B. Geyer, Münster 1955 (*Opera Omnia*, Ed. Colon. XII), s. 29.67–68.