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The quality of social, partisan and governmental representation

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Introduction

The concept of representation occupies a central place in political science and in contemporary democratic theory. Representative government – from a historical perspective, a relatively new device – is the principal 'organisational tool' of modern democracies, in spite of the increasing popularity of fuzzy 'governance' structures and the spread of various techniques of direct democracy. Some sort of representation is always necessary, due to the simple fact that the formulation and implementation of policies requires a division of labour among citizens.

The process of political representation in complex, developed societies consists of a multitude of actors, of their characteristics, relationships and actions. Citizens, voters, candidates, parties, cabinets, bureaucrats, independent regulatory agencies, courts, ombudsmen, the media – all are linked in the chain, or rather web, of representation. The criteria used to evaluate the quality of representation are also diverse: similarity, communication, accountability and responsiveness are perhaps the most relevant ones. Depending on the values and interests of the evaluators, but also on the fashions of political science, different elements and different criteria are placed in the limelight.

In this chapter we depict many aspects of the development of political representation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) across countries, in time and in comparison with Western Europe. It is composed of a rather 'shallow but broad' overview of certain phenomena that – directly or indirectly – are related to the quality of representation and, consequently, to democratic performance. No specific relationship between Europeanisation and representativeness is assumed, although we lean towards a conception of Europeanisation as 'return to Europe' by CEE countries, rather than 'Europeanisation as a consequence of accession'. This particular contribution thus does not analyse and broaden our knowledge of how specific features of EU governance impact on the quality of representation, although we do

assume that this kind influence does take place, even if it is seen as indirect. At the same time we share the view of many scholars (see the introductory chapter by Paul Lewis) that the impact of the EU and Europe on political and party systems of the CEE countries is vague and, if detected, only weak.

The phenomenon of political representation is typically focused on the attitudes of voters and of elected representatives. The bulk of the relevant literature is concerned with the similarity of attitudes and values between voters and MPs and with the part played by perception, legislative behaviour and the constituency work of representatives (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Barnes, 1977; Achen, 1978; Kuklinski, 1978; Monroe, 1979; Luttberg, 1981; Page and Shapiro, 1983; Dalton, 1985; Converse and Pierce, 1986; Holmberg, 1989; Powell, 1989; Hill and Hinton-Andersson, 1995; Esaiasson and Holmberg, 1996; Kitschelt *et al.*, 1999; Miller *et al.*, 1999).[1] This focus is understandable, justified and legitimate. But the picture that emerges can only be partial, as other relevant relationships are neglected. For a more accurate assessment one should also consider whether the electorate truly represents the citizenry and whether the government is in tune with the preferences of the voters.

In line with the classical tradition, we contrast voter preferences for particular parties with the attitudes of the elites of the same parties. But in order to balance out the bias of the literature we also look at the representative character of the voters and of the government, thereby complementing existing knowledge with new perspectives and information.

Additionally, we also consider citizens' opinions about the process and actors of representation. To take these evaluations at face value would be a mistake. But to leave them out of the analysis and judge the quality of representation entirely on the similarity of some sort of 'objective' characteristics also smacks of a paternalism that politicians and political scientists should equally try to avoid. We assume that, in order to talk about high-quality representation, citizens are needed who care about politics and who find elections important ('relevance component'). They also must be satisfied with the most fundamental process of representation, parliamentary elections ('satisfaction component'). Finally, they must also trust the principal vehicles of representation, the parties and the party politicians ('trust component').

Since Hannah Pitkin (1967), it is customary to distinguish 'standing-for' and 'acting-for' types of representation.[2] While the first assures a similarity between those represented and their representatives in terms of descriptive, socio-demographic and social-background characteristics, the second projects a principal–agent relationship relating to links between the two units of representation. By analysing the social characteristics of the active part of the electorate and the profile of governments, as well as proximities between elites and voters in selected policy domains, we are able to evaluate both types.

Concerning 'standing for', *descriptive* representation, we focus on the differences between the politically active and passive parts of society, in other words between voters and non-voters in terms of gender, social status (income, class identification and education), ethnicity, religion, residence (urban vs rural) and age. Many of the hypotheses below refer to descriptive representation, or to put it differently, to the inequality of participation. The 'acting-for' type of representation will be assessed through the proximity of voters and governments according to left–right ideological orientation and the EU issue.

The literature on the 'democratic deficit' and on the 'confidence gap' of Western politics is immense (Nye *et al.*, 1997; Pharr and Putnam, 2000, etc.). For CEE one should expect even more significant problems with representative democracy. The speed of social, economic and technological change, the fragility of political parties and the lack of a robust civic culture present major obstacles so far as a smooth linkage between political and social structures is concerned. One might particularly question the relevance of the 'Responsible Party Model' to the region. The model postulates – among other things – that parties compete for voters' confidence and support on the basis of programmes they promise to implement once in office, and that these programmes are distinguishable and comprehensible to the electorate. If parties offer distinctive policy packages citizens can make meaningful choices. But for these choices to be not only meaningful but also consequential one needs parties that can behave as unitary actors and determine government policies by controlling parliament. The model works where party names have real substance, and party systems offer significant policy diversity (Sartori, 1968; Harmel and Janda, 1982: 29; Dalton, 1985; Thomassen, 1994).

The Responsible Party Model is intimately linked to party system institutionalisation. A solid argument can be made in favour of a positive relationship between the accuracy of political representation and the level of party system institutionalisation. Familiar patterns of party politics may help citizens in identifying actors (agents) whom they can trust, while the agents in such systems are in a better position to honour the trust invested in them. But the link between the institutionalisation of party politics and the quality of representation is not as straightforward as might seem from the argument above. Institutionalisation may also mean the freezing of a structure that systematically favours certain groups to the detriment of others. Moreover, institutionalisation is supposed to be accompanied by strong emotional ties between citizens and parties. Ultimately, societies and polities arrive at cleavage structures, in which 'full closure of social relationships' and 'encapsulation of certain groups within political organisations' take place. Such ties may cloud the way of thinking and may thereby loosen the *rational* preference-based links between parties and voters. The analysis

below will examine this dilemma by contrasting East and West and by comparing post-communist countries with each other.

Representation happens neither in a historical nor in an institutional vacuum. Characteristics of the political environment – most importantly presidentialism vs parliamentarism, majoritarianism vs proportionalism, concentration vs fragmentation – all have a potential impact on how representation is played out. So does the changing social and political context as the respective countries move from the transition period into the EU-membership era. Our analysis will therefore examine the relationship between the accuracy of representation and political institutional factors, on the one hand, and temporal changes, on the other. Given the large number of aspects and the large number of hypotheses to be investigated, we refrain from complex multivariate analyses and focus on bivariate relations.

The following section contains our specific hypotheses. The hypotheses 'alienation', 'polarisation', 'the role of state', 'economic success', 'institutionalisation' and 'personalistic institutions' refer to subjective aspects of representation. The hypotheses 'capitalism', 'mobilisation' and 'divided societies' take the inequality of electoral participation as dependent variables and are closely identified with the *standing-for* type of representation. The 'saliency', 'majoritarianism', 'maturity' and 'dominance of political phenomena' hypotheses are applied to policy-proximity scores and relate to the *acting-for* type of representation. Finally, the 'democratisation' hypothesis can be investigated at all three levels.

Hypotheses

The hypotheses that structure our research are primarily focused on temporal trends and on intra-regional differences. Concerning the first, the fundamental question is how the quality of representation has changed during the nearly two decades that have passed since the collapse of the communist regimes. This period has also been a period of gradual integration with the EU (cf. Enyedi and Lewis, 2006), so the data analysed reflect on the processes of democratisation, consolidation and Europeanisation. The fundamental hypothesis is that, as time progresses and as the processes listed above advance, the accuracy of representation increases. On the basis of this expectation the match between representatives and represented improves as citizens gradually learn the democratic game and as political institutions adapt to the preferences of citizens.

- *H1. Democratisation hypothesis: The discrepancy between electorates and society gradually decreases, citizens learn to appreciate the functioning of representative democracy and the policy distance between governments and voters declines.*

In spite of the relative success of the transition in terms of economic development and the expansion of freedom, reality cannot match the high hopes. Disappointment and frustration may alienate citizens from politics and lead to a depreciation of the structures of representative democracy. Falling turnout, the success of populist forces and the well-documented spread of distrust and cynicism all make this counter-scenario probable.

● *H2. Alienation hypothesis: Attitudes towards elections as a mechanism of representation gradually turn negative.*

Another pessimistic scenario can be based on the economic aspects of transition. The transition from communism to capitalism entails growing inequalities. Electoral participation tends to be driven by resources (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Social inequalities therefore spill over to the political arena, creating a gradually less representative electorate.

● *H3. Capitalism hypothesis: The discrepancy between electorates and society gradually increases in favour of the high-status groups.*

The history of mobilisation among the poor and the discriminated in the West and the logic of intensive preferences suggest, however, a more positive development. According to this scenario the losers of the transition are particularly motivated to try to alter their fate by collective action, including voting. Those with fewer channels to express their demands are the ones who need the state most, and will therefore participate disproportionately in the elections. They are the ones who need the state most, who have fewer channels to express their demands, and will therefore participate disproportionately in the elections. Time is needed for mobilisation, of course, but by the end of the 1990s we would expect signs of active political engagement.

● *H4. Mobilisation hypothesis: From the end of the 1990s the discrepancy between electorates and society increases in favour of low-status groups.*

Governments and parties may not be representative simultaneously on all possible issues. Representation of the European issue is expected to be worse than that of the left–right dimension. After all, left–right placement is a fundamental organising tool of political discourse in the region (Markowski, 1997), while attitudes to the EU are less central and play a secondary role in electoral campaigns.

● *H5. Saliency hypothesis: Governments and parties will represent voters better on a left–right dimension than on the European issue.*

Concerning the social level, we expect serious problems with representation in the more inegalitarian societies. Inequality has increased in most

countries quite radically since the early 1990s, but the country differences are significant. According to the Gini coefficients (see World Bank and CIA websites) the Baltic countries and Poland are the most unequal societies. Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Slovenia form a more egalitarian group.

● *H6. Divided societies hypothesis: The more inegalitarian (in economic terms) the society is, the more disproportionate the electorate becomes compared to the citizenry.*

From a rationalist perspective, politics is relevant if the stakes are high and if involvement in politics may have a significant impact on the everyday life of citizens. This situation occurs if existing alternatives differ widely and if politicians decide on a wide range of matters (including economic). Accordingly, we propose two hypotheses:

● *H7. Polarisation hypothesis: In countries where sharply divided antagonistic forces rule party competition, more people will think that it matters who is in power and that it is important for whom citizens vote at elections.*
● *H8. The role of state hypothesis: In countries where government intervention in the economy is limited, people will question the relevance of who is in power and for whom citizens vote at elections.*

On the basis of the polarisation hypothesis we expect Hungarians, Bulgarians and Slovaks to have high scores, and Slovenians to have low scores (Estonians would also be expected to care little about politics, but on these questions we have no data on Estonia). The second hypothesis singles out the Czech Republic and Poland (and again Estonia) as countries where the role of government in the economy is moderate and therefore citizens are expected to attribute a low relevance to politics. We expect the 'satisfaction component' to be mainly a function of economic success. In rich and fast-developing countries citizens tend to express satisfaction about political institutions and processes as well.

● *H9. Economic success hypothesis: Satisfaction with elections as a means of representation will be primarily found in rich, economically successful countries.*

In the light of this hypothesis we expect the voters of Slovenia and the Czech Republic to be most satisfied, and Bulgarians and Romanians to be most negative. The 'trust component' can be measured against two different attitude objects: parties and party leaders. We expect parties to fulfil their representative function well in institutionalised party systems. The Czech Republic and Hungary have the most institutionalised party politics in the region, and therefore we expect Czechs and Hungarians to value parties particularly.

● *H10. Institutionalisation hypothesis: Parties are appreciated as the instruments of representation in countries that have consolidated party systems.*

Party leaders are expected, however, to play an acknowledged role in the representation process in systems where institutional factors facilitate personalistic politics. This is to be expected particularly in Lithuania, Poland and Romania, where presidents are directly elected and have considerable power.

● *H11. Personalistic institutions hypothesis: Party leaders are seen as fulfilling a representative role in systems that contain elements of semipresidentialism.*

Finally, we apply institutional hypotheses to intra-regional differences in the representative quality of governments. According to the studies of Lijphart and Powell, societies that have fewer parties and have a more majoritarian institutional system are more likely to produce unrepresentative governments. In our sample Hungary, Lithuania and, if one counts strong presidents as majoritarian institutions, Romania constitute the more majoritarian bloc. Party system fragmentation, not representing a constitutionally defined feature, also reflects on the majoritarian nature of a country's political life. If the fragmentation of the party system shapes the quality of representation, then we should expect representative governments in Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and very unrepresentative ones in Latvia and Slovenia.

● *H12. Majoritarianism hypothesis: Countries with majoritarian electoral systems, strong presidents and few parties have less representative governments.*

In terms of party–voter proximity, the quality of representation is expected to be higher in the West than in the East. The deficiencies of political culture, the fluidity of party landscapes and the simple lack of time most likely prevent post-communist societies from developing accurate matches between masses and elites.

● *H13. Maturity hypothesis: Stable democracies have better party–voter proximity scores than the newcomer CEE societies.*

Finally, in both regions party–voter proximity scores are likely to be shaped primarily by political factors. Social background (primarily education) will most probably contribute to high-quality representation, but we expect various political orientations (party identification, political attitudes etc.) to play a more decisive role.

● *H14. The dominance of political phenomena hypothesis: Purely political factors have a larger role in shaping the quality of representation than do social structural factors.*

Analysis

Representation as proportional participation of socio-demographic groups

Tables 8.1A through 8.1I show how the electoral participation of selected socio-demographic groups developed between 1995 and 2007 (the time points, in most cases, were 1995, 1999, 2004 and 2007, but for some of the variables we have only two time points).

As far as gender participation is concerned, the differences between men and women stayed statistically significant throughout the period, but then decreased gradually (the Adjusted Residuals went down from 4.1 in 1995 to 2.9 in 2007). More importantly and more interestingly, the original male over-representation not only diminishes but turns into over-representation of women by 2007.

In terms of age, we note significant differences in the voter–non-voter ratio. The youngest cohort (18–35) is highly under-represented and – if anything – their relative absence at elections increases rather than declines over time. The middle-aged and the oldest cohort (60+) have been systematically over-represented, and the latter group has increased its share significantly during the twelve years between 1995 and 2007.

The results show a weak but significant positive relationship between educational attainment and participation. University graduates exert far more influence on parliamentary representation than people with primary education and, as time passes, the unrepresentativeness of the system increases. For the class factor, unfortunately we have only two time points – 1999 and 2007. Contrasting them indicates the growing under-representation of the working class and over-representation of the upper-middle class. The differences are not extraordinarily strong, but they are significant. A related factor – household income per capita – reconfirms the asymmetry between the rich and the poor, and the moderate tendency for this phenomenon to become more robust over time.

For religiosity/church attendance there has been a discontinuity in the wording of the question. For 1999[3] we used the only available question in the data set, one that asks in a rather 'nominal' way about the respondents' attitude towards religion; the data for 2004 and 2007 use the classical 'ordinal' question about the frequency of church attendance. The overall message is complicated because in 2004 we see no statistically significant differences among the religious groups. But the overall picture is one of slight over-representation of more religious citizens. The much talked-about urban–rural divide hardly appears in our data, although in 1999 there was some over-representation of the rural population.

Table 8.1A Electoral participation by sex

Sex		1995 vote (intention)			1999 vote			2004 vote (intention)			2007 vote		
		NV	*VT*	*Total*	*NV*	*VT*	*Total*	*NV*	*VT*	*Total*	*NV*	*VT*	*Total*
Male	%	43.6	48.3	46.9	45.3	49.1	48.0	44.9	48.1	46.8	50.3	46.2	47.3
	N =	*1156*	*3100*	*4256*	*1295*	*3765*	*5060*	*1622*	*2481*	*4103*	*812*	*2075*	*2887*
Female	%	56.4	51.7	53.1	54.7	50.9	52.0	55.1	51.9	53.2	49.7	53.8	52.7
	N =	*1494*	*3317*	*4811*	*1562*	*3910*	*5472*	*1992*	*2681*	*4673*	*801*	*2418*	*3219*
Total	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N =	*2650*	*6417*	*9067*	*2857*	*7675*	*10532*	*3614*	*5162*	*8776*	*1613*	*4493*	*6106*

Note: All statistically significant.

Table 8.1B Electoral participation by age (3 groups)

Age		1995 vote (intention)			1999 vote			2004 vote (intention)			2007 vote		
		NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total
18 → 35	%	41.8	32.4	35.1	48.3	28.7	34.0	34.9	33.2	33.9	44.7	28.0	32.4
	N =	1106	2076	3182	1375	2188	3563	1259	1712	2971	721	1259	1980
36 → 60	%	39.0	44.9	43.2	34.3	47.3	43.8	42.2	43.0	42.6	38.2	45.7	43.7
	N =	1033	2879	3912	976	3614	4590	1521	2217	3738	616	2052	2668
61 → …	%	19.3	22.8	19.3	17.4	24.0	22.2	22.9	23.9	23.5	17.1	26.3	23.9
	N =	510	1461	510	976	3614	4590	827	1232	2059	276	1181	1457
Total	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N =	2649	6416	9065	2845	7633	10478	3607	5161	8768	1613	4492	6105

Note: Statistically insignificant marked in grey.

Table 8.1C Electoral participation by education (3 groups)

Education		1995 vote (intention)			1999 vote			2004 vote (intention)			2007 vote		
		NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total
Primary	%	32.1	30.7	31.1	32.5	29.0	29.9	29.0	23.1	25.5	10.6	7.5	8.3
	N =	847	1961	2808	922	2219	3141	1044	1188	2232	171	336	507
Secondary (+ uncompleted)	%	59.6	58.4	58.8	56.0	55.2	55.4	62.4	60.8	61.5	75.8	70.9	72.2
	N =	1573	3730	5303	1590	4225	5815	2242	3128	5370	1223	3187	4410
Higher	%	8.3	10.9	10.1	11.5	15.8	14.6	8.6	16.1	13.0	13.6	21.6	19.5
	N =	220	694	914	327	1205	1532	308	826	1134	220	970	1190
Total	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N =	2640	6385	9025	2839	7649	10488	3594	5142	8736	1614	4493	6107

Note: Statistically insignificant marked in grey.

Table 8.1D Electoral participation by subjective class (4 groups)

Class		1999 vote			2007 vote		
		NV	*VT*	*Total*	*NV*	*VT*	*Total*
Working	%	54.5	50.9	51.9	45.6	37.3	39.5
	N =	*1346*	*3647*	*4993*	*736*	*1675*	*2411*
Lower middle	%	35.2	38.3	37.5	37.8	40.6	39.8
	N =	*868*	*2739*	*3607*	*610*	*1823*	*2433*
Upper middle	%	9.6	10.1	10.0	15.4	20.6	19.2
	N =	*238*	*720*	*958*	*248*	*927*	*1175*
Upper	%	.6	.8	.7	1.2	1.5	1.4
	N =	*16*	*54*	*70*	*19*	*68*	*87*
Total	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N =	*2468*	*7160*	*9628*	*1613*	*4493*	*6106*

Note: Statistically insignificant marked in grey.

On ethnicity the contrast between 1995 and 2004 reveals that the balance has shifted in favour of ethnic majorities. Given the cross-country differences and the fundamental differences in the character of various minorities, we must take a closer look at the trajectories of individual countries. One group – composed of the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia – shows a decrease in disproportionality. In all three cases it is the minorities' over-representation that disappears. Another group – Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia – shows significant differences between majorities and minorities (mainly Russian-speakers), with the majority being considerably over-represented. In the first two cases there is virtually no change over time, while in Latvia the majority's over-representation increased between 1995 and 2004. Finally, Bulgaria is a separate case, because in this country minorities are consistently over-represented at elections and the difference has even increased in favour of minorities.

To conclude this part of our analysis, the Democratisation and Mobilisation hypotheses receive little support, while the Capitalism hypothesis has been largely confirmed. Gender and ethnicity turn out to be exceptions; in their case representative accuracy increased and one could even see the over-representation of the weaker social groups. In two other instances (religion and urban–rural divide) there was no indication of poor representation. The slight over-representation of religious groups also fits the Mobilisation frame. But in most cases the trend was towards a decline in the quality of representation, although the level of misrepresentation has never become dramatic.

Table 8.1E Electoral participation by household income (4 groups, each year different income)

Household income		1995 vote (intention)			1999 vote			2004 vote (intention)		
		NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total
Lower 22% (1995) Lower 26% (1999) Lower 25% (2004)	%	23.4	21.6	22.1	32.9	23.9	26.3	31.6	25.4	28.0
	N =	525	1254	1779	845	1749	2594	939	1084	2023
22–55% (1995) 26–66% (1999) 25–53% (2004)	%	33.5	34.7	34.4	38.6	40.1	39.7	28.0	27.2	27.5
	N =	752	2012	2764	990	2926	3916	833	1159	1992
55–80% (1995) 66–86% (1999) 53–76% (2004)	%	23.2	24.9	24.5	17.1	21.4	20.3	21.9	23.4	22.8
	N =	521	1446	1967	440	1561	2001	651	998	1649
Upper 20% (1995) Upper 14% (1999) Upper 24% (2004)	%	19.8	18.7	19.0	11.3	14.6	13.8	18.5	24.0	21.7
	N =	444	1084	1528	291	1069	1360	549	1022	1571
Total	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N =	2242	5796	8038	2566	7305	9871	2972	4263	7235
Lower 26% (1999)	N =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: Statistically insignificant marked in grey.

Table 8.1F Electoral participation by place of residence (rural/urban)

Place of residence		1995 vote (intention)			1999 vote			2004 vote (intention)			2007 vote		
		NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total
Rural	%	39.8	42.4	41.7	25.6	27.2	26.8	34.9	37.0	36.1	20.4	20.6	20.5
	N =	1056	2721	3777	731	2078	2809	1259	1902	3161	271	777	1048
Urban	%	60.2	57.6	58.3	74.4	72.8	73.2	65.1	63.0	63.9	79.6	79.4	79.5
	N =	1594	3695	5289	2120	5562	7682	2345	3242	5587	1056	3002	4058
Total	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N =	2650	6416	9066	2851	7640	10491	3604	5144	8748	1327	3779	5106

Note: Statistically insignificant marked in grey.

Table 8.1G Electoral participation by religiosity (1999)/church attendance (2004, 2007)

| Religiosity/church attendance		1999 vote			2004 vote (intention)			2007 vote		
		NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total
Churches are wrong (relig.–1999)	%	5.2	4.1	4.4	26.1	27.6	27.0	23.2	21.6	22.0
Never (2004, 2007)	N =	143	304	447	917	1399	2316	359	942	1301
Not interested (religiosity–1999)	%	15.4	10.4	11.7	21.5	21.1	21.3	23.8	21.0	21.7
Once a year (2004, 2007)	N =	426	778	1204	753	1071	1824	369	917	1286
Cannot say (relig.–1999)	%	15.0	12.2	12.9	32.4	32.3	32.3	36.7	35.1	35.6
Few times a year (2004, 2007)	N =	415	911	1326	1137	1636	2773	569	1535	2104
In own way (relig.–1999)	%	39.7	46.0	44.3	17.0	15.7	16.2	13.9	18.1	17.0
Once a week (2004, 2007)	N =	1099	3444	4543	596	797	1393	216	791	1007
Follow the teachings (relig.–1999)	%	24.7	27.4	26.7	3.0	3.3	3.1	2.4	4.2	3.7
Several times a week (2004, 2007)	N =	684	2052	2736	104	166	270	37	183	220
Total	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N =	2767	7489	10256	3507	5069	8576	1550	4368	5918

Note: Statistically insignificant marked in grey.

Table 8.1H Electoral participation by left–right self-identification (3 groups)

L–R scale		1999 vote			2004 vote (intention)			2007 vote		
		NV	*VT*	*Total*	*NV*	*VT*	*Total*	*NV*	*VT*	*Total*
Left	*%*	28.0	29.5	29.1	26.4	27.7	27.2	16.5	22.3	20.7
	N =	506	1738	2244	641	1182	1823	266	1000	1266
Center	*%*	51.2	43.2	45.1	53.2	39.1	44.2	66.4	50.4	54.6
	N =	925	2544	3469	1291	1670	2961	1071	2266	3337
Right	*%*	20.8	27.3	25.8	20.4	33.2	28.6	17.2	27.3	24.6
	N =	375	1612	1987	495	1417	1912	277	1227	1504
Total	*%*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N =	1806	5894	7700	2427	4269	6696	1614	4493	6107

Note: Statistically insignificant marked in grey.

Table 8.1I Electoral participation by ethnic group membership

| Ethnic group		1995 vote (intention)			2004 vote (intention)		
		NV	VT	Total	NV	VT	Total
Main	%	90.0	89.6	89.7	84.7	89.3	87.4
	N =	2386	5740	8126	3057	4603	7660
Other	%	10.0	10.4	10.3	15.3	10.7	12.6
	N =	264	669	933	554	550	1104
Total	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N =	2650	6409	9059	3611	5153	8764

Note: Statistically insignificant marked in grey.

Subjective evaluations of system-representativeness

The subjective aspect of representation is typically discussed under the heading of political efficacy, political cynicism and/or political alienation. One of the questions in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data set that pertains to these characteristics is 'whether who is in power makes a difference or not'. Tables 8.2A through 8.2C show both the percentage distributions of the five-point scale and the means at two points in time in particular Central and East European countries.

Fewer citizens think that 'who is in power matters' in the early new millennium years than did so in the late 1990s. The differences are clear and significant. This result strengthens the Alienation hypothesis and casts doubt on the Democratisation hypothesis. The change towards cynicism is particularly spectacular in the Czech Republic and Poland. These two countries were joined in the Module 2 CSES data set by Bulgaria. The opposite trend is exemplified only by Hungary. On average, there is a contrast between the high scorers, Romania and Hungary, and the low scorers, the Czech Republic, Poland and Bulgaria.

A related question is whether 'who people vote for makes a difference'. Tables 8.3A through 8.3C show both the between-country and the temporal patterns. The temporal trend shows a slight decline in the belief of the meaningfulness of the vote. That is, the tests point again in the direction of the Alienation hypothesis. The decline in the belief in voting as an effective procedural democratic tool is most visible among Czechs, followed by Poles; at the same time the trust of Hungarians and Slovenes in the electoral game has increased. The highest support for the relevance of voting was found in Romania, Hungary and Slovenia, the lowest in Poland and Lithuania.

Table 8.2A Responses to statement: 'Who is in power can make a difference' (CSES, Module 1, 1996–2002)

	Czech Republic		Hungary		Lithuania		Poland		Romania		Slovenia	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. It makes a difference who is in power.	939	59.1	673	42.8	832	53.2	812	53.9	1114	70.8	1045	66.7
2. -----------	439	27.6	414	26.4	363	23.2	356	23.6	158	10.0	284	18.2
3. -----------	142	8.9	265	16.9	189	12.1	172	11.4	101	6.4	138	8.8
4. -----------	48	3.0	82	5.3	80	5.1	71	4.7	57	3.6	46	3.0
5. It doesn't make a difference who is in power.	21	1.3	136	8.7	101	6.5	96	6.4	143	9.1	53	3.4
Total	1589	100.0	1570	100.0	1565	100.0	1508	100.0	1573	100.0	1566	100.0
who is in power.	1589	100.0	1570	100.0	1565	100.0	1508	100.0	1573	100.0	1566	100.0

Table 8.2B Responses 2001–6 (CSES, Module 2)

	Czech Republic		Hungary		Lithuania		Poland		Romania		Slovenia		Bulgaria	
1. It makes a difference who is in power.	385	24.7	817	53.1	–	–	533	35.8	865	56.7	804	52.6	617	43.2
2. ----------	501	32.1	357	23.2	–	–	381	25.6	300	19.7	338	22.1	309	21.7
3. ----------	384	24.6	232	15.1	–	–	299	20.1	174	11.4	170	11.2	211	14.7
4. ----------	159	10.2	61	4.0	–	–	121	8.1	75	4.9	69	4.5	122	8.6
5. It doesn't make a difference who is in power.	134	8.6	71	4.6	–	–	156	10.5	111	7.3	147	9.6	168	11.8
Total	1562	100.0	1537	100.0	–	–	1491	100.0	1525	100.0	1528	100.0	1428	100.0

Table 8.2C Mean responses to statement: 'Who is in power can make difference' (CSES, Modules 1 and 2), Central and East European countries

	'Who is in power can make difference'		
	(1. It makes a difference who is in power . . . 5. It doesn't make a difference who is in power)		
Countries	*Module 1*	*Module 2*	*Statistical significance of differences between two points of time in each country (t-test)*
	Mean	*Mean*	
Czech Republic	1.6	2.5	***
Hungary	2.1	1.8	***
Lithuania	1.9	–	***
Poland	1.9	2.3	***
Romania	1.7	1.9	***
Slovenia	1.6	2.0	***
Bulgaria (2001)	–	2.2	***
Total	1.8	2.1	
Eta^2	.03	.04	
Statistical significance of differences between countries in each module (one-way anova)	***	***	

Note: *** sig. < .01; ** .01 < sig. ≤ .05; * .05 < sig. < .1.

The tendency in Hungary towards the growing recognition of the relevance of politics fits the Polarisation hypothesis, but we expected Bulgaria and Slovakia to score high as well, and Slovenia should have been particularly low. The low status of Poland is in line with the Role of State hypothesis. The shift of the Czech Republic and Poland in the direction of depoliticisation also strengthens the latter approach. The third CSES question, 'How well voters' views are represented in elections' taps the 'satisfaction component' of subjective representation. Tables 8.4A and 8.4B show robust cross-country differences.

According to the results, the citizens of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania are more enthusiastic about elections than the citizens of Slovenia and, especially, the Czech Republic (the difference is statistically significant as the between-country differences explain 4 per cent of the variance.) This ranking directly contradicts our Economic Success hypothesis. Perhaps in rich and successful countries citizens are more critical towards political

Table 8.3A Responses to statement: 'Who people vote for makes a difference' (CSES, Module 1)

	Czech Republic		Hungary		Lithuania		Poland		Romania		Slovenia	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Who people vote for won't make a difference	66	4.2	81	5.2	142	9.1	176	11.8	163	10.3	139	9.0
2. ----------	128	8.1	70	4.5	158	10.2	128	8.6	39	2.5	110	7.2
3. ----------	230	14.6	257	16.4	248	15.9	253	17.0	123	7.8	205	13.3
4. ----------	462	29.2	461	29.4	382	24.6	450	30.2	192	12.2	323	21.0
5. Who people vote for can make a difference	697	44.0	700	44.6	623	40.1	483	32.4	1062	67.2	764	49.6
Total	1583	100.0	1569	100.0	1553	100.0	1489	100.0	1580	100.0	1541	100.0

Table 8.3B Responses 2001–6 (CSES, Module 2)

	Czech Republic		Hungary		Lithuania		Poland		Romania		Slovenia		Bulgaria	
1. Who people vote for won't make a difference	142	9.1	45	3.0	–	–	241	16.2	104	6.8	106	7.0	124	9.3
2. -----------	220	14.1	44	2.8	–	–	190	12.8	80	5.2	83	5.4	141	10.5
3. -----------	458	29.3	221	14.4	–	–	334	22.5	206	13.5	185	12.1	265	19.7
4. -----------	516	33.0	364	23.7	–	–	375	25.3	324	21.1	353	23.2	338	25.1
5. Who people vote for can make a difference	226	14.5	859	56.0	–	–	346	23.3	818	53.4	799	52.4	476	35.4
Total	1562	100.0	1533	100.0	–	–	1486	100.0	1533	100.0	1527	100.0	1344	100.0

Table 8.3C Mean responses to statement: 'Who people vote for makes a difference' (Modules 1 and 2), Central and East European countries

'Who people vote for makes a difference'

(1. Who people vote for won't make a difference . . . 5. Who people vote for can make a difference)

| Countries	Module 1	Module 2	Statistical significance of differences between two points of time in each country (t-test)
	Mean	*Mean*	
Czech Republic	4.0	3.3	***
Hungary	4.0	4.3	***
Lithuania	3.8		***
Poland	3.6	3.3	***
Romania	4.2	4.1	**
Slovenia	4.0	4.1	**
Bulgaria (2001)		3.7	***
Total	3.9	3.9	
Eta^2	.0	.1	
Statistical significance of differences between countries in each module (one-way anova)	***	***	

Note: *** sig. < .01; ** .01< sig. ≤ .05; * .05 < sig. < .1.

processes precisely because they are used to higher standards in their economic activities.

Finally, CSES respondents could express their evaluation of the process of representation by grading parties and party leaders. The answers to the question 'whether there are parties that represent citizens' views reasonably well' are to be found in Tables 8.5A and 8.5B. Hungarians and Czechs stand out, followed by Bulgarians and Romanians, as relatively satisfied with the representative capacity of their parties. The other end of the continuum is occupied by Slovenes. The distance between Slovenia and the other CEE countries is surprisingly large. The cross-country differences are statistically significant and explain 12 per cent of the dependent variable variance (Table 8.5B). The high scores of Hungary and the Czech Republic are in line with the Institutionalisation hypothesis, but the scores of Bulgaria and, especially, Romania were expected to be lower.

Table 8.4A Answers to question: 'How well are voters' views are represented in elections?' (CSES, Module 2)

	Bulgaria (2001)		Czech Republic (2002)		Hungary (2002)		Poland (2001)		Romania (2004)		Slovenia (2004)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Very well	128	14.0	15	1.1	48	3.3	78	5.6	89	9.7	39	2.9
2. Quite well	356	38.8	360	27.3	709	48.4	605	42.9	256	27.6	335	24.8
3. Not very well	290	31.6	681	51.6	611	41.7	580	41.2	552	59.7	865	64.0
4. Not well at all	144	15.7	265	20.0	96	6.5	146	10.4	28	3.0	113	8.3
Total	918	100.0	1321	100.0	1465	100.0	1409	100.0	925	100.0	1351	100.0

Table 8.4B Mean differences between CEE countries and their statistical significance in answers to question (see below)

How well voters' views are represented in elections?

(1. Very well . . . 4. Not well at all)

Countries	Module 2
	Mean
Bulgaria (2001)	2.5
Czech Republic (2002)	2.9
Hungary (2002)	2.5
Poland (2001)	2.6
Romania (2004)	2.6
Slovenia (2004)	2.8
Total	2.6
	$Eta^2 = .0$
Statistical significance of differences between countries (one-way anova)	***

Note: *** sig. < .01; ** .01 < sig. ≤ .05; * .05 < sig. < .1.

Table 8.5A Answers to question: 'Does any of the parties represent your views reasonably well?' (CSES, Module 2)

|	Bulgaria (2001)		Czech Republic (2002)		Hungary (2002)	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
0. No	*842*	53.7	*250*	22.1	*420*	27.4
1. Yes	*725*	46.3	*881*	77.9	*1113*	72.6
Total	*1567*	100.0	*1131*	100.0	*1534*	100.0
	Poland (2001)		Romania (2004)		Slovenia (2004)	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
0. No	*803*	59.6	*755*	55.0	*827*	71.1
1. Yes	*544*	40.4	*618*	45.0	*336*	28.9
Total	*1347*	100.0	*1373*	100.0	*1164*	100.0

Table 8.5B Mean differences between CEE countries and their statistical
significance in answers to question (see below)

Does any of the parties represent your views reasonably well?

(0 = no; 1 = yes)

Countries	Module 2
	Mean
Bulgaria (2001)	.5
Czech Republic (2002)	.7
Hungary (2002)	.7
Poland (2001)	.4
Romania (2004)	.5
Slovenia (2004)	.3
Total	.5
	$Eta^2 = .1$
Statistical significance of differences between countries (one-way anova)	***

Note: *** sig. < .01; ** .01 < sig. ≤ .05; * .05 < sig. < .1.

The distribution of the answers to the question whether there are 'party
leaders that represent voters' views reasonably well' is displayed in Tables 8.6A
and 8.6B. Hungarians and Czechs are absolute leaders in believing that their
politicians represent their views fairly well and, again, the Slovenes (and the
Poles) question the representative capacities of their leading politicians.
These results are at odds with the Personalistic Institutions hypothesis and fit
more the Institutionalisation hypothesis. It seems that in consolidated party
systems both parties and party leaders are highly regarded by the public.

Government representation

In the following section we look at the relationship between the median
voter and the government. With information on the programmatic position
of the parties, and knowing the partisan composition of the government, the
Comparative Manifesto Project allows for the reconstruction of the position
of governments on important policy issues. The government's policy position
is calculated as the weighted mean score of the government parties' positions.
The latest volume of the Group's data (Klingemann *et al*., 2006) presents
the median voter's position as well, derived from the party manifestos as:
$L + [(50 - C)/F] * W$, where L is the lower end (ideological score) of the

Table 8.6A Answers to question: 'Does any of the party leaders represent your views reasonably well?' (CSES, Module 2)

	Bulgaria (2001)		Czech Republic (2002)		Hungary (2002)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
0. No	881	56.3	466	44.3	299	19.7
1. Yes	685	43.7	585	55.7	1217	80.3
Total	1566	100.0	1051	100.0	1516	100.0
	Poland (2001)		Romania (2004)		Slovenia (2004)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
0. No	815	60.4	702	51.9	727	64.7
1. Yes	534	39.6	651	48.1	397	35.3
Total	1349	100.0	1353	100.0	1125	100.0

Table 8.6B Mean differences between CEE countries and their statistical significance in answers to question (see below)

Does any of party leaders represent your views reasonably well?

(0 = no; 1 = yes)

Countries	Module 2
	Mean
Bulgaria (2001)	.4
Czech Republic (2002)	.6
Hungary (2002)	.8
Poland (2001)	.4
Romania (2004)	.5
Slovenia (2004)	.4
Total	.5
	$Eta^2 = .1$
Statistical significance of differences between countries (one-way anova)	***

Note: *** sig. < .01; ** .01 < sig. ≤ .05; * .05 < sig. < .1.

interval containing the median, C is the cumulative frequency (vote share) up to the interval containing the median, F is the frequency (vote share) in the interval containing the median, and W is the width of the interval containing the median (for details see also Kim and Fording, 2001). The left–right scale has been constructed by Klingemann *et al.*, by deducting left-wing quasi-sentences from right-wing ones, while the EU position was calculated by deducting hostile references to EU from favourable references in party programmes. We now (Tables 8.7A and 8.7B) take the difference between the two numbers (the absolute value) as the indicator of the representative nature of the government.

As Tables 8.7A and 8.7B indicate, there is little covariation between time and the accuracy of representation. This is true both in general[4] and within individual countries. The Democratisation hypothesis thus suffers a last and final blow. Actually, in a number of countries there is a tendency towards deterioration. In Estonia, as far as the EU issue is concerned, every new election brought a government that was less representative than its predecessor. The development on the left–right dimension was less linear, but also on this dimension the last-recorded government (2003) was the least representative. The same negative, though less steep, tendency can be witnessed in Poland on both left–right and EU. In Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia there has been an improvement on the EU issue, while on left–right the latest figures are promising for the Czech Republic and Slovenia.

Table 8.8 averages the scores for the countries (this is a meaningful exercise, because the countries differ significantly in terms of the quality of representation[5]). According to these results the most accurate representation on the EU dimension is in Bulgaria, Slovenia and Lithuania, while the largest distance between the voters and the government is in the Czech Republic and Estonia. On the left–right dimension, again Bulgaria is the country with the smallest distance, while Romania and Slovenia are located at the opposite extreme.

Most surprisingly, the EU issue is better represented than the left–right position in the majority of the countries (Romania, Slovenia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Bulgaria) while the left–right dimension strongly outperforms the EU only in the Czech Republic and Estonia (weakly also in Hungary and Latvia). This means that the Saliency hypothesis, as formulated at the beginning of this chapter, must be rejected. It seems that the logic of party competition presses parties to develop more homogeneous and more extreme profiles on salient issues than on other issues, and on these issues they must also construct government coalitions that can be unambiguously identified with one of the sides of the debate. The loser in this process is the median voter.

Since left–right positioning is a super-issue, a dimension that is supposed to absorb most of the specific political conflicts, one can regard the distance

Table 8.7A Government–voter policy distance in the CEE countries on the EU issue (data ordered by the size of the 'distance' for each country separately)

| Countries	Year	Distance – EU issue
Bulgaria	1997	.0
	2001	.1
	1990	.1
	1994	.2
Czech Republic	1996	.1
	1992	.2
	1990	1.0
	2002	1.1
	1998	2.1
Estonia	1992	.6
	1995	.7
	1999	1.0
	2003	1.5
Hungary	1994	.0
	1990	.3
	2002	.6
Latvia	2002	.0
	1995	.1
	1998	.1
	1993	1.2
Lithuania	2000	.0
	1992	.3
Poland	1991	.1
	1997	.1
	2001	.5
Romania	1992	.2
	1990	.3
	2000	.3
	1996	.5
Slovakia	1994	.0
	1998	.1
	1990	.3
	2002	.3
Slovenia	1996	.0
	2000	.1
	1990	.2
	1992	.2

Notes: Bulgaria 1991, Hungary 1998, Lithuania 1996, Poland 1993, Romania 2000, Slovakia 1992 are missing. The left–right position was calculated by subtracting the percentages of party programmes devoted to leftist categories from the percentages attributed to right-wing categories: (per104 + per201 + per203 + per305 + per401 + per402 + per407 + per414 + per505 + per601 + per603 + per605 + per606) − (per103 + per105 + per106 + per107 + per403 + per404 + per406 + per412 + per413 + per504 + per506 + per701 + per202). (See Michael Laver and Ian Budge (eds) *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan 1992.) The calculus of the EU position was: per108 − per110. Because of the differences between the structure of the left–right and the EU scales the results have been standardised.

Table 8.7B Government–voter policy distance in the CEE countries
on the left–right dimension (data ordered by size of the 'distance'
for each country separately)

Countries	Year	Distance – LR
Bulgaria	1994	.0
	2001	.2
	1990	.2
	1997	.3
Czech Republic	2002	.1
	1992	.2
	1990	.2
	1998	.2
	1996	.8
Estonia	1995	.3
	1999	.4
	1992	.5
	2003	.6
Hungary	1994	.0
	1990	.1
	2002	.7
Latvia	1995	.2
	1998	.2
	2002	.3
	1993	.4
Lithuania	1992	.6
	2000	.8
Poland	1997	.1
	1991	.3
	2001	.9
Romania	1990	.8
	2000	.8
	1992	1.4
	1996	2.3
Slovakia	1998	.0
	2002	.2
	1990	.2
	1994	1.0
Slovenia	2000	.4
	1990	.7
	1996	.8
	1992	1.9

Table 8.8 Government–voter policy distances and party system fragmentation

Countries	Government–voter distance on EU	Government–voter distance on left–right	Governmental representation (measured as average government–voter policy distance on left–right)	Average effective number of parliamentary parties
Bulgaria	.1	.2	Very high	3.1
Hungary	.3	.2	High	3
Latvia	.3	.3	High	5.8
Czech Republic	.9	.3	High	3.9
Slovakia	.1	.4	High	4.7
Estonia	.9	.4	Median	4.9
Poland	.2	.4	Median	4.7
Lithuania	.2	.7	Low	4
Slovenia	.1	.9	Low	5.5
Romania	.4	1.5	very low	4

between voters and governments on this dimension as a good proxy for the quality of governmental representation. The ranking of the countries on left–right moderately supports the Majoritarianism hypothesis. The unrepresentative nature of Romanian governments may have something to do with the strong role of presidents, and the good performance of Bulgaria may be a result of the proportionality of its institutional regime, but the overall ranking of countries differs from what we had expected. Party system fragmentation is a better predictor of the quality of representation than the legally defined political institutions. If Latvia had had larger, and Romania and Lithuania somewhat smaller, policy distances between governments and voters, the match would have been perfect.

As Table 8.9 shows, the negative correlation between fragmentation and the quality of governmental representation has developed gradually. It seems that party system characteristics, like fragmentation, need time to have an impact on the process of government formation, but in the end the relationship detected accords with the prevailing wisdom in the theoretical and comparative literature.

Party–voter proximity

This last part of the analysis employs the classical (cf. Miller and Stokes, 1963; Converse and Pierce, 1986; Kitschelt *et al*., 1999) approach to the study of the quality of representation – it depicts and evaluates the fit between elites and followers of particular parties on ideology, salient issues and policy areas. We test the proximity between party elites and their voters on the left–right dimension and on their preferences concerning EU unification,[6] i.e. whether the EU project should be 'strengthened', on the one hand, or has already 'gone too far', on the other.

Table 8.9 Correlation between fragmentation and governmental representation (measured as average government–voter policy distance on left–right at three stages of democratic consolidation)

	*Distance on left–right issue * fragmentation*
1990–94	.2
	11
1995–99	−.1
	11
2000–3	−.3
	10

First, we start by depicting simple distributions concerning the average left–right position and 'strengthening EU' distances between elites and masses in CEE and Western European democracies. The underlying query concerns the extent to which new fragile democracies differ from the more established ones, those which are presumably more 'Europeanised'. Surprisingly, in left–right terms there is no difference between the two groups, while on EU-issues CEE citizens are far better represented by their respective parties than are their Western European fellow citizens (the detailed distributions for particular countries are not shown here but are available upon request from the authors). The latter difference is significant at the .000 level, although eta-squared equals only .014. The average distance between parties and their voters in Western Europe is 2.44 (standard deviation = 1.88) and in CEE polities it is 1.97 (sd = 1.48), which indicates that the latter region is both better represented and more cohesive.

As a next step we examine the causes of proximity. Our models explained Western European proximity scores much better than the CEE scores and the left–right dimension better than the EU dimension. When we entered only socio-demographic independent variables into the regressions, education and political sophistication appeared as significant factors in both regions. But when tested in a more multivariate design their direct impact disappeared in the CEE countries. In both regions sociological factors were considerably weaker than the political ones, confirming the dominance of the Political Phenomena hypothesis.

Representation on the left–right axis is shaped in the West by national and party identity. Citizens showing strong affective inclination towards either the nation or parties are less proximate to their parties. In other words, both types of identity impede the positional calculation and lead the voters further away from their parties. Satisfaction with the performance of democracy is positively related to accurate representation. For CEE polities we found only a few significant predictors. Weak, non-significant relationships were detected between education and proximity. Left–right proximities were influenced by the preference of the respondents towards an EU that 'provides better social security for all' (rather than one that is 'economically competitive').

Table 8.10 presents our final regression model with interaction terms, where the 'interaction variable' is citizenship in a country with a *communist past* (COMPAST).

The most straightforward message from Table 8.10 is that the two parts of the European continent differ in terms of representational fit on the left–right dimension because of the different impact of (a) party identification and (b) the preference for an competitive-liberal or social EU (whether its main aim should be to foster competitiveness or provide better social security for all). Party identification in stable democracies impedes the left–right representational

Table 8.10 Determinants of left–right proximity (data: INTUNE)

Dep var: proximity left–right	Coefficient	Robust standard error (clustered by country)	t
COMPAST	−.30	.21	−1.39
Age	.00	.07	−.02
COMPAST*Age	.16	.10	1.70
Education	−.20***	.02	−8.20
COMPAST*Education	.07	.06	1.22
Class	−.01	.05	−.18
COMPAST*Class	.11	.07	1.53
PID	.28**	.09	3.31
COMPAST*PID	−.40*	.16	−2.57
Demsat	−.12*	.05	−2.57
COMPAST*Demsat	.06	.06	.96
Social_eu	.04	.04	.88
COMPAST*Social_eu	.15**	.05	2.83
Nat_id	.03***	.01	3.44
COMPAST*Nat_id	−.03	.02	−1.50
Sophist	−.03*	.01	−2.50
COMPAST*Sophist	−.01	.02	−.39
Const.	2.42***	.20	12.30
N =	5803		
R^2 =	4%		

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

fit, that is, party identifiers are further away from the positions of their parties on the left–right dimension. In new, post-communist democracies this factor works in the opposite way, but the relationship is not significant. The phenomenon of cue-taking by voters from party positions seems to be more robust in new democracies. Alternatively, one might say that in long-established democracies political socialisation and durable identifications, either national or party, are encapsulating citizens into relationships that restrict their calculative potential concerning the assessment of party positions.

The other significant difference between 'the West and the East' concerns the relationship between the social or economic approach to EU and left–right proximity. In CEE post-communist countries citizens who are in favour of a social-redistributive Europe are poorly represented (on the left–right dimension) by their chosen parties, while in Western democracies there is no relationship between the two (the difference between the regions is significant, see interaction term of 'COMP*Soc_eu' in Table 8.10).

Replacing representation on the left–right axis with representation on the EU issue as the dependent variable, we found that among the socio-demographic variables only education matters, i.e. has a positive impact on the accuracy of representation (and this only in Western Europe). Regressing our dependent variable on political factors shows that the more satisfied the citizens are with the national performance of democracy, the more likely they are close to their party on this issue – in both parts of Europe. The remaining factors were either insignificantly or variously associated with our proximity measure in the West and the East.

The coefficients and interaction terms (full model) in Table 8.11 confirm that education is an extremely important factor, but only in the West. The difference between the two regions is significant. Second, satisfaction with democracy is significant in both parts of EU and its directional impact is the same – satisfaction is associated with a high level of representation. The regions differ, however, in the strength of this relationship. Finally, there is

Table 8.11 Determinants of proximity on the EU issue (data: INTUNE)

Dep var: proximity strengthening EU	Coefficient	Robust standard error (clustered by country)	t
COMPAST	−1.83***	.34	−5.34
Age	.10	.10	1.07
COMPAST*Age	−.15	.15	−.99
Education	−.21***	.03	−7.77
COMPAST*Education	.25***	.06	4.27
Class	−.05	.06	−.87
COMPAST*Class	.01	.08	.09
PID	−.01	.08	−.13
COMPAST*PID	.23*	.10	2.27
Demsat	−.28***	.04	−6.47
COMPAST*Demsat	.12*	.06	2.2
Social_eu	−.13**	.04	−3.23
COMPAST*Social_eu	.13	.12	1.14
Nat_id	−.01	.02	−.62
COMPAST*Nat_id	.04	.03	1.15
Sophist	−.01	.01	−.99
COMPAST*Sophist	.00	.02	−.17
Const.	3.93***	.30	13.22
N =	5803		
R^2 =	4%		

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

one more significant difference between the two regions – party identification is unrelated to the quality of representation in the West, but it is influential in the East.

Conclusions

Perhaps the most important conclusion is that the optimistic Democratisation hypothesis must be rejected. CEE post-communist party systems are moving in the direction of deteriorating representation. Particularly worrying is that, with the passing of time, poorer segments of the population withdraw from influencing the composition of the parliaments. Alienation and inegalitarian capitalist structures counterbalance the opening up of political opportunities.

Income, class and education, or to use sociological jargon, aspects of *achieved status*, contribute to growing misrepresentation. But *ascribed status* (sex, place of residence, religiosity) of citizens receives a fairly proportional representation. In case of religious and ethnic groups one can even notice a readiness for (counter-)mobilisation. Ethnicity is the factor that can be least described in terms of universal patterns. In countries where the party of the ethnic minority is a crucial and much sought-after player (like Bulgaria), minority voters are particularly active, while political processes that are biased in favour of majorities (cf. Estonia) alienate minority voters. The over- and under-represented segments do not coincide perfectly with the winners and losers of the transition. This is perhaps most obvious concerning age. The elderly are typically discussed as victims of the neo-liberal reforms, but in CEE they seem to take more advantage of democratic procedures than other groups. The two observations are not in contradiction: the state, under pressure from the pensioner voters, mitigates the negative impact of the free market but in most cases it cannot eliminate it.

The results of the present investigation attest to the fact that representation is a multi-dimensional concept. Different nations score high on different dimensions of representation. Bulgarians find elections representative and have governments that deviate little from the median voter. Hungarians, together with Romanians, attribute high relevance to politics, are pretty satisfied with how elections work, and the former can also find at least one party and party leader that they can be enthusiastic about. In this regard they are joined by the Czechs. But the Czechs tend to have little interest in or respect for the political process.

It is noteworthy that on several issues it is the Slovenes and the Czechs, the wealthiest two nations in the region, who display the most cynical, politically alienated attitudes towards their polities. It seems the alienation can coexist with, or is even fuelled by, economic success. There is no deterministic link between how the representative linkage functions and the kind

of political institutions that operate in a country. But more 'semi-presidential' regimes (Poland, Lithuania, Romania) have often had bad scores on representation, while the most typically high scorers, Bulgaria and Hungary, belong to the least presidential and most purely unicameral regimes of the region. The institutionalisation of party politics has most likely helped the Czech Republic and Hungary to accept parties and party politicians. In these two cases strong political personalities like Orban and Klaus put their energy into consolidating a polarised party-political landscape (Enyedi, 2006).

Government representation on the EU issue proved to be better than expected and better than on the salient left–right dimension. Governments seem to be further away from the median voter on the most relevant political dimension precisely because parties may be particularly keen to match the taste of their clientele on the salient issues. This is, of course, only a speculation, but it is in accordance with the mandate theories of representation and directional theories of voting.

The superiority of the West in terms of accurate matches between party elites and electorates did not materialise. Post-communist citizens are in fact able, on average, to find parties that are close to their views. But we are better able to explain for the West than for the East why some citizens are able to choose the 'right' party. Citizens who are educated, sophisticated, satisfied with democracy and have relatively few national and partisan attachments are represented better by parties. The peculiarity of the East is that those who are for a 'social' Europe tend to end up with parties that are in fact ideologically very distant from them.

Notes

1 Note that the American (Anglo-Saxon) tradition is more concerned with policy outputs, for example budget expenditures on certain policies (Brooks 1985; 1990; Bartels 1991; Petry 1999).

2 She also introduced the differentiation between *formalistic* (conceived of in terms of 'authorisation' and 'accountability'), *symbolic*, *descriptive and substantive* – as she calls them – 'views' of representation. The agenda of empirically oriented scholars have been dominated by the last two categories.

3 Unfortunately no data were available for 1995.

4 There was no significant correlation between year and policy distance.

5 According to the ANOVA test the 'country' variable's impact on Euroscepticism is around the border of the traditional .05 significance level (it is .057), while on left–right it is at the .01 level. The eta squared figures were .431 and .525. Due to the low number of cases the LSD post-hoc comparisons show significant differences only for the minority of the relations: on left–right between Romania and the rest of the countries (with the exception of Slovenia) and between Slovenia and Bulgaria and Slovenia and Latvia. On the EU issue between Estonia and the Czech

Republic, on the one hand, and Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Slovenia, on the other.

6 The question reads: 'Some say European unification has already gone too far. Others say it should be strengthened. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point scale. On this scale, "0" means unification "has already gone too far" and "10" means "should be strengthened". What number on this scale describes your position?' Both issues/questions – the left–right self-positioning and the attitudes concerning EU, utilise the elite and mass surveys of the INTUNE project.

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