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Table and figures at the end.

Introduction: Antecedents and Consequences of European Citizenship

Paolo Bellucci, David Sanders, Gabor Toka, Mariano Torcal

The deepening and widening of the European project that has taken place since the end of the West-East international divide in the early 1990s has significantly changed the role played by public opinion and citizens' orientations in the development of the European polity. The title of a recent article 'From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus' (Hooghe and Marks 2008) aptly summarises the trajectory of a growing involvement of public opinion and of member states' citizens in this process. For four decades, the European polity grew in a technocratic fashion, driven primarily by political elites whose national electoral constituencies lent substantial, if superficial, support to the seemingly distant and slow advances in economic integration. However, the European issue was generally not salient at the mass level and, most importantly, substantively different from the lines of political conflict that prevailed domestically in most member states. As such, debates over the status of the emerging European Union were generally of little consequence for national patterns of party competition.

The relative insulation of European integration from domestic politics began to erode with the inception and later affirmation of Europe as a political community, the adoption of a common currency, the EU's evolving multi-level system of governance covering an increasing number of policy areas, and its enlargement to encompass 27 member states. In the unfolding of this process, it became evident that the original 'permissive consensus' (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Wilgden and Feld 1976) granted by Europeans showed signs of waning. From the early 1990s onwards, polls showed declining levels of support for European integration. Turnout in European elections fell progressively. National referendums produced unexpected results that slowed down the ratification of treaties, and even aborted a drafted European Constitution in 2005. European issues became a matter of intense domestic contestation with the emergence of Eurosceptic populist parties. Mainstream social-democratic and conservative parties were exposed to difficulties in accommodating European integration within their traditional ideological outlooks. At the same time, national and European politics became more intertwined: domestic considerations have begun to influence party preferences over Europe, while European politics has progressively altered traditional patterns of political contestation (Marks and Stenbergen 2004). As a result, popular preferences tend to constrain more than in the past the actions of political, bureaucratic and economic elites in the European arena.

All of this may speak relatively well to the condition of democracy in the European Union, especially in light of past concerns over the 'democratic deficit' of supranational institutions. That popular preferences contribute to shape parties' stances over European integration may entail a reduction of the gap between (more cosmopolitan) elites and mass publics, and enhance the responsiveness and legitimacy of both national and supranational institutions. Yet, at the same time the European project has inevitably become more controversial, as the opinion climate towards it has changed in tone, from one of prevalent enthusiasm to (in some

instances) growing scepticism. Why this has happened is a matter of debate although it is clearly possible that the European Union's slow reaction to the challenges of globalisation and to economic stagnation has played an important role. More important, however, it is the fact that the European Union has been progressively portrayed by its critics as a problematic source of globalisation, rather than as a possible remedial strategy for dealing with it. On this more critical account, the EU's economic integration process, its tighter budget constraints, the introduction of the common currency, policy harmonisation, internal (and external) immigration and greater cultural and religious heterogeneity have all represented increasingly serious threats to national sovereignty and to domestic traditions and customs.

The passage from an economic-trade community to a political union has ostensibly affected traditional mass perceptions of Europe, which was previously seen mainly as a provider of economic benefits associated with a larger single market. More recently, both mass publics and political elites have increasingly expressed concerns over the fact that although membership in a supranational political community entails benefits and opportunities, it also – inevitably - involves constraints and costs. This raises important questions about the contours and the structure of the allegiances that European Union people maintain with their national and supranational political communities. To the extent that Europeans share a 'we-feeling' sentiment and develop an allegiance to supranational institutions, the constraints and limitation to states' sovereignty, together with any emerging economic threats and fears of cultural heterogeneity can be accommodated within a common European framework. Such a process of accommodation would operate in the same way that, in national political systems, a diffuse support for the political regime (legitimacy) compensates for performance shortcomings on the part of governments (Easton 1975). On the other hand, if the sense of European allegiance remains underdeveloped, or falters, the prospects of European integration may dim under the assault of either nationalist and populist concerns or simple dissatisfaction with perceived results of integration, which, with greater intensity, are being voiced within member states.

Since the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957, there has been much academic and elite-level speculation about the development of a common popular European-wide allegiance, and about what it means, or might mean, to be 'a European citizen'. Normative political theorists have pondered the tensions between traditional notions of national citizenship that are rooted in an existing *polis* and the prospects for developing a European citizenship in a situation where no (European) *polis* as such exists (Weale 2007). Neo-functionalist scholars of European integration have speculated that a sense of European citizenship might develop progressively as the institutions of the European Community strengthen and extend their policy range (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). European elites, guided in part by the thinking of legal scholars, have taken the practical step of extending, through the Treaty of Maastricht, formal legal European citizenship to the citizens of all EU member states.

But is the European Union developing as a political community in the eyes of its 'citizens'? Have people acquired allegiances and loyalties with the EU which do not conflict with their national counterparts? Is there any evidence that European mass publics are developing a sense of belonging to a single European *demos*? During the last decade, the geographical widening and the functional deepening of European integration have greatly advanced, producing a complex, multi-level system of governance. Much research has been conducted on the political, institutional and economic consequences of this process. Less attention has been paid, however, to the issue of whether and how this is affecting people's allegiance to

national and supranational polities, and on how those allegiances might be connected. Numerous studies (reviewed in the following chapters) have extensively analysed public support for European integration and its determinants, while fewer have inquired into the structure of the belief system that citizens hold on Europe (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999; Scheuer 1999, 2005; Westle 2007a). Here we broaden the latter focus, to consider *European citizenship*, which we regard as an interconnected set of attitudes towards the supranational arena, as perceived by citizens of EU member states, which may uphold their commitment to the European polity. Further, and reversing the causal order assumed by neo-functionalism, we next ask ourselves what behavioural consequences such allegiance might have, not only for traditional national identities, but also for popular support for European integration and for political engagement with the EU. In this volume we pursue three main goals.

- The first goal is descriptive. We empirically trace the contours of a concept – European citizenship – on which previous public opinion research is unsystematic. We measure its dimensions and assess its spread across Europe, i.e., the extent to which Europeans share an allegiance with the European polity and perceive its legitimacy.
- The second goal is explanatory. We explore the individual level and contextual determinants of European citizenship and test systematically the explanatory power of a set of (sometimes rival) theoretical perspectives.
- The third goal is both theoretical and empirical. We inquire into the consequences that European citizenship attitudes have for support for the European integration and on the likelihood of getting involved with European politics by voting at the European Parliament elections.

The analysis we report is based on a cross-national mass survey conducted in 2007 (and replicated in 2009) within the larger research project of *IntUne – Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe* – that was financed under the 6th Framework Programme of the EU. *IntUne* studies the changes in the scope, nature and characteristics of citizenship in Europe as an effect of the process of deepening and enlargement of the European Union. It looks at the relationships between elites, public opinion and media, whose interactions nurture the dynamics of collective political identity, political legitimacy, representation, and standards of performance. In order to address these issues, IntUne conducted two waves of political and social elite, experts and mass public surveys on these issues in 18 countries. The research described in this volume is based on the analysis of the citizen surveys conducted in 16 member states (we focused therefore on current EU citizens, and excluded the surveys carried out in Serbia and Turkey). The questionnaire administered to representative samples of citizens in these countries and information on the fieldwork are reported in the Appendix.

The *explanandum*: European citizenship

We centre our analysis on the beliefs that member states' citizens share towards the European polity. We focus on the structure of European citizenship's attitudes under the working hypothesis that these are distinct from generalised support for European integration. Of course, expressing loyalties to a polity-in-the-making requires that at least certain features of the polity be already consolidated. Some polity building must inevitably have taken place before allegiance to it can develop. Once this threshold is reached, however, we expect to find a distinction between allegiance to the European polity and support for integration, with a likely causal link flowing from the former to the latter. In principle, evidence relating to changes in public opinion over time could be used to assess the potentially reciprocal

historical dependence between the development of support for European unification and the extent of popular allegiance to EU institutions. However, systematic testing of this sort is difficult to effect in practice because of a lack of both long-term data and adequate survey items. A companion volume to this research (Sanders et al. forthcoming), analysing the available evidence, nonetheless shows that EU attitudes exhibit little trend overtime. Measures of European identity, in particular, have remained remarkable stable over four decades and, contrary to both functionalist and identitarian theorists' expectations, it does not appear that European allegiance follows increases in European integration (Isernia et al. forthcoming). In theses circumstances, we proceed on the strong prior assumption that support for a supranational political system – an evaluative judgment of the desirability of developing one – needs to be distinguished from popular allegiance to it. Our analysis thus builds on Scheuer's (2005) seminal research on the 1994 European Elections Study cross-sectional data showing a separation between European identification and support for European unification. As we will later show, the empirical findings reported here are entirely consistent with this core hypothesis.

Why do we focus on European citizenship? Previous research has investigated the structure of citizen attitudes, analysing how people perceive European institutions. Thomassen and Schmitt (1999), drawing on democratic theory rooted in the analysis of the nation state, pointed to the relevance of two dimensions for the study of the Europeans' belief structure: legitimacy, and representation.

We build on and broaden this perspective both theoretically and empirically, recognising that perceiving that a political system is legitimate and expressing loyalty to its institutions are among the attributes of citizenship. Historically such perceptions have been grounded in the national state - which has endowed its members with a bundle of rights and obligations, overtime expanded in scope and nature, from civic to political to social (Marshall 1950) - and the obvious question is to assess whether it is plausible to extend such a notion so strongly intertwined with the national welfare state to the European supranational polity.

Debates about the meaning and sources of citizenship are constantly evolving, and traditional theorising about citizenship – which proceeded from liberal, communitarian and republican perspectives has been challenged by new approaches, in particular by notions of transnational and multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka 2002; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2004). Both of these approaches recognize that a de-territorialization of politics has occurred (Benhabib 2002) and that the power of nation states has shrunk as transnational institutions have emphasized universal rights and globalisation has increased migration and cultural heterogeneity. As a consequence, citizenship rights are no longer tied to national and territorial boundaries (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2004: 12).

Our perspective on citizenship is less radical, and does not assume that European citizenship must necessarily be of the transnational type. We acknowledge that, given that the EU gradually emerged from consensual agreements among states, 'European citizenship is bound to coexist (probably for a long time) with well-established national definition of citizenship' (Cotta and Isernia 2009: 82). Since its very inception, in fact, the European Community has nurtured the seeds of a European citizenship and the 'language of citizenship' has progressively found its legal codification in the various treaties (ibidem, 74). These (most explicitly the Treaty of Amsterdam) incorporated national definitions of citizenship and laid out further European-specific rights, such as the right to free movement for individuals, the

right to make direct appeal to the European Court of Justice and, obviously, the right to vote in European Parliament elections.

We regard European citizenship as being composed of three core elements (Benhabib 2002; Cotta and Isernia 2009): *identity* – the extent to which people feel a sense of belonging towards Europe; *representation* – the extent to which they consider that the EU represents their economic and political interests; and *scope of governance* – the extent to which they believe that the EU should be primarily responsible for decision making in important policy areas.

Identity is a key component of citizenship. The willingness to act in a polity depends not only on the extent to which people have been granted legal rights but, crucially, also on the extent they *feel* that they are full members of the community. This happens when consciousness of membership of a group goes hand in hand with the perception of the salience of that sense of belonging, that is when the awareness of the existence of a common fate relevant for people's personal lives becomes widespread. Asking whether a political European community exists means therefore asking first whether a common political identity – a demos - has been built (or 'imagined') by its members.

A second component of European Union citizenship stems from the perceived legitimacy of the political institutions, that is, the feeling that institutions are representative of the needs and desires of the members of a polity. Representation, the instrument through which citizens exercise their rule in democratic systems, requires that members of a polity be heard and that their interests, values and preferences are pursued responsively by political actors and institutions. Citizenship attitudes grow when a common political identity is matched by feelings that people are being represented by political institutions and authorities.

Finally, Scope of government, refers to the jurisdiction of the *demos* exercised by representative political authorities. In national contests, this lies ultimately in the state itself, even though sub-national institutions may be responsible for some policy competencies. In the multi-level context of the European Union, scope of government refers to people's preferences over the extent to which EU institutions must be endowed with ruling powers, and to which level (regional, national, European) policy responsibility should be attributed. In this context, feelings of EU citizenship should be associated with perceptions that EU institutions have a right to exercise political authority.

In this volume, we operationalize these dimensions of citizenship employing both traditional and innovative survey items that we discuss in detail in subsequent chapters. Our general goal is to ascertain the extent to which feelings of citizenship are shared by contemporary European publics. In particular we examine:
- the extent to which a European identity is developing across the EU and the sources of the feeling of common belonging;
- how far and why citizens regard the institutions of the EU, and those of their national and sub-national political system, as representative and accountable;
- how far and why EU citizens wish to see extensions to (or reduction in) the scope of EU governance.

Overall these different dimensions of EU citizenship can be regarded as constituting a distinctive European 'political culture', the contours of which – across member states and individuals – allow us to assess the degree of legitimacy that the European project enjoys at

the end of the first decade of the 21st century. In addition, these current measures of the extent of European citizenship may also serve as a yardstick with which to compare the 'state of the Union' in the future.

The broad causal logic of the analyses conducted in this volume is illustrated graphically in Figure 1.1. The first part of our causal analysis seeks to explain why European mass publics vary in the extent to which they feel a sense of European citizenship – in the extent to which they feel a sense of European identity, in how far they feel represented by European institutions, and in their preferences for EU policy competence in different policy areas. The second part focuses on the impact of these three citizenship dimensions on people's 'support' for the EU itself and on their preparedness to vote in European elections, and tests also its reciprocal causal relationships.

<Figure 1.1>

Sources of European citizenship

Scholars of European politics have relied on several theoretical approaches to explain the development of European integration, from the earlier neo-functionalist focus in the 1960s to the multilevel governance and Europeanization perspectives in the 1990s (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). Scholarly efforts - and also disagreements, as exposed for instance in the debate over the intergovernmental or supranational nature of the European project - have obviously been stimulated by the transformation that the deepening of the integration process has brought to the object of study. As Hooghe and Marks have observed: 'The European Union is an extremely versatile institution. It is an international regime that facilitates economic exchange; it is a supranational polity that exerts political authority over its citizens; and it is part of a system of multilevel governance that encompasses national politics' (Hooghe and Marks 2005: 436).

Public opinion researchers have also devoted considerable effort to understanding the reasons and motivations behind people's rejection of or support for European integration. They have pondered the likely impact on public opinion of the evolving nature of the European community of the widening of powers and prerogatives of European Union institutions, and of the domestic politicisation of the European issue (with the ensuing challenges, and opportunities, that it posed for national political actors). In response to these developments, empirical research on the determinants of support for European integration and of European attitudes among mass public has shifted its theoretical focus, moving from early reliance on models based on cognitive mobilisation and cosmopolitan values (in the 1970s) to a rational choice approach inquiring popular perceptions of economic interests (in the 1980s); and, later on, to include the perspectives of national rational-institutionalism, political cues-mobilisation and of identitarian-affective reasoning.

Such diverse theoretical foci are not incompatible with each-other, and none has so far superseded the others. This is unsurprising. A multi-paradigmatic perspective is more likely to reflect both the complex multifaceted European reality but also the complexity of individual and collective opinion formation in democratic polities. This eclectic approach is, mirrored in the efforts of contemporary empirical social science to integrate previously assumed irreducible paradigms of political behaviour: socio-structural, choice based and affective based. Hooghe and Marks (2005), analysing 2000 Eurobarometer data, have shown that several of the previous perspectives contribute jointly to the overall explanation of support for

European integration, reflecting the heterogeneity of individuals (moved by different motivations according to their status and orientations) and the influences exerted by the variety of national (economic and political) contexts in which they live.

Our own analysis of European citizenship relies on a range of theoretical perspectives to develop testable hypotheses about its sources. Here we explore a somewhat uncertain territory, as previous political science empirical research on European citizenship is relatively scarce, sometimes based on small-N quasi-experimental data or more often focused, given the limited data availability, on a restricted range of theoretical *explanans*. We are in the fortunate situation to be able to test directly and to compare the explicative power of different theoretical perspectives relying on the IntUne cross-national survey, where we have purposely inserted an array of items explicitly devoted to their operationalisation. We have also included to these data a set of important country-level aggregate variables to test in a multilevel design the potential effect of some contextual factors. The chapters of this book, although with different emphasis according to the dependent variable of interest (EU Identity, EU Representation, EU Scope of government, EU Support, EU Engagement; EU Citizenship and Support Model), test the impact of four theoretical perspectives: Cognitive Mobilisation, 'Hard' Instrumental (economic and institutional) Rationality, 'Soft' Cueing Rationality, and Affective-Identity. Each chapter also provides a selective review of research mostly relevant for the previous theories: hence, we provide here only a brief general overview of these.

Cognitive Mobilisation, a perspective associated with early analyses of European support, posits that individual resources and value orientations affect attitudes towards Europe. In the early phase of European integration, comparisons of 'cosmopolitism' with 'parochialism' appeared to be a promising line of inquiry, in which European mass publics might be observed to develop 'European attitudes' that would transcend the nation state. Value orientations such as 'postmaterialism' were seen as the result of a process of cognitive mobilisation, that was itself brought about by increasing level of affluence, education, knowledge and political interest in post-war Europe. Later extensions and broadening of this perspective have focused on political attentiveness, political awareness[1] and sophistication as requisites for general political engagement, which in turn have been found to be important predictors of many political attitudes and behaviours. Cognitive mobilisation theory therefore points to individual resources (primarily: education, interest and knowledge) and media exposure as relevant sources of political engagement and opinion formation. These, matched by life experiences which allow people to have direct experience of Europe and of its institutions, are seen as important sources of a sense of European citizenship and of favourable European attitudes and engagement.

It is not surprising that the early focus of European integration on economic and trade coordination stimulated scholars to analyse the costs and benefits accruing from it. Extensive research has been therefore inspired by a second theoretical perspective, that of *'Hard' Instrumental Rationality*, which centres on the mechanisms of choice that are faced by individuals. Relying on strict rational choice assumptions, numerous studies have explored the individual and contextual correlates of attitudes towards Europe. At the individual level, the opportunity to improve (or weaken) one's working status and conditions in a unified European market are linked to evaluations of the European project. Likewise, citizens of countries who benefit economically from the single market (either in terms of trade or in net financial transfers from the EU) are considered likely to develop positive attitudes towards

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[1] For the full discussion of this concept see Zaller (1992).

Europe. More generally, both 'egocentric individualism' and 'sociotropic utilitarianism' imply relatively simple calculations of the benefits/costs that accrue from Europe as a basis for evaluating it. But choice is not uniquely an attribute of markets. It involves also identities and, more broadly, citizenship. Forms of instrumental attachment may indeed result from perceptions of benefits (in a variety of realms, from economic interest to personal esteem, prestige or status) from membership in a group. However, rational calculations of cost and benefits can't be only reduced to pure economic utilitarianism. Citizens might also use hard instrumental calculations when it comes to institutions. Different national institutional settings and their performance are producing consistent losers and winner, which after all might also influence the way citizens evaluate the EU institutions, its performance and current scope (Hix 2007). It follows that perceptions of effective benefits and choice-based processes of identification may directly sustain European allegiance and citizenship beliefs.

However, the levels of knowledge and political awareness that underpin *informed* rational choices are not necessarily distributed evenly among people, who are typically heterogeneous as to the availability of resources of time or interest required in order to become informed. The *'Soft' Cueing Rationality* perspective assumes that people can nevertheless overcome this limitation and act reasonably in a context of 'low information rationality', employing cognitive shortcuts and 'heuristics'. 'Cueing rationality' points therefore to a possible strategy that people may follow in order to form or change opinions on issues for which information is vague or costly. They rely on – they take cues from - objects with which they are familiar - other individuals, institutions or political parties. Hence, in evaluating the European Union, people can rely on the position promulgated by their preferred political party; they can derive their 'European position' from their own left-right ideological position; or they can base their assessment on their perceptions of (and degree of trust in) their own national political institutions. Previous research has shown that these sorts of cue originate mainly within the national systems. This is partly because people are more familiar with it but also because political leaders and parties' competitive strategies make such cues salient and available to people. However, there is evidence that the images of the European Union and of its institutions, as framed and channelled by national mass media, also provide important sources of cueing information (Diez Medrano 2003; De Vreese et al. 2006). This said, there is no consensus in the existing scholarly literature on the mechanisms through which such cues operate. Our discussion of Soft Cueing Rationality accordingly distinguishes between *transfer* and *substitution* cues. Transfer cues involve *projecting* one's feelings about domestic political objects directly to the European sphere (for example: I have confidence in the workings of my national parliament, so I also have confidence in the operation of the European Parliament). Substitution cues involve making judgements about European institutions that compensate for domestic national institutional failings (for example: I have no confidence in my national parliament, so I will express confidence in European institutions). We use this distinction to help explain how and why certain cues exert differential effects on the various dimensions of citizenship and EU engagement.

The fourth major theoretical perspective we use to examine the sources of European citizenship is the *Affective-Identitarian approach*. Social science research has since long recognised the importance of loyalties and identities as enduring sources of social and political behaviour, as well as considering the emotional underpinnings of a variety of individual choices. Although identitarian explanations have been considered since the inception of public opinion research on Europe, this approach has achieved greater prominence in the wake of the rising Euroscepticism that followed the Maastricht Treaty. The ensuing arguments about the EU's challenge to state sovereignty and the dangers of growing

cultural homogeneity articulated by populist and anti-Europe parties were explicitly targeted to hit people's hearts and feelings rather than just addressing the state of their pocketbooks. From this perspective, strong feelings of national identity were at first thought to constrain the development of favourable European attitudes. Later theoretical and empirical research relaxed this assumption. At the same time, the relationship was recognised as being more complex and contingent, involving two important features that condition the relationship between national and European identities: their reciprocal dependence; and the meanings associated in people's minds with national and European identity. Research has therefore explored the exclusive/inclusive nature of identities, and the ascriptive/achieved contents of such allegiances. The former contrast hints to the possible co-existence of multiple and compatible allegiances, while the latter refers to the bases upon which national and supranational identities are constructed (with ascriptive meanings referring to pre-political attributes of nationality such as language, ancestry, religion while achieved meanings refer to civic-political attributes such as rights, institutions, etc). Both these differences have been shown to impinge on European attitudes, although their effective impact is still debated and remains a controversial issue, to which we provide additional, and hopefully convincing, evidence.

Throughout this book we constantly refer to these possible sources of EU citizenship and engagement, assessing to extent to which they rival or complement each other in providing well-rounded explanations of people's attitudes across Europe. Beyond this, other explanatory factors also enter our analysis, both as controls and explanandum of the social and political contexts where European citizens live. We have therefore included in our models, as we said above, a range of national (economic, social, political) characteristics to ascertain the extent to which system-level features impinge upon individual attitudes, employing them to test in multi-level analyses the extent to which systemic characteristics interact and condition individual level attitudes. This way we can test the potential intervening effect of fiscal transfers, governance quality, or EU levels of politicization on the existing relationship among some of these attitudes.

Plan of the volume

This research is the joint effort of a 'European' group of scholars and this volume the outcome of a collective endeavour. Although multi-authored, this book is not an edited collection of interconnected but intrinsically separate essays. Rather, we aimed at writing a cohesive piece of research that would read as unitary, not only in the style but specifically in the way we have built and tested our hypotheses, and in the way concepts are measured and models developed. To this aim, we engaged in extensive discussions whose result was an agreed – in some instances after harsh disagreement - operationalisation of variables, scales and indexes that have been used systematically throughout the chapters. The reader will judge whether we have hit the target. The Appendix documents the various stages of variables construction and describes the methodology employed. Below we describe how our argument unfolds and the organisation of the book.

Chapter 2 – *Conceptualising and Measuring European Citizenship and Engagement* - presents our dependent variables. It discusses the ways in which the various dimensions of European Citizenship and of Engagement have been theorised and measured. As to Citizenship, a six factor analytic solution emerges from analysing a large number of survey responses across 16 EU countries. This solution is robust and consistent across a range of

individual characteristics and types of EU member state, including length of EU membership and Western versus Eastern tradition. This pattern of consistency continues when the six factors (which measure Identity, Institutional Confidence, Political Efficacy, Current Policy Scope Preferences, Future Policy Scope Preferences and Preferred Geographical Scope) are mapped onto the three theoretical dimensions of Citizenship (Identity, Representation and Scope of Government), thus showing that citizens' attitudes are clearly structured along these dimensions. The descriptive picture of European Citizenship that emerges is one of a nuanced balance, in which medium levels of European identification are associated with mixed evaluations of the policy responsiveness of EU institutions and of EU policy competence. The final part of the chapter discusses our two measures of European Engagement: overall support for the EU itself and people's preparedness to participate in elections to the European Parliament.

Chapter 3 - *Towards Explanation: Developing Operational Measures of the Explanatory Variables* - details the main explanatory variables (and associated measures) that are employed in subsequent chapters as independent, control, or intervening variables. The chapter presents a typology of explanatory variables based on the Cognitive Mobilisation, 'Hard' Instrumental Rationality (economic and institutional), 'Soft' Cueing Rationality, and Affective-Identity perspectives. It shows how these sometimes competing and sometimes complementary theoretical positions can be effectively operationalised in terms of a set of exogenous variables that are employed in subsequent chapters to explain variations both in EU Identity, Representation and Scope, and in EU support and engagement. Both individual level 'micro' variables which measure political attitudes and behaviour, and 'macro' variables that describe the diversity of social of political contexts comprising the European Union, are analysed and their variance across Europe assessed by EU accession wave and by region (West *versus* East),.

Chapter 4 – *Explaining European Identity* - analyses individual and national differences in the intensity of European identity, and provides an assessment of the many factors that sustain or hinder the development of a European identification among citizens of EU member states. A model of the intensity of EU identity – comprising feelings of EU belonging and their salience, according to social identity theory – is elaborated considering the various perspectives outlined above (cognitive mobilization, instrumental rationality, political mobilization, national identity), and their distinct explanatory power across the European public is examined. It is found that socio-structural individual level characteristics as well as system-level features have a modest impact on identity. Cognitive mobilization and instrumental 'rational' considerations are far more important in framing the image of Europe and identification with it.

Chapter 5 – *Institutional Trust and Responsiveness in the EU* – analyses the second dimension of European citizenship, Representation. It focuses on the people's evaluation of the EU Parliament and Commission and on the perceived responsiveness of European Union institutions. The chapter argues that as citizens become more acquainted with EU, instrumental motivations acquire greater importance *vis à vis* affective heuristics in evaluating the mechanisms of political representation in the Union. It explores then the role egocentric and socio-tropic evaluations, national political cues and political awareness – all contingent upon economic and political system-level characteristics – exerts on people's trust and perceived responsiveness of the EU. This chapter concludes that evaluations of the EU institutions and their perceived responsiveness depend on three cues: affective support, instrumental sociotropic support, and evaluation of national institutions. The distinctive role

that these three attitudes play in increasing or decreasing the level of EU institutional trust is conditioned by the quality of the governance, the balance of the fiscal transfers, the level of political awareness, and the level of the EU politicization.

Chapter 6 – *The Scope of Government of the European Union: Explaining Citizens' Support for a More Powerful EU* – discusses the third dimension of citizenship – Scope of Government – and analyses people' perceptions and expectations for current and further EU policy-making capacity. It argues that Scope captures mainly a political, prospective and input-oriented dimension of citizenship. Accordingly, instrumental rationality, i.e., perceptions of EU benefits, should have little leeway in explaining people' attitudes over the EU Scope of government (the retrospective logic assumed by instrumental calculation might be ad odds with a prospective vision, as implied by further scope) which might therefore be driven mainly by political and identitarian factors. Among these, it is shown that domestic political cues, confidence in EU institutions, feelings of (exclusive) national identity are strong individual level predictors of Scope of government attitudes, whose impact is reinforced by system-level factors, such as domestic polarisation over EU integration and the quality of government at the national level.

Chapter 7 and 8 shift the focus on the consequences of EU citizenship. The former – *Explaining Support for European Integration* – deals with the impact of citizenship attitudes on popular support for European integration. This issue has been extensively instigated by previous research. The distinctiveness of this new analysis is that it allows an empirical testing of a wide set of theoretical claims advanced in literature but whose explicative contribution only seldom, due to data limitation, have been comparatively assessed. Further, their contribution is tested against that provided by the dimensions of citizenship previously analysed. Last, modelling of systemic-level features and of their interactions with individual level variables is carried out to adjudicate between rival theoretical perspectives. Findings show that Citizenship attitudes are important determinants of people' overall evaluation of EU integration, without any significant variation across Western, Southern and Eastern Europe.

Chapter 8 – *Explaining Turnout in European Parliament Election* – focuses on a key behavioural component of EU engagement, and ascertains the extent to which EU-related attitudes, and in particular Citizenship attitudes, explain electoral participation. Citizenship explanations are therefore tested against a host of traditional determinants of EU turnout (instrumental calculations, partisan cues, sense of civic duties, affective commitment and demographic characteristics). Voters/non voters are grouped in four types, according to whether they vote in both EU and national elections, they did not vote in either, or voted in one election but not in the other. The analysis shows that, with the partial exception of Identity, European attitudes are not important predictors of the (low) level of turnout at the European Parliament elections. Traditional explanations – mainly associated to political and cognitive mobilisation – are far more important, thus pointing out that low turnout does not signal specific anti-European sentiments.

The final analytical Chapter 9 – *Towards an Integrated Model of EU Citizenship and Support* – relaxes the recursive perspective that has informed the previous analyses, and explicitly models reciprocal causal effects, providing a comprehensive and integrated account of the EU Citizenship attitudes on EU Support. While preceding explanatory chapters are all based on single-equation models - in which a given dependent variable is assumed to be affected by a set of exogenous explanatory factors – here a system of equations is estimated in which instrumental variables are employed to sharpen the understanding of possibly reciprocal

causal effects between Citizenship and Support, also controlling for the impact of different levels of political sophistication on the part of different individuals. The results show that: i) among the three dimensions of Citizenship, this appears to be mainly driven by Representation, which has net bigger effects on Identity and Scope; ii) once the 'endogenous' links between Identity, Representation and Scope are carefully controlled, all the four theoretical perspectives whose impacts have been tested throughout the book appear relevant, although stronger influences are associated to instrumental rationality and heuristics rationality variables; iii) although some inter-correlation exist between Citizenship and Support, estimates controlling for such endogeneity show that Support is dependent on Citizenship, thus confirming this research's earlier distinction hypothesis

The concluding chapter provides a summary review of the main themes and empirical findings developed in this book's chapters. It shows that the processes affecting perceptions of EU citizenship and engagement appear to operate in a broadly similar fashion across all of the countries of the EU. Obviously, levels of citizenship and engagement vary across countries and contexts. Nonetheless, the empirical analysis shows that EU mass publics tend to think about the EU in remarkably similar ways. The sense of EU citizenship among mass publics may not yet have 'caught up' with the formal legal citizenship that all EU citizens enjoy. This said, there is a real, measurable emerging sense of European citizenship, which complements rather than contradicts feelings of national citizenship among mass publics in all member states, and which counterbalances a developing Euroscepticism in some EU countries. This structure appears rather stable, as the following 2009 IntUne survey – during the severe global economic crisis which affected European nations – uncovered similar levels of EU Citizenship and Support. To the extent that the EU can continue to deliver in the future clearly perceived benefits to its citizens and its institutions effectively represent citizens' needs and preferences, hard and soft instrumental calculations suggest that perceived EU citizenship and EU support will increase in the future.

Figure 1.1: The causal sequence investigated in the volume

Exogenous explanatory variables	→	Citizenship variables: Identity Representation	→	Consequences: EP election turnout EU support