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Table and figures at the end.

Explaining support for European integration

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This is the first of two chapters that deal with the possible impact of the attitudes forming the dimensions of EU citizenship introduced in chapter two and examined subsequently in this volume. In this chapter the focus falls on support for European integration and its dependence on three dimensions of EU-citizenship. We aim to address three questions. First, we want to explore the links between people's positions on three dimensions of EU-citizenship and their support for the European Union, and asses what is their relative merit in explaining support. Second, we examine relative analytical strength of four sets of long-standing hypotheses concerning possible determinants of mass support for the European integration. We do this to explore whether, and in what ways, other expected determinants may have impact on EU-support once the three key dimensions of EU-citizenship feelings are controlled for. Third, we ask whether theories established in the West European context also explain reasonably well EU-support in the Southern as well as East Central Europe. In this we seek to explore if there is a universal pattern of determinants of mass support for the Europe Union, or whether support patterns exhibit some regional peculiarities, and if so, what drives them. Due to the special focus of the IntUne datasets on EU-related factors, we have a better opportunity than any of the previous studies to simultaneously control for all of theoretically relevant factors while assessing their direct impact on EU-support.

Our theoretical framework and methodology closely follows those in previous chapters in this volume and rounds up the analysis about the roots and impact of European citizenship in EU politics. One rationale for the approach we use in this chapter stems from the current state of the art in the field of public opinion about European integration. A range of theories was advanced in numerous studies published over two decades, with principal explanations based on factors ranging from economic-instrumental calculus, identity or affective attachment, political or other cues to cognitive mobilization. However, few of these studies attempted to test the full range of hypothesis and provide comparative assessment of the validity of individual explanations (for exception and overview see Hooghe and Marks 2005). We aim to fill this gap. We further aim to clarify, to the extent possible within this single chapter, the association between variety of theoretical concepts and the real effects of their empirical measures. This is an important but rarely addressed issue, given that a wide range of theoretical propositions are empirically tested with very similar or even the same set of variables, whose hypothesized effects often vary across studies. This makes the exact and unambiguous understanding of the effects of variables used less than straightforward. We warn that such issues should not be left unaddressed and that empirical studies would benefit from controlling for alternative propositions in a more comprehensive way. Such analytical feat might be hard to achieve given limitations in existing datasets, however, we hold that through the introduction of more contextual variables, and more careful modeling of

interactions between contextual and individual level variables, we should be able to assess analytical merits of a broad range of often countervailing hypothesis.

Further motivation of our study is that the political changes of the recent past may have undermined the validity of some findings reported in the previous literature. After all, the last decade changed the context of EU integration probably more than any before. The 2004 enlargement brought to the union countries with very different social, economic and political circumstances. At the same time, political context surrounding integration changed as immigration and globalization came to be perceived as social and economic threat by many in Western Europe. This triggered calls for a halt in the process of further enlargement and transfer of sovereignty from the national to the European level (Sides and Citrin 2007; Luedtke 2005; McLaren 2007). The Eastern enlargement and the efforts to adopt the European constitution reshaped the structure of public opinion and the terms of public debate. The "permissive consensus" between integrating elites and national mass publics all but disappeared, and questions about accountability and democratic deficit at the EU level got ever louder (Hooghe and Marks 2008; Katz 2001; Gabel and Palmer 1995). Mass support for European integration has supposedly followed these changes, reflecting the increasing politicization and the altered issue frames of European integration among mass publics (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Citizens of France, Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands rejected major treaties in referenda. Meanwhile, in some countries of East Central Europe, where integration generally had high support in the pre-accession period, citizens became somewhat more sceptical after membership was achieved (see, e.g., Table 7.1. below).

Therefore, this chapter focuses on support for integration at a very recent time point and features explicit East-West comparisons utilizing varied contextual variables to provide tests of previously advanced hypotheses. We formulate extensions of previous theories about how the roots of support for the EU might differ between Eastern and Western Europe, and where it may be more or less dependent on each dimension of EU citizenship introduced in the previous chapters.

Since our goal is a comprehensive assessment using the full toolkit provided by the survey instruments developed in the literature on EU-support so far, it may help the reader if the main findings are already anticipated here. We find that overall evaluations of EU-integration build on more specific attitudes related to Europe, above all the dimensions of EU citizenship introduced in chapter 2. Once these more specific attitudes are taken into account, little influence seems to be exercised by factors like cognitive mobilization, domestic political cues, and national identity. Our findings point to a predominantly instrumental logic for EU-support among citizens, with some further role played by EU identity and trust in Europeans as well as EU- and national institutions. The only direct effect of cognitive mobilization concerns the extent to which the influence of instrumental calculus is enhanced by citizens' political sophistication. The roots of EU-support are remarkably similar across Western, Southern and Eastern Europe, and also the level of support is mostly explained by within- rather than between-country differences. The only striking cross-regional difference concerns neither the determinants nor the level of support for EU-integration, but the extent to which attitudes to the EU are crystallized in the various parts of Europe. Citizens of the South and the East tend to have less well developed attitudes towards EU-support than the West European mass publics. We also notice that if attitudes to integration were

to become more crystallized, they would become very slightly less supportive than they are at this point.

The following parts of the chapter are organised as follows. In section one, we discuss theoretical expectations about the sources of support for European integration. Section two discusses how its observed level varies across countries, individuals, and recent years. Section three presents our first empirical tests about the sources of individual-level variation and considers if they vary across regions of Europe. Section four explores whether the determinants of EU support vary across member states in a systematic and theoretically plausible way. Section five concludes.

Propositions about the sources of support

Foundations of support for European integration have been the subject of intensive scholarly research (see Hooghe and Marks 2005 as well as the previous chapters of this volume for overviews). By and large, the individual-level determinants appear to include:

- *instrumental-utilitarian factors*, such as marketable skills and resources as the determinants of the individuals' ability to benefit economically from market integration; the flow of financial transfers between the EU and the member states; and the impact integration is likely to have on the performance of national economies and political systems (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Christin 2005);
- *cognitive shortcuts* and cues used to extrapolate views about European integration from positions held by preferred political parties; ideological orientations and partisan attachments; trust citizens have in national politicians and institutions; and economic conditions (see Anderson 1998; Aspinwall 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Ray 2003a, 2003b; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006a, 2006b; but see Carruba 2001; Gabel and Scheve 2007; and Steenbergen et al. 2007 for some challenges to the cue-taking explanation);
- *affective/identitarian factors* such as national and European identity, including feeling of threat integration may pose to it (McLaren 2002; Carey 2002; Luedtke 2005; McLaren 2007);
- *cognitive mobilization* (i.e., political attentiveness and sophistication), which some studies found to have an influence on what level of government citizens see appropriate for collective action (Inglehart 1970; Gabel 1998b). Some recent studies also highlight the importance of media, more precisely consonant media messages – positive and negative, and sometime with delayed effects – on developments in support (Peter 2004; Bruter 2009; de Vreese 2007; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Vliegenthart et al. 2008);
- *political sophistication*, which can be seen as an indicator of cognitive mobilization, may enhance or limit the impact of incoming new information and reasoned calculus (cf. Zaller 1992 on the general argument, and chapter 5 of this volume for an application to attitudes towards the EU).

Reasons of space prevent us from offering a detailed review of all the related propositions and how different studies operationalized them, but our list of hypotheses at the end of the section is intended to cover nearly all propositions that received some empirical support in the prior literature and are testable with our current data. Our model-building is guided by three further considerations.

First, given that our data set comprises just 16 countries in a single year, we largely ignore the question of what determines aggregate (i.e., national) levels of support for integration. Yet we are particularly well positioned to explore how individual-level determinants of support vary across member states, even though the number of level-2 in the data is still too small to estimate random-coefficient multilevel models. We know from the previous literature that the impact of some determinants is contingent on context (see, e.g., Vössing 2005; Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt 2004; Carruba 2001; Ciftci 2005; Hix 2007; Kaltenhalter and Anderson 2001; Banducci, Karp and Loedel 2003). For instance, Brinegar and Jolly (2005), Hix (2007), Hooghe and Marks (2005) and Ray (2004) find that in countries with higher welfare spending left-wingers tend to be opposed to integration, but in countries with less welfare-spending it is right-wingers who tend to oppose integration more. Furthermore, Christin (2005), Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) and Kritzinger (2003) find that support is higher among lower skilled in countries where the performance of national political institutions or economies is inferior. Hooghe and Marks (2005) and Gabel (1998b), in turn, offer the compatible argument that labour is more supportive of free trade regimes in labour-rich countries, while professionals and managers are more supportive of it in capital-rich ones. Finally, Gary and Tilley (2009) and de Vries and van Kersbergen (2007) find that economic benefits of integration can dampen the effect of exclusive national identity on opposition toward the EU, or conversely that economic anxiety could increase it. It is apparent that the hypothesized effects of some variables differ substantially between different theoretical accounts and are highly conditional on the socioeconomic and political context. By implication, the patterns of support may vary substantially across countries.

Second, we are specifically interested in whether instrumental calculus, cues, identity, cognitive mobilization or sophistication, relative to each other, have a stronger bearing on EU-support. Hence our own theorizing focuses partly on the allocation of various possible determinants among these broader categories. Consider first the scope, representation and identity dimensions of EU citizenship introduced in the previous chapters. We consider that support for a greater policy scope of EU government forms an instrumental/utilitarian foundation of generalized EU-support because linking the two is merely a matter of making a simple logical connection between goals and means. General feelings about representation by EU institution, in their turn, should impact EU-support as cognitive shortcuts (see chapter 5 in this volume). That is, even if citizens cannot tell whether specific problems are more or less effectively solved at more highly aggregated levels of policy making, citizens can have a general predisposition about whether particular institutions represent them well or not. They can use this dimension of citizenship feelings as a cue in judging whether they are willing to allocate those institutions more power or not. Finally, an affective EU identity obviously forms an identity-based foundation for EU-support.

But some determinants of EU-support discussed in the literature fall into more than one of the above conceptual blocks, and a few may even have opposite effects depending on whether they act as shortcuts or via reasoned calculus. For instance, some studies found that EU-support increases as citizens dissatisfaction with the performance of their national political systems and elites grows, presumably because the European Union is expected to correct the failings of national institutions (Kritzinger 2003; Christin 2005). This is an argument about instrumental calculus and expects that high trust in national governments and institutions reduces support for

European integration – but only where good government prevails. However, since party elites and governments are typically more supportive of European integration than are their voters (cf. e.g. Mattila and Raunio 2006), trust in national institutions may actually increase support for European integration if citizens rely on partisan cues rather than a reasoned calculus about the value of increasing EU jurisdiction at the expense of trusted domestic actors. Thus, the main effect of satisfaction with the national political system is one of a cue and is expected to be positive – the usually pro-integration stance of incumbents receives more support when it is pursued by well-trusted national actors –, while its interaction with the quality of government should have a negative effect due to the instrumental calculus that the power of well-functioning national institutions should not be surrendered to Europe.

Some known correlates of EU-support are, however, really irrelevant for adjudicating between rival theoretical perspectives, and therefore we shall only include them as control variables. Consider first the clearest examples. Left-right ideology may influence support for integration via either a reasoned calculus of expectations about what policies will be promoted by a stronger EU, or cue-taking from trusted actors, or identity-based linkages. Similarly, cognitive mobilization theory would probably expect the better educated to be more supportive of Europe because of their less parochial perspective, i.e. their above average belief in the feasibility of and returns on collective actions at higher and geographically more distant levels of political aggregation. However, the assumption of instrumental rationality would expect a similar correlation, since the better educated are more likely to possess marketable skills that are likely to be appreciated in the context of the broader economic market created by EU-integration, and are also more likely to embrace those socially liberal values that formed a key basis for EU-support among party elites, presumably in the expectation that these values will be promoted by integration (cf. Hooghe et al. 2002). Additionally, under benevolent assumptions about the overall impact of EU-integration on society as a whole, information cost theory may see the positive impact of education on support for integration as a sign that education increases the probability of appreciating such collective net benefits of integration that accrue to the more and less educated to the same extent. Therefore, the impact of left-right attitudes and education – and indeed of any socio-demographic trait – on EU-support cannot be seen as an indicator of either instrumental calculus, or the impact of cue-taking, cognitive factors or identity. However, the latter should still be controlled for if we are to delineate the true influence of the theoretically more straightforward variables.

Yet, the interactions of such control variables like education with contextual characteristics can be telling about the validity of particular theories. For instance, in countries that greatly benefit from the flow of EU transfer payments integration may have a wide range of positive effects that accrue to more or less everyone, independently of the marketable skills and social liberalism that distinguish the better educated. Consequently, under the assumption of instrumental rationality, we can expect that the benefits of EU-integration are less closely tied to education in such countries than in others. Therefore we will use certain macro-micro interactions to test particular theories even when the original variables making up an interaction term – such as education and net transfer payments – will, for reasons discussed earlier, only occur among the control variables of our statistical models.

Third, we are also concerned here with how sources of support for the EU may differ across regions of Europe. Previous studies of the East give surprisingly few starting points for this. They

find that positive opinion toward the EU has above average probability among supporters of market economy and democratic values as well as those who have skills or income enabling their holders to compete on the market. Thus, it is presumably tied to a reasoned, if not necessarily correct, calculus that EU-integration will advance the interests of such individuals (Caplanova, Orvinska and Hudson 2004; Cichowski 2000; Tverdova and Anderson 2004; Tucker et al. 2002). Status of a transitional winner or loser also contributes to how one looks at the EU (Tucker et al. 2002; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2004), as does national identity (McManus-Czubinska et al. 2003), political efficacy (Tanasiou and Colonescu 2008; Ehin 2001) and, maybe less consistently, partisan cues too (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006a, 2006b). Hence, at the individual level, the mechanisms behind support for integration in Eastern Europe seem similar to those at work in Western Europe (Marks et al. 2006). Baltic countries are partial exception from this picture as several studies found that fear among citizens about losing control over economic policy, changes in the position of Russian minority and loss of political independence kept support lower than in other CEE countries (Ehin 2001; Vetik *et al* 2006). However, the above theories hardly exhaust the list of possible East-West differences, and we probe this question a little further below by adding some relatively new hypotheses to those found in the previous literature.

To begin with, EU accession is said to have had stabilizing effects on democracy and market economy in Eastern Europe and that it facilitated improvements in the quality of governance and the fight against corruption (Ethier 2003; Pop-Eleches 2007; Vachudova 2009; Schimmelfenning et al. 2003; Schimmelfenning 2008; Haughton 2007; Sadurski 2004; Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008; Sedelmeier 2008), and was also valued as a symbolic break with the authoritarian past and the "return" to Europe (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2004; Sadurski 2004). Given this, we might expect support to be more broadly based in Eastern - and by the same token in Southern – Europe than in the West, since some effects of integration, like improved governance, can benefit nearly all. The same general mechanism may also be operative because of the high trade openness of Eastern European countries. Their more open economies must have a greater capacity to benefit from integration than closed ones, where the benefits of trade must always hurt some established interests. As is the case, several CEE countries, notably Visegrad four and Estonia, significantly upgraded their industries and reoriented their trade toward western European markets which markedly increased their potential to benefit from market integration (Crespo and Fonotoura 2007).

Opposition to integration in turn may be more strongly linked to national identity in the East than the West. It is sometimes argued that the more prolonged experience with foreign (German, Ottoman, Russian and later Soviet) dominance and a lesser matter-of-fact certainty about independent nationhood and statehood in the East might have boosted nationalist opposition to supranational political unions, foreign presence and influence of any sort in these countries (Bunce 2005; Schopflin 1993; Todorova 1992; but see Shulman 2002).

In summary, we expect that:

1. Reasoned instrumental calculus about the EU's role in achieving desired goals influences support for European integration (Hypothesis 1, henceforth H1). Among the attitude variables in our analysis the perceived personal and sociotropic benefits of integration and support for a greater scope of EU government are clear instances of possible instrumental

foundations. Other policy stances of citizens – such as whether they support a 'social' or rather a 'free market' Europe – could in principle be relevant too. However, given that at the time of our survey centrist grand coalitions of the left and the right seemed to have an unassailable hold on European policy making, we expect that such policy attitudes had little across-the-board impact on EU support in Spring 2007;

1a. Interactions between country and individual characteristics are likely to qualify H1. In particular, we expect the difference in support between manual workers and others to diminish in the less affluent – i.e., at least potentially labour-exporting and capital-importing – countries (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Gabel 1998a). Similarly, higher levels of welfare spending must reduce support for European integration among left-wingers and those who prefer Europe to promote a generous system of social welfare rather than a free market Europe – which is just a more precise operationalization of a theoretical proposition present in Brinegar *et al.* (2004), Brinegar and Jolly (2005) and Hooghe and Marks (2005). A high level of trust in domestic political institutions must create reluctance to transferring power to European institutions, but only if the quality of governance is generally high in a country. We would also expect that the benefits of integration are more widely distributed and thus the impact of education on EU-support is less pronounced than otherwise in countries with recent experience of dictatorships, more positive net transfers to the country from the EU budget, and a lower quality of domestic governance institutions;

2. Citizens use cues provided by trusted political actors and economic trends to gauge the merits of integration (H2). Positive perception of economic trends will increase EU-support given that the status quo is the progressive deepening of integration through the play of market forces, acts of the European courts, and occasionally political decisions. Identification with political parties will increase or reduce support for integration depending on what stance the party in question has on European integration.[1] Trust in national institutions and feelings about representation by European institutions as cues about the likely benefits of moving political choices to higher levels of aggregation will also increase EU-support;

2a. The key caveat to H2 is that the power of particular cues may vary across national contexts. Cue-taking from preferred parties, in particular, may diminish with length of EU membership as citizens' personal opinions crystallize over time (Steenbergen et al. 2007). The effect of cue-taking should also diminish if preferred parties are internally divided about European integration in a way visible to voters (Gabel and Scheve 2007). Alternatively, cue-

[1]The extant literature (see, e.g., Ray 2003b and Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006b) as well as previous chapters in this volume sometimes consider identification with a government party as a possible pro-integration cue too, given the supposedly more pro-European stance of the same parties in government than in opposition. However, when we did include this variable in the analyses reported in this paper we found that identification with incumbent parties – once we control for their stance on European integration – has, across our 16 countries, a small negative impact on EU-support that turns statistically significant in some specifications. While this anomaly is substantively interesting on its own, it seems hard to account for it in terms of any one of the theoretical frameworks discussed in this chapter and therefore we decided to omit identification with incumbents from the analysis.

taking from preferred parties may vary by the degree to which parties offer clear alternatives, and thus allow the development of policy-based party-citizen linkages in matters of European integration (Popkin 1991; Lau and Redlawsk 2001). As we reasoned above, cue-taking from perceived representation by European institutions should diminish where the quality of national governance is higher;

3. The strength of national identity reduces, while European identity and trust in fellow Europeans increase support for integration (H3). As Hooghe and Marks (2005) observe, it may be though that it is not so much the strength of national identity but rather an exclusive nature of this identity that animates against the EU. We offer a new test of this proposition using the same measure of exclusive national identity, but this time pitting it against a more elaborate measure of national identity than Hooghe and Marks (2005) could use;

3a. The effect of national identity may also vary, e.g. we expect it to be especially strong in Eastern Europe, where, for reasons of history, citizens are particularly likely to view supranational institutions and foreign presence through an affective/identitarian lens. The effect of (exclusive) national identity may get particularly pronounced where parties are divided over Europe because anti-EU parties tend to mobilize along affective-identitarian lines (Mark and Hooghe 2005). A strong EU-identity, in its turn, should be a stronger source of support for integration in those countries that have a longer experience with EU-membership, as membership promotes institutional and discursive links between European identity on the one hand and the particular framework of the Union on the other.

4. Cognitive mobilization may increase support for integration, presumably because it makes citizens appreciate supranational venues for effective public good provision more highly (H4). We expect this effect to occur with respect to such indicators of cognitive mobilization as internal efficacy, media exposure, political sophistication, social trust, visits to other European countries and non-electoral participation, respectively. This goes back to Inglehart's argument these factors reduce parochialism, which, if present, would reduce support for supranational institutions.

4a. It is possible that H4 was only valid in the period of the permissive consensus about Europe, i.e. when the best informed and most attentive sections of the EU citizenry were particularly strongly exposed to pro-EU elite arguments (cf. Peter 2004). Following this reasoning we can expect that exactly the most involved are the first to receive any new cues from elites (cf. Zaller 1992), and hence within-elite disagreements over Europe should have generated below-average support for integration exactly in this segment of the EU citizenry;

5. Higher levels of political sophistication should increase the impact of instrumental calculus – i.e. perceived benefits and support for a greater scope of European government – on EU-support (H5). This is expected because of the greater information needs of instrumental calculus than affective responses or cue-taking.[2]

[2] Some may wonder why we do not posit that the impact of cues and affective identity drop with citizen sophistication. Regarding the first, the reason is that cue-taking itself requires some prior political knowledge (Lau and Redlawsk 2001) and therefore reduced motivation among sophisticates to use shortcuts may be counterbalanced by their greater ability to use them. Regarding identity, we note that the incidence of affective responses is unrelated to cognitive skills (Marcus 2002) and hence there is no reason to find a weaker effect of identity among political

Support for European integration: measurement and variance

The dependent variable of the present chapter is a highly generalized attitudinal predisposition towards European integration, i.e., whether citizens would like to have more or less of it. The reference point is thus the status quo; and we asked our respondents to express their preferences on the issue at hand without putting the latter in any particular frame, neither referring to specific issues of deepening or enlargement, nor particular perspectives of personal, national, or other interests. Instead, we raised the question in the most general way possible that nevertheless goes beyond soliciting mere evaluations of European integration as good or bad. This question ought to elicit a politically more considered response than mere approval of the status quo: a response that should be the best single proxy for likely voting behaviour in future referenda on European treaties and referenda, no matter whether they concern membership, secession, enlargement, or deepening.

The question that we use to measure our dependent variable reads like this: “Some say European unification has already gone too far. Others say it should be strengthened. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using […] this scale, [where] '0' means unification "has already gone too far" and '10' means it "should be strengthened" What number on this scale best describes your position?” The bivariate correlations between the above measure of EU support on the one hand, and trust in the European Parliament and the Commission, as well as membership approval on the other, suggested that none of the latter items form a common scale with our dependent variable.[3] Indeed, the strongest of these three pairwise correlations within any of the 16 countries was just .50 and the average correlation was just .27. The Cronbach alpha values for any of the two-item scales based on these items averaged a very modest .35 across the 16 countries. Remarkably, the averages remained similarly weak when calculated only for a pair formed by membership approval and our dependent variable (average R=.31, average Cronbach alpha=.27). Thus we are confident that our dependent variable captures a distinct dimension of predispositions.

<Figure 7.1>
<Table 7.1>

Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1 pool data from the 2007 IntUne survey with comparable figures from the 1999 and 2004 European Election Studies to examine the crystallization of attitudes on EU-

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sophisticates.

[3] Trust in institutions was measured on a 0-10 scale, while membership approval with responses to “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?”

integration.[4] Figure 7.1 reveals a negative correlation (-.32, significant at the .05 level) between the percentage of non-response to the EU-support item with the standard deviation of the valid responses across the 41 country-years appearing in the table. In other words, the more people have an opinion about the matter in a country at any given point in time, the more likely that their opinions will be relatively polarized rather than concentrated around a central tendency. Note that in Figure 7.1 the observations about the East European member states (indicated by solid circles) are nearly all concentrated near the bottom-right quadrant, while the South European observations (indicated by a cross) are spread somewhere between the Eastern and Western European ones. In other words, the percentage of non-response tends to increase, and the polarization of responses drop as we move from Western to Southern and then to Eastern Europe. Thus, in the latter parts of the continent, popular opinion seems to be less crystallized on the question of further integration.

One reason for non-responses may be that the wording of the EU-support item creates asymmetric choices for supporters and opponents of integration. For the first, a choice is offered between changing or maintaining the status quo, while for the EU-skeptic side the question is more about the intensity of opposition than a choice between reversing the integration process and maintaining the status quo. Whether the constrained choices on our survey item may have made some opponents of integration decline answering can be best investigated by comparing the density distribution of the original responses along the 0-10 scale with the distribution of our multiply imputed estimates for the likely opinions behind the non-responses (see the Appendix of this book). Multiple imputation makes guesses about the most likely responses of the respondents who did not answer a particular question given their responses to all other questions in the IntUne study and is therefore eminently suitable for gauging latent opinion.

<Figure 7.2>

In a majority of the 16 countries, more of the imputed values for the non-responses than of the original valid responses should fall towards low values on our dependent variable, suggesting that non-response was indeed more frequent among people with low support (cf. Table 7.1). In Austria, Denmark, Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland and in all four Southern European countries the difference between expressed and latent opinions is not only in this direction but is also statistically significant (at the p=.05 level, chi-square tests not shown), while only in Great Britain is the mean level of estimated EU-support significantly higher among those who did not respond to the respective question than among those who did. Overall, however, the estimated

[4] The European Election Studies use compatible sampling methods and the same question wording to measure EU-support, but the responses are recorded on a 1-10 rather than 0-10 scale as in the IntUne survey. For the purposes of comparability, we applied a linear transformation of the responses in the EES survey so that they also run from 0 to 10, and dropped those countries from the analysis that were not covered by the IntUne survey. The EES data and their technical documentation are publicly available from the www.europeanelectionstudies.net web address, and were collected in the immediate aftermath to the 1999 and 2004 elections to the European Parliament.

predisposition of the non-respondents are leaning in a centrist direction everywhere except in Austria, and thus most non-responses indeed stand for uncertain and ambiguous opinions (see Figure 7.2).

Table 7.1 helps to place our 2007 data in a dynamic perspective. In most countries, non-response to the question about EU-support dropped over time, which suggests that a slow crystallization of opinions is taking place. This process did not lead to a growing polarization of opinions though: if anything, a remarkably large drop occurred in the within-country variation (standard deviation) of the responses between 1999 and 2007 everywhere except in Poland (which moved in the opposite direction) and Austria, France, Germany, and Italy, where we observe only small and trendless fluctuations in the degree of division over Europe among citizens in the given period. Even more remarkably, the polarization of opinion dropped not only within, but also across member states.

Turning to the level of EU-support, we observe a large drop of support among the then member states between 1999 and 2004, but that support for EU-integration then increased in most member states in the years following the Eastern enlargement. This trend was particularly strong in some of the most Euro-sceptic member states like Denmark and the UK, but was accompanied by a drop in EU-support in some East European countries, which, in the main, used to have above-average levels of EU-support back in 2004. The results of this variation in national trajectories is that by 2007 there was less within-country, but also less between-country difference of opinions on the future of European integration. Indeed, only half of the 16 countries in our sample deviated by more than half a point from the cross-national mean (5.63) on our 0-10 scale. These were the somewhat less Europhile Austria, Estonia and Great Britain on the one hand, and more Europhile Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain on the other.

Focusing on the 2007 data only, we find that less than eight percent of the total variance in EU-support across the 16 countries and 16,133 individuals in our analysis can be explained by cross-country differences, i.e. by regressing EU-support on a series of dummy variables uniquely identifying each country.[5] The seven country-characteristics listed among our control variables in Table 7.2 (*Communist Past, Quality of Governance, Net EU Transfers, Gross National Income, Welfare Spending, Length of EU Membership,* and *Partisan Divide over Europe*) appear to explain over half of the eight percent cross-country variance, but this explanatory power is more apparent than real as only *Quality of Governance* registers a consistently significant effect across our various analyses. Taken alone, the tendency that better governed countries are less supportive of further integration accounts for just two percent of the total variance, or, in other words, a quarter of the cross-national differences that we find in 2007. Differences in support between Eastern, Southern and Western Europe are more substantial and account for nearly five percent of the total variance. However, these differences cannot be explained in terms of our theoretically informed macro-variables (like the quality of governance at the national level), and boil down almost entirely to the notably higher levels of EU-support in the South (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) than either in the West (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and Great Britain) or the East (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia).

[5] The exploratory analyses reported in this paragraph are not displayed in the tables but are available from the authors upon request.

What concerns us here most, however, is not the explanation of the rather muted cross-national differences in support but an understanding of the country-specific roots of the still very pronounced divisions in the mass public within literally every member state. These divisions, indicated by an average within-country standard deviation of 2.7 in 2007, are substantial in their size in spite of the recent drop; indeed, as van der Eijk and Franklin (2006) noted, much larger than comparable divisions on the left-right dimension in Europe. Remarkably, the shape of these divisions within individual countries remains rather stable over time (cf. Figure 7.3). Thus, in the next two sections we turn to multivariate statistical analyses of the propositions about the sources of EU-support advanced in section one.

<Figure 7.3>

Empirical tests

Table 7.2 lists our numbered hypotheses and identifies the relevant independent variables. This follows the above discussion at the end of section one, and only adds to that the list of control variables employed in our analysis. The variables in the analysis are described elsewhere in the volume (see chapter 3 and the Appendix). The only extra note that is necessary here is that our *EU Representation* variable is the average score on the *EU Institutional Trust* and *EU Efficacy* scales introduced in chapter 2, and *EU Scope* is the average of the *EU Scope Current*, *EU Scope Future* and *EU Geographical Scope* scales.

<Table 7.2>

The control variables in our analyses are of two sorts. First, all our models except number 9 control for sex, age, education, religion, self-employment, manual work, and left-right position because some of the previous literature found differences is support for the EU along these lines. These effects are not directly relevant for the theoretical propositions that our analysis focuses on, but we evidently need to control for their possible confounding effects while examining the theoretically relevant hypotheses. Second, some of the propositions examined in the next section pertain to macro-micro interactions that may explain cross-country differences in what individual-level variables influence EU-support in various countries. Correct statistical tests of these effects require controls for the macro variables entering these interactions. In this section, however, we present and discuss models that only include individual-level variables and ask if instrumental calculus, cue-taking, identity, or cognitive factors explain better the very substantial within-country differences in support for integration, and whether the three regions of Europe differ with respect to the explanatory power of these theories.[6] Such differences can only be assessed with correct estimates of the statistical errors, which we facilitate with estimating all regression models with adjustments for multiple imputation of missing values using the *mim*

[6] To this effect, all variables in this analysis were centered at their country mean, that is we subtracted the country mean from each independent as well as dependent variable, leaving aside that less than 8 percent of its total variance that, as we saw in section two, can be attributed to cross-country differences (results in table 7.3)

package (see Carling, Galati and Royston 2008) as well as for the clustering of observations by country.

<Table 7.3>

Table 7.3 summarizes the results for nine different models. The baseline Model 1, for instance, only includes our individual-level control variables about the respondents' sex, age, age-squared, education, religion (Catholic or not), manual work, left-right position and the extremity of this left-right position (i.e., its squared deviation from the middle-point of the 0-10 scale). The combined explanatory power of these variables is shown in the first row and appears uniformly modest in all three regions of Europe: just below four percent in the West, and a little over a percent in both the South and the East, as well as across all 16 countries combined. The other six models add the substantively interesting groups of predictor variables. Thus, Model 2 refers to instrumental calculus, i.e. it adds to the baseline model the perceived personal and national benefits of EU membership, the *EU Scope* variable, and an attitude item tapping preferences for a 'social' rather than common market Europe; in other words, the four individual-level variables listed under the H1 in Table 7.2. Similarly, Model 3 refers to the four variables on cue-taking listed under H2 in Table 7.2, and so forth. Since information cost theory posits interactions between variables that, taken in isolation from each other, are already part of Models 2 and 5, the distinct contribution of this perspective (and thus of Model 7) to explaining EU-support has to be evaluated against the already demanding standard set by Model 6, which combines all other theoretical perspectives in a mixed model. Finally, Model 8 and 9 are estimated to assess the relative contribution of the three dimensions of EU-citizenship attitudes – identity, representation and scope – vis-à-vis all other variables to the explanatory power of Model 7.

Two striking trends appear in the tables. First, there are very large differences between the West and the other two regions in the explanatory power of any one of the models. This means that established theories of individual-level roots of EU-support fit the reality of Western Europe far better than that of the South or the East. At the same time, however, there are equally striking similarities across the three regions in the relative performance of the different models vis-à-vis each other. Instrumental calculus stands out as the strongest influence in all three regions. Identity and cues come next and each shows an appreciably larger explanatory power than cognitive mobilization. Considering the information costs of instrumental calculus via Model 7 only increases the explanatory power of the model to an entirely negligible extent. Last but not least, a comparison between Models 7, 8 and 9 reveal that the three EU-citizenship variables and their only interaction explain appreciably more variance in EU-support than the other 50 variables and interaction terms of Model 7 combined. In fact, the latter only add, depending on region, a modest two to five percent to the variance that is already explained by the citizenship factors, suggesting that these more specific orientations towards Europe almost fully mediate the impact of all determinants of support for European integration postulated or discovered in the previous literature.

The best tentative explanation for this constellation is that the foundations of EU-support do not differ very fundamentally between the three regions, at least not in terms of their affinity to these four theoretical perspectives. Where the West does differ from both the South and the East is in the stronger structuring of citizen attitudes to integration. This interpretation is very consistent

with the regional patterns in the polarization of opinions and frequency of non-responses to our question about EU-support discussed in section two above, and could plausibly be related to higher levels of cognitive mobilization and longer experience with democratic discourse and free opinion formation in the West than in the two other regions of Europe.

We note that the three regions are also similar in sustaining considerable overlaps between the explanatory powers of the different models. The *prima facie* explanatory power of instrumental calculus can be gauged through the difference between the R-squared for Model 1 and 2.[7] For the West, for example, this difference is a whopping .221. The comparable figure in the West for the *prima facie* influence of cues is .128, for identity .139, and for cognitive mobilization .043. However, the sum of these individual contributions and the maximum possible influence of the control variables (.221 + .128 + .139 + .043 + .039=.569) is a far cry from the actual estimate about their combined influence (see the R^2= .308 figure for the West at Model 6). This gap suggests that about half the apparent work done by the variables belonging to any of these four theoretical models may well be shared by variables belonging to rival models. Again, the fact that similar, albeit slightly smaller, overlaps can be noticed in the data for the South and the East give further support to the idea that there is a similarity of attitude structures, but a difference in the extent of structuring that emerges in belief systems about the EU in the West on the one hand, and the East and South on the other.

<Table 7.4>

Given the overlaps between the explanatory powers of the rival models, we have to consider the parameter estimates of the ultimate combined Model 7 as the best guide to which individual variables may be the most influential within the individual groups speaking to the different theories. Table 7.4 provides the relevant estimates, once again both broken down by regions and for all 16 countries combined. Simple calculus can show that there is not a single coefficient in this unwieldy table where the pairwise difference between any two regions, or between one region and all three combined would show a statistically significant difference: even the biggest difference, which is between the South and the West in the impact of perceived benefits to the nation, stays within sampling error. The important determinants of EU-support appear to be the same across the three regions, even if their impact does not necessarily pass conventional levels of significance within every one of our regional subsamples. That is to say, our three citizenship factors – *EU Scope*, *EU Representation*, and *EU Identity* – stand out as consistent influences from among the indicators of instrumental, cue-taking and identitarian factors. This may be so partly because these variables – unlike some others appearing in the table – already incorporate information from several individual items, and are therefore more reliable measures of what they capture than, say, our simple dichotomous measure of exclusive national identity. However, the overall picture hardly changes when we remove these three citizenship factors from the model: merely the influence of *National Institutional Trust* (a cue-taking factor) and *Trust [in] Other*

[7] By this prima facie explanatory power of a factor we mean the effect as it appears without controls for the influence of variables referring to rival theories, but after we somewhat conservatively adjust it for the maximum possible influence of the control variables.

Europeans (that we classified as an identitarian consideration) increases appreciably, which hardly makes much of a difference in the theoretical conclusions that can be drawn (data not shown).

Expectations regarding the impact of instrumental calculus are mostly borne out by the findings. The apparently weaker effect of personal than national benefits echoes typical findings in the literature on economic influences on voting support. It is against expectations though that supporters of a 'social' rather than common-market Europe register above average EU-support in the West, because one may expect that integration in this policy area may actually imply a drop rather than an increase in welfare commitments in countries where levels of current social spending tend to be higher than in the South and the East. But at the same time citizens of Western Europe have less to fear regarding the effects creation of 'social' Europe might have on competitiveness of their national economies and policy independence of national governments. Among the variables referring to cue-taking, perceptions of the economic situation and party cues do not appear to play much of a role once all other variables are taken into account in Model 7. Trust in European and national institutions clearly trump these influences, possibly because they provide more direct cues – indeed they may capture reasons rather than cues that prompt EU-support.

National identity has negligible direct effects of on EU-support. Only in Western Europe does the (negative) impact of *Exclusive National Identity* come close to reaching statistical significance, and *National Identity* per se nowhere reaches that far. What matters are again attitudes with a more immediate logical connection to integration support, namely the degree of identification with Europe itself, and trust in other Europeans. The results regarding the impact of cognitive mobilization, in their turn, defy expectations of consistently positive effects. Rather, political sophistication (a combination of interest in politics with political knowledge) is the only one with significant effects among them, and while on the one hand it acts slightly to enhance the positive effects of instrumental factors (see the mostly insignificant but consistently positive interactions between *Sophistication* and *EU Scope*), its direct effect on EU-support is negative in all regions and hovers around borderline significance in every one of them. Following our theoretical reasoning about the impact of cognitive mobilization above, it could be that this reflects the fact that it was the most politically knowledgeable section of EU citizens who were the most exposed and receptive to EU-sceptical arguments in the years prior to 2007. This explanation is consistent with the proposition that consonant eurosceptic messages about Europe in media have a delayed effect and at first affect more attentive parts of the public (see Bruter 2009). Our finding may then signal a change of opinion climate whereby EU-critical voices are becoming over-, rather than underrepresented among the politically more knowledgeable segments of the citizenry.

Last but not least, we find that socio-demographic variables have no direct effect on EU-support across Europe once the above attitudinal factors are taken into account. Left-right location does, but in the opposite way as conventional wisdom would expect. It is probably consistent with the balance of power in the EU's representative institutions around 2007 that the right-wingers were, *ceteris paribus*, slightly but not significantly more pro-integration than left-wingers among the citizens. But it is unexpected that extremes on both the left and the right appear to be slightly more pro-EU than their centrist peers. A closer inspection of this puzzle confirmed that this paradoxical finding remains present through all seven models, and across nearly all the 16

countries independently of model specification and our treatment of missing responses. For instance, when EU-support is regressed country by country on just left-right position and left-right extremism, the latter has the unexpected positive effect in all 16 countries save Denmark, and this positive effect reaches a $p<.05$ significance level in eight countries (Austria, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia and Slovenia). The general cross-country pattern is depicted in Figure 7.4, which makes predictions from the empirical estimates obtained with our Model 1 for a fictitious country where the average citizen places herself exactly in the middle of the left-right scale and the country matches the average of our 16-country sample on all other variables. Given that our estimates are based on centred variables, the results are displayed in terms of deviations from the centred country mean (i.e., zero) of EU-support. The reader should note that we expect fairly small differences – at most 0.4 point on an 11-point scale – to go together with left-right position, but that the extremes on either end are more pro-EU than the centre. As possible explanations, future research may consider the dissimilar representation of relatively extreme parties in the European than in the national parliaments, or the perception among citizens of extreme persuasion that the EU may be a vehicle of policy change compared to the status quo that they – given their extreme position – apparently disapprove.

<Figure 7.4>

Determinants of support and the national context

The remaining part of our analysis probes theories regarding the possible sources of cross-national differences in the individual-level determinants of EU-support. Following the research design adopted in most of this volume as well as in section three above, we do so by testing specific a priori expectations about micro-macro interactions in our 16-country pooled cross-national data using clustered regression with fixed effects and the variables centred at their country means. This centering of the variables means that we evaluate the significance of all interactions at average values of all other variables in the model. Given our interest in the variance of within-country patterns and our scepticism that a 16-country data set can tell us much about aggregate level relations, the dependent variable, EU-support, is also centred at its mean. Therefore the main effects of the macro-variables are bound to be essentially nil in this analysis

The a priori expectations tested here are based on findings reported in the previous literature and our own attempts in section one at pushing the related theories a bit further within the logic of instrumental, cue-taking and identitarian approaches. The empirical test adds all the micro-macro interactions referring to the various ‘caveats’ in Table 7.2 to our combined individual-level model (see model 7 above). It turned out to be inconsequential for the findings whether these interactions were added to model 7 one at a time or all were included simultaneously. For simplicity, Table 7.5 presents the results obtained in the latter way and lists the variables in the same order as they appear in Table 7.2.

<Table 7.5>

Starting the reading of the table from the bottom, note that the main effects of the macro-variables appearing among the controls are indeed zero since our focus here is exclusively on the variance within the 16 countries. The estimated impact of the individual-level control variables, as well as

of the interactions of sophistication with the various instrumental motives of EU-support only change within sampling error compared to Model 7.

As it will be remembered from the previous section, our 2007 results flatly contradict cognitive mobilization theorists who observed in the 1970s that politically more involved Europeans favour integration more strongly. We cannot find any support for the idea that this apparently changing impact of variables like political sophistication would have something to do with the diminishing "permissive consensus" on matters of European policy. Only half the posited interactions between indicators of cognitive mobilization and party polarization over Europe go in the expected negative direction, and the only one that reaches statistical significance is wrongly signed: greater party polarization in a country appears to make the impact of visits to other EU countries more positive. All this makes little theoretical sense of course beyond the overall conclusion that cognitive mobilization is not a positive influence on EU-support. If this reflects a change compared to earlier times, then our data provides no support for the idea that this change was triggered by increasing policy differences between European political parties regarding integration. However, we could also speculate that this finding reflects a delayed effect on public opinion of an recent increase in negative media coverage of the EU issues which is first picked up by more sophisticated and attentive members of the public (see de Vreese et al. 2006, Bruter 2009).

Hooghe and Marks' (2005) proposition that a greater level of inter-party dissent on European integration increases the negative impact of exclusive national identity on EU-support does not fare better either. The interaction of *Partisan Divide over Europe* with *Exclusive National Identity* has an effect in the expected direction but remains very far from any conventionally accepted level of statistical significance, and the interaction of *Partisan Divide over Europe* with *National Identity* does not do any better than that. What worked least from our theoretical expectations is however the idea that the impact of (exclusive) national identity on EU-support may be particularly negative in postcommunist Europe. The regional comparisons in section three already raised doubts about this proposition, and in Table 7.5 we can see again that if anything then the opposite is true. Though the positive effects of the *National Identity* with *Communist Legacies* and the *Exclusive National Identity* with *Communist Legacies* interactions are not significant, they come close enough to that to raise the possibility that it may be exactly in Eastern Europe where nationalist feelings may be a positive rather than negative influence on EU support. This finding may easily signify that joining the EU might have been considered as a final sign of break with the communist past and soviet dominance by more nationalist segments of the public in Eastern Europe.

Cue-taking theory may not be much more successful in generating viable propositions about cross-national differences either. Following Steenbergen et al. (2007) we expected that cue-taking from preferred parties diminishes over time as citizens' personal opinions crystallize. Yet we find the exact opposite: the length of a country's EU membership apparently increases the influence of party cues on EU-support. Reasons for this anomaly may include our research design, which lacks an over-time component in the data analysed and thus only offers highly indirect cues about the possible causes of changes over time. However, should Steenbergen et al. (2007) be correct, one would probably have expected that citizens of new democracies are the most likely to follow party cues, and we find the exact opposite of that (for a possible explanation of this see

Markowski and Tucker 2005). It is plausible that it is not crystallization of citizens opinion what matters more in old member states, but rather that citizen's knowledge of partisan exact positions about the EU is higher in old than in new democracies, partially because of longer experiences with parties and their pronounciations on various issues, but also because, and this was very much evidenced at the time of pre-accession referendums, public proclamations about the EU from almost all relevant parties in member countries of Eastern Europe were largely, if not overwhelmingly, positive, while criticism was in most cases either muted or expressed in a very convoluted way (see Szczerbiak and Taggart 2004).

Theories of instrumental calculus do seem to work a little better that most of the relevant macro-micro interactions at least go in the expected direction. Specifically, and partly building on Brinegar and Jolly (2005), Hix (2007), Hooghe and Marks (2005) and Ray (2004), we expected that supporters of a 'social' EU will be likely to support Europe if welfare spending is low, but oppose integration if it is high in their own country. The interaction of *Welfare Spending* with *Social or Competitive Europe* is indeed negative as expected and might conceivably be stronger and statistically significant if our 16-country sample included more countries (e.g. from Scandinavia or the Low Countries) with relatively high levels of welfare spending. We also find that the impact of *Education* (i.e. the marketable skills) on EU-support does vary mostly as we expected along macro-variables that are conceivably related to how diverse the benefits of integration are likely to be. Yet all but one of these interactions are statistically insignificant. The exception concerns EU budget transfers, which should make the benefits of integration more widely visible and does indeed reduce the observed impact of education on support. Hooghe and Marks (2005) and Gabel (1998b) also proposed that manual workers are more likely to support market integration in labour-rich than in capital-rich countries. It is consistent with this that the interaction of *Manual* with *GNI* (gross national income) has a negative effect on support, but again the effect is far from significant.

Last but not least, we expected that *National Institutional Trust* as a cue has a direct positive effect on support for integration, but its effect turns negative where *Quality of Governance* is high, because in the latter situation instrumental calculus will suggest that integration will deliver worse, rather than better outputs. Yet what we find is that *National Institutional Trust* has a particularly positive influence exactly where the quality of governance is high. We suspect that the reason for this may be the even greater credibility of pro-integration national elites in countries with better than average governance, but the data at hand do not allow a more direct test of this proposition.

Conclusions

We find that overall evaluations of EU-integration build on more specific attitudes related to Europe, above all the dimensions of EU citizenship introduced in chapter 2. Once these more specific attitudes towards are taken into account, little influence seems to be exercised by other factors like cognitive mobilization, domestic political cues, and national identity. The only notable exceptions are provided by trust in national political institutions, which – contrary to some expectations – impact EU-support positively, and especially in member states with high-quality governance. Apart from this small exception, our findings point to a predominantly instrumental logic for EU-support among citizens. The roots of EU-support are remarkably

similar across Western, Southern and Eastern Europe, and also the level of support is mostly explained by within - rather than between-country differences. The only striking cross-regional difference concerns neither the determinants nor the level of support for EU-integration, but the extent to which attitudes to the EU are crystallized in the various parts of Europe. Citizens of the South and the East tend to have less crystallized attitudes towards EU-support than the West European mass publics. We also notice that if attitudes to integration were to become more crystallized, they would become very slightly less supportive than they are at this point.

Generalized support for EU-integration can only be a multifaceted phenomenon due to the ever-changing, multipurpose, self-reflexive, and indeed democratic nature of the EU itself. As the EU evolves, its organization, policy agenda, and framing in public discourse adjust to problems and opportunities as perceived by stake-holders. It is only natural then that the determinants of EU-support can vary over time, across countries and across individuals. A key purpose of our volume has been to make this complexity analytically more tractable by distinguishing between three key dimensions of EU-citizenship: identification with the community, support for the scope of the organization, and having a voice in it and feeling to be represented by its institutions. In this chapter we argued that the three citizenship dimensions of identity, scope and representation correspond to the families of affective-identitarian, cue-taking and instrumental explanations for EU-support. When entered in the analysis alongside they do add considerably to explained variance: a model including only the three citizenship factors among the predictors explains 18 percent of the within-country variance of EU-support across the 16 countries while our full combined model shown in Table 7.4 with its 29 independent variables explains just 2.5 percent more. The EU citizenship factors can also be plausibly linked to theoretically different perspectives about the roots of EU-support, and most other variables familiar from the extant literature have just insignificant effects on attitudes towards integration once the EU citizenship variables are taken into account. Indeed, in Table 7.5 only the perceived benefits of European integration to the respondent's country, trust in national institutions, and trust in other Europeans register significant Euro-wide effects on support that are not captured by the inclusion of the three citizenship variables in the analysis. It could of course be argued that citizenship attitudes are causally too close to support for European integration, but previous chapters aptly demonstrated how the varied dimensions of citizenship are influenced in plausible ways by partly different factors themselves. The three dimensions of EU-citizenship, our results suggest, can explain nearly as much of the variance of EU-support as a wide array of theories and previously identified correlates do. Their impact on EU-support is, of course, hardly unexpected,

Overall, our findings suggest that established theories and their logical derivatives do reasonably well in providing a model of EU-support that fits all regions of the EU. Cognitive mobilization should not be counted among the possible roots of support in contemporary Europe any more. Instead, instrumental calculus of the link between policy preferences and further integration, identification with Europe and cue-taking from parties and institutional performance are the key cornerstone of the hybrid model that we arrive at, and the relative influence of these groups of factors is rather consistent across the diverse regions of Europe. By the standards of mass attitude research, the model explains a very respectable amount of variance in Western attitudes towards integration, and fully mediates the impact of socio-demographic variables through specific attitudes. The model works less well for Southern and Eastern Europe, but circumstantial evidence suggests that this is more a consequence of low attitude crystallization in the last two

regions than the presence of substantially different roots of EU-support in the newer member states.

The same theories seem to do markedly less well in explaining cross-national variation in what determines support here and there. One reason for this may be that this variance is in fact very limited and is barely more than some random noise around a common tendency. But we suspect that shortcomings of theory as well as the limitations of the data used in previous analyses may have also a played a role in this underachievement. Several of the interesting findings reported in the previous literature could not be replicated here after we, exploiting the richness of the IntUne data set in attitudinal measures, improved operationalization and added a comprehensive set of control variables to the models. Our discussion and findings also point at some difficulties in clearly delineating information shortcuts from mechanisms of instrumental calculus and even identity, and unearthed large overlaps between the scope of explanation provided by one ostensibly different theoretical approach and another. If previous work in this field was often characterized by elaborate theories linked to a few rather ad hoc attitudinal indicators, here we encountered the opposite problem. Namely, the complex distinctions allowed by our attitudinal data were not always easy to link to established and productive theories of EU-support. Theory-building was probably constrained in this topic area by keeping an eye on a small range of proxy variables easily found in Eurobarometer surveys, and should gain from working out conceptual distinctions that can direct purposeful data generation and eventually generate predictions about how sources and levels of EU-support may change over time.

Table 7.1: The distribution of support for EU-integration in the 2007 IntUne survey and in the 1999 and 2004 European Election Studies for countries included in the IntUne survey.

Country	*Mean response*				*Standard deviation*				*Non-response (%)*		
	1999[a]	*2004*[a]	*2007*[a]	*2007*[b]	*1999*[a]	*2004*[a]	*2007*[a]	*2007*[b]	*1999*	*2004*	*2007*
Austria (AT)	4.67	3.65	3.95	3.94	2.93	2.96	2.87	2.86	4	1	2
Belgium (BE)	4.88	4.80	5.43	5.44	3.31	3.16	2.86	2.85	10	5	2
Denmark (DK)	4.64	4.79	5.73	5.71	3.03	2.81	2.71	2.71	5	6	4
France (FR)	5.95	5.14	5.21	5.20	2.96	3.04	2.95	2.94	12	0	2
Germany (DE)	6.01	4.95	5.38	5.40	2.84	3.13	2.79	2.78	1	6	2
Gr. Britain (GB)	4.12	3.53	4.52	4.54	3.00	3.13	2.72	2.71	7	5	4
Greece (GR)	6.92	6.22	6.63	6.61	3.37	3.56	3.08	3.07	9	2	3
Italy (IT)	6.23	5.73	6.69	6.67	2.67	2.95	3.04	3.03	26	13	4
Portugal (PO)	6.20	5.65	6.82	6.68	3.83	3.25	2.85	2.86	14	14	14
Spain (ES)	6.19	5.90	6.52	6.51	3.16	2.49	2.62	2.62	8	32	2
Bulgaria (BG)	-	-	5.36	5.27	-	-	2.50	2.54	-	-	32
Estonia (EE)	-	5.11	4.84	4.70	-	2.76	2.66	2.67	-	15	19
Hungary (HU)	-	5.51	5.26	5.29	-	2.81	2.37	2.37	-	11	21
Poland (PL)	-	6.01	6.43	6.37	-	3.14	2.46	2.45	-	18	11
Slovakia (SK)	-	5.61	5.51	5.49	-	2.65	2.23	2.23	-	25	8
Slovenia (SI)	-	5.99	5.72	5.71	-	3.45	3.02	3.01	-	11	6

[a]: without multiple imputation of missing values; [b]: after multiple imputation of missing values.

Table 7.2: Hypotheses and independent variables included in the analysis

Hypothesis	*Variables*	*Effect*
H1	EU Personal Benefits, EU National Benefits, EU Scope	+
H1	Social or Competitive Europe	none
Caveats to H1	Education * Communist Legacy	-
Caveats to H1	Education * Quality of Governance	+
Caveats to H1	Education * Net EU Transfers	-
Caveats to H1	Manual Worker * Gross National Income	-
Caveats to H1	Social or Competitive Europe * Welfare Spending	-
Caveats to H1	National Institutional Trust * Quality of Governance	-
H2	Economic Perceptions, Pro-EU Party Identifier, National Institutional Trust, EU Representation	+
Caveats to H2	Pro-EU Party Identifier * Length of EU Membership	-
Caveats to H2	Pro-EU Party Identifier * Partisan Divide over Europe	+
H3	National Identity, Exclusive National Identity	-
H3	Trust Other Europeans, EU Identity	+
Caveats to H3	National Identity * Communist Past	-
Caveats to H3	Exclusive National Identity * Communist Past	-
Caveats to H3	National Identity * Partisan Divide over Europe	-
Caveats to H3	Exclusive National Identity * Partisan Divide over Europe	-
H4	Political Influence, Media Exposure, Political Sophistication, Social Trust, Visited EU Countries, Non-Electoral Participation	+
Counter to H4	[each indicator of cognitive mobilization] * Partisan Divide over Europe	-
H5	[each indicator of (country-specific) benefits] * Political Sophistication	+
No hypotheses (control variables)	Sex, Age, Age-squared, Education, Catholic, Manual Worker, Left-Right Ideology, Left-right Extremism, Communist Past, Quality of Governance, Net EU Transfers, Gross National Income, Welfare Spending, Length of EU Membership, Partisan Divide over Europe	any or none

Table 7.3: The fraction of within-country variance in EU-support explained by various sets of individual-level variables in three regions taken separately and together

Model	*Variable groups included*	*West*	*South*	*East*	*All*
1 (baseline)	controls only	0.039	0.014	0.011	0.014
2 (instrumental)	controls + H1	0.260	0.127	0.136	0.176
3 (cues)	controls + H2	0.167	0.058	0.067	0.093
4 (identity)	controls + H3	0.178	0.066	0.068	0.097
5 (cognitive mob.)	controls + H4	0.082	0.022	0.023	0.034
6 (mixed)	controls + H1 + H2 + H3 + H4	0.308	0.149	0.157	0.204
7 (mixed with sophistication)	controls + H1 + H2 + H3 + H4 + H5	0.309	0.152	0.159	0.205
8 (all but EU-citizenship)	model 7 w/o EU citizenship dimensions	0.241	0.088	0.085	0.131
9 (EU-citizenship only)	just three dimensions of EU citizenship	0.262	0.125	0.138	0.179
Number of cases in the analysis:		6,013	4,014	6,106	16,133

Table 7.4: The individual-level determinants of within-country variance in EU-support in three regions under Model 7 (OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors)

	West		*South*		*East*		*All 16 states*	
	b	*(s.e.)*	*b*	*(s.e.)*	*b*	*(s.e.)*	*b*	*(s.e.)*
EU National Benefits	1.22[a]	(0.36)	0.04	(0.18)	0.59	(0.28)	0.62[a]	(0.21)
EU Personal Benefits	-0.22	(0.35)	0.21	(0.25)	-0.02	(0.24)	-0.08	(0.16)
EU Scope	0.24[a]	(0.07)	-0.10	(0.14)	0.10	(0.15)	0.12	(0.08)
Social or Competitive Europe	0.25[a]	(0.06)	0.30[a]	(0.07)	0.24[a]	(0.07)	0.29[c]	(0.04)
Economic Perceptions	0.01	(0.03)	-0.06	(0.03)	0.04	(0.06)	0.00	(0.03)
Pro-EU Party Identifier	0.11[a]	(0.04)	0.10[a]	(0.02)	0.03	(0.05)	0.08[b]	(0.02)
National Institutional Trust	0.02	(0.04)	0.07	(0.02)	-0.02	(0.05)	0.03	(0.02)
EU Representation	0.19[a]	(0.04)	0.09	(0.06)	0.13[a]	(0.04)	0.14[c]	(0.03)
National Identity	-0.04	(0.02)	-0.03	(0.03)	0.01	(0.03)	-0.02	(0.02)
Exclusive National Identity	-0.23	(0.11)	0.01	(0.07)	0.06	(0.14)	-0.05	(0.08)
Trust Other Europeans	0.15[b]	(0.01)	0.11	(0.04)	0.06	(0.01)	0.10[c]	(0.02)
EU Identity	0.11[a]	(0.03)	0.08	(0.07)	0.12[a]	(0.03)	0.10[c]	(0.02)
Political Influence	0.03	(0.02)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.02	(0.03)	0.01	(0.01)
Media Exposure	0.04	(0.01)	0.03	(0.01)	0.01	(0.02)	0.02	(0.01)
Political Sophistication	-0.10[a]	(0.05)	-0.23[a]	(0.05)	-0.17[a]	(0.06)	-0.17[c]	(0.04)
Social Trust	0.01	(0.02)	-0.04	(0.02)	0.03	(0.02)	0.00	(0.01)
Visited EU Countries	0.05	(0.03)	0.02	(0.05)	-0.01	(0.03)	0.03	(0.02)
Non-Electoral Participation	-0.01	(0.02)	0.03	(0.01)	0.02	(0.02)	0.01	(0.01)
EU National Benefits * Sophistication	-0.06	(0.06)	0.11	(0.07)	-0.01	(0.03)	0.02	(0.03)
EU Personal Benefits * Sophistication	0.08	(0.05)	-0.03	(0.04)	0.02	(0.04)	0.04	(0.03)
EU Scope * Sophistication	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.02)	0.03	(0.01)	0.02[b]	(0.01)
Sex	-0.04	(0.13)	0.05	(0.14)	-0.03	(0.07)	-0.02	(0.06)
Age	-0.01	(0.02)	0.00	(0.01)	-0.02	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)
Age-squared	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
Education	0.01	(0.05)	0.01	(0.06)	0.00	(0.06)	0.00	(0.03)
Catholic	-0.06	(0.06)	-0.09	(0.14)	-0.08	(0.10)	-0.07	(0.05)
Manual work	-0.23	(0.17)	-0.38	(0.43)	-0.04	(0.17)	-0.17	(0.12)
Left-right position	0.00	(0.03)	0.03	(0.01)	0.05	(0.02)	0.02	(0.01)
Left-right extremity	0.01	(0.01)	0.02	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01[c]	(0.00)
Constant	0.00	-0.01	0.00	(0.02)	0.00	(0.03)	0.00	(0.01)

[a]: $p < .05$, [b]: $p<.01$, [c]: $p<.001$

Note: All estimates are adjusted for clustering by country and multiple imputations.

Table 7.5: Individual- and cross-level determinants of within-country variance in EU-support in the pooled 16-country data (OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors)

	b	*(s.e.)*	*beta*
EU National Benefits	0.62[b]	(0.20)	0.10
EU Personal Benefits	-0.08	(0.18)	-0.01
Social or Competitive Europe	0.32	(0.27)	0.05
EU Scope	0.26[c]	(0.04)	0.17
Education * Communist Legacy	0.06	(0.09)	0.01
Education * Quality of Governance	0.04	(0.05)	0.01
Education * Net EU Transfers	-0.07[a]	(0.03)	-0.03
Manual Worker * Gross National Income	0.00	(0.00)	-0.02
Social or Competitive Europe * Welfare Spending	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.04
National Institutional Trust * Quality of Governance	0.08[b]	(0.03)	0.05
Economic Perceptions	0.00	(0.03)	0.00
Pro-EU Party Identifier	0.01	(0.09)	0.00
National Institutional Trust	0.08[a]	(0.03)	0.05
EU Representation	0.14[c]	(0.03)	0.09
Pro-EU Party Identifier * Length of EU Membership	0.00[a]	(0.00)	0.03
Pro-EU Party Identifier * Partisan Divide over Europe	0.01	(0.05)	0.01
National Identity	0.00	(0.06)	0.00
Exclusive National Identity	-0.27	(0.21)	-0.05
Trust Other Europeans	0.10[c]	(0.02)	0.08
EU Identity	0.11[c]	(0.02)	0.07
National Identity * Communist Past	0.04	(0.03)	0.02
Exclusive National Identity * Communist Past	0.26	(0.16)	0.03
National Identity * Partisan Divide over Europe	-0.03	(0.04)	-0.03
Exclusive National Identity * Partisan Divide over Europe	0.09	(0.18)	0.02
Political Influence	0.07	(0.05)	0.06
Media Exposure	0.01	(0.03)	0.01
Political Sophistication	-0.18[a]	(0.07)	-0.16
Social Trust	-0.03	(0.05)	-0.03
Visited EU Countries	-0.15[a]	(0.06)	-0.08
Non-Electoral Participation	0.07	(0.03)	0.06
Political Influence	-0.05	(0.04)	-0.06
Media Exposure	0.01	(0.02)	0.01
Political Sophistication * Partisan Divide over Europe	-0.04	(0.03)	-0.04
Social Trust * Partisan Divide over Europe	0.03	(0.04)	0.03
Visited EU Countries * Partisan Divide over Europe	0.14[a]	(0.05)	0.10
Non-Electoral Participation * Partisan Divide over Europe	-0.05	(0.03)	-0.05
EU National Benefits * Sophistication	0.01	(0.03)	0.03
EU Personal Benefits * Sophistication	0.03	(0.03)	0.06
EU Scope * Sophistication	0.02[b]	(0.01)	0.14
Sex	-0.02	(0.06)	0.00
Age	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.08

Age-squared	0.00	(0.00)	0.07
Education	0.05	(0.04)	0.02
Catholic	-0.06	(0.05)	-0.01
Manual work	0.02	(0.23)	0.00
Left-right position	0.02	(0.01)	0.02
Left-right extremity	0.01[c]	(0.00)	0.04
Communist Past	0.00	(0.04)	0.00
Quality of Governance	0.00	(0.02)	0.00
Net EU Transfers	0.00	(0.02)	0.00
Gross National Income	0.00	(0.00)	0.00
Welfare Spending	0.00	(0.00)	0.00
Length of EU Membership	0.00	(0.00)	0.00
Partisan Divide over Europe	0.00	(0.04)	0.00
Constant	0.00	(0.08)	.

[a]: $p < .05$, [b]: $p<.01$, [c]: $p<.001$

Note: All estimates are adjusted for clustering by country and multiple imputations.

Figure 7.1: The opinionation and polarization of public opinion about support for EU-integration across 41 country-years



Figure 7.2: Observed and imputed support for EU-integration by country (0-10 scale)



Figure 7.3: Support for EU-integration by year and country (0-10 scale)




Figure 7.4. EU-support by left-right ideology
Cross-country estimates under Model 1
Deviation from country mean on 0-10 EU-support scale
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
0
2
4
6
8
10
Left-right self-placement from 0=left to 10=right
Expected value (--- 95% confidence interval)