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Tables and Figure at the end.

Conclusions

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It is widely acknowledged that the process of European integration was, from the outset, an elite-driven project. The Schuman Plan, which initiated the integration process in the early 1950s, was a conscious attempt by a small political elite to generate a set of economic and political conditions in which armed conflict in (at that time, western) Europe would become impossible. At the heart of the project was the idea that, if elites could generate mechanisms of economic and political cooperation and construct appropriate supranational institutions to support this process, the worldviews of European mass publics would gradually shift from being exclusively focused on their own nation towards a greater awareness of the benefits of a unified economic space and stronger political cooperation. In the process, this would result in development of a stronger sense of common interests, shared destiny and joint identity centered on Europe. This was not to suggest that national identities would disappear, but rather, that they would increasingly be complemented by a sense of a wider, 'European' citizenship. In short, European mass publics would gradually come to think of themselves also as citizens of an emerging European *polis* and members of a single Europan *demos*. To this end, the introduction of direct elections to European parliament in 1979 was intended to

give European citizens a symbolic channel of participation in European affairs and allow them to seek accountability from the elites that were leading the process. It was also supposed to increase their sense of representation at the supranational level and increase their attachment to European institutions.

In an effort to further move citizens of member countries to see themselves as members of common European *demos*, all citizens of EU member state countries were formally accorded *legal* EU citizenship in 1993. Apart from its symbolic effect, this step awarded EU citizens a range of rights, including the freedom to settle and work across the EU and the right to vote for, and be represented by, local governments and MEPs in other member states. This step took place at a time when the "permissive consensus" (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Wilgden and Feld 1976) between elites and masses, which had characterised the integration process since its inception in 1950s began to weaken, and when European integration was becoming an increasingly politicized issue for mass publics in many member states (Katz 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2008). The increase in the scope and quantity of EU legislation, combined with the increased politicization of the EU integration process required the creation of more durable links between the European polity-in-the-making and the mass publics of its constituent states. Thus, as European integration has become less and less the preserve of national political elites, issues of attachment to the EU and the representativeness and accountability of its instutions have become increasingly important. In such a setting, the critical questions that remain are how far these 'legal' citizens feel that they are actually part of a functioning European political system and how much they *think* of themselves as EU citizens. In this volume, we have sought to answer three key questions. How widespread is this sense of European citizenship? What are its core drivers? And what consequences does it have, if any, for EU support and for active political participation in EU politics?

We begin this chapter by reviewing the way in which EU citizenship is conceptualised and measured throughout this volume. The following section outlines the main theoretical ideas that have informed our analysis. Part 3 summarises the key specific empirical findings we have presented relating to the causal factors that underpin the development of EU citizenship, together with its main consequences. The final section discusses the general implications of these findings for understanding the development of EU citizenship. It also reflects on the stability of EU citizenship in the face of the economic crisis that afflicted the European and world economies during the course of 2008.

Conceptualising and measuring European citizenship

Our central theoretical claim is that citizenship should not be conceived in unidimensional terms. If we wish to know the extent to which Europeans feel that they are citizens of an EU *polis,* it is not enough just to ask them if they view themselves as citizens of the European Union. To understand what citizens consider under this arguably vague notion, we need to understand what underpins the subjective feeling of being an EU citizen**.** Thus we need to take the abstract notion of EU citizenship and break it down into component parts, each of them more clearly defined conceptually and empirically measured. In this we follow Benhabib (2002) in distinguishing three distinct, but related, dimensions of citizenship. The first two – *identity* and *representation* – correspond to what would typically be expected of a sense of citizenship at the national level. The third – attitudes towards the *scope* of different levels of governance – is more explicitly related to questions of citizenship in the EU as complex polity.

The first dimension – identity – is probably the least contentious. Whether an individual is thinking of her/his national political system or of a developing supranational system like the EU, s/he needs to have a sense of common identity with other members of that system if s/he is to feel a sense of common citizenship. It is this shared identity, often linked to the idea of 'shared fate' at the national level, that is central to the development and maintenance of welfare state and progressive taxation policies typical of most advanced democracies, in which transfer payments are used to redistribute income (and sometimes wealth) across different socio-economic groups. Thus our simple supposition in this context is that, at the supranational level, a sense of European identity, as a feeling of belonging to a single community with a shared destiny and of having a sense of solidarity with its other members, is an essential precondition for the development of a full sense of European citizenship.

The second dimension of EU citizenship relates to people's sense that they are represented by a political system. The more they feel that the system effectively represents their values, interests and concerns, the stronger their sense of citizenship. Again, it is easy to see how this might apply at both the national and the supranational level. Modern representative democracies provide citizens with opportunities at the national level to vote for (or to reject) political parties that aim and claim to represent their interests. To the extent that people believe that their individual and/or collective interests are represented by the governments that are duly elected, they are likely to feel a sense of a sense of citizenship towards their respective national political systems. At the EU level, where a longstanding 'democratic deficit' made it difficult for voters to hold EU policymakers directly to account, the same principles nonetheless apply. To the extent that mass publics consider that the political institutions of the EU effectively represent their interests, the more likely they are to consider themselves European citizens.

The third dimension in our conceptualisation of European citizenship – policy scope – is perhaps less relevant in the context of *national* citizenship, since in most democracies (even in federal systems) it is usual practice for the national government to be ultimately responsible for the most important (if not all) areas of public policy. Indeed, in many national contexts, the question of the policy competence of the nation-state is a non-issue. However, in the context of the European Union, there is a clear tension between the pre-existing policy competencies of national governments and the issue of extending the policy competencies of the EU itself. The question of EU policy scope accordingly acquires a distinctive importance for people's sense of European citizenship. People who wish to see a diminution of EU policy scope are likely to feel a weak or non-existent sense of EU citizenship; those who wish to see an extension of EU scope are more likely to think of themselves as citizens of that wider community. This does not mean that they do not continue to see themselves as national citizens; merely that such national citizenship in increasingly supplemented by a sense of belonging to a more extensive supranational *polis* as well.

With these distinctions in mind, we conducted a series of surveys across the EU that sought to capture the extent to which mass publics in different European countries thought of themselves in terms of Eurpean identity, representation and policy scope. As we showed in Chapter 2, a factor analysis of some twenty-two different survey items covering these three areas indicates the existence of six distinct factors: one relating to European identity; two relating to representation (trust in EU institutions and personal political efficacy); and three relating to scope (preferences for EU policy scope now, for EU policy scope in the future, and for a geographical extension of the EU itself). Note, moreover, that these six empirical factors emerge no matter how the data are divided up – either by East/West Europe, by EU accession

wave, or by demographic category. Crucially, the six empirical factors map very clearly onto our three conceptual dimensions of citizenship. The fact that the dimensions are empirically distinct from one another reinforces the idea that they need to be differentiated from one another theoretically. It supports the idea that European citizenship should be conceptualised in multidimensional terms, such that different individuals can display different patterns of citizenship depending on their positions in a 3-dimensional space, the axes of which are defined by their sense of EU identity, EU representation and EU scope. In principle, it is possible for individuals to be located at any point in this space – even though there might be strong clusters of individuals in particular sectors. The importance of this observation is that, in line with our theoretical distinctions, European mass publics appear to differentiate among identity, representation and scope. An important consequence of this differentiation, as we show below, is that Europeans' views on identity, representation and policy scope are driven by different (though partially overlapping) sets of predictors.

What does our analysis reveal about the strength of European Citizenship across the EU? Table 10.1 provides a summary answer. It reports the average scores for EU Identity, Representation, and Scope – and for the summary measure of EU Citizenship – on our 0-10 'constant range' scales.

The average scores for the whole sample suggest that levels of European Identity (4.84) and preferences for EU Policy Scope (4.83) are slightly higher than the average sense of EU Representation (4.44). However, the differences are not particularly marked, and they collectively produce an EU Citizenship average score of 4.70. The question that arises, of course, is whether the glass is half-full or half-empty – whether figures at this sort of level imply a relatively strong or a relatively moderate or even a relatively weak sense of EU

citizenship. To throw light on this issue, the table also reports the average levels of National Identity and sense of National Representation, both measured on the same 0-10 constant range scales. The average National Identity score is 7.89 – substantially higher than the equivalent European measure. The average National Representation score, however, is only 4.46 – virtually identical to the EU Representation average score of 4.44. These comparisons collectively suggest that, although the sense of European Identity is still not particularly well-developed, average confidence in European political institutions is just as high as confidence in their national counterparts. Each citizen can easily assess relatively whether s/he feels attachment to Europe or not, whereas it is not so easy to establish if one's interest are adequately represented by particular level of governance in a multilevel political system.[1] All of this implies that the glass of EU citizenship is perhaps best regarded as half-full rather than half-empty.

Note, finally, that Table 10.1 also reports the variations in the various average citizenship measures by EU Accession Wave. These figures are reported simply to reiterate a point that has been made in successive chapters. There is no systematic connection between the length of time that countries have belonged to the EU and the average levels of EU citizenship recorded by their populations. The average highest levels of EU Identity, Representation and Scope are registered in the Southern Wave accession states (Greece, Spain and Portugal), which joined in the 1980s; the lowest are found in the countries that joined in the 1970s (in our sample, Britain and Denmark). Although the average scores are also relatively high in the founding member states, it is clear that length of membership alone cannot explain the cross-

[1] As discussed in chapter 5 of the present volume, the similarity of national supranational representation scores could be the result of a transfer of evaluations from national institutions, or the consequence of a tendency to evaluate national and European institutions as a single institutional set. This might further indicate that citizens are willing to accept European institutions and treat them as an equal part of the governance package.

national variations in our EU citizenship measures.[2] The task of the contributing chapters in this volume was to establish the factors that do account for variations in the positions of EU mass publics on various citizenship dimensions, using the theoretical framework reviewed below.

<Table 10.1>

Towards explanation: theoretical perspectives

In a companion volume to the present study, we report evidence which shows that levels of European identity, sense of EU representation and preferences for EU policy scope among European mass publics did not trend strongly in any particular direction during the period between 1975 and 2007 (Sanders et al. forthcoming). There are nonetheless interesting variations in these measures of EU citizenship both across individuals and across countries that were described in detail in earlier chapters – and these variations clearly require explanation. The substantive chapters of this book have used a range of theoretical perspectives to generate testable hypotheses about the sources of the different phenemona that they have respectively sought to explain. Four main perspectives have been employed: 'hard' instrumental rationality; 'soft' cueing rationality; identitarian attachment; and cognitive mobilisation. Here, we briefly review the core theoretical claims of each of these perspectives and illustrate the ways in which our substantive chapters employed them in their analyses.

'Hard' instrumental rationality

[2] For a similar argument see (Sanders et. al. forthcoming).

The idea that people's views and preferences reflect rational, 'economic' calculations about their own or their countries' interests is widespread in the analysis of public attitude formation and change. Instrumental (economic or institutional) rationality assumes that, when faced with a choice, people will weigh the perceived costs and benefits of each option in order to judge between them (Gabel 1998c; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky 2002; Hix 2007). Since it is difficult directly to observe people engaging in this kind of 'weighing' activity, individual- and aggregate-level research typically has to make assumptions in order to test for the effects of instrumental rationality. In chapters 4 (European Identity), 5 (EU Representation), 6 (EU Policy Scope), 7 (EU Support) and 9 (Combined Model) individual-level tests are conducted which assume that instrumental rationality can be operationalised by examining people's beliefs about the relative costs and benefits (economic or political) that have accrued either to them personally or to their respective countries as a result of EU membership. The simple empirical proposition tested is that those who believe that either they or their country have benefited will be more likely to take a pro-European stance that those who believe otherwise.

'Soft' cueing rationality

In recent years, rational choice analysts have increasingly recognised the possibility that individuals with access to very limited information might still behave rationally, by using heuristics or 'cognitive shortcuts' in order to make decisions (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). They might, in short, use 'cues' with which they are relatively familiar in order to make judgements about issues and objects with which they are relatively unfamiliar. In electoral research, one classic heuristic or cue for individuals who have neither the time nor inclination to familiarise themselves with the detailed policy stances of rival parties is to focus on the likely managerial

capabilities of rival party leaders (Clarke et al. 2004, 2009). There are two main sorts of cueing effect that relate to mass attitudes towards the EU: *substitution* and *transfer* cueing. Substitution cueing occurs when an individual evaluates domestic institutional performance negatively (positively) and therefore assumes that it would be desirable (undesirable) for more (fewer) decisionmaking powers to be ceded to supranational institutions (Kritzinger 2003; Christin 2005). Reasoning of this sort is assumed to operate in chapter 6, where it is hypothesised that trust in national institutions has a negative effect on EU policy scope. The core idea is that if things are badly run at home, people are more likely to look to Europe; if they are well run at home, Europe is not so important. The second type of cueing is 'transfer cueing'. This sort of cueing is based on the idea that people who evaluate their own national institutions positively (negatively) may uncritically extend these positive (negative) evaluations to the supranational sphere and, as a result, also make positive (negative) evaluations of EU institutions (Anderson 1998). In contrast to substitution cueing, this *transfer effect* clearly implies a *positive* relationship between attitudes towards national and EU institutions. This sort of transfer effect is hypothesised to operate in chapters 5 and 7, where trust in domestic political institutions is hypothesised to have a positive cueing effect, respectively, on people's sense of EU representation and on general support for the EU. Transfer cueing is also hypothesised to operate in chapter 5, where people's identification with a pro-EU political party is considered to contribute positively to their evaluations of EU political institutions: people are more likely to feel that the EU represents their interests if they identify with a party that adopts a broadly pro-EU stance (Ray 2003a; Stenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007).

In addition to all of these individual-level cueing effects, our analysis also considered the possible cueing effects of a key macro-level country characteristic (Jolly and Brinegar 2005;

Christin 2005) – the Quality of Governance, a measure that combines a number of features of domestic political systems, including (the absence of) corruption and the transparency of decisionmaking. Two rival sets of hypotheses were identified in relation to this variable in chapters 4 to 7. On the one hand, following the logic of substitution cueing, Quality of Governance could be negatively associated with the various EU citizenship measures, on the grounds that people living in countries with poor governance are more likely to assume that 'things are better' at the European level. On the other hand, following the logic of transfer cueing, Quality of Governance could have a positive effect on EU citizenship, on the grounds that people living in countries with sound governance are more likely to assume that their domestic experience wil be reproduced at the European level (see for instance chapter 5). Given that both hypotheses have some *a priori* plausibility, both were tested, either explicitly or implicitly, in the empirical analysis conducted in the various substantive chapters.

Affective/identitarian factors

The suggestion that people might have affective feelings towards political objects that can influence their attitudes and preferences just as strongly as rational calculations is neither novel nor contentious. It is clear from a large number of psychological and attitudinal studies that people's feelings and sense of political and social identity can have profound effects on their political attitudes and choices, especially when lack of information obliges citizens to fall back on these basic attitudes when they make up their minds (Zaller 1992). The notion of identity has been widely used in analyses of EU attitudes (McLaren 2002; Carey 2002; Luedtke 2005) and it is used in two contrasting ways in the chapters in this volume. In chapter 4, national and European identities are seen as complementary. A strong sense of national identity constitutes a positive resource that can co-exist with, and even strengthen the

development of, a *European identity*. National identity is accordingly predicted to have a positive effect on European identity. In contrast, in chapter 6, a strong sense of national identity is regarded as a constraint on people's preferences with regard to EU policy competence; in this latter context, national identity is predicted to have a negative effect on *EU policy scope*.

Cognitive mobilisation

The basic claim of cognitive mobilisation theory is that, as people become more informed about politics through greater education and exposure to political information (the latter often through the mass media) , they are more likely to take a more progressive, cosmopolitan view of politics, policy and political institutions (Inglehart 1970). Inglehart used cognitive mobilisation theory in order to explain the developing sense of European identity that was emerging during the 1960s, arguing that rising levels of cognitive mobilisation – of education and knowledge – were stimulating an increase in support for the then EEC. This core idea is used in two of the chapters here – in the discussion of the sources of European Identity in chapter 4 and in the discussion of EU Support in chapter 5. Both chapters explore the extent to which educated and informed individuals exhibit stronger EU orientations than their less educated and uninformed counterparts. This theme is taken up more explictly in chapter 9, in the discussion of the potentially confounding role of 'political sophistication'. A related argument is presented in chapter 5, which tests the proposition that instrumental calculation plays a more important role in the determination of trust in the European Parliament among people with relatively high levels of political awareness.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that a range of theoretical perspectives have been used in a diverse set of ways in different chapters. We regard this eclectic approach as entirely appropriate. The phenomena that the different chapters seek to analyse, though often empirically related, are conceptually distinct. It would be decidedly odd if a single theoretical perspective – or even a single set of perspectives – could satisfactorily account for all of the individual and cross-national variation that we have described in our substantive chapters. In the next section, we offer a summary account of the major factors that our analysis suggests are responsible for individual- and country-level variations both in EU Citizenship attitudes and in EU Support. As we will see, although the various theories outlined above all play a role, they by no means provide – even in combination – a full explanation of the complex and diverse pattern of variation that we have outlined.

Empirics: the sources of EU citizenship

Because we provided, in chapter 9, a summarising, 'combined' model of the different empirical effects observed in earlier chapters, we can be relatively brief here in outlining the main empirical findings about the causes and consequences of EU Citizenship that emerge from our study. The first set of findings that merits attention concerns the inter-linkages among the three dimensions of citizenship itself. As discussed in chapter 9, although EU Identity, Representation and Scope are all reciprocally related, some of the linkages among them are stronger than others. Figure 10.1 reprises Figure 9.1. The coefficient magnitudes reported in the figure are all directly comparable with each other since the variables are all measured on the same 0-10 scale. The implications of the figure are clear. The effects that Representation has on both Identity and Scope are almost twice as large as the effects that they exert on Representation. As we suggested in chapter 9, this implies that it is the

representation dimension that is key to the development of a generalised sense of a sense of citizenship at the EU level. This in turn places a significant premium on the need to address popular doubts about the EU's 'democratic deficit'. Without a greater sense that the EU effectively represents their interests, European mass publics will be reluctant either to strengthen their identification with Europe or to approve an extension of EU policy competence. In short, they will be unprepared to think of themselves as genuine citizens of a functioning european-wide *polis*.

<Figure 10.1>

The second set of core findings that requires brief review relates to the main factors that drive each of our three component dimensions of EU citizenship, over and above the reciprocal effects that they exert on each other. Our analysis of *European Identity* shows that it is affected by factors associated with all four of the theoretical approaches outlined earlier. The positive effects of perceptions of *personal benefits* acruing from EU membership show that Identity is in part a reflection of 'hard' rational calculation. The negative effects of *national institutional trust* indicate that there is also a role for 'soft' rationality 'substitution cueing'.[3]

[3] We should point out here that this negative relationship between Trust in National Institutions and EU Identity only appears in models that also include Trust in EU institutions as a controlling variable. Trust in *national* institutions has a clear positive effect on EU identity through trust in *EU* institutions (see chapter 6). However, when trust in EU institutions is included in the model, national institutional trust has also a small negative direct effect on EU Identity (see chapter 4 and this concluding chapter). This implies that Trust in National Institutions, when not transferred into Trust in EU institutions, does indeed have a small negative effect on EU identity. To put in another way, *supranational attitudinal transferring* is the dominant cueing mechanism that we observe, but there is also a modest amount of *attitudinal substitution* as well.

The positive effects of *national identity* on European Identity support the idea advanced earlier that national and European identities are complementary rather than in competition. Finally, we find that European Identity is also positively affected by cognitive mobilisation. As Inglehart argued some 40 years ago, more informed, interested and educated Europeans are more likely to identify themselves as 'European'. But if the sources of Identity lend credence to all four of our theoretical perspectives, the same cannot be said of EU Representation. Here, only rational calculation, in both its 'hard' and 'soft' forms, seems to play a role. Our analysis of EU Representation suggests, first, that it is positively affected by instrumental calculations about the *benefits to the individual's country* that derive from EU membership (though this relationship is conditioned by levels of political awareness). Second, Representation is also affected positively by two 'transfer cueing' mechanisms: higher levels of *national institutional trust* and *identification with a pro-EU political party* also translate into a stronger sense of EU Representation. Finally, our analysis of EU Scope demonstrates a role for both instrumental-rational and identitarian factors. In terms of 'hard' rationality, perceptions of both *national* and *personal benefits* from EU membership have *negative* effects on Scope. We interpret this finding as indicating the distinctiveness of mass publics' views about EU Policy Scope, as opposed to Identity and Representation. This in turn reflects the likelihood that individuals who perceive that the EU has benefited themselves and/or their countries also want to preserve the *status quo* position on EU policy competence that generated the benefits from EU membership in the first place. In terms of 'soft' rationality, Scope is also affected, negatively, by *national institutional trust* – a classic example of substitution cueing, in which people who believe that their own national institutions are ineffective place a greater trust in those of the EU. Lastly, Scope is influenced negatively by *national identity*: those individuals who strongly identify with their national political systems

are less likely to favour either current levels of EU policy competence or to support an extension of EU competence to new policy areas.

One issue that arises from these different patterns of effect is why 'substitution' cues appear to operate in some contexts while 'transfer' cues operate in others. One possible response is to observe simply that people are inconsistent and that there does not have to be a particular reason or set of reasons why they take one sort of cue in one context and a different sort in another. However, we can take the argument a little further. We suspect that the predominance of substitution cueing in relation to Scope and the predominance of transfer cueing in relation to Identity and Representation reflect a fundamental difference in the way that people think about these different aspects of EU Citizenship. Identities – whether they are national, European, subnational, religious or whatever – are not really in competition with each other. They can coexist precisely because people can carry multiple social and political identities, just as they can perform multiple social and economic roles – as daughter, mother, consumer, employer, worshipper, patient and so on. Identities, in short, are not in a zero sum relation with one another. On the contrary, they are in a variable sum relationship. I can be Umbrian, Italian and European without any contradiction. The same general position holds for Representation. It is perfectly possible (though obviously not necessarily the case) that my interests can be 'represented' effectively by several different levels of governance simultaneously – local, regional, national and even supranational. Again, these different levels of representation are not in a zero sum competition with one another in terms of representing my interests. Now, consider the contrasting question of Policy Scope. Here, the position is much more akin to a zero sum competition. If one level of governance is competent in a given policy area, then the other level(s) *cannot* be. Individuals know, therefore, that if they prioritise one governance level, then they must downgrade another or others. It follows from

all this that substitution cueing is much more likely in situations of zero sum competition, where discreet choices have to be made. In contrast, where choices can be avoided – in variable sum situations – transfer cueing is more likely to be the norm. Identity and Representation develop in variable sum contexts in which national-level and EU-level considerations are not mutually exclusive; Identity and Representation are accordingly affected primarily by transfer cueing. Scope perceptions, in contrast, develop in zero sum contexts and hence substitution cueing predominates.

Our final set of empirical findings relate to the *consequences* of EU Citizenship. The results of our models here are very clear. General Support for the EU itself is strongly influenced by the extent of people's sense of European Citizenship, where Citizenship is conceived as an aggregation of the individual's scores on EU Identity, Representation and Scope. In addition, there is a feedback effect from Support to Citizenship – if I support the EU, I am more likely to feel a strong sense of EU citizenship – but it is nothing like as strong as the effect of Citizenship on Support. In terms of *exogenous* effects on Support, we find evidence of both 'hard' and 'soft' rationality. Instrumental calculation features strongly in our Support models, with perceptions of *personal benefits* from EU membership exerting a powerful positive effect. Transfer cueing also strongly affects support, with *national institutional trust* displaying a similar positive effect. As with Identity and Representation, EU Support is in a non-zero sum relation with, for example, national government support, so transfer (rather than substitution) cueing makes very good sense in this context.

But if EU Support is influenced by EU Citizenship, the same cannot be said for its behavioural counterpart, turnout in European elections. Our empirical results here, reported in detail in chapter 8, demonstrate comprehensively that people's orientations towards the EU

have no impact whatsoever on their inclination to vote in elections to the European Parliament (EP). The decision whether or not to cast an EP vote is driven much more by domestic political considerations – including the factors that move to people to vote in national elections – than by anything related to the EU. It is sometimes thought the simple act of participating in the political process can change the way people think and feel about the political systems to which they belong. The evidence that we reported in chapter 9 suggests that this is certainly not the case in relation to voting in EP elections. Our models show that such voting has no effect on EU Support, on our aggregate measure of EU Citizenship or any of the three constituent dimensions (Identity, Representation and Scope) of that Citizenship. MEPs may well feel that the more people vote in European elections, the greater the legitimacy of the decisions that the Parliament takes. However, they should not delude themselves into thinking that this participation in itself signifies anything very much – or that it will contribute significantly to the development of a sense of EU Citizenship among EU citizens.

Conclusions

Throughout this volume, we have sought to describe and analyse the individual- and country-level variations in the citizenship perceptions of EU mass publics. There are, of course, significant variations at both levels. The populations of some countries – like the UK and Denmark – are consistently more Eurosceptic than average; in others, as in Italy and Spain, most people are much more Europhile. There are also differences in the sense of EU Citizenship between Western Europe and the newer member-states of the East. Mass publics in the East are generally more enthusiastic about extensions to EU Policy Scope – primarily because of institutional failings at home – but they have obviously had less time as members

to develop as great a sense of EU Identity and Representation as evident among their counterparts in the West. In spite of these differences in 'national' levels of EU sympathy, our statistical analyses suggest that, in the determination of EU Citizenship perceptions and EU Support, similar cognitive processes across EU mass publics. In the various substantive chapters, we have explored the possibility that the calculus of Citizenship and Support might vary from country to country, from EU Accession Wave to Wave, or from East Europe to West. We found no such variations to exist. The same broad mechanisms and factors appear to operate across all of the countries that we have examined. A similar conclusion is in order in relation to the *calculations* of different types of people within countries, even though there are some minor differences in Citizenship and support *levels* across different sociodemographic groups. In terms of the determinants of their EU Citizenship and Support attitudes, men do not appear to think differently from women. Old people do not think differently from young people. Cognitively sophisticated people do not differ in their calculations from their less politically informed 'unsophisticated' counterparts. We could go on, but we trust that the general point is made. People develop (or fail to develop) a sense of EU Citizenship in more or less the same way across the EU. They do so primarily on the basis of rational calculations about the costs and benefits that accrue to them and their countries as a result of EU membership. They use heuristics – substitution cues and transfer cues – to guide them in their judgments when they lack the necessary detailed information to make a more informed assessment. Much less important – though still significant – they also use their sense of national identity as a (negative) guide to their EU thinking, particularly in relation to EU Policy Scope. Finally, if people are more involved in politics and cognitively mobilised they are more likely to feel a sense of European Identity, though this effect does not extend to Representation, Scope or Support.

Where does this leave us? We have shown that the sense of EU Citizenship among European mass publics is quite extensive. We have also argued that, against comparable standards of 'national citizenship', the European Citizenship glass is probably best viewed as half full rather than half empty. But how stable are the set of EU attitudes and orientations that we have reported? The detailed analysis that we have conducted here relates to a set of surveys that were carried out in the spring of 2007. As a follow up, we also asked a similar set of core questions to a similar cross-national sample in the late summer of 2008. In the period between the two surveys, the world economy was hit a banking crisis that was initially labelled 'the credit crunch', but which developed into a full-blown world recession. By the time of our second survey, the world economy – and the European economy with it – was already in recession. By comparing EU Citizenship and Support patterns across the two waves, we can very clearly assess the impact of the crisis on mass public attitudes. In short, we can make use of a 'natural experiment' to determine whether on not the 'external shock' of the worst economic crisis since the Second World War affected the stability of our measures of Citizenship and Support.

Table 10.2 reports the simple comparison across all of our sixteen sampled countries, before and after the 'shock'. The magnitude of the economic shock itself on popular perceptions can be seen in the first segment of the table, which reports the percentage of people who thought that the economic situation had got worse/the same/better over the previous twelve months. The change is extraordinary (and unprecedented on an annual basis with data of this sort). The percentage of respondents who thought the economic situation had worsened increased from 43.8 percent to no less than 85.2 percent – an increase in pessimism of no less than 42.4 percentage points. Clearly, people knew that a serious economic crisis had occurred. Indeed, if EU attitudes were unstable, then we would certainly expect to find that an economic shock

of this magnitude would disturb them noticeably. Yet when we look at the figures for EU Support, we see that the percentage of respondents who consider that the EU is ‘a good thing’ is in effect constant – it falls from 70.5 percent in 2007 to 70.1 percent in 2008. This is well within any conceivable margin a sampling error (which we estimate at +/- 3 percent). Similar patterns are evident when comparisons are made in terms of EU Identity (the percentages in the various identity categories are virtually identical across both columns of the table); and in terms of EU Representation (satisfaction with democracy at the EU level falls only 2.6 points to 63.4 percent; the institutional trust levels on average fall less than 3 points; and the percentage expressing a preference for ‘Strengthening the EU’ actually increases marginally to 49.3 percent). In terms of Scope, the percentages preferring EU competence again *increase* across four of the five policy categories – most noticeably in relation to unemployment and immigration.

<Table 10.2>

What all of this suggests is that the sense of EU Citizenship among European mass publics is remarkably stable. Not only is the EU Citizenship glass half full, but not much – if any – of it was spilt even in the face of the 2008 recession. For good measure, Table 10.3 breaks down the results shown in Table 10.2 by East and West and Europe. The results shown in the table illustrate perfectly the central theme of this book. The pattern of radical change in economic perceptions but stability in EU attitudes is clearly evident in both East and West. The *levels* of EU-sympathy are different in some areas (though they are not that different), but the *responses* to the economic crisis in terms of the pattern of attitude *change* are virtually identical. Mass publics across Europe tend to make their judgements about the EU in very similar ways. Their sense of EU Citizenship and the extent of their Support for the EU are

driven by the same common set of factors, regardless of their regional or national backgrounds. It may be the case, of course, that our 2009 survey was fielded too early for the global economic crisis to impact fully on the structure of EU beliefs. However, from what we have observed so far we would argue that, if the EU delivers, and is perceived to deliver, clear benefits for its citizens, and if its political institutions effectively represent its mass publics, then the currently stable half full glass of EU Citizenship will continue progressively to fill.

<Table 10.3>

Table 10.1: Mean Scores on 0-10 Scales, EU and National Citizenship Measures

Accession Wave	*EU Identity*	*EU Representation*	*EU Policy Scope*	*EU Citizenship*	*National Identity*	*National Representation*
Founder	5.12	4.58	4.82	4.84	7.64	4.64
Join 1970s	4.63	4.44	3.96	4.34	7.31	5.26
Join 1980s	5.13	4.74	5.44	5.10	7.79	4.48
Join 1994+	4.60	4.23	4.85	4.56	8.23	4.14
All	4.83	4.44	4.84	4.70	7.89	4.46

Total N = 16133; for Founders, N = 4023; for Join 1970s, N = 2000; for Join 1980s ('Southern Wave'), N = 3002; for Join 1994+, N = 7108

Table 10.2: Comparison of Economic Perceptions and EU Orientations, 16-country Averages, 2007-2008

	2007	2008	Change
Economic Perceptions			
Economic Conditions in the last 12 months:			
Got worse	43.8	85.2	+41.4
Stayed the same	30.8	11.1	-19.7
Got better	25.4	3.7	-21.7
EU Support			
EU Membership is:			
A good thing	70.5	70.1	-0.4
Neither good nor bad	14.7	14.2	-0.5
A bad thing	14.8	15.7	+0.9
EU Identity			
See self as:			
National only	38.9	39.5	+0.6
National and European	47.9	47.3	-0.6
European and National	7.2	7.1	-0.1
European only	3.9	4.0	+0.1
EU Representation			
Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU:			
Satisfied	66.1	63.4	-2.7
Dissatisfied	33.8	36.6	+2.6
Trust the European Commission (score over 5 on 0-10 scale)	40.0	36.7	-3.3
Trust the European Parliament (score over 5 on 0-10 scale)	39.8	37.2	-2.6
Strengthen the EU (score over 5 on 0-10 scale)	49.1	49.3	+0.2
EU Policy Scope			
Prefer EU decisionmaking in:			
Fighting unemployment	22.4	27.1	+4.7
Immigration	43.4	46.4	+3.0
Environment	46.2	47.6	+1.4
Fighting crime	39.1	41.5	+2.4
Health	21.5	20.9	-0.6

Note: Table entries are column percentages (within each segment) shown. N for 2007 = 16133; N for 2009 = 16,614.

Table 10.3: Comparison of Economic Perceptions and EU Orientiations, East and West European Averages, 2007-2008

	East		*West*	
	2008	*2009*	*2008*	*2009*
Economic Perceptions				
Economic Conditions in the last 12 months:				
Got worse	39.4	81.9	47.2	87.7
Stayed the same	34.7	13.9	27.8	9.0
Got better	25.9	4.2	25.0	3.4
EU Support				
EU membership is:				
A good thing	65.3	63.2	73.9	74.4
Neither good nor bad	10.7	24.5	8.6	7.8
A bad thing	24.0	12.4	17.4	17.8
EU Identity				
See self as:				
National only	45.5	47.1	33.8	33.8
National and European	44.0	43.4	50.9	50.3
European and National	5.8	5.1	8.2	8.6
European only	2.2	2.3	5.2	5.2
EU Representation				
Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU:				
Satisfied	67.6	64.3	65.1	62.7
Dissatisfied	32.4	35.7	35.0	37.3
Trust the European Commission (score over 5 on 0-10 scale)	37.4	33.1	41.9	39.3
Trust the European Parliament (score over 5 on 0-10 scale)	34.7	33.9	43.3	39.4
Strengthen the EU (score over 5 on 0-10 scale)	45.1	46.8	51.8	51.0
EU Policy Scope				
Prefer EU Decisionmaking in:				
Fighting unemployment	21.0	25.1	23.2	28.3
Immigration	41.8	46.3	44.4	46.4
Environment	40.7	42.6	49.8	50.6
Fighting crime	40.6	42.8	38.1	40.6
Health	18.4	20.0	20.4	21.5

Note: Table entries are column percentages (within each segment). N for 2007 = 16133; N for 2008 = 16,614.

Figure 10.1: Reciprocal Effects Among EU Identity, Representation and Scope (Based on Table 9.4)