The Impact of Cross-Cutting Cleavages on Citizens' Political Involvement

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Abstract

The paper revisits some old propositions of pluralist theories and the Columbia school about the impact of "cross-pressure" on political attitudes and behavior that, following some discouraging test results, largely vanished from scholarly works since the early seventies. Cross-pressure means that some individuals, like socially conservative trade union members in the United States, are pulled in opposite partisan directions because of their different characteristics. In their most generalized form the relevant hypothesis suggests that the more conflicting are the ways the various attributes of citizens pull them towards one party or another, the more disengaged they become, reducing cognitive and affective involvement with politics as well as participation. The paper scrutinizes the micro-logic of the proposition, points out that cross-pressure on citizens may be one of the mechanisms underlying the freezing effect of cleavages postulated by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), develops a greatly improved measure of cross-pressure, and subjects the hypothesis to a far more comprehensive test than those attempted before.

The empirical analysis finds some support for the hypothesis using worldwide cross-sectional data on various forms of political participation from the World Values Study. However, not all forms of participation are affected to the same extent, and there are also signs of some significant cross-national variations. The cross-national differences can, however, be linked to survey sample and political system characteristics in ways that are consistent with the original hypothesis. Interestingly, it is the conflicting electoral influence of different value orientations that seems to be the truly consequential source of cross-pressure, and not the conflicting influence of two or more socio-demographic characteristics on party preference.

This paper revisits an old concept that has been somewhat sidelined in electoral research in the last few decades. Cross-pressure, in the context of voting behavior research, means that some people are under conflicting influences with respect to their vote choice; a "combination of characteristics which, in a given context, would tend to lead the individual to vote on both sides of a contest" (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954: 283; see also Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948: 53, 56). Strongly pro-business Israelis who support giving up Israeli control of the occupied Palestinian territories in order to achieve lasting peace are a case in point. Because of their beliefs about economic policy, they may be inclined to vote for Likud, but their support for the peace process recommends them the opposite choice. Obviously, the cleavage structure underlying the party system has a great deal of systematic and persistent influence on who is subject to cross-pressures and who is not in the given polity. Thus, cross-pressure may well mediate the impact of cleavage structures on political behavior and attitudes.

The political sociology literature of the first two decades following World War 2 generated a number of more or less similar hypotheses about the impact of cross-pressure on political behavior and the political system. Two families of propositions can be easily distinguished among these, and had rather different treatment in the subsequent literature too. The first comprises propositions about the supposedly positive impact of cross-pressure (and hence crosscutting cleavages) on the stability of democratic systems. The second group deals with the negative impact of cross-pressure on turnout and citizens' involvement with partisan politics. But by the late 1970s all these propositions went out of vogue and in the recent literature only a few contributions, so far of very limited impact, made any use of the concept (Grönlund 1997; Narud and Valen 1996; Nilson 2002; Saglie 2000; and the rather more extensive literature in North European languages referred to in these works). However, the proposition about the impact on democratic attitudes was not even tested, while those concerning involvement were arguably unsatisfactory.

The literature also failed to recognize a potentially important implication of the involvement hypothesis. If cross-pressured citizens participate less, then the political arena must be disproportionately populated by the opposite kind of citizens, who are pre-selected by the established cleavage structure. These will be the people for whom

positions on the politically mobilized cleavage lines coincide more as the party system binds these positions together than the way they are connected or disconnected among citizens at large. If they are more likely to be active in politics than cross-pressured citizens, then the politically most active layers of society may sustain the established cleavage lines even after they lost relevance for most of the population.

Thus, cross-pressures may well be one of the mechanisms through which that mysterious "freezing of party alternatives" takes place, which was postulated in a much-quoted but vague and somewhat *ex cathedra* remark of Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 54). As it will be remembered, they asserted that the party systems of the 1970s reflected, "with few, but significant exceptions" the party systems of the 1920s, because the mobilization of some initial cleavages made West European party systems resistant to sweeping social changes, even though the latter "have made the old established [party] alternatives increasingly irrelevant." Cross-pressure theory can support this proposition despite the fact that it is hard to find any party system characteristics that became 'frozen' after the 1920s (Shamir 1984), and previous research returned basically no evidence about the impact of cleavage mobilization on the stabilization of party alternatives.[1] Hence, given the importance of the freezing hypothesis, cross-pressure theory is well worth to revisit.

The paper begins with a discussion of the key propositions advanced about the political impact of cross-pressure, and the reasons for the decline of scholarly interest in these hypotheses since the early seventies. I argue that these reasons remain unsatisfactory, and there is a need for new tests of some of the old hypotheses with a new research design. The subsequent empirical investigation relies on a data set that, as far as I can tell, is far larger and far less context-specific than anything used in the study of cross-pressure before. A novel measure of cross-pressure is developed that is superior to previous ones on several counts. First, it does not require a dichotomous operationalization of relevant divisions in the electorate. Secondly, it allows us simultaneously to consider cross-pressures generated by a large number of cleavage lines

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[1] Cf. Tóka (1998). Note that even Bartolini and Mair (1990) stopped short of demonstrating such an effect. They merely showed that electoral volatility somewhat decreased after the 1920s, and that ethno-religious heterogeneity, union density and party membership rate influenced electoral volatility – which can hardly be called compelling evidence about the impact of cleavage mobilization on the freezing of party alternatives, given that none of these variables appear to measure the latter, and especially not in the light of Bartolini and Mair's complex definition of cleavages.

with respect to any number of parties. Third, instead of treating all cleavages and parties as equally important, the aggregation procedure attributes each of them as much weight as the theory of cross-pressure itself suggests they must have.

Inspired by some contemporary debates about the mechanisms behind cleavage closure, the analysis also disaggregates the total cross-pressure citizens are exposed to into cross-pressures between different socio-demographic characteristics, cross-pressures between different value orientations, and cross-pressure between socio-demographic characteristics and value orientations. The conclusion sums up the findings and point out some avenues for further research.

1. THEORY

Cross-pressure and democracy

Cross-pressure theory can be traced back to the works of the early 20th century German sociologist Georg Simmel (1964), but found its most memorable expressions in the work of pluralist theorists. The earliest *locus classicus* is Ross (1920: 164-5):

> "[e]very species of social conflict interferes with every other species in society ... save only when lines of cleavages coincide; in which case they reinforce one another. ... A society, therefore, which is ridden by a dozen of oppositions along lines running in every direction may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence of falling to pieces than one split along just one line. For each new cleavage contributes to narrow the cross clefts, so that one might say that *society is sewn together* by its inner conflict." [Emphasis in the original.]

Hence the deceptively simple basic idea: the more divisive issues two individuals agree on, the less intense their conflict will be on whatever divides them, and the more likely it becomes that they can co-exist peacefully even in the absence of a coercive state apparatus that would instantaneously oppress any violent expressions of conflicts in society. A seemingly straightforward extension of this idea to the world of macro-level relationships is that the chances of stable democracy are weaker when the politically

mobilized cleavage lines reinforce, rather than cross-cut each other. Between the mid-1950s and the late 1960s political scientists and sociologists routinely advocated slightly different formulations of this basic hypothesis (cf. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954: 318-9; Dahrendorf 1959: 215; Lipset 1963: 75-9; Dahl 1956: 104-5; Dahl 1966: 377-81; Dahl 1967: 277; Axelrod 1970: 159-62).

The micro-logic of the proposition can be stated as follows. Whether cross-pressure is the result of multiple group membership or values pulling the individual in opposite partisan directions, cross-pressured individuals must be more likely to be exposed and receptive to conflicting partisan perspectives. Hence they can easier develop an understanding of each. Indeed, accountability to groups with different preferences and exposure to their best arguments was recently shown to increase one's probability of developing complex, integrative arguments (Green, Visser, and Tetlock 2000). Cross-pressured individuals should also find something good about almost any party political alternative, election result, and government. Hence "there is less of a tendency for disaffection to be cumulative. … As a result … the degree of ideological [i.e. militant] thinking is presumed to decline and the individual will be more capable of tolerating an ambiguous environment" (Conn 1973: 240). This, in its turn, may promote the acceptance of moderation, compromises, the uncertainty of outcomes and their dependence on the whims of popular will: in other words support for democratic procedures. Meanwhile those people who consistently favor the same partisan alternative across all conceivable cleavages and issue domains must have a much harder time to feel satisfied with the democratic system, which allows that from time to time (or even all of the time) such parties form the government that they strongly oppose. Their high stakes in political competition may reduce their tolerance for other opinions and the uncertainty of political outcomes, and hence their appreciation of the democratic process.

Of course, in the above arguments the relationship between cross-pressure and support for democratic principle is mediated by several – and rather uncertain - steps in a complex chain of causation (see Figure 1 below, where every arrow stands for a postulated positive relationship). Thus the empirical relationship between the two ends of the chain may be quite weak and often break down. The theory is also a bit unclear about whether it is cross-pressure as such, or rather indifference between the parties – that can

also be caused the lack of any pressure, rather than a crosscutting between them - that creates whatever consequences we attribute to cross-pressure. Moreover, the effect could even run in the opposite direction: cross-pressured people are unlikely to be entirely satisfied with any government, and hence may get disillusioned with the democratic process easier than some strong partisans. Hence the direct link from indifference (denoted as "appreciation of alternative outcomes" in Figure 1) to democratic values may well be a negative effect – which is indeed what I found in some of the analyses reported in a previous version of this paper (see Tóka 2003).

Figure 1: Some possible chains of causation from cross-pressure to democratic values

Although elegant mathematical formulas to measure cross-pressure became readily available (see Taylor and Rae 1969; Rae and Taylor 1970; Mayer 1972), obtaining satisfactory cross-national data on crosscutting between cleavages remained apparently difficult. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that empirical tests of the link to democratic stability did not abound. The few empirical analyses that considered the issue did not find unqualified support for the proposition, but tentatively confirmed one or another aspect of the expected link between democratic stability and cross-pressures. Dahl (1966) found a macro-level link between unequally intense and at the same time crosscutting cleavages on the one hand, and a reduction of political conflicts on the other across Western democracies. Budge and O'Leary (1971) found that levels of issue consensus and crosscutting preferences could not explain differences in inter-communal

relations and political violence between Glasgow and Belfast, but crosscutting between the salient socio-demographic cleavages of religion and class did differentiate between the two cities as expected. Budge and O'Leary (1972) offered a plausible theoretical account of how these seemingly mixed findings actually fit the pluralist theory of cross-pressure exceedingly well. More recently, Schafer (1997) offered experimental evidence about how inter-group contact between parties in a proxy international conflict improved the image of the out-group among decision-makers – without, however, an immediate impact on their political choices.

Nonetheless, consociational theorists increasingly brought attention to deviant cases like the Netherlands where the pluralist theory of crosscutting cleavages seemed unable to explain why a stable democracy could emerge (cf. Lijphart 1968). As a result, by the mid-70s most scholars seemed to accept that democratic stability in deeply divided societies was more a question of accommodative elite behavior than of multiple, crosscutting political alignments among citizens (see the literature review of Powell 1976: 2 as well as Conn 1973: 237-9, 242-4). Interesting theoretical accounts were offered about why cross-pressure theory may not work (see e.g. Goodin 1975).

In a few years time, scholarly works on democratic stability abandoned the concept of cross-pressure. In the early 1970s, a critic still noted with some dismay that "the hypothesis that politically relevant divisions which cross-cut each other contribute to the mitigation and regulation of conflicts is probably the explanatory hypothesis most widely accepted among American political scientists" (Nordlinger 1972: 93). But soon afterwards even textbooks started to downplay the proposition and eventually omitted references to it. For instance, the first edition of Gordon Smith's *Politics in Western Europe* still firmly asserted that conflicting political loyalties moving the same people in different directions are "a precondition for stable democracy" (Smith 1972: 16, quoted by Nilson 2002: 355). In the second edition of the same book a much weaker version of the proposition appeared, and only in a quote from Lipset's *Political Man,* which was there merely to illustrate a particular view that was not endorsed by the author (Smith 1976: 3).

It can be countered, however, that consociational explanations of democratic stability – whatever we think about their validity - have no implications whatsoever about whether or not genuinely cross-pressured citizens are more tolerant of their political

opponents and supportive of democracy than diehard partisans of rival camps. According to consociational theory, grand coalition governments and similar practices can accommodate bitterly divided political camps partly because cooperating political elites control the behavior of ordinary adherents through vertically integrated political pillars, which monopolize the representation of their political subculture as well as its interactions with other political subcultures. These pillars isolate rank and file adherents of rival camps "from cradle to grave", and thus can assist accommodation without doing anything to promote tolerant, pro-democratic attitudes.

Hence the rising popularity of consociational theory alone must not have led to a wholesale rejection of cross-pressure theory. In fact, macro-level evidence about the determinants of democratic stability may be entirely irrelevant to evaluate the validity of propositions about the micro-level determinants of inter-group tolerance or support for democracy. Democratic stability may simply depend much less on popular attitudes than on factors like the international setting, economic conditions, or constitutional design (cf. Przeworski *et al.* 2000).

In order to improve on pluralist theories of cross-pressure, one can simply discard the hasty jumps in their reasoning from individual psychology to macro-level consequences. Consider the following example: "studies of individual voting behavior … indicate that individuals under cross-pressure … are less likely to be strongly committed politically. […] Where a man belongs to a variety of groups that all predispose him toward the same political choice, he is in the situation of the isolated worker and is much less likely to be tolerant of other opinions. [Hence:] The available evidence suggests that the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations" (Lipset 1963: 77). Clearly, the core arguments of this quotation refer to individual level relationships, and hence they would have to be tested accordingly.

However, even this modification may be unable to save the first family of cross-pressure hypotheses. Using the same data set as in the present paper, I found that cross-pressure affects various forms of regime support inconsistently across variants of the same measurement procedure as used in the present paper (Tóka 2003). The effect proved statistically insignificant in most analyses despite the large N provided by a 37-nation

pooled cross-national analysis, and also changed sign between analyses that concerned the cross-pressure that people experienced regarding all parties and analyses only looking at cross-pressure with respect to the respondents' party of choice. Thus the net impact of cross-pressure on attitudinal support for democracy in the contemporary world seems to be zero.

A plausible interpretation of this finding is that the demobilizing impact of cross-pressure has ambiguous implications for regime support. The pluralism of partisan leanings created by cross-pressure "makes for enough consensus to hold the system together and enough cleavage to make it move. Too much consensus would be deadening and restrictive of liberty; too much cleavage would be destructive of the society as a whole" (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954: 318). Therefore, the failure of the first family of cross-pressure hypotheses may be due to the reductive impact of cross-pressures on political involvement. If so, then any further progress in understanding the impact of crosscutting cleavages on democratic stability is dependent on a better exploration and understanding of their demobilizing impact. So let's now turn to the analysis of the latter.

Cross-pressure and political involvement

Herbert Tingsten (1937: 230-1) was probably the first to coin the idea that cross-pressures decrease citizens' cognitive and behavioral involvement in party politics. He found that in interwar Stockholm turnout among the working class increased with the proportion of workers living in the district. His explanation, the "law of the social center of gravity", was that workers in working-class areas received a reinforcement of their underlying voting preferences for the social democratic party in their residential environment, while other workers received the opposite stimulus.

Yet it awaited the works of the "Columbia school" to generalize and popularize the idea, linking all possible sorts of cross-pressure to varied expressions of involvement and partisanship. In the *People's Choice* they noted that in the 1940 American presidential elections cross-pressured individuals - more often than others in Erie Country, Ohio - delayed their vote decision until late during the election campaign, belittled the importance of the election outcome, and hesitated between candidates

(Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948: 58-60, 62, 67-69). Their book on the 1948 election in the city of Elmira repeated much the same conclusions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954: 19-20, 27, 129-32, 384), which were buttressed by some further analyses too (cf. Sears 1969). The link with non-voting was merely mentioned as a possibility by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954: 200), but received much attention in subsequent works by Lipset *et al.* (1954) and Lipset (1963: 211-26). Since these varied consequences cover behavior like turnout, cognitive phenomena like delaying the vote decision, and affection (i.e. strength of partisanship) too, I will use here the generic expression of political involvement to refer to all these consequences collectively.

For Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates, cross-pressure seemed to help explaining who can possibly be converted during an election campaign from one side to another, and to falsify some simplistic popular notions about the deterministic impact of any single factor - like attitudes on a major issue or social class - on vote choice. Hence it was irrelevant for them whether cross-pressure influenced involvement merely because it increased indifference between the rival candidates or also on its own right, over and above the impact of indifference. As a result, their empirical tests never attempted to make a distinction between these two subtypes of the proposition. Yet their oft-repeated remark that cross-pressures cause "stress" make it clear that they thought of cross-pressure not just as a factor that increases indifference between the alternatives in the election, but also as a factor that increases voters' decision-making costs and reduce their psychological benefits from any kind of cognitive or behavioral involvement with voting and electoral choice.

The micro-logic of the proposition is fairly straightforward then. The demobilizing effect of cross-pressure is indeed consistent with both instrumental and expressive accounts of voting behavior.[2] Citizens who are pulled towards party *j* because of its stance on one issue but towards a rival party *k* by another issue must feel, *ceteris paribus*, more indifferent between the two parties than people who are, objectively speaking, on the side of the same party on both issues. Note that this is not an entirely trivial proposition as Heron (1971) suggested. It may well be the case that only one or the

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[2] On the instrumental-expressive distinction see Brennan and Lomasky (1994); Brennan and Hamlin (1998).

other issue is important for every single individual, and hence "objective" cross-pressures are, after all, subjectively irrelevant. But if additive models of vote choice are valid at least for some citizens, then indifference as well as decision-making costs must stochastically increase with cross-pressure. Thus, involvement with anything related to party politics should be reduced among the cross-pressured. Conversely, the more the different issue dimensions pull some people in the same partisan direction, the higher both their instrumental and expressive utility must be from supporting that alternative. As a result, political involvement will increase in an inverse proportion of cross-pressure (cf. Figure 2).

Figure 2: Chains of causation from cross-pressure to political involvement

A few studies confirmed key findings of Lazarsfeld and Berelson in both electoral (cf. Campbell *et al.* 1960: 85-6; Narud and Valen 1996) and non-electoral contexts (Cole 1969; Oegema and Klandermans 1994). It was repeatedly observed that conflicts between personal partisanship and prevailing trends in one's immediate social environment increase the volatility of voting intentions (cf. McClosky and Dahlgren 1959; Powell 1976; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995: 54; Zuckerman, Valentino and Zuckerman 1994; Zuckerman, Kotler-Berkowitz and Swaine 1998). This certainly supports Tingsten's (1937) theory. But the Columbia school's claim that all sorts of cross-pressure can reduce strength of partisanship and turnout was either rejected, or supported only weakly, and only in some special cases (Pool, Abelson and Popkin 1965: 76; Converse 1966; Segal

1969; Powell 1970; Horan 1971; Melson 1971; Peele and Morse 1974; Powell 1976; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980: 35; Grönlund 1997; Nielson 2002).

Subsequently, most scholars working on political participation heeded Wolfinger and Rosenstone's (1980: 35) advice and avoided using the cross-pressure concept altogether. Others suggested complicated modifications of the theory that neatly fitted anomalies noted in one context, but offered no obvious explanations for other puzzling or negative findings, and implicitly replaced the theory of cross-pressure with something else. For instance, Segal's (1969) work is really just an application of Gerhard Lenski's theory of status inconsistency to electoral abstention, without any application to cross-pressures that are unrelated to social status. Similarly, Grönlund (1997) effectively replaced cross-pressure theory with an expressive theory of participation, whereby citizens vote as long as at least one candidate is attractive for them, and do so irrespectively of how indifferent they are between the contenders.

A different path of further research will be taken here, which responds to some obvious weaknesses in the empirical tests carried out before. These weaknesses include crude measurement of cross-pressures, concentration on just a few examples of cross-pressure instead of taking a more comprehensive approach, relying on single country analyses, focusing on supposed cross-pressures between membership in some large social groups and neglecting cross-pressures between attitudes and values. Section 2 discusses how the present analysis responds to these problems and deviates from previous studies.

Structural and value cleavages

A detour about the notion of cleavages is necessary here. There is a strong tradition in the scholarly literature that stresses that "real" cleavages must in some ways be anchored in the socio-demographic characteristics differentiating citizens – political divisions based on differences in political values only should not, in this account, be called cleavages (cf. especially Bartolini and Mair 1990; Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995). In contrast, I think it must be treated as an open empirical question whether one or another type of voter alignment is better able to produce the behavioral and attitudinal consequences – such as the stabilization of voting preferences over time or the creation of effective cross-pressure

- that are, in empirical political theory, attributed to "cleavages". Therefore the second part of the empirical analysis below is devoted to this issue.

The hypothesis leading this part of the investigation builds on my previous research. In a study of electoral volatility I found evidence that vote choices in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in the mid-90s were more stable over time if they were anchored in citizens' value orientations rather than in their socio-demographic characteristics. Vote choices anchored in the latter were not significantly more stable over time than vote choices that could not be explained by either values or socio-demographic traits. Indeed, this is what we can expect even on theoretical grounds in countries where the party system is relatively fragmented, links between interest groups and parties somewhat vague and unstable, and where parties make little use of direct appeals to social group identities (Tóka 1998). At any rate, value divisions in the electorate can apparently generate the supposed effects of cleavages even without support by a socio-structural underpinning.

It is in this spirit that I borrow from Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) the extremely useful distinction between structural and value voting. The first refers to the type of voter alignment showed by citizens whose party choices can be predicted (or, more precisely, postdicted) from their socio-demographic attributes. "Value voting", in turn, refers to the behavior of citizens whose party choices are anchored in their value orientations – which comes rather close to, but is still not as wide as the commonly used concept of "issue voting".

The first part of the empirical analysis below treats structural and value divisions the same way. But the second part of the analysis makes a distinction between cross-pressures between structural cleavages, cross-pressures between value cleavages, and cross-pressures between structural cleavages on the one hand and value cleavages on the other. This last category is basically the inverse of "cleavage voting", a concept introduced by Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) to denote the overlap between structural and value voting. This overlap occurs when socio-demographic attributes and value orientations pull a person towards the same vote choice - assuming that his or her choice is influenced by these attributes the same way as they impact the electoral behavior of the average voter in the given polity.

While I am persuaded that Knutsen and Scarbrough operationalized with the concept of "cleavage voting" Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) cleavage concept faithfully, I do not think that loyalty to a terminological convention is the only relevant criteria regarding the value of conceptual distinctions and theoretical definitions. What should matter more is whether there is a distinct causal mechanism and effect behind each concept that we introduce. The notions of structural and value voting satisfy this criterion. The first can be expected to stabilize voting preferences - beyond the level that we could explain with the attitudes of the individual – through its impact on the partisan homogeneity of one's interpersonal environment and other information sources. Given the well-documented impact of the interpersonal environment on vote choices, this factor may keep citizens vote as before even when their personal attitudes would already pull them in another direction.

Value voting, in its turn, can link the individual's party preference to some of the most persistent issue attitudes that he or she has. This is likely to create subjectively meaningful – and hence subjectively pleasing – links between one's electoral choices and some major issues of conviction involving the ego. Through these mechanisms, value voting can create a greater stability of voting intentions than we could expect simply on the basis of the totality of the individual's issue attitudes, and how each of these attitudes is related to party choice in the population at large at the time of subsequent voting decisions.

Thus, I expect that both structural and value cleavages are more likely to produce cross-pressure than other possible determinants of vote choices. But "cleavage voting", as Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) understand it, could only be expected to generate some effects of theoretical interest through the mechanisms that structural voting and/or value voting operate through - provided that they have any relevant effects on political attitudes and behavior. Therefore, I think this is a redundant concept and the phenomenon that it describes can be seen merely as a combination of structural and value voting. Indeed, my previous empirical work on volatility showed no distinct effects of "cleavage voting" that would not be just the same that we would expect from merely additive effects of structural and value voting (Tóka 1998). Knutsen and Scarbrough's (1995) reasoning would, I believe, imply that cross-pressures working against "cleavage voting" are more

consequential for political choices and thus for political involvement than those cross-pressures that reduce structural or value voting. My hypothesis is that cross-pressures between structural and value cleavages will have about as much effect as the average impact of cross-pressures between socio-structural traits and of cross-pressures between personal values.

2. AN IMPROVED TEST

Large-N cross-national analysis and a fragile relationship

The present analysis relies on cross-national data coming from the third wave of the World Values Study, for which fieldwork was carried out around 1996.[3] Appendix 1 describes why certain countries were excluded from the analysis. The analysis is based on weighted national samples from countries with at least a modicum of electoral competition: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, India, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, the USA, and Venezuela. The Eastern and Western parts of Germany are treated in the analysis as two separate entities, thus bringing the number of contextual units (henceforth "countries") in the analysis to 37.

The disadvantage of relying on a secondary analysis is that the complex mechanisms depicted in Figure 2 cannot be examined in great detail. Yet this is not my intention anyway. Instead, I would like to assess the gross relationship between the endpoints of the causal chains. This exercise benefits from considering such a large number of countries exactly because the causal chains linking cross-pressure to political involvement rely on several highly uncertain steps.

Most importantly, it is not at all obvious that "objective" cross-pressures always translate into an actual personal experience of cross-pressure, or that they do so equally

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[3] See Inglehart *et al*. 2000. The original collector of the data, ICPSR, and the relevant funding agency bear no responsibility for uses of this collection or for interpretations or inferences based upon such uses.

across countries. As Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954: 200) themselves noted, "a few cross-pressured voters act like the proverbial donkey and do not vote at all. Others do make a choice between the parties […] through the weights or priorities assigned, by the individual himself or larger events, to the relevant issues." In many situations this should be a fairly unproblematic exercise, without any impact on partisanship or participation. Surely one's vote choice is not influenced by all the personal characteristics - from ethnicity to various issue attitudes - of an individual that may influence *some other people* in the same society to vote in a particular way.

Cross-pressures, whether they are caused by belonging to two different groups with conflicting partisan predilections or by having a left-wing attitude in one issue domain and right-wing attitudes in another, merely establish a probability that an individual will have a subjective experience of conflicting considerations when it comes to choosing a candidate or party. Even at a very high probability of cross-pressure emerging because of two sets of personal characteristics, for some individuals only one of the two sets may be a salient determinant of vote choice. Hence, the objective probability of cross-pressure may not translate into a corresponding subjective experience.

For instance, Powell (1976) found a very weak link between - objective - cross-pressure stemming from multiple socio-cultural group membership on the one hand, and participation (campaign activity) on the other in Austria. He could explain the weakness of the link by showing that occupying a supposedly cross-pressured position – like being a working class practicing Catholic in a country where party choice was largely reduced to a choice between secular socialists and Christian democrats – only influenced participation indirectly, through several relatively weak links. Objective cross-pressure slightly increased the probability that the individual perceived that different parties promote the interests of the social groups he or she belonged to. This perception had a weak negative impact on the strength of partisanship, which, in its turn, reduced participation. Meanwhile the political homogeneity of one's network of friends also impacted the strength of partisanship as expected by cross-pressure theory. But the cross-pressured location of the individual did not have a significant impact on the political homogeneity of these networks.

Thus, the pattern of interpersonal relations and the perception of party positions in Austria were such that cross-pressure between one's objective position on the class and religious cleavages was either not salient for most people concerned, or only very weakly influenced their strength of partisanship and political involvement. Yet weak individual-level relationships may have important consequences for the democratic political system, especially if the weak relationship happens to be very resilient and universal. It suffices to recall how weak correlations between social status and electoral participation are sometimes argued to have major consequences for the politics or representation (cf. Lijphart 1997).

Hence, it should come neither as a surprise nor as a compelling refutation of cross-pressure theory if the expected relationship between the two ends of the chains depicted in Figure 2 only show up in some contexts. If so, then it should be a further task for inquiry to study the conditions under which it occurs. It may also be the case that the observed effects only show random variation across countries around a clearly non-zero central tendency, yet – at least partly because of crude measurement – are not statistically significant within most national samples. If so, then 37 national samples should be enough to discover that this is the real reason behind the discouraging and somewhat inconsistent previous findings.

A new measure of cross-pressure

Some further measurement problems, unrelated to the tenuous link between objective probabilities and subjective experiences of cross-pressure, also plagued previous studies. Above all, there is nothing in the concept of cross-pressure that would recommend a dichotomous classification of citizens into cross-pressured and the rest, or suggest that only one pair of factors can create cross-pressure at a time. Yet this is exactly the way previous studies of citizen involvement measured cross-pressure.[4] This is clearly wrong, since the objective probability of cross-pressure must be a genuinely continuous variable, simultaneously influenced by the individual's position on a potentially infinite number of

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[4] The only exception that I am aware of one of the measures used by Gopoian and Hadjiharalambous (1994), which operationalizes cross-pressure as the standard deviation of a given individual's position across a range of issue dimensions. However, even this measure fails to weight issue dimensions according

relevant divisions in the electorate. Hence it is hardly impressive if let's say Catholic businessmen in 1950s America where just a bit less involved with partisan politics than an appropriately selected control-group (cf. Campbell *et al.* 1960: 85-6). The combined impact of all sorts of cross-pressure may still be substantial on citizens' behavior. Indeed, one cannot even assess accurately the impact of a single, analytically isolated cross-pressure without controlling for other kinds of cross-pressure.

Therefore my analysis relies on a newly developed measure of the objective probability of cross-pressure, which is described in Appendix 2. The cross-pressure variable sums all the various objective cross-pressures that individuals are subject to because of each party alternative and each individual determinant of vote choice considered. These various components of the total cross-pressure are captured through continuous variables, and are weighted in the aggregation process exactly by the degree to which they – "objectively" – should pull the given respondents' vote choice towards different parties. In contrast, previous measures invariably operationalized cross-pressure as a dichotomous variable, defined by a single pair of characteristics, and exclusively focused on cross-pressures regarding a single party (or a choice between just two parties).

Note that the convenient summation of cross-pressures across cleavages and parties is possible exactly because the concept of cross-pressure implicitly establishes a common metric for all of these effects. Namely, the bigger the difference between the distributions of voting intentions in group A and B, the more likely that simultaneous membership in the two groups will create cross-pressure for any individual. Therefore, the task is simply to calculate the extent to which each cleavage pulls each individual with a given cleavage position towards each party, and then compare this with the pull of other cleavages on the same individuals. From this we can derive a continuous measure of the objective probability of cross-pressure created by each cleavage for each individual with respect to any one party. The final step is merely to sum up whichever components of the total cross-pressure into a single instrument.

One can thus aggregate cross-pressures regarding a particular party or set of parties, or cross-pressures caused by a particular set of cleavages regarding one or more

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to the exact degree that they pull vote decisions in opposite directions, and is applicable only to dichotomous choice situations.

party. The present analysis first considers the total amount of cross-pressures caused by all eleven cleavages in the analysis with respect to all parties. One could argue that this is misleading to the extent that some of the parties may simply not be relevant for some of the individuals, since they would anyway not vote for them ever. However, the World Values Study offers little information to determine the relevant choice set for each individual. As an extreme solution, one could limit the analysis to cross-pressures experienced regarding the most favored party of the given individuals. However, the findings reported in Tóka (2003) show that this change would not alter the findings regarding the impact of cross-pressure on political involvement (while it does change the findings regarding democratic values).

Cleavages considered

Nearly all the negative evidence regarding the Columbia school's theory of cross-pressure comes from studies that only considered cross-pressure supposedly generated by membership in social groups, and neglected the possible cross-pressures that may arise because of the attitudes of the individual.[5] This is in stark contrast with the way the cross-pressure concept is defined throughout the literature. Obviously, it is not feasible here either to consider all attitudes and group affiliations that may impact vote choices in at least one country at one point in time. Instead, given my interest in how established, relatively persistent cleavage structures impact citizens' political attitudes and behavior, I will concentrate on six socio-demographic and five value divisions that, according to my reading of the literature on party systems and voting behavior, have created partisan divisions in the electorate of numerous countries for extended periods of time.

These eleven potential cleavage lines are gender, age, rural vs. urban residence, social class, religion, ethnicity, socio-economic attitudes related to the traditional left-right divide, non-economic attitudes relevant for the new left vs. new right divide, attitudes relevant for the clerical vs. secular cleavage, attitudinal support for the political

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[5] Gopoian and Hadjiharalambous' (1994) study is once again an exception, but they only examined the impact of cross-pressure on the time of vote decisions. In the literature on political involvement proper, the only other examples of supposed cross-pressure that apparently failed to have the expected effect refer to ecological aggregates in Finland and Norway where, because of the ethnic or occupational composition of the population, a diffrerent presidential candidate preference, or a different referendum-vote dominated

system – this should capture the regime cleavage where it exists -, and nationalist vs. cosmopolitan attitudes. With the exception of some socio-demographic cleavages like gender, several variables or scales will measure the position of the individuals on each cleavage (see Appendix 3).

In the first part of the empirical analysis aggregates all sorts of "objective" cross-pressure – whether generated by structural or value cleavages – into a single measure. The second part of the analysis explores the relative contributions of structural and value cleavages as well as what Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) called "cleavage voting" to political involvement. Thus, it will disaggregate total cross-pressure into three distinct components: cross-pressures between different socio-demographic characteristics, cross-pressures between different value orientations, and cross-pressure between socio-demographic characteristics and value orientations.

Model specification issues

As Heron (1971) pointed out, whatever variables are used to establish who is cross-pressured and who is not, their linear effect – on political involvement and so forth – must be always controlled for while estimating the impact of cross-pressure. Otherwise the cross-pressure variable would pick up the linear impact of the variables that - in combination with each other - defined the objective probabilities of cross-pressure. My analysis simply follows Heron (1971) in this respect. Thus the 35 socio-demographic variables and attitude scales used to identify the individuals' positions on the eleven cleavages enter my computations at two different points. First, country-by-country discriminant analyses are used to determine the direction and degree to which each cleavage – objectively speaking - pulls the party preferences of the individuals in the analysis. The information obtained this way is then used to compute the objective probability of cross-pressure for each individual. Secondly, measures of political involvement are regressed on cross-pressure, while controlling for the effect of the 35 socio-demographic variables and attitude scales that were used to identify the individuals' positions on the eleven cleavages.

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than the one supported by the party that normally had above average support in the area (see Grönlund 1997; Nilson 2002).

The intervening variables depicted in Figure 2 – i.e. indifference, decision-making costs, strength of partisanship - will be omitted from the analysis, partly for lack of data, and partly because of my interest in whether cross-pressures can contribute to the freezing of party alternatives. From the latter perspective, the key question is whether cross-pressure has any effect on political involvement: exactly what factors mediate this effect is less important.

For the same reasons, political involvement will be measured through multiple variables: political interest, frequency of political discussion, party membership, and participation in petitions and demonstrations (see Appendix 4 for the technical details). The more forms of involvement and especially of participation are impacted by cross-pressure negatively, the more likely it is that a freezing effect may operate through cross-pressure. Obviously, further analyses will be needed to ascertain the effect on electoral participation, which the World Values Study data does not allow.

Since all indicators of involvement are dichotomized, logistic regression equations will estimate their dependence on cross-pressure.

3. RESULTS

Thus, cross-pressure and the 35 control variables are the only independent variables included in the regressions estimated separately for each 37 samples and each measure of political involvement. There is neither reason nor space here to display all the parameter estimates from the 185 equations. Tables 1 to 5 merely show, for one form of involvement after the other, a cross-tabulation of the sign of the impact of cross-pressure with the statistical significance level of this effect.

Remember that the hypothesis is that cross-pressure reduces political involvement. So statistically significant negative effects support the theory, while statistically significant positive effects strongly contradict it. If there is absolutely no relationship between cross-pressure and political involvement in the real world, then we should find a very even – or if you like, random - distribution of the 37 samples across the cells of tables 1 to 5. That is to say, roughly 5 percent of the samples must then show an effect of cross-pressure that is significant at the $p \square 0.05$ level, and another five percent

must show effects significant at the 0.05<*p*□0.10 level. Similarly, about ten percent of the samples must show a cross-pressure effect significant at each of the 0.10<*p*□0.20 to 0.90<*p*□1.00 levels, which cover wider ranges of *p* values. At all significance levels, about half the effects must be positive, and half negative. This means that we should find about one case in each of the cells in the top two rows of the tables, and about two cases in all other cells.

Beyond this, it is hard to formulate clear theoretical expectations about the size of the effect – or how frequently it should prove statistically significant. All we know for sure is that the estimated effects are likely to be deflated. Firstly, we cannot consider just about all cleavages that may be relevant in any one of the polities covered, and even the respondents' positions on the cleavages considered are measured in just a superficial way. Secondly, the cross-pressure variable measures only the objective probability of cross-pressure, and cannot capture its actual experience. To put it differently, the measure assumes that a single linear and additive model correctly describes the links between cleavage positions and party preference for each respondent in a given country. The more varied is the salience of particular cleavages for different people in the same country, the less valid this assumption is, and the less the cross-pressure variable is able to measure the probability of cross-pressure for each individual. Thirdly, there is no reason to expect these errors be correlated either with political involvement or with the true extent of cross-pressure. Therefore, their unfortunate presence in the data is likely to deflate the estimated impact of cross-pressure on political involvement. The size of this error is unknown and unknowable, and therefore the sign and significance level of the effects pf cross-pressure are the only statistics of interest.

Tables 1 to 5 about here

Consider table 1, which presents the findings regarding the impact of cross-pressure on political interest. Eighteen samples – more than half of the total - show a negative effect significant at the .05 level, and another five show negative effects significant at the .10 level. So the hypothesis that cross-pressure reduces interest in politics is by and large supported. Although there are two samples where the effect of

cross-pressure is positive and significant at 10 percent or lower level, this is exactly the number that we would expect to occur merely at random in the absence of any relationship between cross-pressure and political interest. Therefore the data do not give reasons to suspect that there may be cross-national variance regarding the direction of this relationship: the few positive and statistically insignificant effects may well be explained by the laws of probability.

By and large, the same conclusions can be drawn from tables 2 and 3 as well. A good plurality of the samples show a statistically significant negative effect of cross-pressure on both engagement in political discussion and party membership, while the number of samples with significant positive effects remains as low as expected if there were no relationship whatsoever. So once again, there is strong support for the hypothesis that cross-pressure reduces involvement in many - and possibly all - countries, and no strong reasons either to refuse or to endorse the idea that there may nonetheless be some cross-national variation in the direction of the relationship.

The picture barely changes as we move to tables 4 and 5. The negative effects still outnumber the positive ones quite clearly – though a bit less so than in tables 1 to 3 -, and the significance level of the negative effects is skewed towards the lowest values, which signal significant effects. In contrast, the positive effects are nearly uniformly distributed across the significance levels distinguished, so they may well be just random occurrences that are entirely due to sampling errors. In statistical terms, the results are almost perfectly consistent with the hypothesis that in all 37 countries the true effect is negative, albeit small.

However, both tables 4 and 5 have one more positive effect significant at the .05 level than we would expect to occur merely by chance. Thus, this time it is not only that we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is some cross-national variation in the direction of the effect. The data on participation in petitions and demonstrations even offers a bit of support for the proposition that in a few countries the relationship may be genuinely positive, while at most places it is negative.

Table 6 about here

Table 6 offers some further indirect evidence that point at a possible difference between these two forms of involvement and the three others. The table displays parameter estimates from five linear regression analyses – one for each form of involvement -, which aim at detecting the causes of the observed cross-national variation documented by tables 1 to 5. For the sake of these regression analyses the observed impact of cross-pressure on each form of involvement in the 37 countries was expressed as the ratio of the respective logistic regression coefficient to its standard error. In the given small sample of N=37, this dependent variable was regressed on three factors that can influence findings in ways that are consistent with the Columbia school's theory.

First, the deviant findings may be due to sampling error. If so, then the occasional positive effects of cross-pressure on involvement must occur especially in surveys with relatively small sample size. So the impact of sample size in table 6 must be negative. Secondly, some odd findings may occur because in some countries cross-pressure may be close to zero for every respondent – if for no other reason, then because none of the eleven cleavages included in the present analysis pull people in any clear partisan direction there. If so, then in table 6 the within-country standard deviation of the CROSS-PRESSURE variable must show a negative effect on the occurrence of positive effects of cross-pressure on involvement.

Finally, cross-pressure may not have an instantaneous effect on involvement. It may take repeated experience with essentially the same party system and cleavage structures before political involvement among the cross-pressured falls appreciably. This would be perfectly consistent with the spirit of the freezing hypothesis: we would hardly expect fluid, volatile, poorly institutionalized party systems to prompt the psychological responses that contribute to the freezing effect at the level of citizens. If the impact of cross-pressure on political involvement cumulates over election years, then the few deviant findings identified in tables 1 to 5 should have been more likely to occur in countries where the cleavage structure is relatively new. In practice, of course, any cleavage structure is a mix of old and new elements, but there must still be a difference of degree between countries where the party system in existence in 1996-98 was established before the 1980s, in the 1980s, or afterwards. Hence, Australia, Finland, India, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Puerto Rico, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, the USA, Venezuela, and

West Germany were coded 1; Argentina, Chile, the Philippines, Spain, and Turkey 2; and the remaining countries - post-communist countries in Eastern Europe as well as Brazil, Bangladesh and South Africa – 3 on the NEW CLEAVAGES variable. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on the observed impact of cross-pressure on political involvement in the given country.

The findings displayed in table 6 – as well as the bivariate correlations between the three new variables and the country-specific impact of CROSS-PRESSURE (not shown) - show a clear-cut difference between political interest, political discussion and party membership on the one hand, and participation in petitioning and at demonstrations. The observed cross-national differences in the impact of cross-pressure on the first three are related to NEW CLEAVAGES, sample size, and the standard deviation of CROSS-PRESSURE as expected: all coefficients are in the expected direction, and many of them are statistically significant. In contrast, in the last two columns of table 6 we find several effects of unexpected sign and no effect reaching statistical significance.

Why do the above explanations fail to work regarding the impact of cross-pressure on the last two forms of political involvement? The most straightforward explanation seems to me that cross-pressures – which are, of course, the products of party politics - are bound eventually to reduce the probability of party membership, interest in politics, and engagement in political discussions just about anywhere, while demonstrating and petitioning may be related to partisan cross-pressures either way. The first three forms of involvement may be universally determined by what is happening in the most visible, and most celebrated part of the democratic process: the party political struggles in elections and the policy-making process. In contrast, it may be just some of the countries where demonstrations and petitioning are organized mostly by actors and interests that are well integrated in party politics and the cleavages underlying the latter. In others, such actors and interests may take the lead in organizing demonstrations and petitions that do not find a very suitable expression through the party system. It is perfectly conceivable that these organizations find their clientele especially among cross-pressured citizens. In such countries participation in demonstrations and petitioning may, therefore, be more frequent among the cross-pressured. In the absence of good data on the extent to which parties and their satellites organize demonstrations and petitioning

across the 37 countries, this proposition cannot be tested here, but may well deserve further investigation.

Table 7 about here

Finally, do all kinds of cross-pressure have the same effect? Table 7 addresses this question, which is again answered by regressing five forms of political involvement on cross-pressure for each of the 37 countries separately. Except for minor changes, the format and content of table 7 are similar to those of tables 1 to 5. The first change is that three kinds of cross-pressure are distinguished – thus table 7 has three times as many columns as tables 1 and 5 -, and they all enter simultaneously the logistic regression equations that model each of the five forms of political involvement as a function of cross-pressures and the 35 indicators of cleavage positions. The latter were once again controlled for in estimating the parameters that the cell entries of table 7 refer to. Secondly, for reasons of space and parsimony, the results regarding the five forms of political involvement are squeezed into a single table, rather than being separated as in tables 1 to 5. Thus, each of the three vertical panels of table 7 refers to a total of 185 estimated coefficients – i.e. five forms of involvement in 37 countries.[6]

The hypothesis is that cross-pressures between value cleavages and cross-pressures between structural cleavages are both capable of reducing political involvement. Knutsen and Scarbrough's (1995) argument about cleavages may lead us to an opposite expectation, since they insist that only "cleavage voting" – i.e. a reinforcement between values on the one hand, and socio-structural position on the other - can contribute to the freezing of the party system. A simple association between values and party choice, or between social position and party cannot, they argue, have such an effect. One can infer from this that the freezing of the cleavage structure is only hindered by cross-pressures between value and social positions, but not by cross-pressures between different values, or between different aspects of social status.

If there a particular kind of cross-pressure had no real impact on involvement in

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[6] More detailed breakdowns, not shown in table 7, did not suggest any noteworthy variation across forms of involvement other than the one noted in the previous discussion.

any one of the 37 countries, then we would expect that the 185 coefficients referring to this effect are distributed uniformly across significance levels and signs: i.e. that roughly nine cases fall in the each of the 20 cells of each panel.[7] The middle panel of table 7, referring to the impact of cross-pressures created by the conflicting partisan pull associated with an individual's positions on different value cleavages, shows a very clear predominance of statistically significant negative effects: in fact, no less than 55 of the 185 estimated effects were negative and significant at the .05 or lower level.

The results regarding cross-pressure between different aspects of one's socio-demographic positions and those between socio-demographic position and values do not show such clear-cut pattern. In both cases, more statistically significant effects occur than we would expect to emerge by chance. The ratio of significant positive versus significant negative effects (with $p \leq .10$) is 13:18 in the first, and 9:15 in the second case. In the first case, both numbers are well above nine, and the ratio of effects significant at the .05 or lower level is 8:7. Thus, there is some reason to suspect that cross-pressures between various components of social position reduce involvement in some countries but increase it in others. Cross-pressures between one's social position – in all the dimensions considered here combined – and values, in their turn, seem to be slightly more likely to produce positive than negative effects on political involvement. Neither of these results was anticipated by my previous reasoning.

At any rate, the most interesting – and probably the only robust - finding of table 7 is perfectly clear. The reductive effect of cross-pressure on political involvement that tables 1 to 5 demonstrated was due chiefly or exclusively to cross-pressures between value cleavages, and had little or nothing to do with one's social group membership. This certainly explains why some previous research found little or no evidence that cross-pressure would reduce political involvement. At the same time, this findings contradicts Knutsen and Scarbrough's (1995) account of what kind of divisions in the electorate are really consequential for party systems and electoral alignments, as well as uncountable previous works that stressed the importance of socio-structural cleavages at the expense of value cleavages.

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[7] To make a visual assessment easier, the $p \leq .05$ and the $.05 < p \leq .10$ significance levels were collapsed in table 7.

Conclusions

The present analysis confirms that cross-pressure reduces political involvement. As shown elsewhere, the negative relationship between the two also holds when the overall degree to which cleavages pull a citizen towards a particular party is controlled for (see Tóka 2003). This is rather remarkable, since it means that the impact of cross-pressure is not fully mediated by a reduction in the degree to which a respondent is pulled by the various cleavages towards a particular party. In other words, it is not merely the weaker commitment to a party, the smaller perceived stakes of electoral competition, or the smaller utility differential between parties that reduces political involvement. Rather, the experience of cross-pressure itself is enough to undermine political involvement – presumably because of the increase in decision-making costs that it produces.

The negative effect of cross-pressure on political involvement can be accounted for both in instrumental and expressive models of voting and may give an explanation for Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) freezing hypothesis. Thus, the concept of cross-pressure may be far more important for cleavage theory than this was recognized in the last twenty or thirty years, when this concept was out of vogue. Cross-pressured citizens must, by definition, have a diminished political utility differential regarding alternative governments and legislative majorities, increased costs of political decision-making, and reduced psychological benefits from supporting either party that they are pulled for. Hence, the cleavage structure underlying the established party system may shape through cross-pressures which groups of citizens become more and less involved with politics. Differential involvement, in turn, must shape the distribution of political influence in society, and increase the systemic inertia that helps sustaining the existing cleavage structure for some time after it loses some or all of its relevance for citizens at large.

An interesting caveat emerging from the present analysis is that probably not all forms of involvement and not in every country are equally influenced by the cross-pressures based on the cleavage structure underlying the existing party system. It seems well worth to further examine the possibility that those forms of political involvement that are not closely linked to partisanship and party mobilization may even be made more frequent, under some circumstances, by cross-pressure. The results presented in this

paper gave some hints that this may be the case.

Quite remarkably, most – and possibly all - reductive effects of cross-pressure on political involvement are due to value cleavages. When different aspects of one's social status (say class position and religion) pull a voter in different partisan directions, that situation does not have a comparably strong and consistent effect on political involvement than a similar conflict created by one's position with respect to different value cleavages. The implication seems to be that, in the case of a conflict with other motives of vote choice, the clues for vote choice provided by one's membership in social group are much easier to disregard than the pull created by one's values.

This finding about the importance of value voting – i.e. a very individualistic link to parties - fits neatly some findings in the previous literature, and generates puzzles for future research. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995: 392-415) showed that issue engagement - either in the form of strongly held opinions on, or personal stakes in the issue - increase participation in non-electoral contexts. The present finding about the power of cross-pressure between values to reduce involvement seems to make the reverse side of the same statement. Similarly, linkages created by value-based party choices were shown to be more powerful than "structural voting" – i.e. class, religious, etc. voting - in creating stable party preferences and reduce electoral volatility among citizens (Tóka 1998). Overall, then, it would seem that value cleavages have a greater power than socio-demographic cleavages to shape citizens' behavior, and through that cement politically mobilized cleavage structures and party systems.

Further research is needed to explore how these individual-level findings can be reconciled with Powell's (1980) aggregate-level finding about the enormous contribution of "structural voting" to electoral turnout. It also remains to be seen whether all this or some other effects of cross-pressure can promote or undermine the stability of democratic regimes. The present paper could not make much positive contribution regarding this last issue, but probably made some progress in highlighting questions that were not satisfactorily answered by previous research.

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Appendix 1: Data sets in the analysis
The analysis relies on the national data sets from the third wave of the World Values Study included in the first public release in February 2000 (see Inglehart *et al.* 2000). Separate subnational samples (from Russia, Spain, and Yugoslavia), as well as samples with an unweighted sample size below 800 (Ghana, Pakistan, Dominican Republic) were excluded from the analysis. Pilot study samples (in Georgia and Taiwan) were also excluded. Since this step reduced the sample size below 800 for Taiwan, that country was dropped from the analysis altogether. South Korea, Nigeria and China were excluded because of lack of party competition and/or valid responses to the party preference question (V210). Great Britain was excluded from the analysis because for some undocumented reason only a tiny fraction of the sample answered the party preference question, and hence cross-pressures could not be reliably estimated. Peru and Azerbaijan were dropped from the analysis because a very large majority of all respondents declared support for the same party (not a big surprise given how undemocratic these countries were at the time of fieldwork for WVS3), thus making any analyses of crosscutting largely meaningless. The combined number of cases included in the analysis in the 37 samples was 51713.

Appendix 2: Measuring cross-pressure
Traditional measures of cross-pressure involve identifying two characteristics, say membership in groups A and B, which are possessed by some but not all people included in the analysis, are not perfectly correlated with each other, and are expected to pull the respondents in different partisan directions. For instance, if most members of group A support party j and most members of group B support party k, then simultaneous membership in both groups is expected to cause cross-pressure.

Such dichotomous classifications of citizens into "cross-pressured" and the rest are obviously quite crude. Moreover, they do not really allow the summing of various sources of cross-pressure, since obviously not all cross-pressures are equally important for those concerned. The new measure used in this paper overcomes this problem by using a single assumption: namely that the probability that being member of both group A and B creates a personal experience of cross-pressure for respondent j is proportional to the difference between the distribution of party preferences observed in the two groups.

In the first step, the respondents' current party preference is modeled as an additive function of socio-demographic and attitudinal variables described in Appendix 3. Let x_1, x_2, … x_{35} denote the 35 demographic and attitude variables that are assumed to measure the respondents' positions on eleven potential cleavages. The eleven cleavages are, in my reading of the literature on parties, elections and voting behavior, likely to be relevant for vote choice and capable of forming relatively persistent divisions in the electorate across a large number of countries. At every possible point multiple indicators were used to capture the respondents' position on these potential cleavage lines, so that the number of countries that could be included in the various analyses was maximized despite the fact that some of the input variables are not available in all the 37 countries

covered.[8] For instance, the five value cleavages in the analysis were operationalized with the help of twelve attitude scales, and these scales were each based on numerous indicators themselves (see Appendix 3).

This first step in the measurement process is very much like a conventional analysis of what determines party choice in a particular country, and was carried out for each national sample separately. The parameter estimates derived from these analyses are not immediately relevant for the analysis, and are not reported in the paper. Note that the parameters in all these vote choice models were estimated with discriminant analysis.[9]

Every discriminant analysis produced as many new variables as parties distinguished on the voting intention variable used in the analysis. Each of these new variables show for a particular party j the estimated probability that any respondent i prefers party j given (1) given his or her value on a certain subset M of the x_1, x_2, … x_{35} variables, and (2) how the variables in the subset are related to party preference in the given country. The discriminant analyses assume that these relationships are linear, additive, and identical for every respondent i. The resulting estimated probabilities of preferring all individual parties j are between 0 to 1 for every respondent i, and collectively sum up to 1 for every individual.

Suppose now that the respondents' position on the first cleavage is captured through variables x_1 and x_2. The probability that this cleavage, in combination with some others that we wish to consider, puts respondent i under cross-pressure with respect to choosing (or not choosing) party j depends on two factors. One is the objective probability that the respondent will support party j given his or her value on variables x_1 and x_2. Let's denote this as $PROB_I(PARTY_J \mid M)$, where M denotes a certain subset M of the x_1, x_2, … x_{35} variables, in this case x_1 and x_2. The other factor is the objective probability that the respondent will support party j given his or her value on all the remaining determinants of party choice, which in the present case are x_3, x_4, … , x_{35}. Let's denote this probability as $PROB_I(PARTY_J \mid NOT\text{-}M)$, where $NOT\text{-}M$ denotes a subset of the x_1, x_2, … x_{35} variables excluding only the variables contained in the M subset.

Those respondents who have above-average value on both $PROB_I(PARTY_J \mid M_2)$ and $PROB_I(PARTY_J \mid NOT\text{-}M)$ are pulled towards party j by both variable sets M and $Not\text{-}M$, and hence are not cross-pressured – at least not with respect to this party and by this pair of factors. Similarly, those respondents who have below-average value on both probability scores are not cross-pressured by this pair of factors with respect to party j, since both variables x_1 and x_2 and variables x_3, x_4, … , x_{35} pull them away from party j. In either case, the more different the two probability scores are from the sample mean, the lesser the probability that the respondent will feel cross-pressured by this pair of factors regarding party j.

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[8] Of course, this creates some incomparability between the findings regarding individual countries. However, my analysis does not aim at comparing countries in terms, for instance, of the explanatory power of different cleavage lines or different models of vote choice. Instead, my analysis focuses on cross-pressure and from that perspective I can consider the various biases introduced by some variables missing in one country and some other variables in another as just another source of random measurement error that increases the imprecision of my estimates, but is highly unlikely to bias the overall direction of my findings.

[9] A size-proportional a priori probability was assumed for each party included in the analysis. Multinomial regression was tried first but it could not reliably estimate some of the models. All computations were carried out with SPSS 11.

Conversely, the only people cross-pressured in the given respect are those who have above-average value on one of the two probability scores, and below-average score on the other. In their case, the probability of a subjective experience of cross-pressure should increase with the difference between either of the two probability scores on the one hand, and the sample mean of this probability on the other.

Thus, one can calculate for any respondent i a simple indicator of the probability that variables x_1 and x_2 on the one hand, and variables x_3, x_4, … , x_{35} on the other will put him or her under cross-pressure with respect to party j. Let's call this variable $CROSS$-$PRESSURE_{IJM}$, where the index i stands for respondent i, index j for party j, and index M for a subset of variables among x_1, x_2, … , x_{35}. The indicator is a simple multiplication of the difference between $PROB_I(PARTY_J | M)$ and its sample mean on the one hand, and the difference between $PROB_I(PARTY_J | NOT$-$M)$ and its sample mean on the other. This product needs to be multiplied by minus one (-1) to assure that high – that is, highly probable - cross-pressure is assigned high, and low (i.e. very improbable) cross-pressure is assigned low values. This two-step multiplication procedure is then repeated ten more times to calculate the cross-pressures generated by each of the eleven cleavages considered regarding party j, and then the same set of measures need to be produced for all parties included in the analysis.

The final step in the development of a measure of cross-pressure is to sum up for each respondent i the values of all the $CROSS$-$PRESSURE_{IJM}$ variables over (1) each pair of the M and Not-M variable sets to be considered, and then (2) over all parties j. The result is $CROSS$-$PRESSURE_I$, i.e. the variable that actually entered the analysis reported in Tables 1 to 5. The summation over variable sets amounts to making the assumption that it really does not matter what politically relevant divisions create cross-pressures, the impact will be the same. This assumption is relaxed in a later part of the analysis (see Table 7), where three subcomponents of the total cross-pressure are distinguished (see more on this below).

The second summation, over the parties, makes the assumption that all parties j are in the feasible choice set of all respondents i. Less technically and more to the point, it makes the contestable claim that cross-pressure regarding any of these parties will equally influence the respondent's political attitudes and behavior, no matter how unacceptable that party is for them. I think this assumption is not testable here since the World Values Study has just a few and rather simple questions regarding political parties. Hence, there is absolutely no way to tell which of the existing parties are relevant for each individual respondent. But to show whether the contestable assumption biased my results I replicated all reported analyses with an alternative measure of *Cross-pressure*, which also sums cross-pressure over cleavages, but only takes into account the one party that is obviously in the feasible choice set of respondents i: namely the one they said they prefer. Of course, those respondents who reported no party preference had to be excluded from the analysis carried out with this alternative variable, yet the results regarding the relationship between the five forms of political involvement described in Appendix 4 and cross-pressure remained basically unchanged (cf. Tóka 2003).

The final part of the analysis reported in the paper relies on three separate cross-pressure variables, summing up cross-pressures between socio-demographic cleavages, cross-pressure between value cleavages, and cross-pressures between socio-demographic and value cleavages, respectively. These variables were created as described above

except for a straightforward difference in the interpretation of the *Not-M* subset of the cleavage variables. Thus, in calculating the cross-pressure generated by a value cleavage *M*, the *Not-M* subset only included the attitude scales that were not included in the *M* subset. Similarly, in calculating the cross-pressure generated by a socio-demographic cleavage *M*, the *Not-M* subset only included the socio-demographic variables that were not included in the *M* subset. Finally, in calculating the cross-pressures between socio-demographic positions on the one hand and value orientations on the other, the *M* subset included all the socio-demographic variables from the x_3 , x_4, … , x_{35} set, and the *Not-M* subset all the attitude scales.

Appendix 3: Variables in the discriminant analyses of party preference

Note: In the description below all variable names like v210 etc. follow the variable names appearing in the original dataset.

Dependent variable: based on V210 of Inglehart (2000), recording responses to the following question: "If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote?". Respondents without a party preference and supporters of parties who were named by less than 30 (unweighted) respondents were excluded from the discriminant analyses but the predicted probabilities of supporting each party were still calculated for them.

Independent variables entering the vote choice models: The 35 independent variables appearing in the vote choice models included six sets of socio-demographic characteristics measuring gender, age, rural vs. urban residence, social class, religion, and ethnicity, plus five sets of value orientations - measured with a total of twelve attitude scales -, each referring to a potential cleavage line that seems to exist in at least some countries. The 35 variables defined 11 models, each based on a subset *M* of cleavage variables as follows:

Gender model: variable *SEX*.

Age model: variables *AGE* and *AGE-SQUARED*.

Urban-rural model: variable *URBAN-RURAL*.

Class model: variables *TERTIARY EDUCATION, LOW EDUCATION, WHITE-COLLAR OCCUPATION, BLUE-COLLAR OCCUPATION, SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS* and *INCOME*.

Religion model: variables *CATHOLIC MINORITY, MUSLIM MINORITY* and *OTHER RELIGIOUS MINORITY*.

Ethnicity model: variables *IMMIGRANT, BLACK* and *LANGUAGE1* to *LANGUAGE9*.

Left-right model: variables *SUPPORT FOR CAPITALISM VS. SOCIALISM IN THE ECONOMIC DOMAIN* and *ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE POOR*.

Clerical vs. secular model: variables *SUPPORT FOR CONVENTIONAL FAMILY VALUES, MORAL PERMISSIVENESS* and *RELIGIOSITY*.

Regime cleavage model: variables *SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC VALUES* and *ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM*.

New left vs. new right model: variables *POST-MATERIALIST VALUES, ENVIRONMENTALISM* and *SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S LIBERATION*.

Nationalist vs. cosmopolitan model: variables *ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS* and *NATIONAL PRIDE*.

The construction of individual variables was as follows.

Sex: based on V214. Missing values were recoded as man.

Age and **age-squared:** based on V216 (but on V215 if V216 was not available). Missing values were replaced with the weighted national mean and the variable was standardized within the weighted national samples.

Urban-rural residence: respondent's place of living ranked on an urban-rural scale (V232). The scale appears to have a poorly documented country-specific coding. Missing values were replaced with the weighted national mean and the variable was standardized within the weighted national samples.

Tertiary education: based on V217, recoded as 1=completed university-level education, 0=all else. Note that the education variable is missing for South Africa and Japan, and appears to have a different coding in Croatia, Sweden, and Norway than what my variable recoding assumes on the basis of the available documentation.

Low education: based on V217, recoded as 1=maximum primary school, 0=all else. Note that the education variable is missing for South Africa and Japan, and appears to have a different coding in Croatia, Sweden, and Norway than what my variable recoding assumes on the basis of the available documentation.

White-**collar occupation**: based on V221 (present or last occupation of the chief wage-earner in the respondent's household). The variable was recoded as 1=employer, manager, professional, supervisory office worker or other non-manual, 0=all else.

Blue-collar occupation: based on V221 (present or last occupation of the chief wage-earner in the respondent's household). The variable was recoded as 1= foreman and supervisor, skilled manual worker, semi-skilled manual worker, unskilled manual worker, or agricultural worker, 0=all else.

Subjective social class: based on V226, which records responses to the following question: "People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: (1) upper class; (2) upper middle class; (3) lower middle class; (4) working class; or (5) lower class?" Missing values were replaced with the weighted national mean and the variable was standardized within the weighted national samples.

Income: the natural logarithm of V227, recording on a ten-point scale the responses to the following questions: "Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions." In Macedonia and Bulgaria income was apparently measured on a different (continuous) scale, but my variable construction could and did ignore this. Missing values were replaced with the weighted national mean and the variable was standardized within the weighted national samples.

Catholic minority: based on V179 (religious denomination), recoded as 1=Catholic (only where Catholics are a numerically significant minority), 0=all else. In countries where Catholics are a majority the variable was coded zero.

Muslim minority: based on V179 (religious denomination), recoded as 1=Muslim (only where Muslims are a numerically significant minority), 0=all else. In countries where Muslims are a majority the variable was coded zero.

Other religious minority: based on V179 (religious denomination), recoded as 1=other relevant minority (only where there is another numerically significant religious minority than Muslims or Catholics), 0=all else. Note that Protestants in Switzerland were also coded 1 on this variable.

Immigrant: based on V206, recording responses to the following questions: "Were you born in this country?" The variable was recoded as 1=born in another country, 0=all else.

Black: based on V234, recoded as 1=black (only in the United States), 0=all else.

Language1 to **Language9**: nine dichotomous variables based on V209 (language spoken at home). Within each national sample, all separately coded language groups were distinguished on a separate variable provided that at least 50 respondents chose that language as the one they speak at home.

Support for capitalism vs. socialism in the economic domain: an additive scale calculated as $zv125 - zv126 + zv127 - zv128 + zv140$, where the ZV_i variables are the standardized scores of the respective V_i variables. The question wording was as follows. "Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. V125. Incomes should be made more equal OR We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort. V126. Private ownership of business and industry should be increased OR Government ownership of business and industry should be increased. V127. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for OR People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. V128. Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas OR Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people." ""I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it (1) a great deal of confidence, (2) quite a lot of confidence, (3) not very much confidence or (4) none at all? […] V140. Labor unions." Missing values on the input variables were replaced with the weighted sample mean of the respective variables and the variables were standardized within the weighted national samples.

Attitudes towards the poor: an additive scale calculated as $zv172 + zv173 + zv174$, where the ZV_i variables are the standardized scores of the respective V_i variables. The question wording was as follows. "V172. Why, in your opinion, are there people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: Which comes closest to your view? (1) They are poor because of laziness and lack of will power; (2) They are poor because society treats them unfairly. V173. In your opinion, do most poor people in this country (1) have a chance of escaping from

poverty, or (2) there is very little chance of escaping? V174. Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is (2) about the right amount, (1) too much, or (3) too little?" Missing values on the input variables were replaced with the weighted sample mean of the respective variables and the variables were standardized within the weighted national samples.

Support for conventional family values: an additive scale calculated as $zv94 + zv95 - zv92 - zv93$, where the ZV_i variables are the standardized scores of the respective V_i variables. The question wording was as follows. "V92. If someone says a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily, would you tend (1) to agree or (2) disagree? V93. Do you think that a woman (1) has to have children in order to be fulfilled or (2) is this not necessary? V94. Do you (1) agree or (2) disagree with the following statement? (READ OUT): "Marriage is an outdated institution"? V95. If someone said that individuals should have the chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted, would you tend (1) to agree or (2) disagree?" Missing values on the input variables were replaced with the weighted sample mean of the respective variables and the variables were standardized within the weighted national samples.

Moral permissiveness: an additive scale calculated as $zv197 + zv198 + zv199 + zv200 + zv201$, where the ZV_i variables are the standardized scores of the respective V_i variables. The question wording was as follows. "Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. [READ OUT STATEMENTS. CODE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT ON A 1=NEVER JUSTIFIABLE … 10=ALWAYS JUSTIFIABLE SCALE.] […]V197. Homosexuality. V198. Prostitution. V199. Abortion. V200. Divorce. V201. Euthanasia - ending the life of the incurably sick." Missing values on the input variables were replaced with the weighted sample mean of the respective variables and the variables were standardized within the weighted national samples.

Religiosity: an additive scale calculated as $(zv135 + zv181 + zv182)*(-1)$, where the ZV_i variables are the standardized scores of the respective V_i variables. The question wording was as follows. "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it (1) a great deal of confidence, (2) quite a lot of confidence, (3) not very much confidence or (4) none at all? […] V135. Church(es)." "V181. Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? [CODING: (1) More than once a week, (2) once a week, (3) once a month, (4) only on special holidays, (5) once a year, (6) less often, (7) never practically never.] V182. Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are...(READ OUT) (1) … a religious person; (2) not a religious person; or (3) a convinced atheist?" Missing values on the input variables were replaced with the weighted sample mean of the respective variables and the variables were standardized within the weighted national samples.

Support for democratic values: the same additive scale as described under the same name above except that missing values on the input variables were replaced with

the weighted sample mean of the respective variables and the variables were standardized within the weighted national samples before they were summed up.

Attitudes towards the current political system: calculated as the difference between the standardized score of the difference between V151 and V152 ("People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad and 10 means very good. [...] V151. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it was A. in communist times. [IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS THAT HAVE UNDERGONE A REGIME CHANGE WITHIN THE EXPERIENCE OF A MAJORITY OF RESPONDENTS: E.G. MENTION THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN CENTRAL/EASTERN EUROPE; THE FRANCO REGIME IN SPAIN; THE MILITARY REGIME IN CHILE]; B. IN COUNTRIES WHERE THERE HAS BEEN NO REGIME CHANGE IN RECENT TIMES, ASK: ten years ago? V152. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?") on the one hand, and the sum of the standardized version of V124 ("On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. (1) The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action. (2) Our society must be gradually improved by reforms. (3) Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.") and V152 (see above) on the other. Missing values on all input variables were replaced with the weighted sample mean of the respective variables and the variables were standardized within the weighted national samples before they were summed up.

Post-materialist values: this scale sums up the number of "postmaterialist" values ranked first and second on V104, V105, V106 and V107, minus the number of "materialist" values ranked first and second on them. The question wording was: "V104. People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? [RESPONSE OPTIONS:] (1) A high level of economic growth; (2) making sure this country has strong defence forces; (3) seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities; or (4) trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful? V105. And which would be the next most important?" "V106. If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? (1) maintaining order in the nation; (2) giving people more say in important government decisions; (3) fighting rising prices; or (4) protecting freedom of speech V107. And which would be the next most important?" Missing values on all input variables were replaced with the weighted sample mean of the respective variables and the variables were standardized within the weighted national samples before they were summed up.

Environmentalism: an additive scale calculated as $zv38 + zv39 - zv41 + zv147$, where the ZV_i variables are the standardized scores of the respective V_i variables. The question wording was as follows. "I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one I read out, can you tell me whether you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) disagree or (4) disagree strongly? (READ OUT

EACH STATEMENT AND CODE AN ANSWER FOR EACH) V38. I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental damage. V39 I would buy things at 20% higher than usual prices if it would help protect the environment." "V41. Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? (1) Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs, OR (2) Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent." "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it (1) a great deal of confidence, (2) quite a lot of confidence, (3) not very much confidence or (4) none at all? […] V147. The Green/Ecology movement." Missing values on the input variables were replaced with the weighted sample mean of the respective variables and the variables were standardized within the weighted national samples.

Support for women's liberation: an additive scale calculated as zv99 - zv98 - zv100 + zv101 + zv102 + zv103 - zv148, where the ZV_i variables are the standardized scores of the respective V_i variables. The question wording was as follows. "V98. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. V99. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay. V100. Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income. V101. On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do. V102. If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems. V103. A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl." "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it (1) a great deal of confidence, (2) quite a lot of confidence, (3) not very much confidence or (4) none at all? […] V148. The Women's movement." Missing values on the input variables were replaced with the weighted sample mean of the respective variables and the variables were standardized within the weighted national samples.

Attitudes towards the free movement of people and goods: calculated as minus one times the sum of the standardized scores of variables V133, V134 and V149. The question wording was as follows. [V133:] "Do you think it is better if: (1) goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to buy them; or that: (2) there should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this country?" [V134:] "How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do? (1) Let anyone come who wants to; (2) let people come as long as there are jobs available; or (3) place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here; or (4) prohibit people coming here from other countries?" [V149] "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it (1) a great deal of confidence, (2) quite a lot of confidence, (3) not very much confidence or (4) none at all? [V149] [IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES:] The European Union [in North America:] NAFTA [ELSEWHERE: the most important regional

organization]." Missing values on all input variables were replaced with the
weighted sample mean of the respective variables.

National pride: based on V205, recording responses to the following question: "How
proud are you to be [NAME OF TITULAR NATIONALITY]: (1) very proud; (2)
quite proud; (3) not very proud; or (4) not at all proud. (5) [IF VOLUNTEERED]:
not a member of titular nation." Missing values were replaced with the weighted
sample mean and the variable was standardized within the weighted national
samples.

Appendix 4: Dependent variables in the analyses reported in the tables

Political interest: based on V117: "How interested would you say you are in politics?"
The variable was dichotomized so that 1="very interested" or "somewhat
interested", and 0=all else.

Political discussion: based on V37: "When you get together with your friends, would
you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?" The
variable was dichotomized so that 1="frequently", and 0=all else.

Party membership: based on V32: "Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary
organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member,
an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization? […] A political
party". The variable was dichotomized so that 1="member", and 0=all else.

Petitioning: based on V118: "Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out
some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to
tell me, for each one, whether (1) you have actually done any of these things,
whether (2) you might do it or (3) would never, under any circumstances, do it.
[…] V118. Signing a petition." The variable was dichotomized so that 1="have
done", and 0=all else.

Demonstration: based on V120: "Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read
out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you
to tell me, for each one, whether (1) you have actually done any of these things,
whether (2) you might do it or (3) would never, under any circumstances, do it.
[…] V120. Attending lawful demonstrations." The variable was dichotomized so
that 1="have done", and 0=all else.

Table 1: The direction and statistical significance of the impact of cross-pressure on political interest in 37 national samples

Significance level (two-tailed)	Negative effect	Positive effect
$p \leq .05$	18	1
$.05 < p \leq .10$	5	1
$.10 < p \leq .20$	0	0
$.20 < p \leq .30$	1	0
$.30 < p \leq .40$	2	1
$.40 < p \leq .50$	4	0
$.50 < p \leq .60$	2	0
$.60 < p \leq .70$	0	1
$.70 < p \leq .80$	1	0
$.80 < p \leq .90$	0	0
$.90 < p$	0	0
Subtotal:	33	4

Note: the table entries show the number of samples where the estimated effect of cross-pressure had the significance level and direction in question. Parameters were estimated with logistic regression coefficients, by regressing the *POLITICAL INTEREST* variable on *CROSS-PRESSURE* and the 35 cleavage variables that were used to estimate cross-pressure on vote choice. On variable construction see the Appendix.

Table 2: The direction and statistical significance of the impact of cross-pressure on political discussion in 37 national samples

Significance level (two-tailed)	Negative effect	Positive effect
$p \leq .05$	13	1
$.05 < p \leq .10$	6	0
$.10 < p \leq .20$	9	3
$.20 < p \leq .30$	1	1
$.30 < p \leq .40$	1	1
$.40 < p \leq .50$	0	0
$.50 < p \leq .60$	0	1
$.60 < p \leq .70$	2	1
$.70 < p \leq .80$	1	1
$.80 < p \leq .90$	1	0
$.90 < p$	1	0
Subtotal:	28	9

Note: the table entries show the number of samples where the estimated effect of cross-pressure had the significance level and direction in question. Parameters were estimated with logistic regression coefficients, by regressing the *POLITICAL DISCUSSION* variable on *CROSS-PRESSURE* and the 35 cleavage variables that were used to estimate cross-pressure on vote choice. On variable construction see the Appendix.

Table 3: The direction and statistical significance of the impact of cross-pressure on party membership in 37 national samples

Significance level (two-tailed)	Negative effect	Positive effect
$p \square .05$	13	0
$.05 < p \square .10$	0	1
$.10 < p \square .20$	2	1
$.20 < p \square .30$	3	0
$.30 < p \square .40$	0	1
$.40 < p \square .50$	2	2
$.50 < p \square .60$	1	0
$.60 < p \square .70$	4	0
$.70 < p \square .80$	2	0
$.80 < p \square .90$	0	1
$.90 < p$	4	0
Subtotal:	31	6

Note: the table entries show the number of samples where the estimated effect of cross-pressure had the significance level and direction in question. Parameters were estimated with logistic regression coefficients, by regressing the *PARTY MEMBERSHIP* variable on *CROSS-PRESSURE* and the 35 cleavage variables that were used to estimate cross-pressure on vote choice. On variable construction see the Appendix.

Table 4: The direction and statistical significance of the impact of cross-pressure on petitioning in 37 national samples

Significance level (two-tailed)	Negative effect	Positive effect
$p \square .05$	6	2
$.05 < p \square .10$	4	1
$.10 < p \square .20$	4	1
$.20 < p \square .30$	2	1
$.30 < p \square .40$	3	1
$.40 < p \square .50$	0	1
$.50 < p \square .60$	3	1
$.60 < p \square .70$	3	1
$.70 < p \square .80$	1	0
$.80 < p \square .90$	0	1
$.90 < p$	1	0
Subtotal:	27	10

Note: the table entries show the number of samples where the estimated effect of cross-pressure had the significance level and direction in question. Parameters were estimated with logistic regression coefficients, by regressing the *PETITIONING* variable on *CROSS-PRESSURE* and the 35 cleavage variables that were used to estimate cross-pressure on vote choice. On variable construction see the Appendix.

Table 5: The direction and statistical significance of the impact of cross-pressure on participation at demonstrations in 37 national samples

Significance level (two-tailed)	Negative effect	Positive effect
$p \leq .05$	10	2
$.05 < p \leq .10$	3	2
$.10 < p \leq .20$	2	0
$.20 < p \leq .30$	0	2
$.30 < p \leq .40$	2	1
$.40 < p \leq .50$	3	1
$.50 < p \leq .60$	1	0
$.60 < p \leq .70$	3	0
$.70 < p \leq .80$	2	1
$.80 < p \leq .90$	0	1
$.90 < p$	0	1
Total:	26	11

Note: the table entries show the number of samples where the estimated effect of cross-pressure had the significance level and direction in question. Parameters were estimated with logistic regression coefficients, by regressing the *DEMONSTRATION* variable on *CROSS-PRESSURE* and the 35 cleavage variables that were used to estimate cross-pressure on vote choice. On variable construction see the Appendix.

Table 6: The influence of country characteristics and sample size on the impact of cross-pressure on five forms of political involvement across 37 samples

	Dependent variable: Effect of cross-pressure on				
	Political interest	Political discussion	Party membership	Petition-ing	Demon-strations
SAMPLE SIZE:	-.359**	-.122	-.260*	.140	.055
Standard deviation of					
CROSS-PRESSURE:	-.288*	-.335**	-.174	-.006	-.208
NEW CLEAVAGES:	.454**	.423**	.558**	.068	-.012
Adjusted R^2:	.235	.142	.245	-.027	-.040

Notes: the table shows standardized beta coefficients derived from five linear regression analyses with N=37 in each. Effects significant at the $p \leq .05$ level are marked with **; effects significant at the $p \leq .10$ level are marked with *; constants are not shown. The dependent variables in the equations were the estimated effect of cross-pressure (i.e. the B regression coefficient divided by its standard error) on the five measures of political involvement. The independent variables were three country-characteristics: sample size (ranging from 984 to 2935), the standard deviation of the *CROSS-PRESSURE* variable; and a categorical variable called *NEW CLEAVAGES*. On the latter variable Australia, Finland, India, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Puerto Rico, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, the USA, Venezuela, and West Germany were coded 1; Argentina, Chile, the Philippines, Spain, and Turkey were coded 2; and the remaining countries 3.

Table 7: The direction and statistical significance of the impact of cross-pressures between socio-demographic positions, between values, and between values and socio-demographic positions on five different forms of political involvement in 37 national samples

Cross-pressures between:	Socio-demographic positions		Values		Values and socio-demographic pos.	
Direction of effect:	-	+	-	+	-	+
Significance level (two-tailed)						
$p \leq .10$	13	18	65	5	9	15
$.10 < p \leq .20$	12	11	17	3	6	18
$.20 < p \leq .30$	5	9	11	6	7	14
$.30 < p \leq .40$	6	15	4	6	11	17
$.40 < p \leq .50$	10	11	16	2	9	6
$.50 < p \leq .60$	7	8	6	6	4	9
$.60 < p \leq .70$	7	6	9	3	5	9
$.70 < p \leq .80$	9	10	8	7	6	8
$.80 < p \leq .90$	9	10	3	5	8	10
$.90 < p$	6	3	2	1	9	5
Subtotal:	84	101	141	44	74	111

Note: the table entries show the number of samples where the estimated effect of cross-pressure had the significance level and direction in question. Parameters were estimated with logistic regression coefficients, by regressing the *POLITICAL INTEREST* etc. variables on three components of cross-pressure and the 35 cleavage variables that were used to estimate cross-pressure on vote choice. On variable construction see the Appendix.