

Parties and Electoral Choices in East Central Europe

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## Acronyms used in the paper

### Poland

KPN: Confederation for Independent Poland

PSL: Polish People's Party (peasant party)

SdRP: Social Democratic Party of Poland (SLD when in coalition with the OPZZ trade union federation)

PL: People's Agreement (Post-Solidarity peasant party)

NSZZ "S": Solidarnosc trade union

ZChN: Christian-National Union

UD: Democratic Union

PC: Centre Agreement

RdR: Movement for the Republic

KLD: Liberal-Democratic Congress

URP: Union of Realpolitics

### Czech Republic

KSCM: Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (LB if in coalition with some other left wing groups)

CSSD: Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party

LSU: Liberal Social Union (permanent coalition of the Agrarian Party, the Socialist Party, and the Green Party)

HSD-SMS : Movement for Moravia and Silesia, etc.

SPR-RSC : Republican Party, etc.

OH: Civic Movement

CSL : Czech People's Party (KDU-CSL if in coalition with the Christian Democratic Union)

ODA : Civic Democratic Alliance

ODS: Civic Democratic Party

### Slovakia

SDL: Party of the Democratic Left

SSDS: Slovak Social Democratic Party

HZDS: Movement for a Democratic Slovakia

SNS: Slovak National Party

KDH: Christian Democratic Movement

MKM-EG-M: coalition of Hungarian Christian-oriented parties

DS: Democratic Party

SKD: Conservative Democratic Party (previously ODU, ex-VPN)

### Hungary

KDNP: Christian Democratic People's Party

MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party

MDF: Hungarian Democratic Forum

FKGP: Independent Small Holders Party

SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats

FIDESZ: Federation of Young Democrats



### **The problem**

Linking the characteristics of party systems to democratic legitimacy has a considerable tradition in the political science literature, therefore it suffices here to make only a vague reference to that component of the argument which is relevant for assessing the data presented in this paper. Since 1. representative democracies claim legitimacy partly on the ground of adequately transforming popular preferences into changes (and persistence) in government composition and public policies; and 2. the main democratic channels of political representation are the political parties; it may become a serious delegitimizing factor if the party system fails to provide either meaningful, relatively attractive and electable alternatives, or a sufficient degree of government stability (the latter being a prerequisite to establish a visible link between voters' decisions and policy outcomes). This state of affairs is believed to lead some citizens either to vote for extremist parties - cf. Kaltefleiter (1980) about the supposed effect of the CDU/CSU-SPD grand coalition on the upsurge of neo-Nazi vote in the late sixties in the Federal Republic - or to turn their back on institutionalized democratic processes altogether: see e.g. Kolosi et al. (1992) on the causes of the low turnout in the 1990 Hungarian, and *ceteris paribus* in the 1990 and 1991 Polish elections. Though these propositions sound undeniably plausible, they are yet to be supported by more systematic investigations before they can be taken on face value. If, for example, the supposed lack of an effective left wing alternative led to low turnout in Hungary and Poland, then why this factor failed to have the same effect in Czechoslovakia (or for that matter, in Ireland)? Are there some seemingly non-left parties which provide a functional equivalent of social democrats over there? If yes, how can we be sure that the same functional equivalents were absent in Poland and Hungary?

Nevertheless, the prospects seem to be bright at least for the hypothesis about the delegitimizing potential of the voters' deprivation from the opportunity to vote a party out of office. Throughout the seventies and eighties, Italians were reported to be more dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy than the citizens of any other EC-country (Fuchs-Guidorossi-Svensson, forthcoming); by 1991, at least, the Japanese rate of satisfaction with the political system was equally inferior to comparable figures from other Western democracies as the alarmingly low Italian levels (see data reported in Alwin, 1992). Also some Swiss findings give support to the mentioned hypothesis (see Glass, 1978). Finally, Weil's cross-national analysis of time-series data from the larger Western countries seems to confirm that mass support for the democratic regime has much less to do with changes in macroeconomic conditions than with the capacity of the party system to "present voters with clear alternatives, each capable of rotating into office, and none likely to destroy democracy. And governing coalitions should be stable and reflect voters' choices as directly as possible" (Weil, 1989: 684). Thus, though the evidence is still somewhat scattered, and one is always free to believe that controlling for this or that factor would falsify the proposition in question, it seems justified to assume that different patterns of party competition may affect the quality and popular acceptance of the democratic regime.

To be sure, the party system may be just a residual factor in the equation. Though Weil suggests that changes in "satisfaction with the democracy" and other measures of diffuse system support are unrelated to changes in macroeconomic conditions (i.e. unemployment

and inflation rate, changes in real incomes), Lockerbie (1993) has shown that citizens' evaluations of economic conditions have a pervasive effect on satisfaction with democracy in the EC-countries - at least when one analyze only cross-sectional data. As far as the four east central european countries are concerned, by Fall 1992 Slovaks and especially Czechs seemed to be happier with their political system than Poles and Hungarians, but even the first two were tremendously more dissatisfied than the citizens of any EC-country - save Italy - used to be throughout the seventies and the eighties (see table 1).

Table 1 about here

Differences in economic conditions are apparently unable to explain these findings perfectly: note, for instance, that Italian economic conditions are incomparably better, and Slovak living standards arguably lower than those in Poland or Hungary, and this fact is not echoed by the rates of political satisfaction observed in these countries. An analysis of the currently available east european data (Tóka, forthcoming) suggests that differences in generalized regime support between individuals, countries, and various points in time are virtually unrelated to differences in macroeconomic conditions. All three, however, show a fairly strong correlation with differences in the popular evaluation of economic conditions and prospects. But even this relationship is far from deterministic: some of the variation appear to be linked to political factors. Moreover, who would deny that popular evaluation of the macroeconomic prospects may already be related to the perceived competence and commitment of the incumbents to improve economic conditions? At any rate, table 2 witness that across East Central Europe, between country differences in popular satisfaction with the electoral process fit almost as well the pattern observed in the case of generalized regime support as the cross-national variations of economic evaluations do. Of course, one can imagine every sorts of causal ordering of these three variables<sup>1</sup>, and finding the empirically most tenable one would require densely populated time-series data covering all three factors (and we have no such data, neither I am aware of any analysis of west european trends which would have included each into its equations).

Table 2 about here

Thus, in the followings it is taken for granted solely on the ground of relatively plausible arguments that the growth of democratic legitimacy in Eastern Europe is partly a function of whether the party system provides a meaningful choice between the incumbents and at least one electable alternative. Furthermore, I assume that all this means the following relatively simple requirements;

- 1: government and opposition parties should be identifiable as such;
- 2: the electors must perceive some policy differences between them;
- 3: the parties must be willing and able to implement the policies associated with them by the voters;
- 4: large sections of the electorate must not be deprived from the gratifying feeling that ...
  - 4.A: there is at least one party which represents them adequately and that party is electable within the given international and domestic environment. An electable party is

defined here by being pro-system and sufficiently endowed with the virtues of statesmanship and competence;

4.B: those parties to which they would prefer any other alternative have no reasonable chance to become the major government party.

The operationalization of these criteria is, of course, dependent not only on the chosen theoretical focus, but also on the nature of the available data. The details are saved for the discussion of the analysis. I reckon that conditions 1 to 4.B are never fully satisfied in the real world: rather, they denote the endpoint of a scale along which we can legitimately rate the existing democracies. Between the two fictitious endpoints I leave a big deal of uncertainty for I cannot propose anything about how these above criteria should be weighted in order to arrive at a sensible combined scale of the "meaningfulness of electoral choice". Finally, note that the relevance of these criteria for the evaluation of east european party systems can be justified even if they would happen to have no effect on legitimacy at all. For they denote conditions which can be valued on their own right; thus, they can help us to distinguish between more and less likeable party systems.

In the followings, I try to assess the performance of the four east central european countries in regards to criteria 1 and 2. Criteria 4.A will be dealt with in a rudimentary form at the beginning. Though a party system's and an electorate's capacity to prevent the parties advocating mutually exclusive or otherwise untenable goals from winning substantial electoral support should, I think, be a key concern in evaluating various patterns of electoral competition, I cannot assess the performance of the four party system concerning criteria 3. To do this seriously, one would need some comparative data about what the parties pledged to do, how the electorate reacted to this message, and what the party actually did when it came into office. Since none of these data is at my disposal, I can hardly contribute anything to the discussion of what, according to my hunch, is probably the more crucial determinant of popular support for representative democracy.

### **Are the east central european parties likeable at all?**

The question posed in the subtitle goes into the heart of the criteria 4.A, but it is impossible to answer without saying something about the "relative to what" problem. What we can consider is as follows.

Political parties are the principal actors in parliamentary democracies anyway. One reason suggested by some opinion polls for the legitimacy problems of the new democracies was exactly the contradiction between this objective characteristic of the political system on the one hand, and the new political parties supposedly limited capacity to make themselves recognized by the public as the most important channel for articulating the public's political interests and views (see e.g. Agh, 1993 on the contradiction between the "overparticipation" of the east european democracies and the supposedly weak performance of the new parties in interest articulation and aggregation). It was also often suggested that certain other interest organizations could be more readily recognized by large parts of the public as their effective political representative, and therefore a strong reliance on corporatist decision

making processes might increase popular support for the new regimes. One assumption of this argument is clearly contradicted by the data presented on table 3.

Table 3 about here

The respondents in the CEU (1992) surveys were asked to rate various organizations (including the eight (in Hungary, six) most important parties operating in their country) on a seven point scale according to "how well they represent their views and interests". It seems to be true at first sight, that East Central Europeans tend to rate "political parties" (in plural) rather unfavourably. The average score of all parties was surprisingly similar (around 4.5, that is, unfavourable rather than neutral) in all four countries, and almost all non-party organizations were rated more favourably than that everywhere except in Hungary. This, however, is not a legitim comparison in my view. What a well functioning representative democracy presumes is certainly not that citizens trust every single party, but rather that almost everybody finds at least one which he/she recognizes as a good representative of his/her interests and views. Therefore it is more important to look at the best rating each individual gave to any one of the main parties. By September 1992, the country means of this indicator were considerably more favourable in both parts of Czechoslovakia than in Poland and Hungary, but they were around 2 in all four nations: a quite favourable rating both in absolute terms (indicating that the average citizen found at least one party which almost always "expressed his views and interests well") and relative to the rating given to non-party organizations.

Indeed, in all four countries it was only a small minority (between 10 and 26 percent) of the respondents who gave a more favourable rating to any of the non-party organizations than to their most preferred party (see table 3 for details). Even this minority is provided mostly by the sympathizers of the hardly institutionalized environmentalist groups (on strikingly similar German results with, in fact, a bit less favourable rating of political parties, see Wessels, 1991). Thus, the overwhelming majority of citizens tends to find his/her best political representative in a political party, rather than in other organizations. On this score the east central european parties seem to live up to their privileged role in the political system. If there is a deep problem with political representation in East Central Europe, then it must have at least as much to do with the interest organizations as with the political parties. Corporatist arrangements may be good for a number of things, but the evidence on their capacity to make East Central Europeans feel better represented seems missing. Though Polish parties may do a little less well than others, the cross-national differences are negligible on this score once we discount the debatable case of environmentalist groups.

### **The identifiability of government and opposition: qualified support for majoritarian governments?**

After what was said above, the reader should feel free to think that the majority of Poles, Czeches, Slovaks, and Hungarians express just a lukewarm, but volatile attitude towards some new, but hardly known objects. My account on this score starts with the very basics. For party attachments to have any political meaning, we must surely expect the voters to be

aware of whether they will contribute to the survival or to the downfall of a government, if they vote for party A instead of party B.

Our respondents were asked to name the government and opposition parties of their country. In the lack of time-series data and comparable figures from other multiparty systems, I cannot offer truly satisfactory explanations of the findings. Rather, the point to be emphasized is threefold. Frequent changes in the government and high fragmentation may indeed undermine the very basis of governments' electoral accountability. But one can make an intuitively convincing case for the considerable effect of party policies on the sheer identifiability of the incumbents. This, in turn, may have some noteworthy implications about the merits and vices of majoritarian systems. Finally, the capacity of the political system to inform the voters about the most trivial facts of politics, and the voters' ability to absorb this information are quite arguably related to the extent to which social inequalities prevail in political participation in East Central Europe.

Table 4 shows the percentages of Poles, Czeches, etc. who mentioned the parties in question as a government or as an opposition party. Insignificant parties and parties without parliamentary representation are not shown. For various reasons three of the remaining parliamentary parties (the parliamentary club of the Polish NSZZ "Solidarnosc" trade union, the postcommunist Slovak SDL, and the Hungarian FKGP) cannot be unambiguously classified in terms of government and opposition and therefore I will ignore them this time.

Table 4 about here

The first thing which strikes the eye is how few Poles identified ZChN and UD as government parties. The relative novelty of the government cannot explain this finding. The Suchocka-government was exactly as old at the time of this survey as the Czech Klaus- and the Slovak Meciar-government. I also doubt that the sheer number of Polish parties would be responsible for this finding. How could this factor explain that SNS, a party which has had exactly as minimal share of portfolios in the Meciar-government as PL had in the Suchocka-government, is recognized as a government party by a larger proportion of Slovaks than as many Poles do so with their natural party of government (i.e. Democratic Union)?

But since minor government parties (i.e. PL or KLD in Poland, ODA and KDU-CSL in Bohemia, SNS in Slovakia, and KDNP in Hungary) are certainly less often identified as government parties than the major coalition partners, it still makes sense to argue that the peculiarity of the Polish case is due to another aspect of high party fragmentation. For in the 1991-93 Sejm it was indeed impossible to create any government in which the major partner would have been promptly identifiable, since no party gained more than 14 percent of the mandates and seven got from 7.5 to 12.3 percent of the votes. Furthermore, with minority governments becoming the normal practice, no party could make such a big imprint on public policies in Poland as ODS and HZDS had in the last days of Czechoslovakia.

That it is indeed voters' ability to realize the potential or real impact of a particular party on policies which gives us the clue to understand the figures displayed on the table is

supported by several facts. The Slovak SNS, despite being a minor party, saw its policy on the greatest issue of Slovak politics (the future of Czechoslovakia) eventually adopted and implemented by the major government party: hence Slovaks marked propensity to discover its presence in government. In Poland, the proportion naming UD as government party went down from 55 percent in early October 1992 to 49 percent in late January 1993, whereas the proportion naming ZChN as a government party increased with four percent at the same time. My explanation is *ad hoc*, but overwhelmingly plausible, I think. In August and September, the main issue was the Suchocka government's handling of some large strikes, and commentators agreed that the tough policy of the government reflected Democratic Union's commitment to balancing the budget, and not the ZChN views. Then in early January came the new abortion law which was arguably ZChN's major policy success and UD's loss of face.

Additional evidence is provided by Hungary. In numerical terms, this country tends to have a less fragmented party system and a much older configuration of government and opposition than the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Neither I am aware of any marked difference between the three countries which would suggest that majoritarian as against consensual drives are less prevalent in the Hungarian institutional arrangements and policy style than in those of the former Czechoslovakia. Still, significantly less Hungarians recognized MDF as a government party than as many Slovaks and Czeches did this with HZDS and ODS. Furthermore, Czeches and Slovaks were more likely than Hungarians to identify correctly the main opposition parties - Left Block (i.e. KSCM), KDH, and SZDSZ, respectively. This result has an easy explanation in a fact demonstrated later in this paper, namely that Czeches and Slovaks see more marked and consistent ideological differences between government and opposition parties than Hungarians do. Thus, the moral of the Hungarian data can be summarized as follows: a majoritarian drive in policy-making does not automatically deliver results concerning the greater electoral accountability of government. If clearly defined policy differences between government and opposition are in dearth, the government parties may remain unaccountable also for their overall performance, since many voters will not be aware who the incumbents are.

Therefore it appears that a majoritarian style of policy making may have payoffs to offer for the voters: as I will argue in a second, particularly for lower class voters. This gain may probably be realized without being inevitably forced to put up with a high degree of ideological polarization<sup>2</sup>: parties simply need to be distinctive. The sort of data discussed above surely cannot tell us to what extent Poland enjoyed the benefits of consensual policy-making in 1992-93 and to what extent she was ruled by unaccountable civil servants. But it does suggest that in addition to making an end to a constitutional deadlock, Slovakia and Bohemia surely enjoyed a supposed advantage of majoritarian democracy: whoever planned to vote for or against the government (had there been an election there at that time) certainly knew which parties and to what extent were to be praised or blamed for the government's record.

This was less so in Hungary and much less so in Poland. Note that the percentages of respondents correctly identifying the main government party in each of the four country

show a remarkable similarity to what we know about differences between the four countries in terms of electoral turnout in general elections. To check whether we can possibly speak about a causal relationship here, some regression analyses were carried (data not shown). The dependent variable was intention to vote if there was a general election next weekend (responses coded on a four point scale ranging from "surely wouldn't" to "surely would go out to vote"). The predictor variables were respondents' self-reported interest in politics; his/her ability to identify the government parties (which was measured by subtracting the number of incorrect from the number of correct answers given by the respondent on the question about the partisan composition of government); and social status (a composite index which summed up the information about respondents' education and occupation). With the exception of Poland social status had no direct effect on the intention to vote once political interest and knowledge about government parties were controlled for: the significant correlation between voting intention and status (which we can observe in each country) was mostly or entirely the result of the latter's effect on interest and knowledge. The fact that the status-participation correlation was substantially stronger in Hungary and Poland than in Slovakia and the Czech Republic found its explanation partly in the weakness of the correlation between status and knowledge in the last two countries.

Cross-sectional survey data alone will never be able to tell us whether these cross-national differences have something to do with the whole political system's capacity to let the voters know which one is the main government party. But this brief analysis suggests that probably not only the differential dissemination of this basic information, but also the differences in electoral turnout and the degree of social inequalities prevailing in political participation and knowledge are influenced by the government's electoral accountability. As long as the "one man - one vote" principle is to be upheld, this proposition gives a credit to the party systems of the former Czechoslovakia and a relatively bad score to the Hungarian and particularly to the Polish patterns of party competition.

### **Social cleavages and electoral alignments**

The widespread view is that "... in Poland and Czechoslovakia ... the new parties are just emerging from the unspecified opposition movements. The analysis of the Hungarian party system may offer a short explanation for the genetic defects of the democracy in Poland and Czechoslovakia as well. The common weaknesses of parties are the missing links to the social actors, i.e. [they stem] from the lack of dialogue between the social and political actors which would be the case in a developed liberal constitutional state ... The parties are still 'hovering' over the social and economic realities, they are not yet articulated according to relevant programmes and value systems, which is the major reason for the missing party identities and party identifications" (Agh, 1993: 242-243). Moreover, there are at least three rather deterministic arguments around which suggest that the new east european democracies cannot help providing a less meaningful electoral choice than consolidated democracies do, and the parties of the region are mere puppets of forces beyond their control. The first argument says that because of the burden of debt service, the dependence on foreign trade, and the disastrous legacy of state-socialism, the economic policy options of east european governments are extremely limited: on matters of economic policy,

responsible parties cannot offer a real choice. Let me just briefly indicate why I find this argument not entirely convincing. A high foreign debt not only rules out certain policy options, but also creates real dilemmas: e.g. it does make a difference whether a government party intends to be a good debtor or ask for a moratorium. Dependence on foreign trade is simply not a regional but a small country phenomena: it is extremely difficult to tell whether, for instance, the Dutch or the Polish government is more constrained in its policies by world recession, changes in foreign exchange rates, and the like. Finally, though I myself do believe that the legacy of state-socialism makes the economic policy options of east european governments skewed in one direction (and in this sense no "left wing alternative" is viable), I know of no evidence which would suggest that mine is a majority opinion in East Europe. Therefore, I see no insurmountable obstacle for political parties to try proving the opposite (cf. the evidence presented later in this paper about the fairly crystallized left wing ideological profile of Slovak government parties). Even more importantly, the whole argument about the legacy of communism can be turned upside down. One can easily argue that because of the depth of the economic crisis and the vast concentration of economic power in the hands of the state, a one percentage point change in the government parties' location on a left-right scale makes tremendously more difference in Eastern Europe than in the consolidated market economies.

The second deterministic argument says that even if some parties have fairly distinctive and comprehensive political profile, the voters of the new democracies are doomed to remain largely unaware of that for quite a long time. Firstly, learning takes a long time (i.e. in this case much more than just a couple of months or years; for some evidence apparently supporting this point in regards to Germany see Klingemann and Wattenberg, 1992). Secondly, since at least at the very beginning of postcommunist transition most voters certainly lack any habitual party attachment, the electoral market is extremely competitive and volatility is high (Mair, 1991). Therefore, the incentives to create more and more new parties abound (Kopecky, 1993), and by being expected to learn a little bit about a vast number of new parties, voters may remain fairly ignorant about each.

Furthermore, the third argument adds that even the existing differences between the individual parties are likely to be obscure. Given the relatively unstructured character of post-communist societies and the weak development of the civil sphere, the process of interest articulation is anything but smooth, and hence parties are doomed to be relatively ineffective in interest aggregation (Waller, 1991).

I have only two objections against the last two arguments. Firstly, they tend to divert our attention away from the more crucial issue, namely whether and how parties can make a difference. Secondly, these theories do not fare dramatically well with the available empirical evidence.

Let me start demonstrating this second point by an intuitively appealing method of measuring whether parties provide a meaningful choice: namely by looking at the social composition of their constituencies. Unfortunately, mass surveys alone cannot provide the judgement whether a very close or increasing correlation between social background and

party choice is an indicator of democracy's health or - as Lipset (1963) insists - of the preponderance of sectionalist appeals, extreme polarization, and a crisis of democracy. But the kind of systematic data from which we know that the US Republicans keep on nominating Black candidates, whereas the Bolsheviks did not try to attract *khulak* voters in the 1918 elections to the Constituent Assembly is absent in the case of the new east european parties. This leaves four questions to be answered:

- 1: Do the differences in the social basis (however little these differences may be) of the various parties correspond in some meaningful way to the common places we know about the profile of these parties?
2. How strong the correlations between social background and party preferences are?
- 3: Do these correlations get stronger as the party systems become more mature?
- 4: To what extent are these correlations due to the presence of a few unambiguously sectional parties?

Table 5.A to 5.D shows the evidence on the first, and table 7.A to 7.E on the second and third question. Question four is answered only in the text. The short answers are, respectively, "yes", "just about as strong as in the Western democracies", "they are stable or decreasing over time", and "not exclusively".

Table 5.A to 5.D about here

There are few surprises in the details. In the two CEU surveys, only one of the MKM-E-M supporters in Slovakia failed to declare a Hungarian ethnicity, and the HSD-SMS supporters in the Czech Republic were equally exclusively found only among Moravian residents. With the exception of Slovakia, peasants tend to vote either for peasant parties (PSL, PL, "Solidarnosc" RI, etc. in Poland, the Czech Agrarian Party incorporated in LSU, and FKGP in Hungary) and the Christian parties are supported by frequent church-goers, who, in turn, are overrepresented among farmers and the elderly. The existence of these relatively minor parties account for quite a good deal of the correlation between party choice on the one hand, and ethnicity, religiosity and place of residence on the other. The Christian parties of the region have virtually no (i.e. invariably between 0 and 1 percent) electoral support among those who never attend church, and only the Czech People's Party (KDU-CSL) would barely pass the electoral threshold if it had as much electoral support in the total population as among those who attend church only irregularly (i.e. only some times a year or less frequently). In Poland, Slovakia and Hungary only about 3 percent of these voters support the Christian parties (i.e. the Hungarian MDF and FKGP are not counted here as Christian parties because they have a much more complex appeal and far more electoral support than the cited devout parties among irregular church goers and the non-religious).

Interestingly, the electoral strength of Christian parties show much less cross-national variation than the proportion of monthly church-goers among the voters. In Poland, about 70 percent of the electorate fall in this second category, but only around a tenth (occasionally even less) of them would vote either for ZChN or for the smaller Christian parties (SLChD, PChD, ChD). By saying that KDU-CSL attracts some thirty to some forty

percent of devout Czechs, whereas KDNP only some twenty of the Hungarian, and KDH and SKDH, respectively, about 30 and 5 percent of Slovakian regular church-goers, and adding that monthly church goers account for about 10, 40 and 20 percent of the Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian voters, we already explained why KDH is the only Christian party in the region which ever managed to get more than ten percent of votes. Thus, though only the Czech church attendance rates show similarity to Nordic trends (Hungary more closely resembles Britain and France on this score), the electoral base and strength of east central European Christian parties resemble much more closely that of their sister parties in the Nordic countries than those on the Continent.

It is not that the public would not be well informed about the views of these parties on matters of socio-economic policies. By Fall 1992, all four of the main Christian parties were believed by the public to be committed to both market oriented reforms and to the welfare state, but - precisely reflecting the known differences between the policies of these parties - Slovaks felt KDH to be more committed to the first, whereas Hungarians saw KDNP laying more emphasis on left wing economic goals. Czech and Poles found ZChN and KDU-CSL relatively centrist in this respect (see APPENDIX B on the popular perception of party positions). But the fact of the matter is that in each country only a relatively small section of the public attributed any distinctive views to these parties on socio-economic issues and they were overwhelmingly associated with goals in the moral domain (moral renewal, increasing church influence, banning abortion; again see APPENDIX B). Thus, the electoral base and strength of these parties tend to reflect a relatively sectional appeal.

The picture about the agrarian parties show much more cross-national variation and somewhat less signs of an exclusively sectional appeal. In Slovakia, no significant peasant party came into being and HZDS appears to have (or at least, to have had) a large majority in the farming population. In the Czech Republic, the smallish agrarian party became incorporated into LSU (i.e. into a permanent coalition with the Greens and the Socialist Party). The Small Holders Party (FKGP) plays a controversial role in Hungarian politics, but with its complex appeal to anti-communist, nationalist, Christian, and to generally pro-market, but in particular agrar-protectionist sentiments, it can in no way be described as a truly sectional party.

In Poland, the agrarian population is larger, and not only small scale farming, but also the separate political representation of agrarian interests maintained a continuity throughout the communist period. Moreover, the farming population suffered an exceptionally large (supposedly about 50 percent) loss of real incomes in the first years of transition. Therefore it is hardly surprising that the Polish peasant parties have a more sectional appeal than their Czech and Hungarian counterparts. However, a move away from an intransigent sectional politics seems already visible. The party fragmentation of the agrarian scene dramatically decreased after the 1991 election, with PSL destined to emerge as the unitary representative of agrarian interests after the 1993 election. Getting rid of its former "blockflute" image<sup>3</sup> PSL also increased its legitimacy and *Koalitionsfähigkeit* (cf. the designation of party leader Pavlak for premier in June 1992 by President Walesa), and the data suggest that it has recently increased its electoral strength in urban areas.

By and large, electoral support for these three agrarian parties (PSL, LSU and FKGP) in the non-farming population is pretty much above the fifty percent of their national total, and even in larger cities (i.e. more than 100.000 inhabitants) they attract around 2-3 percent of the party preferences. Even so, their electoral support seems to be more heavily concentrated in the rural areas than that of the Scandinavian agrarian parties.

The prospects of the smooth integration of all these relatively sectional parties in the party system will be assessed in the conclusions. To point to be emphasized at this stage is that their existence cannot explain everything from the correlations between social background and vote in East Central Europe. Parties with a clear-cut appeal to the pride and pains of the working class (i.e. NSZZ "Solidarnosc" and KPN in Poland, and to some extent HZDS in Slovakia) have a predominantly working class electorate. Parties contesting the pro-market field - UD, KLD, PC, ODS, ODA, OH, SKD (i.e. the ex-ODU), and MDF - draw a disproportionately large group of their supporters from among white-collar and large town residents. This, however, is not necessarily the case with the Hungarian liberal parties. The reasons for their deviation in terms of their class base will, I hope, become entirely clear later on. Here it is enough to take a note of the fact that they are the only significant pro-market parties in the region who have not yet been involved into any government.

With the exception of the Czech Republic, where the white collar vote is almost monopolized by the direct successors of Civic Forum (ODS, ODA, OH), both postcommunist - the Polish SdRP (SDL), the Czech KSCM, the Slovak SDL, and the Hungarian MSZP - and social democratic (i.e. CSSD in Bohemia and SDSS in Slovakia) parties have more support among white collars than in any other occupational group. In other words, a sort of "negative class voting" occurs in the case of the ideologically left wing parties, which are apparently not very much recognized by the workers as their own. The parallel to the East German case is obvious (on the former DDR, see Dalton, 1992). At this point, it is enough to note that the social composition of post-communist vote reflects hardly more than the well-known social composition of the ruling parties in the last forty years. For more details about the post-communist vote the reader should consult table 6 and the lengthy footnote devoted to this topic<sup>4</sup>.

Table 6 about here

Young people rarely vote either for the postcommunist or for the Christian parties; rather, they prefer the secular anti-statist parties (KLD in Poland, OH, ODA, ODS in Bohemia, FIDESZ in Hungary) or parties known for their troublesome nationalist radicalism (the Polish KPN, the Czech SPR-RSC, and the Slovak SNS). The latter parties tend to do poorly among white collars; hence they do better among lower class people. My *ad hoc* explanation of this finding would refer to the relatively low social acceptability of these parties in the eyes of the more educated voters (as it was noted above, this may be only a part of the story in the case of KPN).

The strength of association between various social characteristics of voters and their party preference is measured here by the uncertainty coefficient in three successive surveys of the adult population in the four East Central European countries (see table 7.A to 7.D), plus in a 1990 comparative survey from the Western world (see table 7.E). Since some readers may be needlessly surprised by the seemingly low figures, table 7.A to 7.D also show the respective correlation (i.e. eta-) coefficients<sup>5</sup>. All the associations which have a T-value above 1.98 are statistically significant.

Table 7.A to 7.E about here

The lesson is fairly unambiguous: the age of the party system is totally unrelated to the social distinctiveness of the various parties' electorates. Whichever social background variable we look at, its correlation with party choice tends to show as much variation and a similar average among Western countries as in East Central Europe. If there is any change in these correlations as the east central european party systems grow older, the change usually means a statistically insignificant (though probably real) decrease. The more notable changes are related to the increasing popular support for those parties in Slovakia which have a less narrowly defined electoral base than KDS (previously ODU) and KDH, and to the above discussed changes on the Polish agrarian scene.

If we concentrate only on the most widely discussed issue, we can indeed see that the coefficient for class voting is much higher in Britain than in East Central Europe. But firstly, the rest of the Continent does not really differ from Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Hungary looks rather like the US and Ireland on this count). Secondly, consider Norway and Britain. It is well-known that whenever the British and Norwegian Labour parties differ in terms of how much more support they get among workers than their national total, this difference tends to be greater in Norway. Still, the uncertainty coefficient suggests that our ability to predict a randomly selected person's vote on the ground of he/she being either an industrial worker or not is actually greater in Britain than in Norway. And this is indeed so. Because of the greater fragmentation of the Norwegian party system neither working class, nor non-working class vote is as much concentrated on any single party there than they are in Britain. Hence the lower numerical figure in Norway, and that is why the uncertainty coefficient it is the proper measure for this sort of analysis. For we would not be prepared to say that Poland has more of class voting than Britain solely on the ground that supporters of a relatively small party (i.e. KPN) are more overrepresented among industrial workers than those of the Labour Party.

### **Do electoral choices lack political content?**

With all this said, the general conclusion regarding cleavages and electoral alignments is that the frequent assertion about the obscure social base of east central european parties was based either on seriously flawed expectations or on misjudgement. Next I turn to another hypothesis which was proposed by Klingemann and Wattenberg (1992). They analyzed American and German time-series data covering the 1952-1980 and 1972-1987 period, respectively. The analysis was based on a series of open ended questions asking the

respondents to tell what they liked and what they disliked about each of the major party. They found that as the German party system matured, there was an increase in the percentage of respondents who referred to the ideology, the policies, or to the social groups which SPD and CDU/CSU represented in their view, and a decrease in the percentage of those who had absolutely nothing to say about either what they liked or disliked about them. In the same period, the correlations between party choice and social background tended to decrease. Therefore, they suggested that in the new democracies of Eastern Europe the latter correlations may be particularly strong at the beginning, since it is likely that people will be ignorant about the specific policies and ideologies of the parties, and thus vote simply on the ground of the perceived socio-cultural similarity (e.g. in terms of age, religiosity, social status) of party representatives to themselves. This factor will then give an advantage to those parties who have an easily identifiable sectional appeal.

These hypotheses are, of course, just a markedly more sophisticated formulation of the frequent assertion that even if East European voters have something in their mind about the individual parties, it is most likely to be a black and white evaluation based on misperceptions, hasty generalizations, the attributes of the party leaders and a host of other things which have little to do with party policies and ideologies. The problem with most earlier studies on this question is that they compared their findings (or simply preconceptions) about the east european voters only to normative ideals about the well informed citizen (which can be a justified procedure, but not when it is used to establish empirical generalization). Below I try to avoid this mistake by presenting some Polish, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian in a format comparable to the 1972 and 1987 German, and 1952 and 1980 American figures reported by Klingemann and Wattenberg. In all these six countries, representative (i.e. random) samples of the electorate were asked to tell what they liked and what they disliked about each of the most important parties operating in their country. The answers were then aggregated into some broad categories in order to assess how much, and how sophisticated political content the responses had.

Table 8 about here

Table 8 shows the percentage of respondents who neither liked, nor disliked anything about the various parties (or at least failed to tell so). In the Czech and Slovak lands these percentages are quite close to the 1972 German and 1952 American results, and - especially if we consider the much greater number of parties which the Czech and Slovak voters are expected to be aware of - usually much smaller than the respective percentages in the US in 1980. The Polish and Hungarian results are on this score closer to (but still better than) the 1980 US results, which means that they are more discouraging than either the 1952 American, or the 1972 and 1980 German results. In respect to black and white thinking all four East Central European electorate are somewhere between Americans and Germans: the Germans are much less, the Americans are much more likely than them to have either only positive or only negative things to say about the individual parties (the data on black and white thinking, i.e. on the proportion of respondents who had only likes or only dislikes to report about one or another party, are not shown).

If the reader immediately recalls now what political science and journalism taught about the pre-1980 decay of the American party system, then I can only agree. For the only point the table is to make that the age of the party system does not have much predicting power in matters of electoral politics. And the method used here to detect its effect seems to be valid: indeed very few Slovaks had anything to say about KDS, which (at least under this name) was a brand new party without any parliamentary representation at the time of the quoted survey. But since facing salient parties, voters are probably more receptive than they are often thought to be, the mentioning of such either very popular or very unpopular parties as the Czech ODS and KSCM, the Slovak KDH, HZDS, SDL and SNS, and the Hungarian FIDESZ and FKGP, elicit quite a good deal of comment from them<sup>6</sup>. Again, the results have a similar message than in the case of the identifiability of government parties. In one way or another, parties need to generate intense feelings about themselves in order to make the voters aware of their existence, and Czech and Slovak parties may do this better than Hungarian and Polish ones. There is, though, a difference between the frequency of likes and dislikes about SPD and CDU/CSU on the one hand, and the former Czechoslovak parties on the other, and it may well be that the differential fragmentation of these party systems is responsible for that.

Table 9 about here

Table 9 shows the evidence on how sophisticated the political content of the answers about likes and dislikes were in each country. The answers were aggregated into some broad types of reasoning and only the frequency of the supposedly more sophisticated answers are displayed. The default expectation is that East European are much less likely to mention ideologies, supposed party linkages to social groups or concrete policies than Germans and Americans. East Europeans may also be expected to refer to the personalities of party leaders more frequently.

By and large, these expectations are only partly met. There are only two truly robust East-West differences which we can observe in this table. East Central European left-wing (that is, postcommunist) parties are much less likely to be liked, and usually more disliked for their association with certain social groups than the American Democrats or the German SPD<sup>7</sup>. It also appears that the only East Europeans parties which are at least as frequently liked or disliked because of their ideologies as the German and American parties are the Christian and nationalist parties (see the data about the Polish ZChN, the Czech CSL, the Slovak KDH and the Hungarian KDNP, and the data about the Polish KPN and the Slovak SNS). East Central European secular liberal and left wing parties are indeed less frequently judged on the base of their ideologies than American and German parties are.

A more complicated picture emerges in the case of domestic policy references<sup>8</sup>. Probably surprisingly, the postcommunist parties are about as likely to be associated with attractive domestic policies (almost exclusively in the socio-economic domain) as US Democrats in 1980 and the SPD in 1972. There is no systematic difference between the two Western countries on the one hand, and the two parts of Czechoslovakia on the other in the likelihood to which non-communist parties are liked for their domestic policies. Poland and

Hungary clearly lag behind again. Adding the evidence presented on table 8 seems to give some insight into the reasons for these cross-national differences. Firstly, only those Eastern European parties which have already been involved as senior partners into government coalitions were about as much disliked for their domestic policies as the major German and American parties. But the latter were probably more frequently liked for the same reason than UD, ZChN, ODS, KDH, HZDS, and MDF. Though the data does not answer this question, I would give better odds to economic than to political explanations of this.

Secondly, in the new democracies the parties associated with highly controversial policies (that is, the three Christian parties mentioned above, the Hungarian Small Holders associated with land restitution, and the Czech ODS with its radically thatcherite rhetoric on economic policies) appear to have a much clearer profile in terms of domestic policies than the rest. This suggests that the development of clear party profiles may have a price. Namely, the factors which can probably most easily accelerate this process are frequent alterations of government and opposition on the one hand, and parties' advocacy of such public policies which are highly unpopular for many on the other. Of course, while the rapid development of clear party profiles may indeed be advantageous for the consolidation of competitive party politics, both of these factors may alienate some from democratic politics.

#### **Are party choices unrelated to political attitudes?**

All this, however, does not really answer the question whether, and to what extent the east central european public's party images are based on misperceptions. Misperceptions may have different causes ranging from voters' guessing party position in the lack of clear clues to the systematic manipulation of media messages by political actors. At this point I address only the first problem, leaving the question of systematic misjudgements for a little later. If it is only the sheer novelty of the parties, than we should expect one voter to err in one direction in his/her judgement of a party, and another in the opposite one. That is to say, the error component of party images will be randomly distributed. In this case, the only politically relevant consequence of misperceptions is that a relatively large number of voters will vote for a different party than they "should" on the base of their own policy attitudes. Although the proportion of these voters cannot be safely determined because of some technical difficulties involved, we can compare countries in terms of the overall correlation between respondents' party preferences and issue attitudes.

The comparison between the four east central european countries is methodologically straightforward, as the CEU (1992) survey contained some twenty identically phrased attitude questions in each country, and a few country specific items on the dismantling of the Czechoslovak federation as well. The comparison with Western countries is somewhat cumbersome, partly because there are obviously large differences between the various countries in the content of the relevant issues, and therefore the results can never be strictly comparable. The closest possible comparison which I could find to my discriminant analysis was provided by a British study (see Himmelweit et al., 1984), which tried to predict party preferences from answers to a large number of attitude questions supposedly

covering virtually all major issue domains of British politics. Although the items I used were different in their content, and smaller in number than the ones utilized by the British study, I assume that they covered most of the relevant issue domains of East Central European politics. The methodology of the analysis was identical. A discriminant analysis provided an optimal weighing of the the answers for various attitude questions in order to predict party preference. The overall correlation between the weighed summed of issue positions and party preferences can be conceived as a measure of the overall congruence between policy views and party preference in the various countries.

A minor complication in the comparison is that in Britain almost all issues pitted Labour-voters against Tories, and liberal supporters were normally in the middle. Therefore almost all issues were incorporated into one ideological superdimension (corresponding to the British understanding of the Left-Right divide). In contrast, in the east central european multiparty systems we can find about three different ideological dimensions which discriminate between various party blocks (i.e. one between religious and secular parties, another one between pro-market vs. social-protectionist parties, and sometimes a third one which tends to have a country-specific content). The content of the various dimensions somewhat varied across the countries and since the main body of the text provides another, arguably more conclusive set of evidence about the popularly perceived ideological positions of the various parties, I don't go into details about this discriminant analysis. The main point is that the overall canonical correlations between the three most important issue dimensions and party preference were .74, .46 and .35 in the Czech Republic; .64, .58 and .46 in Slovakia; .49, .47 and .38 in Poland; and .51, .37 and .29 in Hungary. The first issue dimension had around .75 correlation with party preference in Britain at the time of several successive general election in the seventies and early eighties (see Himmelweit et al., 1984). By and large, these results suggest that the Czech, but probably also the Slovak parties tend to have ideologically as homogeneous constituencies as British parties used to have, but Poland and even more so Hungary differ quite a bit from Britain in this respect.

Thus, at this point our results suggest that the sheer novelty of parties does not necessarily increase the random error component of party images to such heights which would be unprecedented in ideologically disciplined, not very fragmented, and relatively old party systems. It also appears that the emergence of a relatively high degree of issue voting is not dependent on the presence of uniquely divisive and somewhat exceptional "national" issues either. Whereas attitudes toward the dismantling of the Czechoslovak state were, of course, one of the most important sources of attitude differences between the supporters of various Czech and Slovak parties, it should be emphasized that they were obviously not the only one. At least in the Czech Republic our ability to predict party preference from issue attitudes remains practically unaltered when we exclude those attitude questions from the analysis which referred to this issue domain. Whether the greater ideological meaningfulness of electoral alignments in the former Czechoslovakia than in Poland or Hungary was caused by differences in party strategies, and whether it is conducive for the consolidation of a competitive party system, are questions which I can only pose but cannot answer now.

### **Mandates and the ideological dimensions of party competition**

Yet another meaning which we may demand from the electoral choice offered to the electorate is the structuration of various policies into meaningful packages. Below I will call these packages ideologies. An ideology is defined here as any persistent link between such policies which cannot be derived from each other by straightforward logical operations. The first aspect of the normative evaluation could be the "meaningfulness" of the emerging ideological divides. Though in principle it looks an awesome concept which is difficult to operationalize, in the present analysis this will not cause a major problem since the ideological divides characterizing the four east central european party systems are very similar both to each others' and to those of the majority of Western democracies. Therefore the question about the "meaningfulness" of the east central european ideological divides can be largely converted into a question about the meaningfulness of electoral choice in a much larger sample of democracies. After doing this, I will take the freedom to leave this question unanswered.

There are two additional concerns related to the ideological dimensions of party competition which can be used to evaluate the emerging patterns of party competition. The first is the degree to which a small number of ideological divisions is able to predict each party's position on virtually any issue. While it may be true, that the larger the number of ideological dimensions (and thus, that of parties), the more precisely a sophisticated voter can express his/her policy preferences in his/her vote, beyond a very low number of (i.e. 2 or 3) dimensions these gains are likely lost on the trade-off between the number of dimensions on the one hand, and the predictability and stability of the resulting government coalitions on the other (see Mitra, 1980; Warwick, 1992). Presumably even the voters of the most sectional parties would like to know which other parties may be helped to office by their voting for their first preference. But if the ideological structuration of the party system is weak (i.e. much of the variation in party positions' on various issues is left unexplained by the parties' location on the first one or two ideological axes), they are likely to remain ignorant about the possible consequences of their vote.

The distribution of issue advantages between the various parties can also be a fairly important determinant of the meaningfulness of electoral choice. The accumulation of a disproportionately large number of issue advantages by any single party over others is likely to result in the emergence of a dominant party. This may have a number of advantages in many respects, but arguably little in terms of making elections a contest worth to participate in. To make it clearer what factors are postulated here as conducive to the emergence of a dominant party, let me summarize (and simplify) an argument from Budge's and Fairlie's (1983) analysis of electoral competition. Left wing parties normally owe much of their attractiveness to being perceived as much more credible and effective than their competitors on issues related to socio-economic distribution. The normally high saliency of the issues related to socio-economic distribution provides a great potential advantage to the Left. Therefore, the emergence of a relatively balanced party competition is the function of their competitors' ability to establish electoral advantages on a large number of other issues (e.g. general competence, foreign policy, religion, law and order). Following this reasoning,

the long lasting electoral hegemony of the US Democrats, the Canadian Liberals, the Irish Fianna Fail, and the Indian Congress Party can be convincingly explained by their ability to combine a somewhat left of centre image with long term advantages over their competitors on a number of issues which in the more balanced party systems of continental Europe normally benefit the right wing parties.

The twin problems of ideological structuration and conceivable electoral dominance are assessed here on the basis of mass survey data. The respondents of the CEU (1992) and CEU (1993) surveys were asked to tell which parties were the most, and which one was the least likely to pursue various political goals (the description of these goals is shown in APPENDIX A). Respondents were also asked to tell how important these goals were them personally. The present analysis relies only on the Fall 1992 results, which covered a larger number of issue domains than the follow-up study. Table 10 shows that just as Budge and Fairlie postulated, a good number (though not all) of the "left wing" socio-economic goals - e.g. reducing unemployment, inequalities, putting less economic burden on people's shoulders during the transformation of the economy - are found important or very important by virtually everybody. It is certainly not the case that a pro-market party would, by definition, be unable to deliver achievements on these issues: increases in pensions, for example, are normally less of a question of commitment to the welfare state than a by-product of economic growth. But most of the left-wing socio-economic goals have visible trade-offs with reducing corporate taxes and other measures which a pro-market party is likely to consider. A few "natural right wing" goals - i.e. fighting crime - are certainly popular and almost as consensual in the eyes of the voters as the mentioned left wing goals. But most of the default right wing goals (i.e. increasing the influence of religion and the churches, strengthen patriotism, decommunization) are salient only a smaller part of the public, and there is also a considerable minority opposed to them. Thus, there is a good chance that a party which establish a high credibility on all the left wing economic goals can be matched in electoral strength only by such competitors who achieve credibility, and thus, several smaller net gains, on a wider range of issues and preferably also on general economic competence. Note, however, that this "natural advantage" of the Left is much smaller in the Czech Republic than in the other three countries: Czeches tend to attach somewhat lower (though still very high) priority to the typical left wing socio-economic goals, and a little higher priority to the typical right wing economic goals than Poles, Slovaks, or Hungarians do. This fact alone may explain quite a bit from the fact that the secular right wing parties have a much greater electoral strength in the Czech, than in the Slovak and Polish lands (40 percent of total Czech, and only 19 and 6 percent of the total Polish and Slovak samples expressed a voting preference for ODS or ODS, UD or KLD, and DS and SKD, respectively). Just as in the case of class voting, the Hungarian liberal parties (SZDSZ, FIDESZ) again deviate from any simple prediction based on their sister parties' performance in the other three countries. On the basis of popular attitudes towards various directions of public policies, we would expect their electoral strength to be closer to the Slovak or Polish figures than to the Czech, but in actual fact SZDSZ and FIDESZ commanded 33 percent support in the total Hungarian sample<sup>9</sup>. The answer for this is provided, as we will see below, partly by the somewhat idiosyncratic nature of the dominant ideological divides in

Hungary, and partly by some seeming oddities in the popular perception of the various parties' socio-economic policies in Hungary.

Table 10 about here

The answers concerning which parties were likely to pursue these goals were aggregated and adjusted for the "wishful thinking" effect<sup>10</sup>. The adjusted data are shown in APPENDIX B. High positive figures indicate how larger that percentage of respondents, who think that the party was committed to the goal in question, would have been than those, who think that the party is the most unlikely to pursue that goal, had there been no popularity differences between the parties. Negative figures indicate that the second opinion would have been more numerous in the sample in this case than the first.

Two things are clear from the data, and they must be stressed before going into the details. Firstly, the respondents were asked simply about the parties' commitment for or against certain goals, and not about their exact location on some continuum ranging, for instance, from the most clerical to the most anticlerical position. Therefore, the data describe the popularly perceived direction of party positions, and not so much their intensity. This is an important feature of the data for both methodological<sup>11</sup> and normative reasons. The normative evaluation of the development of party systems must surely consider the distinctiveness of party positions as a positive trait: I am not aware of any dissenting view on this count. But ideological polarization is usually judged differently. If it has anything positive in the eyes of the observers, then it is valued only for its capacity to make the direction of party policies more clearly visible. And this is exactly what this sort of data claims to capture from the effects of polarization, but no more.

Secondly, whereas the data about party positions on such moral and social issues like strengthening patriotism, increasing church influence, etc., reflect rather faithfully what the parties are pledged to, this is not necessarily the case in the socio-economic domain. Apparently no party, whatever policies it is pledged to, is able to establish much more credibility on either left or right wing socio-economic issues than as much general economic competence it is believed to possess (see the results with item C). This, again, is important for both methodological<sup>12</sup> and normative reasons. The voters may be wrong in assessing the competence of the various parties, but they are only rational when they ignore the socio-economic promises of those parties which they perceive as incompetent.

The discussion of the details must start with the more or less constant factors. The east central european publics see very little difference between the four postcommunist party regarding their positive commitment to such goals as reducing inequalities, putting less burden on people's shoulder during the transformation of the economy, and providing better health care and education. They are also invariably believed to be largely indifferent regarding strengthening patriotism. There are, however, very large differences between the Czech KSCM on the one extreme, and the Slovak SDL and the Hungarian MSZP on the other regarding general competence and these parties' perceived attitude toward clerical, anticommunist, and pro-market policies. Much more Czechs than Slovaks and Hungarians

attribute lack of competence (see items C and R), and opposition to typically right wing goals (see items B, M, N and Q) to the postcommunist parties. Whereas the image of the Polish SdRP is usually closer to that of KSCM on this count, SDL and MSZP successfully established quite a good deal of positive reputation on competence issues. Thus, it is hardly a surprise that the last two appear to have a larger electoral base than SdRP and KSCM (see table 6).

The cross-national variation in the image of the Christian parties is even smaller. Relatively few people attributes any policy priorities to them other than those directly related to their religious appeal (i.e. item H and M, and opposition to item I, free choice concerning abortion). Those few who still associate socio-economic goals with them thinks that they are either committed to the development of market economy, or to providing better health care and education, or - even more likely - to both. The cross-national variations precisely reflect a correct popular understanding what can be known about these parties: the Slovak KDH has a bit more right wing, and the Hungarian KDNP a more left wing image on socio-economic issues than the Polish ZChN and the Czech KDU-CSL. The Hungarian public also proved to be prophetic concerning the KDNP-position on abortion: by being less likely to believe that KDNP is opposed to free choice than Czeches, Slovaks, and Poles concerning their own Christian parties, Hungarians correctly "predicted" that in a few months time almost a half of the KDNP-caucus was to vote in favour of a rather liberal abortion law. Among the agrarian parties, the Polish PSL, and particularly the Hungarian FKGP achieved a much greater visibility and a more elaborated ideological profile than the post-Solidarnosc PL. Whereas the FKGP has a rather clerical, patriotic and pro-market profile, the Polish PSL is thought to be left of centre and rather secular.

Thus, the integration of Christian and agrarian parties' images into what, as we will see below, appear to be the main ideological dimensions of party competition in East Central Europe, was already in a fairly advanced stage by Fall 1992. The coalition preferences of these parties also became known - at least for the learned observers - and I hope that other contributors will discuss their reasonability in detail. Suffice here to say that they do not appear to be entirely inconsistent with their ideological positions. These facts suggest that the electoral base of these parties may eventually become less sectional in the near future than what they were at the time of the reported survey data. These prospects, however, are likely to be closed for the regionalist HSD-SMS in the Czech Republic, for the Polish PL, and for the MKM-E-M coalition speaking for the interests of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia. Whether because of their own faults or not, these three parties have an almost entirely single issue image, and - according to the current poll results - PL is likely to become extinct after the September 1993 election.

The rest of the significant east central european parties fall, according to our common sense knowledge, in about four different categories, and the individual parties are often too idiosyncratic to be unambiguously classifiable regarding the extent to which they should be described as secular liberal or as secular conservative (i.e. this is the classification problem with the Czech ODA and ODS), or secular conservative or nationalist-anticommunist (i.e. this is the dilemma with PC in Poland and MDF in Hungary). The Polish KPN is certainly

perceived as a secular, anticommunist, nationalist and on the questions of economic policy, distinctively left wing party. The Republicans (SPR-RSC) are seen by Czechs as an anticommunist nationalist (in fact, presumably as a xenophobic and anti-Gypsy) party - again, with rather left wing, if any, views on economics. The third clear case in this class is the Slovak National Party (SNS). The remaining patriotic-anticommunist party in the public perception are the Hungarian MDF, and particularly the Polish PC. They - both with a considerable government record behind - are much more likely to be associated with pro-market, rather than left wing goals in the socio-economic domain, and MDF is, of course, also believed to be credible on Christian issues and effective foreign policy.

The group of secular liberal and secular conservative parties also shows a good deal of cross-national variation. In the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary, they are often believed to be tough anticommunists (ODA, ODS, the currently insignificant DS and SKD in Slovakia, SZDSZ and FIDESZ in Hungary), in Poland they are not (see item Q at the columns referring to KLD and UD in APPENDIX B): the legacy of the Mazowiecki's government reign during the contracted Sejm is, I should think, very visible in this case. These parties are invariably strongly associated with pro-market policies, economic competence, pro-choice views on abortion, and not much enthusiasm regarding the protection of unprofitable companies. Where they most strongly differ from each other is their perceived commitment to left-wing economic goals. The Czech ODA and ODS, the Slovak SKD and DS, and the Polish KLD have virtually no credibility at all on such goals, but the Polish UD and - even more so - the two Hungarian liberal parties are.

Finally, the Slovak government party, HZDS, is - in my view - a class of his own. With its extraordinarily high ratings on every issue except the most "obviously" right wing ones (i.e. decommunization, increasing church influence, and maintaining good relations between Czech and Slovaks - an issue largely monopolized by the otherwise insignificant federalist Right in Slovakia), by Fall 1992 HZDS indeed come close to establishing a profile promising long term electoral hegemony. The only east central european parties with such an apparently broad appeal were, at that time, the Hungarian liberals, SZDSZ and FIDESZ. We would obviously need more than just impressions about what these parties promised to the voters to understand the origin of such devastatingly popular images. In the lack of such data I can rely only on my intuitive judgement which I do not want to make sound more academic than it actually is. The Hungarian examples suggest to me that relatively popular opposition parties can afford to keep on promising pro-market policies without alienating any voters. As long as they are perceived as much more competent than their competitors, and do not pledge to e.g. freezing pensions once they got into office, they can trust that the wishful thinking of desparate voters will do the rest of the job.

The example of the HZDS, however, also suggests that not too carefully designed election pledges may also raise such popular expectations which are hard to meet by an east european government. Though qualitatively oriented experts and public opinion polls tended to disagree on whether the Hungarian liberals could expect a landslide victory in 1994, the Slovak example provides relatively clear evidence that the first landslide won with such a broad appeal is not likely to be followed by a second one. In April 1993, the CEU (1993)

survey registered a huge loss in HZDS's credibility on virtually every issue (compared to the September 1992), but much less so on pro-market policies than on left-wing socio-economic goals. Similar losses were also registered in voting support for HZDS (1993 data not shown). Whether the image of the Hungarian liberal parties would change to such marked degree should they manage to win the 1994 elections, or whether they would end up with an image similar to those of the Polish UD, remains, of course, an open question which may easily remain unanswered even after 1994. But the example of HZDS suggests that the depth of socio-economic problems itself guarantees that no dominant party is likely to emerge in the region in the foreseeable future.

With the question of feasible electoral hegemonies thus answered, we can turn to the question of ideological structuration. The first check can be done visually. As appendix B shows, Hungarians are more likely to associate both right wing and left wing socio-economic goals with any of their six main parties than Czeches, Slovaks, and Poles. This would suggest that the ideological structuration of party competition is weaker in Hungary than in the other three countries. To check whether this is so in a more careful and quantitative way, the raw data discussed until now was subjected to a factor analysis (see table 11.A to 11.D). Because of their single issue character, PL, HSD-SMS and MKM-E-M are excluded from the analysis. The proportion of variance explained by the first one or two factors can be conceived as a measure of ideological structuration. The higher these figures are, the more easily we can explain the variation in party images by expressing the loading of parties and the scores of issues on one or two ideological dimensions.

Table 11.A to 11.D about here

The results show a fairly similar picture across the three countries. The first dimension is a general Left-Right dimension, with increasing church influence, decommunization, helping the development of free market economy and other right wing goals having high scores on the one extreme, and reducing inequalities and other left wing goals having high scores on the other extreme. The second factor pits the secular liberal and conservative parties, with their emphasis on pro-market goals, against the Christian parties, with their religious appeal and more emphasis on social services. The third dimension (which does not occur in Hungary, where there are only two factors with an eigenvalue greater than one) pits the anticommunist nationalist against the rest. The first two factors, so familiar from west european politics, explain 71 percent of the total variance in aggregated party images in Poland, 67 percent (and a much greater emphasis on the first, predominantly socio-economic dimension) in the Czech Republic, 72 percent in Slovakia, and 80 percent in Hungary. This suggests that the ideological structuration of party images is actually stronger in Hungary than in the other three countries. Under closer inspection, the contradiction between this finding and the lower degree of consistency between party preferences and voters' political attitudes (which was reported earlier) disappears. Where Hungary deviates from the other three is the much greater emphasis on the generally less salient (see table 10 on this point) non-material components of the Left-Right divide in creating consistent ideological profiles for the parties, and not in the generally weaker ideological structuration of the party space.

## Conclusions

It should be clear by now that the East Central European party systems look a little more ordinary than as chaos theorists describe them. Besides being empirically untenable, chaos theories has not much to offer either: for it is exactly the deviations from chaos which need to be explained.

The four countries examined show some variations regarding the meaningfulness of electoral choice, but neither the available theories, nor survey data seem to lead us very far in explaining this. Polish and Hungarian electors appear to be consistently less well informed about, and at the very least, more indifferent towards party politics than Czeches and Slovaks. In the first two countries turnout is also lower, and social inequalities are more prevalent in political participation. Presently I see no way to determine whether these phenomena are rooted in the generally less egalitarian character of these societies, or rather in their less revolutionary scenario of democratic transition, or in certain characteristics of their party systems.

At least in the socio-economic domain, a generally lower degree of ideological crystallization and polarization seem to characterize Hungary than the other three. These factors and the precarious stability of the first democratically elected government may add something to the explanation of the above phenomena. For as we saw repeatedly, East Central Europeans are more likely to associate relatively clear policy profiles with present and past major government parties and sectional parties. Hungary has a relative dearth of each, and this may well be appreciated. But the very same factors may also explain why on most tests of the meaningfulness of electoral choice Hungary lagged behind the two parts of the former Czechoslovakia, and frequently also behind Poland.

The Polish case is even less straightforward to explain. In terms of ideological crystallization the Polish party system is about as "developed" as the Czech and Slovak, but in respect to fragmentation ...; well, I hope it is already clear that fragmentation and the novelty of parties are not the only variables to consider when we talk about East Central European party systems.

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<sup>1</sup> I would not even exclude the possibility that - as the current Hungarian premier used to comment on survey data of this sort - their correlation reflects only the dependence of each on the differential degree to which habitual pessimism (or optimism) prevails in a country. This explanation, however, is somewhat contradicted by the fact that satisfaction with the performance of governments, and, as the earlier Times-Mirror (1991) study already demonstrated, popular approval of top public officials, show by and large as much variation across East Central European as across Western democracies and in this respect there is no really consistent difference between the two groups of countries.

<sup>2</sup> True, inasmuch as a bipolarization of the party system tends to make electoral decisions mostly a matter of voting for or against the incumbents, a majoritarian tendency in policy making may provide some marginal advantages for relatively extreme opposition parties over those who are less readily identified either as opposition or government parties: Poles were more likely to realize that SdRP and KPN were in opposition than to discover that PC and UP were there too, and for Czeches opposition was more likely to mean the communists (LB) or the xenophobe Republicans (SPR-RSC) than the social democrats (CSSD). But this is probably not necessarily so. As it will be demonstrated later, the average Hungarian thinks that the liberal parties (SZDSZ, FIDESZ), though offering a distinctive package, are

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ideologically somewhere between the government parties and the socialists (MSZP). But as table 4 shows, this does not prevent Hungarians from naming the liberals as opposition about as often as the Socialists. Thus, the quite possible short term disadvantage of the more centrist parties may evaporate eventually, if the centrist parties manage to define the areas where they differ from others without losing their centrist image.

<sup>3</sup> In the forty years preceding 1989 PSL was a permanent "coalition partner" of the Polish United Workers' Party.

<sup>4</sup> After controlling for former communist party membership in a multivariate design, no social background variable shows a consistent effect on SdRP-, KSCM-, SDL-, or MSZP-preference (data not shown). Emphasizing this, it must also be added that their supporters are simply far too numerous to be described simply as the members of the former nomenclature, or that they are, at the very least, diehard opponents of democracy. Neither is the appeal of these parties designed to be sectional: quite the contrary. Maybe, they could do more to dissociate themselves from the past regime, but it is extremely dubious whether such efforts could alter the fact that they are markedly more credible in the eyes of a certain segment of the electorate which is distinctive from the population in large not so much in its socio-economic background, but rather in the political socialization which its members went through in the past. The evidence for the rather gloomy prospect for change is shown on table 6. To understand the data displayed, it must be clear for the reader that in the 1991 Polish, the 1990 and 1992 Czechoslovak, and the 1990 Hungarian elections the pre-election estimates about the electoral strength of these parties, which were based on unadjusted survey data, would have had to be multiplied by something around 1.7 in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, and with a little more than 2 in the Czech lands to get a good forecast. Thus, the apparent increase in the reported voting support for these parties may reflect either a real growth, or just an increasing frankness of the respondents, or both. But in the latest surveys, the reported voting preference for the Slovak SDL and for the Hungarian MSZP already exceeded their share of the votes in the last elections (see the fourth row on each suitable). Therefore it looks certain that their electoral strength is truly increasing. In the Slovak case the growth is already about 100 percent compared to the June 1992 election results. Does this development reflect, and indeed require a dramatic transformation of the postcommunist electoral base? Speculative analyses normally answer with yes, since they almost invariably postulate an inevitable link between these parties' dissociation from their troubled past and their prospects for electoral growth.

For each country, the first row shows the percentage of those (among the respondents revealing any voting preference) who said that in one or another period before the end of 1989 they had been members of the ruling communist party. Though some people obviously fail to give correct information about this sensitive topic, the figures tend to be quite high (some ten to 22 percent in the various surveys) because of the substantial fluctuation among party members during the past decades. The second row of the table shows how large proportion of postcommunist parties' voting support comes from this group. By late 1991 the cross-national variations in this respect were almost entirely due to between country differences in the proportion of former party members in the electorate. In each of the four countries former communist party members were about three to four times more likely to vote for these parties at that time, and therefore they provided more than sixty percent of KSCM and SDL, and only a little less of SdRP and MSZP-supporters.

Considering the number of cases on which the figures reported in the second and third row are based, the "changes" registered by the post-1991 surveys in Poland and the Czech lands may well be just random fluctuations caused by sampling error. But in Slovakia and Hungary the proportion of former party members among SDL- and MSZP-supporters seems to have decreased dramatically. However, the percentage gains of these parties were larger among former party members than in the total population. Thus, the most plausible explanation of the declining proportion of former members among their supporters is simply

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the saturation of their voting support in the core constituency well below the hundred percent level.

Since I do not find a detailed discussion of my own analyses concerning post-communist vote worth of an extra ten page of technical appendix, here they are summarized only briefly, and it is left to the reader to check their validity in the Dohnalik et al. (1991), the Times Mirror (1991), the International Social Justice Survey (1991, see Alwin, 1992), the World Value Survey 1990, and the Eastern Eurobarometer (1991) files, which contain comparative mass survey data on party preferences and socio-political attitudes in a large number of East European countries, and are already in the public domain. The message, which comes through of all the Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian survey data which contain the respective variables and which I am familiar with is that pro-welfare state, anti-unemployment and egalitarian attitudes are only extremely weakly correlated with post-communist vote, if they are at all. The really strong dividing line between post-communist voters and the rest is in their evaluations of the past and the present regime, of the past and the present conditions in general. In other words, there are quite a large number of postcommunist voters with "right wing" views on socio-economic issues, and a person's left wing views on such topics is not very likely to increase his or her propensity to vote for the postcommunist parties. Since in the light of APPENDIX B it would be very unreasonable to believe that the left wing ideological position of these parties is insufficiently known by the electorate, these findings suggest that the typical postcommunist voter is likely to be a person who thinks that the heirs of the past regime would do better on virtually any important issue - be it law and order, cutting the budget deficit, speeding up privatization, unemployment or pension indexation -, than anything what the new parties have to offer. Thus, the postcommunist parties' association with the past regime is not only a source of credibility and legitimacy deficit: it is also a source of support. The growth of support for the Slovak and Hungarian postcommunist parties may have much more to do with disappointments about the performance of other parties, than with the increasing recognition of these parties as the credible left wing alternative. The latter may well be just a function of the former.

<sup>5</sup> The readers are warned, however, that taken the measurement level of the variables in question, correlation-like coefficients (such as eta) are, in principle, inappropriate measures of the strength of association in this case.

<sup>6</sup> The popularity of the parties at the time of the survey was ascertained by the items analyzed on table 3. The mentioned parties were either had extremely favourable, or extremely unfavourable ratings on the seven point scale. Also in Poland, UD tended to be the most popular, and KPN the least popular of the eight most significant parties, and indeed Polish respondents appeared to have a little more to say about them than about other Polish parties.

<sup>7</sup> See the results concerning PARTY D - that is, SdRP in Poland, KSCM in the Czech Republic, SDL in Slovakia and MSZP in Hungary - on table 8 ad 8. The relatively frequent reason for disliking these parties because of their links to social groups was, of course, their association with the former nomenclature.

<sup>8</sup> The frequency of references to foreign policies is not shown in the table on the ground of the apparently reasonable assumption that the data would not allow meaningful comparison between old and new democracies, since this issue domain virtually never plays as great a role in the electoral politics of small countries as it does in the United States and Germany. Indeed, between 3 to 17 percent of 1952 and 1980 American, and between 4 to 38 percent of 1972 and 1987 German respondents mentioned their foreign policies as a reason for liking/disliking one or another of the major parties. (The 38 percent figure is related to the SPD in 1972, in the heydays of the new *Ostpolitik*.) In Poland and Hungary such references

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are hardly ever found in the answers. The relatively high frequency of foreign policy references in the Czechoslovak case (reaching 21 percent in the case of reasons to dislike SNS) was due to a single and temporary issue, namely they came from references to party position's regarding the highly controversial dismantling of the Czechoslovak federal state.

<sup>9</sup> All the reported figures about voting support are based on all answers (including "do not know", "would not vote, etc." answers and straight refusals of answering) concerning the likely direction of respondents' vote if there was general election next weekend.

<sup>10</sup> Granberg and Holmberg (1988) has shown on American and Swedish data that respondents always tend, to some extent, to project their own issue preferences on the parties they like, and attribute the opposite preferences to the parties they dislike. The strength of this tendency is, however, unrelated to the fact whether the respondents are able to identify the party positions on an issue correctly or not. In the present analysis the adjustment (which is described in APPENDIX B) seemed advisable because the analysis used aggregated data about the perception of party positions. This type of data is somewhat more strongly biased by the fact that it shows the more popular parties to be more associated with the relatively popular goals, independently from their ideological profile. This, of course, is likely to reflect partly the cause, and partly an effect of these parties' popularity. To clean the data from this second factor, the adjustment procedure generates that distribution of the answers, which is structured by the same ideological divides as the unadjusted data, but gives a more reliable picture about the net issue advantages of the various parties on the various issues. Though the reported factor analysis is based on this adjusted data, the factor analysis of the unadjusted data leads to practically identical results, both in terms of the factor structure and in regards to the proportion of explained variance.

<sup>11</sup> On the directional theory of voting, which assumes that voters act as if there were differences only in the direction, but not in the intensity of party positions on various ideological dimensions, see Rabinowitz and McDonald (1989); Listhaug, McDonald and Rabinowitz (1990); and Rabinowitz, McDonald and Listhaug (1991). These articles provide both arguments and empirical analysis suggesting that this theory can indeed lead to a more realistic and significantly different understanding of party competition and electoral behaviour than the traditional spatial models.

<sup>12</sup> On some arguments and empirical tests suggesting the feasibility and usefulness of incorporating competence and other non-ideological dimensions in the traditional spatial models of voting and party competition, see Enelow and Hinich (1984).

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Table 1: Percentage "very" or "fairly satisfied" with the way democracy functions in (country).

Germany	77
Luxemburg	77
Denmark	70
The Netherlands	64
Portugal	63
Great Britain	59
Ireland	58
Spain	58
Greece	56
Belgium	56
France	51
Czech Republic	38
Slovakia	28
Italy	24
Hungary	22
Poland	19

Notes: For the EC-member states, the averages of 1976-89 sixmonthly figures are reported. For the East Central European countries, the data come from surveys conducted in late September and early October, 1992.

Source: Eurobarometers and CEU (1992), quoted by Tóka (forthcoming).

Table 2: Popular evaluation of the socio-economic conditions and the electoral process in East Central European countries.

	Poland	Czech R.	Slovakia	Hungary
Satisfied with the working of democracy in (country)	19	38	28	22
		percent satisfied		
The current economic situation is very unfavorable to me and my family	82	59	74	81
		percent agree		
As the things develop now in our country, people like me have a good chance of getting ahead in life	18	50	28	16
In elections in ... (country), voters have a real choice	70	90	91	81
Parties are interested in people's vote only, but not in their opinion	90	71	76	86

Source: CEU (1992).

Table 3: Responses for the question: "Now I would like to ask you to tell me how much each of the following organizations express or opposes your views and interests. ... If you think that an organization expresses your views and interests very well, then give a score of 1; if you think that the organization is strongly (sharply, completely) opposed to your views and interests, then give a score of 7; if you think that the organization expresses your views and interests in some respects, but it is opposed to them in some other important respects, then give a score of 4 and so on."

	Ratings on the original 1-7 scale			
	Poland	Czech R.	Slovakia	Hungary
Average rating of the 8 main parties	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.5
Average rating of the most liked party	2.3	1.8	1.6	2.2
The rating of interest organizations:				
(Old) trade unions*	4.7	4.4	4.1	5.1
(New) unions (Solidarnosc, Liga)	4.31	-	-	5.5
Catholic Church	4.0	4.6	4.3	4.8
Entrepreneurs' organizations	4.9	4.0	4.7	4.9
Agricultural producers' orgs.	4.2	3.8	3.7	5.1
Environmental groups	2.7	2.8	2.8	4.0

Percentage of respondents who gave better rating to selected organizations than to any major party (percentage giving equal rating to ... and to the most preferred party is shown in parentheses):

	Poland	Czech R.	Slovakia	Hungary
Old unions*	4 (16)	3 (9)	3 (17)	4 (12)
New unions	9 (15)	-	-	2 (10)
Catholic Church	12 (20)	4 (13)	5 (19)	7 (15)
Entrepreneurs' organizations	5 (12)	4 (15)	2 (11)	4 (15)
Farmers' organizations	9 (18)	5 (16)	4 (24)	4 (12)
Environmental groups	26 (31)	13 (32)	10 (32)	11 (22)

Percentage of respondents who gave better rating to at least one interest organization than to any major party (percentage giving equal rating to any interest organization and to the most preferred party shown in parentheses):

	Poland	Czech R.	Slovakia	Hungary
	31 (37)	17 (41)	14 (46)	18 (30)

\*: Old unions mean OPZZ in Poland, and MSZOSZ in Hungary. These unions are aligned with SdRP and MSZP, respectively.

Source: CEU (1992).

Table 4: "Which parties do you think the government (opposition) parties are?"  
Percentage distribution of answers by parties, Fall 1992.

Poland					NSZZ				
	KPN	PSL	SdRP	PL	"S"	ZChN	UD	PC	KLD
government	6	8	2	6	9	40	55	9	25
opposition	37	12	39	1	2	0	1	24	1

Government parties at the time of the survey: UD; ZChN; KLD; PL (plus several smaller parties not shown on the table).

Ambiguous relation to the government: NSZZ "Solidarnosc".

Czech Republic				HSD-	SPR-	KDU-		
	LB	CSSD	LSU	SMS	RSC	CSL	ODA	ODS
government	3	5	4	2	2	45	62	92
opposition	75	44	31	11	51	2	0	0

Government parties at the time of the survey: ODS-KDS; ODA; KDU-CSL.

Slovakia	MKM-				
	EG-M	KDH	SNS	HZDS	SDL
government	1	4	62	94	58
opposition	47	78	2	0	7

Government parties at the time of the survey: HZDS; SNS.

Ambiguous relation to the government: SDL.

Hungary						
	KDNP	MSZP	MDF	SZDSZ	FKGP	FIDESZ
government	55	6	79	13	57	11
opposition	5	58	1	54	10	61

Government parties at the time of the survey: MDF; KDNP.

Ambiguous relation to the government: FKGP.

Note: table entries are column percentages. Percentages do not sum up to 100 because the frequency of respondents not naming the party in question as either a government or an opposition party, or naming it as both is not displayed.

Source: CEU (1992).

Table 5.A: Variation in the electoral attractiveness of selected parties and party groups across social groups in Poland, October 1992-January 1993.

	KPN	PSL and other peasant	SLD or SdRP	NSZZ "S"	ZChN and other Christian	UD	PC and RdR	KLD and URP
socio-economic groups:								
white-col.	-	-	+		-	+	+	+
workers	+	-		+	+	-		-
farmers	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
residents of ...								
rural areas	-	+	-			-	-	-
large towns	+	-	+			+	+	+
education:								
minimal		+	-		+	-		-
graduates	-	-		-	-	+	-	+
cohorts:								
18-29 y. old	+	+	-	-	-			+
60- y. old	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	
church attendance:								
monthly		+	-	+	+		-	-
never		-	+	-	-	-		-

NOTE: Plus (minus) signs indicate that the party in question tends to have a larger (smaller) share of party preference in the social group in question than among all respondents who reported any party preference. When neither plus, nor minus signs are displayed, then support for the party in the group showed inconsistencies over time, or the difference from the whole sample was not greater than 1 percent at either time, or it was less than 0.5 percent at least once.

Source: CEU (1992) and CEU (1993).

Table 5.B: Variation in the electoral attractiveness of selected parties and coalitions accross social groups in the Czech Republic, September 1992-April 1993.

	KSCM	CSSD	LSU	HSD- SMS	SPR- RSC	OH	KDU- CSL	ODA	ODS
socio-economic groups:									
white-col.	-		-		-	+	-	+	+
workers				+	+	+			-
farmers	-		+	+	+	-	+		-
residents of ...									
rural areas	+	-	+			-	+		-
large towns	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+
education:									
minimal	+		+		+	-	+	-	-
graduates	-		-		-	+	-	+	+
cohorts:									
18-29 y. old	-	-		+	+	+	-		+
60- y. old	+	+	+		-	-	+	-	-
church attendance:									
monthly	-	-				-	+	-	-
never	+	+	-	+			-		-

NOTE: Plus (minus) signs indicate that the party in question tends to have a larger (smaller) share of party preference in the social group in question than among all respondents who reported any party preference. When neither plus, nor minus signs are displayed, then support for the party in the group showed inconsistencies over time, or the difference from the whole sample was not greater than 1 percent at either time, or it was less than 0.5 percent at least once.

Source: CEU (1992) and CEU (1993).

Table 5.C: Variation in the electoral attractiveness of selected parties and coalitions accros social groups in Slovakia, September 1992-April 1993.

	SDL	SDSS	HZDS	SNS	KDH	MKM-EG-M	DS
socio-economic groups:							
white-col.	+		-	-	-	-	+
workers		-	+	+	-	+	-
farmers	-		+			+	-
residents of ...							
rural areas	-		+				-
large towns	-	+	-		-	-	+
education:							
minimal	-	-	+	-	+	+	
graduates	+	+	-			-	+
cohorts:							
18-29 y. old	-	-		+	-	-	
60- y. old	-	+		-	+	+	
church attendance:							
monthly	-	-			+	-	
never	+	-			-	-	+

NOTE: Plus (minus) signs indicate that the party in question tends to have a larger (smaller) share of party preference in the social group in question than among all respondents who reported any party preference. When neither plus, nor minus signs are displayed, then support for the party in the group showed inconsistencies over time, or the difference from the whole sample was not greater than 1 percent at either time, or it was less than 0.5 percent at least once.

Source: CEU (1992) and CEU (1993).

Table 5.D: Variation in the electoral attractiveness of selected parties accross social groups in Hungary, September 1992-January 1993.

	KDNP	MSZP	MDF	FKGP	SZDSZ	FIDESZ
socio-economic groups:						
white-col.	-	+	+	-	-	+
workers		-	-		+	
farmers	+	-		+	-	-
residents of ...						
rural areas	+	-		+	-	-
large towns	-	+	+	-	-	
education:						
minimal	+			+		-
graduates	-	+	+	-	-	
cohorts:						
18-29 y. old	-	-	-	-	-	+
60- y. old	+	+	+	+	-	-
church attendance:						
monthly	+	-	+	+	-	-
never	-	+	-	-	+	+

NOTE: Plus (minus) signs indicate that the party in question tends to have a larger (smaller) share of party preference in the social group in question than among all respondents who reported any party preference. When neither plus, nor minus signs are displayed, then support for the party in the group showed inconsistencies over time, or the difference from the whole sample was not greater than 1 percent at either time, or it was less than 0.5 percent at least once.

Source: CEU (1992) and CEU (1993).

Table 6: Baseline figures about voting support for SdRP (SLD), KSCM, SDL and MSZP in three successive surveys.

Poland			
	Oct. 1991	Oct. 1992	Jan. 1993
former comm. party members ...			
in % of total:	14	11	13
among SdRP-supporters (%):	50	32	40
% of former comm. party members			
supporting SdRP:	26	23	21
SdRP-supporters in % of total:	7	8	7
Czech Republic			
	Oct. 1991	Sep. 1992	Apr. 1993
former comm. party members ...			
in % of total:	22	19	20
among KSCM-supporters (%):	65	57	60
% of former comm. party members			
supporting KSCM:	13	36	34
KSCM-supporters in % of total:	4	12	12
Slovakia			
	Oct. 1991	Sep. 1992	Apr. 1993
former comm. party members ...			
in % of total:	17	16	16
among SDL-supporters (%):	66	38	36
% of former comm. party members			
supporting SDL:	22	45	59
SDL-supporters in % of total:	6	18	25
Hungary			
	Oct. 1991	Sep. 1992	Jan. 1993
former comm. party members ...			
in % of total:	15	16	13
among MSZP-supporters (%):	55	39	36
% of former comm. party members			
supporting MSZP:	30	34	40
MSZP-supporters in % of total:	8	14	14

Note: All table entries were calculated by crosstabulating the answers for the questions about respondents' former communist party membership and the likely direction of their vote if there was an election next weekend. All respondents who failed to name a party on this latter question were excluded from the calculation of the reported percentages.

Source: compiled from Dohnalik et al. (1991), CEU (1992) and CEU (1993).

Table 7.A: Strength of association between party preference and various social background variables in Poland at three different points in time: uncertainty (with party preference as dependent; T-values in parentheses) and correlation (eta, with party preference as the independent variable) coefficients.

Date of survey	October 1991	October 1992	January 1993
white-collar occupation (non-manual employees vs. all else)			
uncert. coef.:	.04 (4.89)	.04 (4.70)	.03 (3.72)
correlation:	.36	.36	.31
working class occupation (non-agricultural employees doing manual work vs. all else)			
uncert. coef.:	.01 (2.48)	.01 (2.28)	.01 (2.49)
correlation:	.22	.20	.22
farmer (agricultural workers and farmers vs. all else)			
uncert. coef.:	.06 (5.33)	.04 (4.57)	.03 (4.02)
correlation:	.49	.41	.35
size of community (rural vs. small town vs. large town residents)			
uncert. coef.:	.07 (6.65)	.08 (7.31)	.06 (5.74)
correlation:	.41	.44	.40
education (low vs. average vs. secondary vs. higher)			
uncert. coef.:	.07 (7.06)	.05 (5.55)	.05 (4.83)
correlation:	.47	.37	.37
age (18-29 vs. 30-44 vs. 45-60 vs. 61+ years old)			
uncert. coef.:	.01 (2.31)	.03 (4.02)	.01 (2.28)
correlation:	.17	.17	.15
frequency of church attendance (monthly vs. less often vs. never)			
uncert. coef.:	.03 (3.72)	.03 (4.38)	.03 (3.70)
correlation:	.33	.30	.29

Sources: compiled from Dohnalik et al. (1991), CEU (1992) and CEU (1993).

NOTE: respondents who had no party preference and supporters of smaller parties were excluded from the analysis. The party preference variable was derived from answers for the question "If there is a parliamentary election next Sunday, which party would you vote for?" and was recoded into the following categories: peasant parties (PSL, PL, Solidarnosc RI, Samoobrona); Christian parties (ZChN, PChP, SLChD); PC or RdR; NSZZ "Solidarnosc"; liberal parties (KLD, URP); UD; KPN; SdRP (or SLD).

Table 7.B: Strength of association between party preference and various social background variables in the Czech Republic at three different points in time: uncertainty (with party preference as dependent; T-values in parentheses) and correlation (eta, with party preference as the independent variable) coefficients.

Date of survey	October 1991	September 1992	April 1993
white-collar occupation (non-manual employees vs. all else)			
non-manual employees vs. all else			
uncert. coef.:	.01 (3.01)	.01 (2.40)	.01 (3.24)
correlation:	.22	.18	.22
working class occupation (non-agricultural employees doing manual work vs. all else)			
uncert. coef.:	.01 (2.54)	.01 (1.97)	.00 (1.67)
correlation:	.19	.15	.12
farmer (agricultural workers and farmers vs. all else)			
uncert. coef.:	.02 (3.14)	.01 (2.44)	.02 (3.16)
correlation:	.36	.21	.27
size of community (rural vs. small town vs. large town residents)			
uncert. coef.:	.03 (4.59)	.03 (4.15)	.01 (2.51)
correlation:	.28	.22	.14
education (low vs. average vs. secondary vs. higher)			
uncert. coef.:	.03 (4.84)	.02 (3.71)	.02 (4.41)
correlation:	.28	.21	.25
age (18-29 vs. 30-44 vs. 45-60 vs. 61+ years old)			
uncert. coef.:	.03 (4.44)	.03 (4.63)	.03 (4.63)
correlation:	.24	.27	.24
frequency of church attendance (monthly vs. less often vs. never)			
uncert. coef.:	.05 (5.82)	.07 (6.36)	.05 (6.08)
correlation:	.42	.48	.43

Sources: compiled from Dohnalik et al. (1991), CEU (1992) and CEU (1993).

NOTE: respondents who had no party preference and supporters of smaller parties were excluded from the analysis. The party preference variable was derived from answers for the question "If there is a parliamentary election next Sunday, which party would you vote for?" and was recoded into the following categories: KSCM; CSSD; LSU and CSS; HSD-SMS; Agriculture Party; Greens; SPR-RSC; OH; ODA; ODS-KDS; KDU-CSL.

Table 7.C: Strength of association between party preference and various social background variables in Slovakia at three different points in time: uncertainty (with party preference as dependent ; T-values in parentheses) and correlation (eta, with party preference as the independent variable) coefficients.

Date of survey	October 1991	September 1992	April 1993
white-collar occupation (non-manual employees vs. all else)			
uncert. coef.:	.01 (2.20)	.02 (3.70)	.01 (2.26)
correlation:	.20	.24	.17
working class occupation (non-agricultural employees doing manual work vs. all else)			
uncert. coef.:	.01 (1.73)	.01 (2.83)	.00 (1.63)
correlation:	.16	.20	.12
farmer (agricultural workers and farmers vs. all else)			
uncert. coef.:	.01 (1.83)	.01 (3.17)	.00 (1.82)
correlation:	.15	.14	.10
size of community (rural vs. small town vs. large town residents)			
uncert. coef.:	.02 (2.95)	.02 (3.75)	.01 (3.08)
correlation:	.20	.22	.13
education (low vs. average vs. secondary vs. higher)			
uncert. coef.:	.03 (4.03)	.03 (3.86)	.02 (4.06)
correlation:	.26	.24	.17
age (18-29 vs. 30-44 vs. 45-60 vs. 61+ years old)			
uncert. coef.:	.04 (4.23)	.03 (3.93)	.02 (3.97)
correlation:	.30	.27	.24
frequency of church attendance (monthly vs. less often vs. never)			
uncert. coef.:	.10 (7.58)	.07 (6.80)	.07 (7.85)
correlation:	.51	.42	.45

Sources: compiled from Dohnalik et al. (1991), CEU (1992) and CEU (1993).

NOTE: respondents who had no party preference and supporters of smaller parties were excluded from the analysis. The party preference variable was derived from answers for the question "If there is a parliamentary election next Sunday, which party would you vote for?" and was recoded into the following categories: KDH; ODU or VPN or SKD; DS; MKM-EG-MNP; SKDH; SNS; Greens; HZDS; SDSS; SDL.

Table 7.D: Strength of association between party preference and various social background variables in Hungary at three different points in time: uncertainty (with party preference as dependent; T-values in parentheses) and correlation (eta, with party preference as the independent variable) coefficients.

Date of survey	October 1991	September 1992	January 1993
white-collar occupation (non-manual employees vs. all else)			
uncert. coef.:	.01 (3.06)	.01 (2.86)	.01 (2.84)
correlation:	.19	.18	.18
working class occupation (non-agricultural employees doing manual work vs. all else)			
uncert. coef.:	.00 (1.56)	.00 (1.14)	.00 (.81)
correlation:	.11	.08	.06
farmer (agricultural workers and farmers vs. all else)			
uncert. coef.:	.01 (2.23)	.01 (2.50)	.01 (2.49)
correlation:	.18	.22	.23
size of community (rural vs. small town vs. large town residents)			
uncert. coef.:	.02 (3.41)	.02 (3.96)	.02 (3.23)
correlation:	.21	.24	.23
education (low vs. average vs. secondary vs. higher)			
uncert. coef.:	.03 (4.88)	.03 (4.44)	.03 (4.27)
correlation:	.25	.23	.23
age (18-29 vs. 30-44 vs. 45-60 vs. 61+ years old)			
uncert. coef.:	.07 (7.57)	.05 (5.73)	.09 (7.64)
correlation:	.45	.36	.48
frequency of church attendance (monthly vs. less often vs. never)			
uncert. coef.:	.06 (6.47)	.05 (5.15)	.05 (5.50)
correlation:	.40	.36	.38

Sources: compiled from Dohnalik et al. (1991), CEU (1992) and CEU (1993).

NOTE: respondents who had no party preference and supporters of smaller parties were excluded from the analysis. The party preference variable was derived from answers for the question "If there is a parliamentary election next Sunday, which party would you vote for?" and was recoded into the following categories: MDF, SZDSZ, FKGP, MSZP, FIDESZ, KDNP.

Table 7.E: Strength of association between party preference and various social background variables in various other party systems in 1990: uc (uncertainty coefficients, with party preference as dependent; T-values in parentheses).

variable:	white collar		worker		farmer			
	uc	T-val.	uc	T-val.	uc	T-val.		
Australia	.00	(2.35)	.01	(3.37)	-			
USA	.01	(1.93)	.01	(1.76)	.00	(0.59)		
Ireland	.00	(0.65)	.01	(1.68)	.01	(2.09)		
North.Ireland	.01	(2.28)	.01	(1.86)	-			
Great Britain	.04	(3.96)	.04	(4.07)	-			
Norway	.01	(3.71)	.01	(3.18)	.03	(4.45)		
West Germany	.00	(1.46)	.01	(3.46)	.01	(2.81)		
East Germany	.01	(2.26)	.01	(1.94)	.00	(1.07)		
Italy	.00	(1.10)	.01	(2.47)	-			

  

variable:	size of community		education		age		church attendance	
	uc	T-val.	uc	T-val.	uc	T-val	uc	T-val
Australia	.03	(5.70)	.01	(2.71)	.01	(3.89)	.01	(3.68)
USA	.02	(2.61)	.02	(2.57)	.01	(2.24)	.01	(1.55)
Ireland	.03	(3.49)	.03	(3.79)	.01	(2.26)	.01	(2.24)
North.Ireland	-		.03	(3.76)	.02	(3.47)	.02	(3.69)
Great Britain	-		.02	(2.72)	.01	(2.15)	.02	(2.86)
Norway	.01	(3.58)	.02	(4.54)	.02	(4.37)	.08	(8.25)
West Germany	.02	(4.00)	.05	(6.85)	.06	(8.43)	.05	(6.65)
East Germany	.02	(3.05)	.04	(4.98)	.01	(2.50)	.02	(3.53)
Italy	.02	(3.34)	.03	(4.68)	.02	(3.81)	.05	(5.75)

Source: compiled from ISSP 1990 data files.

NOTE: respondents who had no party preference and supporters of smaller parties were excluded from the analysis. The party preference variable was normally derived from answers for the question "If there is a parliamentary election next Sunday, which party would you vote for?", except in the US, Britain, West Germany and Northern Ireland, where party identification was asked; and in Italy and East Germany, where vote in the last election was asked. The answers were recoded into the following categories:

Australia: Liberal; Labour; Country; Australian Democrats;

USA: Democrat; Republican;

Ireland: Fianna Fail; Fine Gael; Labour P. or Workers' Party; Progressive Democrats;

Northern Ireland: Conservative; Labour P. or Workers' Party; SDP or Alliance (Mainland) or Alliance (NI); DUP; OUP; SDLP.

Great Britain: Conservatives; Labour; Liberal Democrats;

Norway: Labour or Red Electoral Alliance; Progress P.; Conservatives; Christian Democrats; Centre P.; Socialist P.

West Germany: CDU/CSU; SPD; FDP; Greens;

East Germany: CDU/CSU; SPD; FDP; Greens or Bundnis; PDS;

Italy: MSI; DC; PLI; PRI or PSDI or PR; PSI; Liste Verde; PCI; Leghe.

Table 8: "What do you like (dislike) about ... (party)?"

Note: The parties about which the respondents were asked:

	Poland	Czech R.	Slovakia	Hungary	US	Germany
PARTY A	KPN	CSSD	KDH	SZDSZ	Rep. ('52)	CDU/CSU ('72)
PARTY B	UD	ODA	SNS	KDNP	Dem. ('52)	SPD ('72)
PARTY C	ZChN	ODS	HZDS	MDF	Rep. ('80)	CDU/CSU ('87)
PARTY D	SdRP	KSCM	SDL	MSZP	Dem. ('80)	SPD ('87)
PARTY E	PSL	SPR-RSC	SSDS	FKGP	-	-
PARTY F	KLD	CSL	SKD	FIDESZ	-	-
PARTY G	PC	LSU	DS	-	-	-

Percentage of respondents who did not give any reason either for liking or for disliking the party

	Poland	Czech R.	Slovakia	Hungary	US	Germany
PARTY A	41	35	13	42	21	14
PARTY B	43	34	21	48	15	14
PARTY C	40	13	12	34	46	5
PARTY D	48	19	22	46	40	6
PARTY E	47	44	45	30		
PARTY F	62	28	64	27		
PARTY G	48	42	53			

Sources: The German and American data was published in Klingemann and Wattenberg (1992). The source of the data about PSL, SPR-RSC, SSDS, KLD, CSL, SKD, PC, LSU, DS is CEU (1993). The rest of the reported data come from CEU (1992).

Table 9: "What do you like (dislike) about ... (party)?" Frequency of some types of reasonings given by the respondents.

Note: On the parties which the respondents were asked about see table 8. The table entries in the rows starting with "PARTY A +" show the percentage of respondents in the given country who answered the "What do you like about ... (PARTY A)?" question with saying something about the alleged domestic policies, etc. of the party. The table entries in the rows starting with "PARTY A -" show the same percentages in the case of the question about "And what do you dislike about ... (PARTY A)?" Because the respondents were allowed to give more than one reason, the total frequency of various reasons given for liking or disliking a party may exceed 100, though the frequency of references to competence and some other factors are not shown on the table.

	references to domestic policies (in % of the sample)					
	Poland	Czech R.	Slovakia	Hungary	US	Germany
PARTY A +	6	17	16	5	15	17
PARTY A -	3	4	16	4	26	4
PARTY B +	8	9	29	7	37	17
PARTY B -	6	4	5	12	22	17
PARTY C +	8	22	23	5	11	44
PARTY C -	22	22	10	22	7	29
PARTY D +	11	12	18	9	11	38
PARTY D -	2	5	3	1	12	26
PARTY E +	17	6	21	12		
PARTY E -	6	1	3	10		
PARTY F +	9	12	3	4		
PARTY F -	11	26	2	1		
PARTY G +	4	27	6			
PARTY G -	3	8	2			

	references to party ideology (in % of the sample)					
	Poland	Czech R.	Slovakia	Hungary	US	Germany
PARTY A +	7	2	9	3	11	6
PARTY A -	4	5	4	1	6	6
PARTY B +	4	3	1	13	11	8
PARTY B -	1	2	12	9	9	10
PARTY C +	9	1	0	2	11	5
PARTY C -	8	2	2	4	5	6
PARTY D +	1	1	1	4	8	4
PARTY D -	6	4	4	4	8	10
PARTY E +	1	1	3	0		
PARTY E -	1	6	2	1		
PARTY F +	1	11	4	1		
PARTY F -	1	7	1	0		
PARTY G +	2	0	10			
PARTY G -	1	3	1			

(continued)

Table 9 (continued)

	references to social groups which the party is for or against (in % of the sample)						
	Poland	Czech R.	Slovakia	Hungary	US	Germany	
PARTY A +	6	8	9	4	3	6	
PARTY A -	2	3	15	3	20	11	
PARTY B +	4	0	2	4	33	18	
PARTY B -	4	3	5	4	5	5	
PARTY C +	5	1	7	2	4	8	
PARTY C -	13	8	4	8	19	34	
PARTY D +	11	7	12	11	26	36	
PARTY D -	14	5	6	6	4	8	
PARTY E +	21	11	10	9			
PARTY E -	6	5	2	4			
PARTY F +	3	5	1	13			
PARTY F -	4	3	2	3			
PARTY G +	3	5	3				
PARTY G -	1	2	2				

	references to party leaders (in % of the sample)						
	Poland	Czech R.	Slovakia	Hungary	US	Germany	
PARTY A +	5	3	1	2	12	10	
PARTY A -	10	6	4	2	6	16	
PARTY B +	10	16	1	2	8	10	
PARTY B -	3	5	2	2	11	15	
PARTY C +	1	17	9	4	4	14	
PARTY C -	2	7	8	7	4	14	
PARTY D +	2	1	13	9	4	12	
PARTY D -	1	3	0	2	4	15	
PARTY E +	9	5	3	4			
PARTY E -	1	25	1	23			
PARTY F +	4	6	1	4			
PARTY F -	3	5	0	1			
PARTY G +	5	3	1				
PARTY G -	11	7	1				

Source: same as for table 8.

Table 11.A: Ideological dimensions of party competition in Poland at Fall 1992 (unrotated factors).

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3
Explained variance:	40%	31%	15%
	Factor loadings:		
KPN	.21	-.27	.92
PSL	-.78	.09	.20
SDRP	-.94	.22	.09
ZCHN	.58	-.62	-.24
UD	-.09	.96	.02
PC	.78	.42	.33
KLD	.58	.78	-.12
	Factor scores of items:		
reduce inequalities	-.88	*	.81
support free market	1.27	1.62	-.59
competent managers	*	1.05	*
defend democracy	*	*	*
less economic burden	-1.05	-.59	*
environment	-.69	*	-.53
social services	-.66	*	*
moral renewal	*	-.93	-1.26
abortion allowed	-1.05	1.28	*
protect companies	-.72	-1.00	-.60
patriotism	*	-.75	1.52
pensions and benefits	-.92	*	*
increase church influence	1.21	-1.83	-2.21
speed up privatization	1.58	1.76	-.77
reduce unemployment	-.90	*	*
fight crime	*	*	*
decommunization	2.24	-1.12	2.37
foreign policy	*	.75	*

\*: absolute value of factor score is less than .50.

Note: The table shows the results of a principal component analysis of the aggregated individual level data shown in APPENDIX B.  
Source: CEU (1992).

Table 11.B: Ideological dimensions of party competition in the Czech Republic at Fall 1992 (unrotated factors).

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3
Explained variance:	50%	17%	16%
	Factor loadings:		
KSCM	.89	.31	-.15
CSSD	.86	.17	.05
LSU	.58	-.13	-.27
RSC	-.06	.11	.96
CSL	-.16	-.94	.00
ODA	-.84	.35	-.19
ODS	-.95	.21	-.15
	Factor scores of items:		
reduce inequalities	1.07	*	.74
support free market	-1.48	*	-.87
competent managers	-.67	*	-.76
defend democracy	*	*	*
less economic burden	1.38	*	*
environment	.71	-.74	-1.05
social services	*	*	*
moral renewal	*	-1.00	*
abortion allowed	*	2.12	*
protect companies	1.27	*	*
patriotism	*	*	1.29
pensions and benefits	1.18	*	*
increase church influence	-.60	-3.13	*
speed up privatization	-1.81	.52	-.84
reduce unemployment	1.23	*	*
fight crime	*	*	*
decommunization	-1.27	*	3.16
foreign policy	-.94	.55	-1.03

\*: absolute value of factor score is less than .50.

Note: The table shows the results of a principal component analysis of the aggregated individual level data shown in APPENDIX B.  
Source: CEU (1992).

Table 11.C: Ideological dimensions of party competition in Slovakia at Fall 1992 (unrotated factors).

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3
Explained variance:	51%	21%	18%
	Factor loadings:		
SDL	.94	.07	.30
SDSS	.68	-.25	.54
HZDS	.77	.53	.00
SNS	.30	.35	-.82
KDH	-.65	-.63	-.09
DS	-.77	.50	.33
SKD	-.73	.60	.29
	Factor scores of items:		
reduce inequalities	.74	*	.87
support free market	-.80	1.17	.52
competent managers	*	.74	*
defend democracy	*	*	.59
less economic burden	.85	*	.53
environment	*	-.81	*
social services	*	*	.53
moral renewal	*	-1.11	*
abortion allowed	*	1.72	.59
protect companies	.94	-.60	*
patriotism	.60	.61	-3.19
pensions and benefits	.82	-.83	.94
increase church influence	-1.81	-2.15	-.73
speed up privatization	-1.44	1.63	.71
reduce unemployment	1.16	-.55	*
fight crime	*	*	*
decommunization	-2.32	*	*
foreign policy	.65	.77	-1.44

\*: absolute value of factor score is less than .50.

Note: The table shows the results of a principal component analysis of the aggregated individual level data shown in APPENDIX B.  
Source: CEU (1992).

Table 11.D: Ideological dimensions of party competition in Hungary at Fall 1992 (unrotated factors).

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2
Explained variance:	52%	28%
	Factor loadings:	
KDNP	-.59	-.53
MSZP	.84	-.39
MDF	-.63	.54
FKGP	-.67	.62
SZDSZ	.69	.67
FIDESZ	.86	.37
	Factor scores of items:	
reduce inequalities	.74	*
support free market	*	1.69
competent managers	.92	*
defend democracy	.77	*
less economic burden	*	*
environment	.90	-.62
social services	.55	-.67
moral renewal	-.64	-1.19
abortion allowed	1.55	.60
protect companies	*	-1.61
patriotism	-1.33	*
pensions and benefits	*	-.64
increase church influence	-2.39	-1.53
speed up privatization	-.58	1.35
reduce unemployment	.89	*
fight crime	*	*
decommunization	-1.41	1.82
foreign policy	*	.51

\*: absolute value of factor score is less than .50.

Note: The table shows the results of a principal component analysis of the aggregated individual level data shown in APPENDIX B.  
Source: CEU (1992).

Table 10: How important it is ... (to reduce unjust inequalities, etc.).

	Poland	Czech R.	Slovakia	Hungary
Rating of various policies on a five point scale (1=very important, 5=not important at all)				
Q18A Reduce inequalities	1.6	2.0	1.5	1.5
Q18B Help private enterprises	2.5	1.8	2.1	2.0
Q18C Competent managers	1.4	1.1	1.2	1.2
Q18D Defend human rights	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.4
Q18E Less economic burden	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3
Q18F Environment protection	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.7
Q18G Better health care	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.3
Q18H Deterioration of moral	1.8	1.3	1.3	1.5
Q18I Abortion allowed	2.3	1.9	2.3	1.8
Q18J Protect companies	2.5	3.2	2.4	3.2
Q18K Strengthen patriotism	1.9	2.1	2.0	2.3
Q18L Increase pensions, etc.	1.5	1.8	1.5	1.4
Q18M Incr. church influence	3.7	3.6	3.3	3.3
Q18N Speed up privatization	2.7	2.1	2.5	2.8
Q18O Reduce unemployment	1.4	2.0	1.4	1.4
Q18P Fight crime	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.4
Q18Q Decommunization	2.9	2.3	2.7	2.8
Q18R Effective foreign policy	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.8
Q18S SEE APPENDIX	1.9	1.5	1.3	-
Q18T SEE APPENDIX	-	3.0	3.6	-

Note: for the exact wording of the items see APPENDIX A.

Source: CEU (1992).

APPENDIX A: The phrasing of the items of question 17 and 18 in CEU (1992).

q.17 "I am going to read some political goals. Please, tell me after each, which party or parties in ... (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) you think really wish to reach that objective. You can name maximum three parties in each case. Then I am going to ask you which party you think is the least likely to pursue that goal. Please, consider every parties operating in our country, not only those which we talked about earlier."

q.18: "Now I would like to ask you how important each of these political goals are for you personally. When one of them is very important for you, answer with one, if it is not important for you at all, answer with five, and so on.")

- a. Reduce unjust inequalities between people
- b. Help the development of private enterprises and a free market economy in ... (COUNTRY)
- c. Guarantee that competent people are to be in charge of the economy
- d. Defend human rights and individual freedom in ...(COUNTRY)
- e. Guarantee that less economic burdenis put on the shoulder of people during the transformation of our economy
- f. Make more effective steps in environment protection
- g. Provide better health care and education
- h. Stop the deterioration of moral in our country
- i. Guarantee that women can have abortion if they decide so
- j. Protect unprofitable companies and mines from bankruptcy
- k. Strengthen national feelings
- l. Increase pensions and social benefits
- m. Increase the influence of religion and the Church(es)
- n. Speed up privatization of state-owned companies
- o. Reduce unemployment
- p. Give the police proper means to fight crime effectively
- q. Removing former communist party members from positions of influence
- r. Representing (promoting) ... (CZECH, POLISH, ETC.) interests abroad better
- s. (POLAND ONLY) Protect the Polish food market by customs and taxes from foreign products.
- s. (CSFR ONLY) Preserve friendly relations between Czechs and Slovaks.
- t. (CSFR ONLY) The rapid separation of the Czech and Slvak Republics.

APPENDIX B/A: Direction and distinctiveness of party positions on various issues adjusted for differences in the overall popularity of the parties in question. Mass survey data, Fall 1992, Poland.

Reading instruction: The table shows percentage figures which were obtained by subtracting the percentage of respondents naming the party as the one least likely to pursue the goal in question from the percentage of respondents naming the party as one which pursues that goal. Thus, minus six means that six percent more of the respondents thought that the party was most unlikely to pursue that goal than as many thought that the party was likely to pursue it. The text of the question and the items (indicated with A to T) is shown in APPENDIX A.

	KPN	PSL	SdRP	PL	ZChN	UD	PC	KLD
A reduce ineq.	23	17	37	1	10	24	6	-6
B free market	6	4	-20	2	8	40	18	49
C competent manag.	15	14	17	1	2	36	10	26
D defend democracy	24	10	18	1	13	34	4	12
E less burden	19	14	38	1	5	15	0	-12
F environment	5	16	5	6	4	13	2	0
G social services	10	14	33	1	6	26	7	2
H moral renewal	8	4	-2	2	59	14	2	4
I abortion allowed	8	6	59	1	-65	32	4	11
J protect compan.	7	6	34	1	1	6	1	-23
K patriotism	47	7	7	0	23	15	4	5
L pensions & benf.	15	11	40	0	1	21	2	-14
M church influence	-2	1	-52	1	75	-3	2	0
N privatization	2	2	-23	0	10	40	22	52
O reduce unemploy.	16	12	42	2	4	19	2	-8
P fight crime	21	7	14	1	10	25	8	11
Q decommunization	55	1	-62	1	38	2	26	4
R foreign policy	15	10	9	1	10	34	8	23
S food market	7	51	9	20	-1	5	1	-14

N=480 (41.8 % of the total sample).

Note: Respondents who did not rate all the eight parties on question 10 (see text in table 3) were excluded from the analysis. The number of respondents remaining in the analysis is shown at the bottom of the table. Responses were weighted so as to adjust the data for differences in the popularity of the parties. For each party a different weight was used so that respondents giving a score of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 all account for one seventh of the weighted sample.

Source: CEU (1992).

APPENDIX B/B: Direction and distinctiveness of party positions on various issues adjusted for differences in the overall popularity of the parties in question. Mass survey data, Fall 1992, Czech Republic.

Reading instruction: The table shows percentage figures which were obtained by subtracting the percentage of respondents naming the party as the one least likely to pursue the goal in question from the percentage of respondents naming the party as one which pursues that goal. Thus, minus six means that six percent more of the respondents thought that the party was most unlikely to pursue that goal than as many thought that the party was likely to pursue it. The text of the question and the items (indicated with A to T) is shown in APPENDIX A.

	KSCM	CSSD	LSU	HSD- SMS	SPR- RSC	KDU- CSL	ODA	ODS
A reduce ineq.	35	34	16	4	11	17	7	-23
B free market	-50	3	4	0	-1	14	42	71
C competent manag.	-6	12	10	1	1	13	36	49
D defend democracy	8	17	10	3	3	22	22	23
E less burden	33	45	23	1	7	12	10	-32
F environment	-5	4	49	1	1	8	4	-4
G social services	20	19	9	0	2	19	14	12
H moral renewal	2	14	8	1	2	40	13	10
I abortion allowed	17	13	4	0	3	-48	13	23
J protect compan.	44	31	12	1	0	1	3	-39
K patriotism	-1	10	5	25	15	12	14	3
L pensions & benf.	38	37	11	1	1	7	3	-23
M church influence	-62	1	2	1	-1	80	2	5
N privatization	-56	0	2	0	0	12	50	82
O reduce unemploy.	45	39	15	2	6	8	7	-22
P fight crime	5	9	6	1	9	12	18	32
Q decommunization	-69	2	0	1	32	10	26	43
R foreign policy	-11	5	2	0	-3	8	36	52
S Czech-Slovak rel.	37	28	15	7	5	15	3	-6
T rapid separation	-45	-19	-8	0	-5	13	46	77

N=666 (81.7% of the total sample).

Note: Respondents who did not rate all the eight parties on question 10 (see text in table 3) were excluded from the analysis. The number of respondents remaining in the analysis is shown at the bottom of the table. Responses were weighted so as to adjust the data for differences in the popularity of the parties. For each party a different weight was used so that respondents giving a score of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 all account for one seventh of the weighted sample.

Source: CEU (1992).

APPENDIX B/C: Direction and distinctiveness of party positions on various issues adjusted for differences in the overall popularity of the parties in question. Mass survey data, Fall 1992, Slovakia.

Reading instruction: The table shows percentage figures which were obtained by subtracting the percentage of respondents naming the party as the one least likely to pursue the goal in question from the percentage of respondents naming the party as one which pursues that goal. Thus, minus six means that six percent more of the respondents thought that the party was most unlikely to pursue that goal than as many thought that the party was likely to pursue it. The text of the question and the items (indicated with A to T) is shown in APPENDIX A.

	SDL	SDSS	HZDS	SNS	KDH	MKM- E-M	DS	SKD
A reduce ineq.	45	17	40	15	5	5	3	-5
B free market	-1	5	43	15	11	1	11	25
C competent manag.	35	6	49	15	-6	-2	5	11
D defend democracy	29	14	33	22	16	9	6	6
E less burden	42	14	46	13	0	3	1	-10
F environment	9	1	13	4	2	0	0	-4
G social services	32	11	37	13	15	3	3	4
H moral renewal	15	5	23	7	54	7	2	0
I abortion allowed	40	5	47	15	-73	4	6	13
J protect compan.	40	9	46	15	-8	-1	-1	-19
K patriotism	9	1	44	83	-9	-4	-1	-11
L pensions & benf.	40	18	39	9	7	3	1	-9
M church influence	-48	0	-13	2	91	20	4	-1
N privatization	-14	1	36	9	9	3	15	35
O reduce unemploy.	52	15	50	15	-3	1	-1	-12
P fight crime	25	5	57	19	-2	-1	2	0
Q decommunization	-49	0	-2	15	54	4	15	28
R foreign policy	20	5	67	50	2	-13	1	-2
S Czech-Slovak rel.	32	18	12	-32	34	11	18	31
T rapid separation	-2	-5	60	76	-33	-6	-3	-18

N=641 (90.0 % of the total sample).

Note: Respondents who did not rate all the eight parties on question 10 (see text in table 3) were excluded from the analysis. The number of respondents remaining in the analysis is shown at the bottom of the table. Responses were weighted so as to adjust the data for differences in the popularity of the parties. For each party a different weight was used so that respondents giving a score of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 all account for one seventh of the weighted sample.

Source: CEU (1992).

APPENDIX B/D: Direction and distinctiveness of party positions on various issues adjusted for differences in the overall popularity of the parties in question. Mass survey data, Fall 1992, Hungary.

Reading instruction: The table shows percentage figures which were obtained by subtracting the percentage of respondents naming the party as the one least likely to pursue the goal in question from the percentage of respondents naming the party as one which pursues that goal. Thus, minus six means that six percent more of the respondents thought that the party was most unlikely to pursue that goal than as many thought that the party was likely to pursue it. The text of the question and the items (indicated with A to T) is shown in APPENDIX A.

	KDNP	MSZP	MDF	FKGP	SZDSZ	FIDESZ
A reduce ineq.	24	41	17	14	32	43
B free market	5	-1	42	34	40	31
C competent manag.	13	34	21	14	39	47
D defend democracy	30	26	29	8	43	47
E less burden	18	13	16	6	25	36
F environment	17	41	-1	13	30	38
G social services	40	31	21	3	31	39
H moral renewal	58	18	28	10	18	19
I abortion allowed	-35	34	12	6	38	47
J protect compan.	8	26	4	7	10	8
K patriotism	33	8	53	33	15	20
L pensions & benf.	28	43	21	11	27	31
M church influence	78	-19	35	24	-3	0
N privatization	8	-6	44	29	35	27
O reduce unemploy.	15	43	5	15	32	39
P fight crime	14	22	41	14	27	24
Q decommunization	15	-36	42	45	30	25
R foreign policy	14	27	51	11	34	30

N=891 (74.2 % of the total sample).

Note: Respondents who did not rate all the eight parties on question 10 (see text in table 3) were excluded from the analysis. The number of respondents remaining in the analysis is shown at the bottom of the table. Responses were weighted so as to adjust the data for differences in the popularity of the parties. For each party a different weight was used so that respondents giving a score of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 all account for one seventh of the weighted sample.

Source: CEU (1992).