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Party Systems and Voting Behaviour in the Visegrad Countries 15 Years After the Transition

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It is probably fair to say that in the course of the 1990s the emphasis in the international scholarly literature on party systems and electoral alignments in Eastern and Central Europe in general, and the Visegrad countries in particular, shifted far away from the initial emphasis on the inherent instability of post-authoritarian contexts represented by works like Ágh (1998), Cotta (1994), Rose and Mishler (1995). Instead, the main theme in the literature of the late 1990s was the remarkable ability of some or even most of these party systems to offer intelligible programmatic alternatives and party-voter linkages, and the need to explain a surprisingly large cross-national variation across the post-communist landscape in any aspect of the political and policy changes that the observers looked at (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Kitschelt *et al.* 1999; Mateju and Reháková 1996; Mateju and Vlachova 1997; Miller *et al.* 1998; Tóka 1996b, 1997b; Tworzecki 2002). Yet this shift was probably as much a reflection of intellectual fashion as that of actual political developments in the region.[1] It is probably not so surprising, then, that in recent years the pendulum is again swinging in the evaluative remarks about the outcome of post-communist political transitions. This time, the new trend appears to be an accentuation of how underdeveloped is the soft, social infrastructure of democracy basically everywhere east of Germany and Austria, in spite of the apparent consolidation of democracy and market economy west of the Belorussian-Ukrainian border. A new generation of assessments is now pointing out that strongly partitocratic regimes and weak civil societies, generating relative little *de facto* citizen participation and popular control of the policy making process emerged in the Eastern annex of the European Union (Adam *et al.* 2005; Biezen 2003; Howard 2003; Markowski 2005; Rose-Ackermann 2005).

In the present paper, we aim at a fresh assessment of party systems and electoral alignments in the Visegrad countries, and at giving justice to all three assessments by specifying in which respect each of them holds true. First we shall look at some basic parameters of party system development, then we turn our attention to voting behaviour, and finally to cleavage structures. Limits of space prevent us to reiterate basic facts about elections, parties, and political events in individual countries. It is not our choice but the (un)availability of cross-nationally comparable data

[1] In fact, the passing of time probably obfuscated rather than clarified programmatic alternatives in some of these party systems once the initial big issues of post-communist transition like the regaining of national independence,

that make us pay a great deal of attention to somewhat dated evidence from the last European Values Study in 1999/2000 and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems surveys in the 1996-2004 period, and that Slovakia is not as extensively covered in our tables as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.[2] Partly to compensate for these hiatuses, we tried to make the paper empirically richer by including a wide range of comparative referents from other East European countries and occasionally even from outside of Europe.

Party systems

Citizens' voting behaviour cannot stop reflecting or even mirroring the choice set that they face, i.e. the supply side of the electoral market. Not surprisingly, then, since the transition to democracy electoral politics in the countries of East Central Europe has been in a state of permanent flux (Kostelecky 1999). Parties were emerging and vanishing, merging and splitting – though remarkably less frequently in the South than in the North. Hungary (and beyond that Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Macedonia) witnessed far fewer changes in the identity of the major parties than Poland (and beyond that the Baltic States). In both North and South, however, the electoral alignments of the mass public were inevitably shifting with the changes in the party system, the crystallization of political alternatives and the ideological shifts of parties. Obviously, after half a century of communist dictatorship, the translation of social divisions into political alignments was bound to take some time – conceivably much more than after the comparatively short-lived and socially less transformative fascist regimes in post-war Italy or Germany (Cotta 1994). Consolidation was further delayed by rapid changes in the issues of political contestation, which can also be related to the tendency of communist rule – and consequently of post-communist transitions – to impact deeply on every sphere of life.

Following previous studies of Southern Europe and Latin America, we can benchmark the stabilization of post-democratization East Central European party systems by looking at the fragmentation of the party system, the inter-election changes (volatility) in individual parties' share of the vote, and – as a logical corollary of the latter – the percentage of partisan identifiers in the electorate (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Morlino 1995). In Table 1, party system fractionalization is measured with the effective number of electoral parties (*ENEP*) in two subsequent elections around 2000. If n is the number of parties winning any votes, and v_i is the fraction of votes obtained by the i^{th} party, then $ENEP = 1 \Big/ \sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i^2$. Thus, *ENEP* conveniently equals x when there are x parties competing in an election and each wins an equal share of the vote, but falls far below x if at least

large scale privatization, and market opening were settled for good.

[2] Regarding our data sources and other technicalities about our computations the reader is referred to the notes adjoining the tables.

one of these parties wins a much larger share of the vote than the others. Aggregate electoral volatility (AV) measures the stability of the party system with a similarly straightforward formula, namely $AV = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} |v_{it} - v_{it-1}|}{2}$, where v_{it} and v_{it-1} are the percentage of votes obtained by the i^{th} party at an election held at time t and in the previous election, respectively. The formula sums up the party by party differences between two subsequent election outcomes and divides the result by two because the percentage gains of the vote-winning (or new) parties necessarily equal the combined losses of all other parties together. While Table 2 provides more detailed data on both indicators for the Visegrad countries across the entire period since 1990, Table 1 focuses only on the average of the two elections closest in time to the dates when the survey data summarized in the column about partisanship in the electorate were collected.

A further technical note is due before the analysis. Following previous findings in the comparative literature, one would expect that party system fractionalization increases volatility and reduces partisanship in the electorate, while the latter are strongly and negatively correlated with each other (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995). These expectations are only met in these data if the suspiciously high percentage of party identifiers in the Russian and Ukrainian survey data – in fact, and quite counter-intuitively, higher than what turnout in legislative elections was in these countries at the time – are discarded in the analysis.[3] Therefore this is exactly what we will actually do below in the belief that translation problems or other factors made the survey data from these two countries incomparable to those obtained elsewhere with ostensibly the same question. In other words, Russia and the Ukraine are excluded from the calculation of the East European regional average reported at the bottom of the last column.

Table 1 about here

Since the table is otherwise unwieldy, some regional averages are presented in the bottom rows. One interesting finding is that around the turn of the millennium the four Visegrad countries were not really different from the West European average in terms of the number of parties and the partisanship of the electorate, but even then, at least Poland and Slovakia were dramatically different from Western Europe in terms of volatility. Yet, as the regional averages and previous studies make it plainly clear, by then Western Europe was significantly influenced by a new wave

[3] Of the mentioned correlations only the one between *ENEP* and *AV* (R=.475, p=.007) is significant across all data points shown in Table 1. The correlations between the first two indicators one the one hand and the incidence partisanship on the other substantially increase (from -.03 to -.35 between *ENEP* and partisanship, and from -.31 to -.69 between *AV* and partisanship) and reach statistical significance when the Russian and Ukrainian survey data are ignored.

of relatively volatile election results, increased party system fragmentation and a strong erosion of partisan attachments and traditional party alignments in the electorate (cf. Franklin *et al.* 1992; Mair 2002; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995). This new upheaval can be attributed both to recent socio-economic changes in affluent postindustrial societies and to an aging of their party systems. Hence a comparison with Southern and Eastern Europe may be more interesting, since these regions are still largely unaffected by these newer developments. In this comparison, the Visegrad countries turn out to be far more similar to the new democracies of Eastern than to the not-so-old democracies of Southern Europe. The latter are, in fact, marked by higher levels of partisanship and lower volatility and party system fragmentation than the older and more affluent democracies of North-Western Europe and Italy, and thus have far more consolidated party systems than the Visegrad countries. It is indeed striking how much higher electoral volatility still is in the latter than it was in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain – or post-fascist Germany for that matter - after the first four-five rounds of democratic elections in the postwar period (cf. Mair 1996; Morlino 1995).

Table 2 about here

Table 2 shows a more nuanced picture regarding party system development in the Visegrad countries. Here we further distinguish between 'raw' and 'adjusted' electoral volatility. The first shows a naïve calculus that counts as relevant electoral change even those instances where a party changed its name or formal organizational structure (thus turning, for example, from OH in 1992 to SD-LSNS in 1996 and then to CSNS in 1998), to recall a familiar example from recent Czech history. Adjusted volatility, in its turn, disregards every numerical change in vote distributions that, mathematically speaking, could be explained away as a mere artifact due to changes in party names, electoral alliances, party mergers and party splits. For instance, the main right-wing party in Hungary, commonly referred to as Fidesz, run a joint list with the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) in 2002, but then changed its official name (from Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party to Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Movement) and run a joint list with the KDNP – which was electorally non-existent in 2002 -, rather than the MDF in the 2006 election. The 'raw' estimate treats the 2006 vote (47 percent of the total) for the Fidesz-KDNP joint list and the MDF as votes for two entirely new parties, while the 'adjusted' count treats them as the vote for the same party that, under the guise of the Fidesz-MDF joint list, received 41 percent of the vote in 2002. In practice, judgments about party continuity inevitably involve drawing a more or less arbitrary threshold between 'continuity' and 'discontinuity', and hence neither of the two figures is perfect.[4] That is why we present here

[4] For instance, in the present analysis we treated the Freedom Union (US) as one successor – alongside with ODS itself – to what the ODS vote represented in the 1996 Czech elections. However, we decided to consider the ODA

both estimates to facilitate a judicious assessment.

The most interesting finding is the lack of clear trends over time, which is in stark contrast with the experiences of post-authoritarian Southern Europe, where both volatility and party system fractionalization sharply declined a few elections after the transition to democracies (Morlino 1995). Among the Visegrad countries only Hungary shows such a trend. In the Czech Republic and Poland trends are visible, if at all, only with respect to party system fragmentation, while in Slovakia they are altogether absent. The latter three countries, but especially Slovakia and Poland, also have much higher volatility and somewhat higher party system fragmentation than we might expect under their moderate PR systems and rather limited ethno-religious heterogeneity.[5] In contrast, by 2006 Hungary developed a strikingly stable and more concentrated party system than what we might expect under the mixed electoral system of that country.[6]

Of course, particularly low and particularly high levels of party system stabilization are both usually detrimental for instilling strong electoral accountability of governments and a simultaneously intelligible and nuanced representation of citizens' preferences in the legislature. Instead, a moderate level of party system fragmentation and electoral volatility may well be the ideal mix to strengthen both accountability mechanisms and representational linkages. Clearly the high fragmentation and volatility that we see in Poland and Slovakia may be prone to generate inordinately big shifts in the direction of public policies from one electoral cycle to another when no such shift is really justified in terms of the policy preferences of the entire electorate. Alternatively, following Sartori's (1976) model of polarized pluralism, we may expect them to generate unhealthy levels of ideological polarization and the dominance of government formation by a single party occupying the centre ground. In contrast, Hungary's near two-party system may generate such a low ideological polarization that, at least in the eyes of some citizens and observers, may reduce elections to a frivolous choice between two monozygotic twins.

Since ideological polarization is always a matter of degree, a comparative look can probably illuminate this matter a little better. Since we rely here on a survey of political scientists and other experts to judge how polarized European party systems are, the range of countries is slightly

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a party that went (temporarily) out of business in the 1998 election without any successor contesting the 1998 election. The more or less explicit rules behind such choices always refer (in our analysis consistently, we would hope) to a threshold of continuity that could just as well be drawn somewhat higher or somewhat lower.

[5] As a rough guide to the effective number of parties and electoral volatility that, given the historical experience of Western Europe, one may expect under different electoral systems, party system fragmentation and ethno-religious heterogeneity, see Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Lijphart (1994).

[6] The ENEP figure for Hungary in 2006 is identical to what Lijphart (1994: 104) reports as the average for first-past-the-post electoral systems across the established democracies in the 1945-1990 period. Since the Hungarian electoral system features majoritarian runoff rather than FPTP rules in the single-member districts, and the system as a whole is clearly dominated by a (high threshold) PR rather than majoritarian tendency, just on the basis of the electoral system one would expect a significantly higher ENEP figure in Hungary than those observed. The volatility – adjusted as described in the main text - in Hungary between 2002 and 2006 is also roughly equal to the 8.5 percent average of established democracies across the 1945-1985 period as reported by Bartolini and Mair (1990).

different from before. Ideological polarization is measured via the location of the parties on an abstract scale from left to right, which we expect to reflect distances between the parties on whatever is the major bone of contention between the parties in a given country – whether that is rooted in genuine policy differences, symbolic appeals, or a zero-sum competition between spoil-hunting clientelistic organizations.

Looking at Chart 1, we can observe that more fragmented party systems indeed tend to be ideologically more polarized. We can probably discount the results for Cyprus (CY), Malta (MT), and Moldova (MD), three small countries for which the available elite survey data on ideological polarization may feature unusually great measurement error. Then, only the two consociational ethno-federal states, Belgium (BE) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BA) stand apart with excessive party system fragmentation combined with relatively limited left-right ideological polarization. The rest of Europe seems to line up nicely along a single continuum running from the somewhat less fragmented and less polarized party systems clustering between Great Britain (UK) and Romania (RO), towards the more fragmented and highly polarized systems in Italy (IT), Norway (NO), and the less obviously democratic Ukraine (UA).

The location of the Visegrad countries in the chart is quite intriguing though. At least in the given data sets, the Czech (CZ) party system appears to be more ideologically polarized than the considerably more fragmented Polish (PL) and Slovak (SK) systems. In fact, the latter appear no more polarized than the Hungarian (HU) party system. If anything, it is the Polish party system that, with its combination of fragmentation and polarization levels, seems to be in a position near the mainstream of the European party systems in this chart. The Czech and Hungarian systems may even look a bit too polarized for how many political parties they are based on. Visually, this is signalled by their position slightly below the imaginary regression line that, running from Malta (MT) towards Switzerland (CH), could capture the central tendency of country locations in the chart. This quantitative observation is reinforced if we recall that of the four Visegrad countries it is indeed only the Czech Republic that has a permanently ostracised major party excluded from any governmental coalition on ideological grounds, as well as recurrent problems with forming cohesive legislative majorities. Hungary, in its turn, is also unique with its recent experience of the opposition questioning the legitimacy of election outcomes and violent street demonstrations aiming at a change of government - both motivated not the least by the sharp ideological opposition between the major party alternatives. In contrast, the persistently volatile Slovak party system may seem to have a bit too many parties for how limited the left-right ideological differences are between them. No doubt, the excess number of parties in Slovakia is partly, but not entirely explained by the one extra party added to the system by an ethno-linguistic cleavage that has no parallel in the other Visegrad countries. But the big picture seems to be that the party systems of

East Central Europe only approach the level of party system concentration and stabilization that is closer to the West European than to the current East European average when the left-right polarization between the parties reaches a point where it already creates dysfunctional consequences in the democratic process – as in the Czech Republic ever since 1990, and in Hungary in more recent years.

At this point in the analysis we cannot yet say anything about whether left-right distances between the parties in a given country reflect differences in socio-economic policies, stances on ethno-religious cleavages, purely clientelestic friend-foe oppositions, or what. What we can conclude from the findings of this section instead is that more than ten years after the post-communist transition the party systems of the Visegrad countries are not as unstable and unstructured as those further to the East and the South, but do not show a clear and inevitably progress toward catching up in these respects with the Western European – and even less with the South European – party systems. Where and when they nonetheless appear to be heading in that direction, they probably do so by carving out unusually distinctive and ideologically polarized party identities, which create problems of their own for the functioning of the democratic system.

Voting behaviour

The key normative questions regarding citizens' voting behaviour are whether voters act in an instrumentally rational manner with respect to the limited information and the political preferences they have, and whether their limited information allows them to make the same choices that they would if they were perfectly informed (Brennan and Hamlin 1999; Brennan and Lomasky 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). However, non-experimental empirical studies of voting behaviour have only the most limited opportunities to explore these questions directly. Therefore, they typically approach the problem indirectly, asking questions about whether issues, candidate characteristics, ideological labels, inherited partisan prejudices, the advice of their peers, economic conditions, or some other information shortcuts are most frequently relied upon by citizens in deciding which party to vote for (cf. e.g. Niemi and Weissberg 1993a, 1993b).

This is the approach that we too take below. Our analysis distinguishes between four possible cues that voters presumably use extensively in just about any democratic election. The degree to which they use one and the other can however shed some light on cross-national differences in how political culture interacts with the given institutional framework of democratic politics. The four cues that we focus on are attachments to leaders and parties on the one hand, and ideological self-placement and evaluations of government performance on the other.

As it will be seen shortly, these four cues to vote choice are not equally important in presidential and legislative elections, and – independently of the type of election – do not have the

same weight in presidential and parliamentary systems. Their relative importance also depends on how party-centred the national political culture is, and whether the political system is closer to what Lijphart (1984, 1999) described as the majoritarian or the consensual type of democracies. Hence, the statistical analysis below helps us to address such questions as whether voting behaviour in the Visegrad countries resembles what the typical voting behaviour is in parliamentary or presidential elections/systems; whether it fits the patterns of the West European party-centred and ideologically oriented, or of a clientelistic and leader-centred political culture; and whether it coheres with an institutional framework that stresses majoritarian or consensus-oriented principles.

Table 3 shows the fit between the four different cues and vote choices in particular elections, i.e. statistics about the degree to which we could predict the party (or presidential candidate) choice of a representative sample of individual citizens from their responses to each of four questions, referring to the four cues mentioned above.[7] The data come from a global study of voting behaviour in national elections, and it proved illuminating to keep in the analysis all elections covered by this study, including those held in non-European democracies. Unfortunately, Slovakia was not covered by this study, so here we can only examine three of the Visegrad countries – and for one of them, we can even do so for two different elections.

Table 3 about here

The leftmost column of Table 3 shows a dramatically clear distinction between the very low scores of countries under the impact of the party-centric politics of Western Europe, including all European cases in this analysis as well as New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Israel, and the much higher scores of Brazil, South Korea, Philippines and Taiwan on the other. In the latter, few if any people vote according to which party they consider their best representative – partly because so few people can name such a party. This holds true even for legislative elections, as is the case with respect to the Korean and Taiwanese data at hand. In contrast, the same relationship is virtually deterministic in the European countries even when it comes to presidential elections, as in the 2002 French data in the analysis. In the countries in this European fold, once we know which party people think represents them best, we also know with near certainty how they vote in elections. If we are to explain these differences in terms of the distinction between a party- and ideology-centred European, and a leader-oriented and clientelistic political culture, then it only makes good sense that

[7] The responses regarding vote choice in the last election and the four other questionnaire items are likely to be related through reciprocal causation. That is to say, it is not only that vote choice may be influenced by one's ideological position or evaluation of the government, but the latter can also be coloured by an attempt at rationalizing one's choice in the election. Even then, however, our analysis highlights at least the way people rationalize their electoral behaviour in different contexts – and that should also tell us something about how institutions and political culture shape actual voting behaviour in different countries.

the data on a Mexican congressional election and a US presidential election show a score half-way between the two extreme types.

Of the Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic occupies practically the same extreme position on the party-centric end as the Scandinavian countries or Israel, and Hungary is not very far from this pole either – though has probably been moving away from this pole recently. Poland, in its turn, is the only European country in this sample that has a score closer to that of the hybrid type constituted by Mexico and the United States than to the Scandinavian-Israeli-Czech end-point of this dimension of differentiation.

At first sight, a rather surprising picture confronts us in the second column of the table. It is not some famously leader-centric political context, say the South Korean, that produces the closest fit between vote choice on the one hand and which leader people see as the best representative of their views on the other, but the legislative elections of the legendarily collectivistic-impersonal Scandinavia. The explanation for this odd finding must be that in the Nordic countries party leaders tend to be seen as merely the first servant of the party's collective will, who can be a conductor of the orchestra but not the composer of the work they perform. In this mindset, the party leader can be just as good a representative of the views of a party's followers than the party itself – hence the very close correspondence between party choice on the one hand, and which leader people feel closest to their views on the other (cf. Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996). In the world of poorly institutionalized parties – say in Korea –, in contrast, attitudes towards national parties are easily separated from candidate choice in a local constituency race in legislative elections. This must be the explanation for the somewhat odd results in column two.

Thus, we probably get to assess the personalization of electoral politics better if we consider the figures in column two not in isolation, but in comparison to the figures in the first column, i.e. the importance of leader effects vis-à-vis party effects. The simple difference between the figures in the first and second columns is shown in column 5 of Table 3. Here we indeed find a striking difference of the expected sort between the four presidential elections in the data set (in Brazil, France, the Philippines and the US, respectively), and all the rest of the data. Independently of the presidential or parliamentary nature of the political system, the explanatory power of model 1 proves to be stronger than that of model 2 in every single legislative election, while the exact opposite is the case in all presidential elections, even if the latter are organized in Europe, under the French semi-presidential system.

Among the Visegrad countries, Hungarian electoral choice turns out to be most personalized not only in an absolute sense – as suggested by the data in column 2 – but even more clearly relative to the importance of party cues to vote choice. Indeed, among the European countries it is only in semi-presidential France, Ireland and Portugal, and in two of the three examples of

Kanzlerdemokratie[8], namely Germany and Hungary, that more people find a leader than a party who would represent their views 'reasonably well'. In all other European countries, with the Czech Republic as one of the most extreme example, it is the other way round – citizens orient themselves far more towards parties than party leaders. Poland, where residuals of the pre-1997 semi-presidential system are still present in the new constitution that also made one step – the adoption of the construction vote of no confidence – towards *Kanzlerdemokratie*, exactly as many people mention a party as a leader as a reasonably good representative of their views. However, as Table 3 shows, these attitudes regarding individual leaders have much less of an effect on vote choice in Poland than the attitudes regarding the parties. Thus, column 5 of Table 3 shows Poland falling, in terms of citizen behaviour, close to Hungary in 2002 but closer to the least personalized systems of Switzerland and the Czech Republic than to Hungary as of 2006.

Let's continue now our investigation with a look at some indirect indicators of performance- and ideology-based voting. We can also conceive these as two opposite types of voting behaviour that best correspond to the ideals of majoritarian and consensus democracies as defined by Arendt Lijphart (1984, 1999). The latter type facilitates dispersion and sharing of governmental power, for instance through a fragmented multiparty system, (oversized) coalition governments, minority governments dependent on support from the opposition in the legislature, a highly proportional electoral system, powerful legislative committess, and so forth. Thus, it usually gives an excellent opportunity for voters to choose from a wide ideological range of parties the one that is closest to their preferences. At the same time, however, it tends to reduce the direct electoral accountability of elected office-holders for governmental performance, since the dispersion and sharing of political power somewhat obscures the exact degree of responsibility among the political parties for particular outcomes. Similarly, consensus democracies – like Switzerland – may not offer such a clear, visible and dependable link between election outcomes and government composition as Westminster-type majoritarian democracies aspire to do. The ideal typical majoritarian system has a two-party system, a first-past-the-post electoral system, and one-party majority governments that are hardly constrained in their acts by opposition backbenchers occupying powerful veto points in legislative committees, independent central banks, judicial review and corporatist institutions. Thus, this type creates a better opportunity for voters to apportion blame and credit between the competing parties for particular outcomes, but at the same time – because of an intensely

[8] I.e. a parliamentary system characterized by prime ministerial, rather than collective governmental responsibility to parliament, the constructive vote of no-confidence that makes it almost certain that prime ministers serve a full term, and electoral campaigns that heavily focus on the issue of who was selected as prime ministerial candidate and as possible coalition partners for after the election by the major parties. All these traits turn parliamentary elections very nearly into something like a direct election of the chief executive for a fixed term in office. Poland, in spite of adopting the constructive vote of no-confidence in 1997, did not really embark on this road of development. Apart from Germany and Hungary, Spain is the only other European political system that fits this type.

competitive two-party system – is likely to reduce the ideological differences between the main contenders. Therefore a majoritarian democracy should facilitate performance-, while consensus democracy should prioritize ideology-based voting in elections.

Political systems in the real world, with the possible exception of the Swiss Federation, do not correspond to these pure ideal types. Nevertheless, most Anglo-Saxon democracies are leaning towards the majoritarian, and most continental European systems plus Israel towards the consensus democracy type (Lijphart 1999). In the light of all this, it comes hardly as a surprise that these latter countries show the strongest signs of ideological voting among citizens in the third column of Table 3. The highest figures in this column – and thus the weakest ideological influences on the vote – are observed in East Asia and Latin America, independently of their institutional arrangements. The Anglo-Saxon countries score somewhere between these two extremes. The association with the type of democracy becomes clearer when we examine the impact of ideology relative to that of performance evaluations. If we look at the difference between the explanatory power of the two respective models in the sixth column of Table 3, we can see the Anglo-Saxon democracies on one pole, where perceived government performance has invariably more influence on the vote than ideology, and the large majority of the European countries – together with Israel – on the opposite pole.

The Visegrad countries show quite some variance again. While in terms of institutions Poland is probably closest to the consensus democracy type, in terms of voting behaviour the Czech citizens show – both in an absolute sense and relative to performance-based voting – the strongest ideological voting, even stronger, in fact, than the Nordic countries or the Netherlands. Hungary, in terms of institutions, is a complex blend of majoritarian and power-sharing features, and this is also echoed in the countries' score on our present indicators. Performance-based voting appears to be particularly frequent in Hungary – even stronger in an absolute sense than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Back in 2002, ideological voting was almost as strong in Hungary as the performance-based, but by 2006 the country moved closer to the Anglo-Saxon in this respect too. Again, the similarity with Germany is striking: these are the only European countries in the sample that, in their ratio of ideological versus performance based voting, approximate the pattern of the majoritarian-leaning Anglo-Saxon democracies. Institutions cannot fully account for this, though, since voting behaviour in the third *Kanzlerdemokratie*, Spain, is still far more ideology- than performance-oriented.[9]

However, the most unexpected pattern among the Visegrad countries is probably shown by Poland. What is peculiar about the Polish data is not so much a mismatch between the patterns of

[9] One would suspect that this may have to do with the probably more programmatic and ideologically polarized pattern of party competition in Spain (cf. ES in Chart 1) than Germany or Hungary.

voting behaviour that we find with the given indicators and the institutional framework that largely follows the consensus-democracy pattern. Rather, it is the surprisingly limited explanatory power of every one of these four standard determinants of voting behaviour in Poland that is noticeable. For instance, while the country has, as we may expect on the basis of its institutions, significantly more ideological than performance based voting, and a much smaller impact of leaders than of parties, the overall impact of party cues on the vote (in column 1 of Table 3) is still weaker than in Hungary, and that of ideological voting (in column 3) is not stronger than what is typical in Hungary. Overall, it would seem that voting behaviour in Poland may have rather more idiosyncratic components than in the Czech Republic or Hungary, and it is tempting to relate this finding to the lesser stabilization of the Polish party system.

While the Polish case thus remains a little bit of a *terra incognita*, the main conclusion of the present section concerns the clear and striking contrast between Czech and Hungarian voting behaviour. The first is far more party- than leader-oriented, and more ideological than focused on 'throwing the rascals out' in the case of bad governmental performance. Hungary, in contrast, by the beginning of the 21st century, has become one of the few countries on the European continent where individual leaders almost count for as much or more than party, and voting is far more performance- than ideology-oriented. Our analysis suggested that differences in institutional design between the Visegrad countries offer plausible explanations for many of these findings. Yet the bottomline is that all these differences still remain within the usual European pattern of strongly party- and ideology-inspired electoral behaviour, at least in a global comparison.

What these analyses have not yet revealed is what values, interests and cleavages divide the electorates of the Visegrad countries. Do these follow patterns familiar from European history, or do they provide different, possibly idiosyncratic national meanings to the left-right ideology that, at first sight, seems to structure voting behaviour in all these countries to a considerable extent? These are the questions that we address in the remainder of our paper.

Electorally relevant cleavages

Left-right ideology tends to be a catch-all dimension of political competition, the meaning of which incorporates whatever the main socio-political divides in the given country are (Laponce 1981; Fuchs and Klingemann 1989). Therefore it is particularly suitable for exploring whether countries differ with respect to the nature of the social and value divisions that impact voting behaviour. This is so especially when the name, size and ideology of the competing parties is continuously changing in a volatile environment, and hence cross-national comparisons using party choice as the dependent variable are of dubious usefulness.

In order to compare across countries the relationship between left-right self-placement and

party choice on the one hand, and value orientations on the other, we employ data from the European Values Study 2000. The drawback of this data set is that it was collected in 1999 and 2000, when quite a few parties that are currently represented in parliaments were not even in existence, and other parties occupied their place in the party system. Moreover, electoral alignments and attitude configurations may have changed since then. However, in spite of this drawback, among all comparative surveys the European Values Study offers by far the best chance to accomplish our task here. The reason for this is the richness of this study – and the poverty of all readily available alternatives – in mapping citizens' attitudes and value orientations in a variety of policy relevant domains. In this survey, we identified as many as 31 attitude items relevant for our exercise. Since presenting the analyses for so many separate items would be unwieldy, the items that tapped similar attitude dimensions were aggregated, through summing up their standardized scores, into a total of 13 attitude scaless. These scales cover most of the policy dimensions associated with left and right in common parlance, from the pre- (or early) modern secular-religius cleavage through the socio-economic issues associated with the class cleavage of modern times to the post-modern social issues dividing the newly emerged right-wing authoritarian and left-libertarian parties from Italy to the Netherlands and Norway. All these scales have a mean of zero and unit variance in the pooled and weighted 37-country data set.

In order to assess whether left-right has a different meaning in the political discourse in different countries, we will estimate regressions with the 10-point left-right self-placement scale as the dependent variable. The independent variables in these analyses are the 13 attitude scales. If these attitude scales exert a different effect on left-right positions in different countries, this would indicate that left-right has a different substantive meaning across countries. Table 4 presents separate regression analyses for each of the Visegrad countries and three regional groups of countries, with left-right positions as the dependent variable and the 13 attitude scales as independent variables. The three regional groups each comprise six or more counties from Western Europe, Southern Europe, and the 'rest of Eastern Europe" (i.e. the former communist countries except the Visegrad four), respectively (see the notes to table 4 on further technical details).

Table 4 about here

Starting with the cross-national similarities, left tends to be associated with distrust of NATO and support for equality over both freedom and meritocratic allocation, social liberalism, women's liberation in both old and new democracies. Likewise, right is associated with religiosity and support for economic individualism, family values, and what we abbreviate as clericalism – i.e. a strong political role of churches – in both sets of countries. Equally remarkably, trust in the

European Union is usually not significantly correlated with left-right position in either old or new democracies. Hungary and Poland (and to a lesser extent the rest of Eastern Europe) are somewhat odd exceptions here with low values (i.e. left-wing self-placement) on the ideological scale being associated with distrust of the EU. We suspect that this occurrence in the EVS study, which is not replicated in many other data sources that we are aware of, merely reflected the situation at the time when the data were collected in 1999/2000, and both countries were governed by a pro-European right-wing government.

One clear finding about differences is that the 13 attitude variables offer a less potent explanation of the respondents' left-right position in Hungary than anywhere else, but particularly less than in the Czech Republic. This difference confirms our previous impression about the far stronger ideological anchoring of political identities in the Czech lands than in Hungary, and suggests that left-right has a more idiosyncratic content – possibly rooted in attitude divides over nationhood and communist legacies (see Tóka 2004) – in the latter country than elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, according to Table 4, there seems to be fairly little else related to left and right in Hungary than attitudes related to the religious cleavage, probably the oldest historical layer of the left-right dimension. The modern socio-economic component of the left-right divide seems almost entirely absent from this country, reflecting that the major left and right-wing party alternatives do not put forward dramatically different positions with respect to the market economy, socio-economic inequalities and fiscal policies. A very different picture obtains in the Czech Republic, where the socio-economic content of the left-right semantics seems to be particularly pronounced, while the older religious cleavage also contributes a bit to the meaning of left and right. Particularly noteworthy is the strong impact of NATO-related attitudes on left-right ideology in the Czech Republic. This relationship tends to occur in countries where – in contrast to Hungary, Poland, or Slovakia – a relatively orthodox communist party retains an important place in the electoral arena, as in some of the Latin countries and indeed the Czech Republic (cf. Evans and Whitefield 1995; Grzymalae-Busse 2002; Tóka 2004).

Apart from the much weaker or even non-existent anchoring of left and right in socio-economic and foreign policy attitudes – which, following the above reasoning, may reflect the absence of an unreconstructed Marxist left – Slovakia shows a very similar picture to the Czech Republic, and, in terms of the determinants of left-right ideology, Poland appears to be in between Hungary and the Czech Republic. In other words, ideological self-placement has to do about as much with modern socio-economic as with early modern religious cleavages in Poland and Slovakia. What is also quite remarkable that nowhere in the former communist countries do we find left and right consistently anchored in its new, post-modern meaning, related to social liberalism, postmaterialist orientations, environmentalism, women's liberation, family values, immigration and

the like. The contrast with Western Europe becomes particularly strong in the Czech Republic – and to some extent in Slovakia – where, to the extent that these attitudes are significantly correlated with left-right ideology at all, the correlation often runs in the opposite direction than in Western Europe. That is to say, what is the 'left-wing' position on family values or postmaterialism in Western Europe is - more often than not - associated with a 'right-wing' position in the former Czechoslovakia.

Overall, the situation in the Visegrad countries seems to be vaguely similar to that in Southern Europe in that the left-right divide still reflects partly – but quite strongly – its pre-modern or early modern roots in the religious cleavage, and partly its modern socio-economic component, centred around issues of economic freedom and equality. The post-modern component of left and right, related to a variety of socially liberal causes, is not (or not yet) mobilized in electoral politics the same way as in contemporary Western Europe. No doubt this last finding is related to the virtual absence of both green parties and immigration as a major social and political issue in the Visegrad countries. The biggest differences in the substantive content of party political divides between the Visegrad countries remain, however, much the same as those observed by Kitschelt *et al.* (1999) in their 1994 study. While Czech party politics predominantly revolves around socio-economic issues, the latter cause no major divides between left and right in Hungary, where the religious cleavage and, as we should add, other symbolic divisions not well captured by the items in the European Values Study (nationalism, anticommunism) provide the main fuel for cementing party identities. In Slovakia and Poland, in their turn, the religious (as well as the nationalist and other symbolic) cleavages do create some relevant divides between the parties, but at the same time socio-economic issues also differentiate between left and right. Given the more complicated, more multidimensional character of the cleavage structures of these countries (cf. Evans and Whitefield 1998; Kitschelt *et al.* 1999; Tóka 1996a, 1997a; Tworzecki 2002), it is probably not surprising after all they also have a higher effective number of political parties too.

Conclusion

At the end of this journey through scattered data sources, the chief lessons that seem to emerge are, as we suggested at the beginning, rather mixed. If one looks at the role of partisanship and ideology in shaping party choices, the Visegrad countries in the early 21st century probably do not look all that different from the established democracies of the continent. Moreover, the occasional dominance of leader images or performance evaluations over these quintessentially continental European determinants of vote choice, which, at least most recently, we could observe in at least one of the Visegrad countries, can be largely explained as the effect of an institutional design that has much celebrated beneficial effects on the concentration of the party system and

executive stability.

However, a rather different picture emerges once the focus shifts to the stabilization of party systems and electoral alignments in the region. After five or six rounds of democratic elections, the party systems of the region show little sign of consolidation – certainly not at the scale that this occurred in Southern Europe in the 1980s. In Poland and Slovakia they are much more in the kind of constant and hectic flux characterizing the party systems of Eastern and South Eastern Europe than in the once again rather volatile but nevertheless structured state of competition found in Western Europe. When some stabilization occur at all, as in the Czech Republic and Hungary, it takes place at the price of arguably dysfunctional ideological opposition and hostility between the major party alternatives. Either way, the degree of electoral accountability that elected office holders are subject to, the responsiveness of policies to public opinion and other representational linkages between parties and their voters must leave ample space for improvement in the coming decades.

The cross-national variation in the cleavage strutures across these countries has been fairly well explored in the previous literature and much is added to this by the other contributions in this volume. What seems most striking from this variation is arguably the far more dominant nature of a modern left-right cleavage, rooted in different visions on socio-economic and foreign policy issues in the Czech Republic than in the other Visegrad nations, and the nearly complete absence of the same divisions from the structuring of party competition in Hungary. The often noted differences in the character of the relatively orthodox ex-communist party in the first, and the fundamentally pro-market, socially liberal and pro-Western ex-communist party in the second must have a complex reciprocal relationship with this phenomenon (for details see Kitschelt *et al.* 1999; Grzymalae-Busse 2002). Poland and Slovakia, even according to our brief analysis, see a more multifaceted issue content to the left-right division – and hence to party competition – than either of these two countries, evenly rooted in religious, socio-economic and social issues. This contrast may also add something to the explanation of why Poland and Slovakia developed more fragmented and less stable party systems than the Czech Republic and especially Hungary, but as yet we would not rush to judge which of these different developmental routes led to a higher quality representation of citizens in politics.

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Appendix

All 13 attitude scales appearing in Table 4 were created, in the 1999/2000 European Values Study data, by summing up the standardized scores of responses to the questions listed right after the name of the respective scale below. Where appropriate, response scales were reversed so that they match the direction suggested by the name given to the summary scale. For example, since on both input variables defining the Religiosity scale high values stood for the opposite of religiousness, it was actually their negative standardized values that were summed up to create the Religiosity scale. Missing values on the original variables were replaced with the weighted mean of that cell in Table 5 into which the respondent fell in terms of voting preference and nationality. A few variables that were altogether missing for a particular party were substituted with a constant of zero for the given country. Each of the 13 scales was standardized to have a zero mean and unit variance in the pooled and weighted 37-country sample.

Economic individualism:
Two items were used for this scale from the same battery: "How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. […] The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for OR People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. […] Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas OR Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people."

Equality over freedom:
A single item was used for this scale: "Which of these statements is the nearest to your opinion? (A) I find that both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance. (B) Certainly both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong."

Equality over merit:
Three items were used for this scale from the same battery: "In order to be considered "just", what should a society provide? Please tell me for each statement if it is important or unimportant to you. 1 means very important; 5 means not important at all." The three selected items were: "Eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens"; "Guaranteeing that basic needs are met for all, in terms of food, housing, cloths, education, health"; and "Recognizing people on their merits."

Distrust NATO:
The item on NATO was used for this scale from the following battery: "Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it 1=a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or 4=none at all?"

Social liberalism:
The "homosexuality", "abortion", "divorce" and "euthanasia - ending the life of the incurably sick" items were used for this scale from the same battery: "Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card." The original coding of the responses run from 1=never justifiable to 10=always justifiable.

Women's liberation:
Three items were used for this scale. The first read: "If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent, but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?" The second and third asked: "For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. [...] A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. [...] Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay."

Postmaterialist:
The two input variables were based on responses (recoded as 2=" Giving people more say in important government decisions" or "Protecting freedom of speech"; and 1=" Maintaining order in the nation" or "Fighting rising prices") to the following question: "There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. If you had to choose, which of the things on this card would you say is most important? [...]And which would be the next most important?"

Environment:
Two items were used for this scale from the same battery: "I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one I read out, can you tell me whether you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) disagree or (4) disagree strongly?" The two items were "I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental damage"; "I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent

environmental pollution".

Distrust EU:
The item on the European Union was used for this scale from the following battery: "Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it 1=a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or 4=none at all?"

Anti-immigrant:
Three items were used for this scale. The first asked: "Which of these statements is the nearest to your opinion? (A) For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions. (B) For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct customs and traditions but take over the customs of the country." The second response was considered less immigrant-friendly. The second item asked: "How about people from less developed countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do? (1) Let anyone come who wants to. (2) Let people come as long as there are jobs available. (3) Put strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here. (4) Prohibit people coming here from other countries." The third item asked: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to [NATIONALITY] people over immigrants."

Family values:
Three dichotomous items were used for this scale. The first asked: "If someone says a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily, would you tend to agree or disagree?" The second asked: "Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?" The third asked: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? […] Marriage is an out-dated institution."

Religiosity:
Two items were used for this scale: "Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? [CODING: (1) More than once a week, (2) once a week, (3) once a month, (4) only on special holidays, (5) once a year, (6) less often, (7) never practically never.] "Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are ... (READ OUT) (1) … a religious person; (2) not a religious person; or (3) a convinced atheist?"

Clericalism:
Four items, with the responses originally coded on a scale from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree, were used for this scale. The question asked: "How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?" The selected items were: "Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office"; "Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections"; "It would be better for [COUNTRY] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office;" "Religious leaders should not influence government decisions".

Table 1: Party system consolidation in European countries around the millennium[10]

	Effective number of electoral parties	Aggregate volatility (%)	Party identifiers in the population (%)
Austria	3.4	14.4	53
Belgium	9.1	13.9	45
Bosnia-Herzegovina	9.1	24.5	-
Bulgaria	3.5	51.9	43
Croatia	4.6	30.8	-
Czech Republic	4.8	19.8	53
Denmark	4.8	13.5	59
Estonia	6.1	41.1	36
Finland	5.6	7.0	55
France	5.8	21.7	53
Germany	3.9	8.4	44
Greece	2.6	6.8	61
Hungary	3.7	25.9	46
Iceland	4.0	6.4	53
Ireland	3.9	-	46
Italy	6.5	24.4	56
Latvia	6.9	57.4	40
Lithuania	6.4	49.1	31
Luxembourg	4.6	8.0	55
Macedonia	4.6	46.1	-
Netherlands	5.6	26.0	57
Poland	4.6	52.7	40
Portugal	3.1	5.9	59
Romania	5.8	34.4	47
Russia	7.9	50.0	63
Serbia	6.7	64.9	-
Slovakia	7.2	44.8	52
Slovenia	5.6	38.2	33
Spain	3.2	8.6	56
Sweden	3.9	14.8	63
Ukraine	8.1	59.2	71
United Kingdom	3.3	9.3	46
Average of the four Visegrad countries	***5.1***	***35.8***	***47.8***
Average of all other former communist countries	***6.3***	***45.6***	***38.3 (see notes)***
Average of Greece, Portugal and Spain	***3.0***	***7.1***	***58.7***
Average of all remaining ('old') democracies	***5.0***	***14.0***	***52.7***

[10] The data on electoral volatility and the effective number of electoral parties in Table 1 is the average across two subsequent legislative elections around 1999/2000, as reported by Mainwaring and Torcal (2004) and updated by the present authors from various sources on the internet using the same counting rules as Mainwaring and Torcal did. The data in the last column is the average percentage - across five surveys - of the respondents who said that there is a party that they feel close to. The average is calculated from whichever of the following five surveys were carried out in the given country: the first and second waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES 2003, 2006); the 2004 European Election Study (see www.europeanelectionstudies.net), and the European Social Survey's 2002 and 2004 waves (Jowell and the Central Co-ordinating Team 2004, 2005).

Table 2: Trends in party system fragmentation (*ENEP*) and electoral volatility (*AV*) in the Visegrad countries from 1990 to 2006[11]

Country, election	Effective number of electoral parties	Aggregate volatility (%) raw figure	Aggregate volatility (%) adjusted figure
Czech Republic, 1990	3.1	-	-
Czech Republic, 1992	6.2	72.4	21.3
Czech Republic, 1996	5.3	31.4	29.2
Czech Republic, 1998	4.7	18.6	16.4
Czech Republic, 2002	4.8	30.9	16.6
Czech Republic, 2006	3.9	28.5	20.9
Hungary, 1990	6.4	-	-
Hungary, 1994	5.2	28.3	25.8
Hungary, 1998	4.4	33.6	31.7
Hungary, 2002	2.8	54.3	18.2
Hungary, 2006	2.7	49.5	8.4
Poland, 1991	13.2	-	-
Poland, 1993	9.8	47.4	34.5
Poland, 1997	4.6	67.0	19.5
Poland, 2001	4.5	83.5	51.6
Poland, 2005	5.9	52.4	41.1
Slovakia, 1990	5.4	-	-
Slovakia, 1992	5.4	55.7	19.6
Slovakia, 1994	5.8	43.9	23.8
Slovakia, 1998	5.3	53.9	21.4
Slovakia, 2002	8.9	63.1	29.9
Slovakia, 2006	6.1	33.0	32.9

[11] The data for the table are the authors' estimates from official election statistics, using the counting rules discussed in the main text of the article. Note that the volatility figures in Table 1 followed the counting rules defined by Mainwaring and Torcal (2004) and are a mid-way compromise between the raw and adjusted figures presented in this table.

Figure 1: The effective number of parliamentary parties and the ideological polarization of European party systems around 2003[12]



[12] Ideological polarization was calculated from the PPMD elite survey data set (Benoit and Laver 2005), as the within-country standard deviation of the mean left-right self-placement of each party by groups of experts in 2003, with parties weighted by the number of supporters. Party system fractionalization is measured here with the effective number of parliamentary parties in the last election prior to mid-2003. If n is the number of parties winning any votes, and s_i is the fraction of seats obtained by the i[th] party, then $ENPP = 1 \Big/ \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2$.

Table 3: The impact of four factors on party (or presidential candidate) choice across the globe expressed with the Wilks lambda statistics (0=deterministic impact; 1=no impact at all)[13]

	Unexplained variance (Wilks lambda) in model				Difference in lambda between models	
	1 (party effect)	2 (leader effect)	3 (ideology effect)	4 (performance effect)	1 and 2 (party vs. leader)	3 and 4 (ideology vs. performance)
Australia (2004)	0.15	0.25	0.78	0.69	-0.11	0.09
Belgium (2003)	n.a.	n.a.	0.81	0.87	n.a.	-0.07
Brazil (2002)	0.93	0.72	0.98	1.00	0.21	-0.01
Bulgaria (2001)	0.13	0.32	0.30	0.54	-0.20	-0.23
Canada (2004)	0.11	0.14	0.86	0.83	-0.03	0.02
Czech Republic (2002)	0.01	0.30	0.27	0.84	-0.29	-0.57
Denmark (2001)	0.00	0.04	0.47	0.73	-0.03	-0.26
Finland (2003)	0.01	0.23	0.57	0.94	-0.22	-0.37
France (2002)	0.14	0.03	0.58	0.70	0.11	-0.12
Germany (2002)	0.20	0.42	0.78	0.64	-0.23	0.15
Great Britain (2005)	0.17	0.24	0.74	0.57	-0.07	0.17
Hungary (2002)	0.04	0.16	0.57	0.55	-0.12	0.03
Hungary (2006)	0.07	0.11	0.68	0.50	-0.03	0.18
Iceland (2003)	0.08	0.28	0.54	0.67	-0.20	-0.13
Ireland (2002)	0.10	0.30	0.86	0.87	-0.20	0.00
Israel (2003)	0.00	0.15	0.38	0.65	-0.15	-0.27
Mexico (2003)	0.31	0.91	0.97	0.88	-0.60	0.08
New Zealand (2002)	0.09	0.10	0.72	0.79	-0.01	-0.07
Norway (2001)	0.00	0.06	0.48	0.92	-0.06	-0.44
Philippines (2004)	0.95	0.80	0.99	0.81	0.15	0.18
Poland (2001)	0.19	0.36	0.60	0.90	-0.16	-0.30
Portugal (2002)	0.07	0.13	0.52	0.85	-0.06	-0.34
Portugal (2005)	0.20	0.27	0.71	0.83	-0.07	-0.13
South Korea (2004)	0.56	0.70	0.80	0.86	-0.14	-0.07
Spain (2004)	0.01	0.02	0.44	0.60	-0.01	-0.16
Sweden (2002)	0.00	0.06	0.42	0.83	-0.06	-0.41
Switzerland (2003)	0.05	0.37	0.53	0.91	-0.32	-0.38
Taiwan (2001)	0.66	0.72	0.98	0.84	-0.06	0.15
The Netherlands (2002)	0.01	n.a.	0.47	0.85	n.a.	-0.38
United States (2004)	0.34	0.22	0.80	0.62	0.12	0.19

[13] The first four columns of the table show Wilks lambda statistics derived from discriminant analyses where vote choice (among parties or presidential candidates) in the last national election was the dependent variable, non-voters were excluded from the analysis, and the independent variables were as follows. Model 1: a series of dummy variables showing the responses to a question on 'Would you say that any of the parties in [country] represents your views reasonably well? [IF YES:] Which party represents your views best?' Model 2: a series of dummy variables showing the responses to a question on 'Regardless of how you feel about the parties, would you say that any of the individual party leaders/presidential candidates at the last election represents your views reasonably well? [IF YES:] Which party leader/presidential candidate represents your views best?' Model 3: a single 0-10 scale showing the responses to a question on 'In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?' Model 4: a single four-point scale showing the responses to a question on 'Now thinking about the performance of the government in [capital]/president in general, how good or bad a job do you think the government/president in [capital] has done over the past [number of years between the previous and the present election OR change in govt.] years. Has it/he/she done a very good job? A good job? A bad job? A very bad job?'

Table 4: The relation of different political orientations to left-right ideology around the millennium[14]

	Western Europe	Southern Europe	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Rest of Eastern Europe
Economic individualism	0.15*	0.06*	0.09*	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.10*
Equality over freedom	-0.10*	-0.01	-0.12*	0.02	-0.04	-0.10*	-0.08*
Equality over merit	-0.14*	-0.08*	-0.14*	-0.02	-0.09*	-0.06	-0.04*
Distrust NATO	-0.09*	-0.12*	-0.29*	n.a.	-0.03	-0.08	-0.07*
Social liberalism	-0.04*	-0.10*	0.04	0.00	-0.08*	-0.07	0.01
Women's liberation	-0.02	-0.03*	0.03	-0.01	-0.07*	-0.09*	0.00
Postmaterialism	-0.07*	-0.01	0.09*	-0.07*	0.05	0.07*	0.03*
Environment	-0.06*	0.03	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	0.08*	0.00
Distrust EU	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.11*	-0.10*	-0.05	-0.05*
Anti-immigrant	0.02*	0.03	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.02*
Family values	0.03*	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.04	-0.02*
Religiosity	0.15*	0.13*	0.17*	0.15*	0.05	0.12*	0.07*
Clericalism	0.05*	0.16*	0.02	0.10*	0.24*	0.10*	0.09*
Adjusted R-squared	.154	.161	.260	.055	.122	.118	.053
N (unweighted)	12,946	6,211	1,762	789	847	1,123	12,789

[14] The table shows standardized coefficients estimated with OLS-regressions of left-right self-placement on a 1-10 scale on the attitude scales listed in the left-hand banner of the table. Coefficients significant at the $p<.05$ level are marked with *. On the construction of the attitude scales see the Appendix. The data come from the European Values Study 1999/2000 (Halman *et al.* 2003) and cover 37 European countries. The countries grouped together as 'Western Europe' include Iceland and 11 non-Southern pre-2004 members of the European Union. The countries grouped together as 'Southern Europe' include Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain. The countries grouped together as 'Rest of Eastern Europe' include Albania, the three Baltic states, Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and all six former Yugoslav republics. The cases are weighted so that each country is given equal weight in the analysis and appropriate socio-demographic weights ameliorate the differences between sample distributions and known population characteristics.